

A Companion to Giles of Rome

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A Companion to Giles of Rome

Edited by

Charles F. Briggs
Peter S. Eardley



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Cover illustration: Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* (Italian, s. xiv); Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. Latin 10207, fol. 2r. Giles of Rome lectures the king (Philip the Fair) and people. (Photo courtesy of the Bibliothèque nationale de France)

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Abbreviations

<i>AHDLMA</i>	<i>Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge</i>
<i>CCSL</i>	<i>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina</i>
<i>CUP</i>	<i>Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis</i>
<i>De cognitione angelorum</i>	<i>Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione angelorum</i>
<i>De differentia</i>	<i>De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae</i>
<i>De ecclesiastica</i>	<i>De ecclesiastica potestate</i>
<i>De mensura</i>	<i>De mensura angelorum</i>
<i>De partibus</i>	<i>De partibus philosophiae essentialibus</i>
<i>De regimine</i>	<i>De regimine principum</i>
<i>De renunciatione</i>	<i>De renunciatione pape</i>
<i>Documenti e studi</i>	<i>Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale</i>
<i>Hexaemeron</i>	<i>Opus Hexaemeron</i>
<i>In Canticum</i>	<i>In Canticum Canticorum expositio</i>
<i>In Physicam</i>	<i>Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis</i>
<i>Ordinatio 1</i>	<i>In primum librum Sententiarum</i>
<i>Ordinatio 2</i>	<i>In secundum librum Sententiarum</i>
<i>PL</i>	<i>Patrologia Latina</i>
<i>Reportatio</i>	<i>Reportatio lecture super libros I–IV Sententiarum</i>
<i>Super Libros Elenchorum</i>	<i>Expositio super libros Elenchorum</i>
<i>Super Libros Rhetoricorum</i>	<i>Expositio super libros Rhetoricorum</i>

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Introduction

Charles F. Briggs and Peter S. Eardley

Giles of Rome (c. 1243/47–1316) was one of the most important and influential scholastics of the later Middle Ages. His academic career at Paris coincided with the final stage of the translation into Latin of Aristotle's philosophical works together with their Arabic commentaries. A student of Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), the theologian most closely identified with efforts to harness Aristotle's philosophy and harmonize it with Christian doctrine, Giles was nonetheless a highly independent and original thinker, not to mention a prolific one. He was, moreover, the guiding intellectual light of the newly founded Order of the Hermits of St Augustine (OESA), being the Augustinians' first regent master of theology at Paris. In 1287 the Order made his teachings their official doctrine. He and his successor to the Augustinian chair at Paris, James of Viterbo (c. 1255–1308), were also the chief architects of the theory of papal supremacy during Pope Boniface VIII's conflict with King Philip IV of France. Despite Boniface's defeat, the Augustinian Order remained committed to a strongly pro-papalist stance throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, Giles even during his own lifetime achieved fame as an advocate of strong royal rule thanks to the enormous popularity of his work of political instruction, the *De regimine principum*.

Despite Giles's considerable influence on scholastic thought, on the formation and future direction of the Augustinian Order, and on relations between Church and State, he has surprisingly never been the subject of a synoptic work such as the present one. At the same time, Giles's thought, works, and influence have elicited considerable interest among scholars over the last three decades. The nine contributors to this volume have all been active participants in this recent scholarly endeavor, and their eight chapters offer an overview of the fruits of these efforts, serving as a guide to future research.

The portrait of Giles of Rome that emerges in the first chapter, "Life, Works, and Legacy," by Charles Briggs, is not only of a brilliant and prolific scholar, but also of an assiduous promoter of his Order, a capable administrator, and an assertive and forceful personality who was no stranger to controversy. His prodigious and innovative scholarly output during his student days at Paris established his early reputation as an intellectual authority of considerable stature. Indeed, some of Giles's views were so innovative that they made him the target of a doctrinal investigation by Bishop Stephen Tempier in 1277. As a member of the Augustinian Order, he played a formative role in its intellectual orientation and educational system, served as its prior general, and gained for

it the patronage of both the French monarchy and the papacy. That support later helped him to become archbishop of Bourges, but it also forced him to choose sides in two of the greatest controversies of his age: that between Boniface VIII and Philip IV, in which Giles sided with the pope, and afterwards, in support of Philip, in the persecution and suppression of the Templars. Giles's most influential and popular work, the *De regimine principum*, can be seen as a product of his intellectual and pedagogical interests combined with his search for patronage from the king of France in the wake of the censures of 1277.

Giles was first and foremost a theologian, and the chapter by Richard Cross treats his theology. Cross's chapter is intended, at least in part, to contribute to the debate over whether Giles was principally a Thomist or an Augustinian. Cross finds little evidence to suggest that Giles was anything other than, at root, a Thomist in his theology, though admittedly a Thomist who developed, as he did in many other parts of his thought, Aquinas's views in novel ways, often under the influence of Augustine. For Cross, if Giles looks Augustinian at times, this is because Thomas himself was a sort of Augustinian. Cross deals with a number of issues related to Giles's theory, organizing them under the two main themes of free will and its problems, and the metaphysics of theology. Under the first he treats issues of grace and predestination, the problem of divine foreknowledge and the question of whether theology is an Aristotelian science. The second major section of Cross's chapter is dedicated to the metaphysical claims that ground Giles's various theological doctrines. Giles's novel theory of modes, in particular, is important in this regard, informing, as Cross argues, such theological doctrines as the Eucharist, the Incarnation, and the Trinity. Cross concludes his chapter with three theological test cases: the issue of substantial form in relation to Christ, the eternity of the world, and the issue of relations with respect to the divine persons, considering these against the background of Giles's 1277 censure.

For scholastic theologians, including Giles, philosophy was primarily a tool for grappling with theological issues. The remaining six chapters of this volume explore the various facets of Giles's philosophy. Silvia Donati and Cecilia Trifogli examine four major topics taken up by Giles in his discussions of natural philosophy: matter, motion, place, and time. As revealed by his treatment of these topics in his several works devoted to Aristotle's natural philosophy and to various theological matters, Aquinas's teaching consistently served as Giles's jumping-off point. From there, however, Giles usually either corrected Aquinas's views or developed them in new directions. So, for example, whereas Aquinas had posited two different kinds of matter or potentiality—that belonging to celestial bodies and that belonging to sublunary ones—in order to account for why the former do not undergo substantial change while the latter

do, Giles by contrast thoroughly rejected this position. Rather, he argued that celestial matter is essentially the same as sublunary matter, ascribing the differences in their behavior to the respective forms with which they are composed. If a celestial body does not undergo substantial change, this is not because of its matter as such, but because God freely created it with an incorruptible form. The same goes for sublunary bodies, which possess the same matter as celestial ones, but which God freely created with corruptible forms. In addition to Aristotle and Aquinas in natural philosophy, Giles was also, as were many of his contemporaries, indebted to Averroes, who was especially influential to Giles's understanding of the relationship between matter and quantity. In particular—at least in his early works—Giles developed Averroes's notion of indeterminate dimensions to advance his novel theory of *quantitas materiae*, widely regarded as a forerunner of the modern concept of quantity of matter.

The chapter by Martin Pickavé focuses on Giles's metaphysics. Unfortunately, Giles's contributions to metaphysics are rarely considered in their own right. His defense of the real distinction between essence and existence has not only overshadowed practically everything else he has to say on metaphysical issues, it has also led to the impression that Giles was a first-generation Thomist. Pickavé aims at correcting both perceptions by providing an overview of Giles's metaphysical thought. After clarifying Giles's understanding of the nature and scope of metaphysical knowledge he turns to five main topics: the composite nature of material substances, the distinction between essence and existence, individuation and universals, types of being (i.e. the categories), and philosophical theology. In dealing with all of these topics, special emphasis is paid to Giles's provision that the metaphysician's investigation has to proceed "in a human way" (*modo humano*). The picture emerging from this survey of Giles's metaphysics is that of a philosopher who subscribes to a broadly realist ontology and who is quite aware of the limitations human cognitive capacities impose on our ability to gain metaphysical knowledge. Is there also a unified philosophical vision behind Giles's metaphysical views? Pickavé remains cautious, but he points to the importance that the idea of modes (of being) has for Giles. Modes of being are, for instance, employed to explain what sort of being a form gives to matter or what an accident (incl. quantity) does to the subject in which it inheres. And it also plays an important role in Giles's account of the ten basic types of being.

Giles's theory of cognition is the subject of Giorgio Pini's chapter. Pini makes the case for Giles providing a systematic treatment of sensory and intellectual cognition in which all acts of cognition are explicable in terms of efficient causality and are grounded in a hierarchical understanding of reality. Although Giles's theory of sensory cognition is of considerable interest, it is his

theory of intellectual cognition that is particularly innovative. Like Aquinas, Giles made use of a theory of intelligible species. Aquinas, however, had argued that these were necessary for every occurrent state of intellection. But this theory generated an important theological problem for Aquinas, namely that if all acts of intellection require species, and species are intermediaries between thought and object, then how is the direct intuition of God enjoyed by the blessed in heaven possible? Here, as was so often the case, Giles tried to preserve Thomas's basic system by modifying it. He did so by arguing that, although the intelligible species is indeed required for some acts of intellection, it is not, as Thomas had argued, required for all such acts. Where the object is present to the intellect no species is required. Rather, the object directly actualizes it. It is only in cases where the object is not so present that a species is needed to act as its "causal proxy" in the act of intellection.

Peter Eardley's chapter on ethics and moral psychology focuses on the three broad issues that were of particular importance to Giles and his contemporaries: the freedom of the will, the foundations of wrongdoing, and the ultimate end of human life. On the topics of human freedom and moral wrongdoing, Eardley argues for a developmental reading according to which Giles embraced an intellectualistic conception of the will in his early works, while defending a voluntaristic conception in his later ones. An interesting feature of Giles's views on the will and human freedom is the way in which he relies on Aquinas's ideas at every stage, while taking them in radically new directions. So for example, whereas Giles in his early *Reportatio* had relied very heavily on Aquinas's *De malo* for his explanation of the relationship between intellect and will in human action, Giles nonetheless stressed the passivity of the will in a way that Aquinas had not. Giles, however, modified this position in his more mature *Quodlibetal Questions*—likely in response to the condemnations of 1277. While still relying on Aquinas, Giles now defended a more active, self-determining picture of the will than in his earlier works, and, for that matter, than Aquinas himself would have done. Giles's various views on the relationship between the will and the intellect in turn influenced his theories on the foundations of wrongdoing. In general, for intellectualists, wrongdoing is ultimately caused by an error in the intellect, while for voluntarists it is the result of a disordered will. As Eardley shows, Giles defended the first explanation for wrongdoing in the early works, while defending the second in his later ones. Finally, in contrast to his views on human freedom and moral wrongdoing, Giles's views on the ultimate purpose of human life show, or so Eardley argues, comparatively little reliance on Thomas Aquinas.

In Chapter 7, Costantino Marmo surveys several of Giles's signal contributions to the theory of language, as contained in his commentaries on Aristotle's

Rhetoric, *Sophistici elenchi*, and *Posterior Analytics*, as well as in his treatises *De partibus philosophiae essentialibus* and *De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae*. Much of the focus of Marmo's chapter is on Giles's commentary on the *Rhetoric*, the first major commentary on that work to have survived and widely considered by subsequent commentators to be the *expositio par excellence* of Aristotle's text. Aspects associated with Giles's theories on rhetoric that are taken up include the relationship of rhetoric to the parts of logic and, in particular, to dialectic, its association with moral philosophy, as well as the relationship of the three modes of persuasion—*ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*—to the emotions. In addition to his influential commentary on the *Rhetoric*, Giles composed an important commentary on the *Sophistical Refutations*. Among other topics, Marmo here explores Giles's theories of signification, meaning, and fallacy. Finally, Marmo considers aspects of Giles's massive commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, a welcome treatment given that this important work has yet to receive the attention it deserves in the scholarly literature, despite the fact that it had a massive influence on subsequent debates, particularly over the various types of logical demonstration.

Perhaps as much as for his scholastic contributions, Giles is known today for his political thought, thanks to the importance and influence of his mirror of princes, *De regimine principum* and his uncompromising defense of papal power in the treatise *De ecclesiastica potestate*. These works, as well as the political ideas found in Giles's *De renunciatione papae*, the *Ordinatio* of book two of the *Sentences*, and *Contra exemptos* are discussed in this volume's final chapter, by Roberto Lambertini. In *De regimine principum* Giles managed to compose a moral and political treatise that was at once profoundly Aristotelian and strikingly original. Thus while Giles drew most of his material from Aristotle's works of moral philosophy, he reorganized that material in a novel way, reinterpreted much of it with the help of the works of Thomas Aquinas, and at times even used Aristotle's texts to argue against the Philosopher's own conclusions. A salient feature of *De regimine principum* is its advocacy for strong monarchical rule by a prince who makes positive law while at the same time not being bound by it. Giles maintained this same adherence to virtually unfettered power in his various treatments of papal authority. Thus he supported Celestine V's right—though not obligation—to abdicate in *De renunciatione papae*, argued for the pope's superiority over all earthly power (including those strong kings he described in *De regimine principum*) in *De ecclesiastica potestate*, and likened the pope's power to that of God in *Contra exemptos*.

Life, Works, and Legacy

Charles F. Briggs

1 Introduction

*Here lies the palace of good character,
The purity of life,
Most clear-sighted commentator of Aristotle's supreme philosophy,
Principal doctor of theology,
Light leading doubts into light,
Brother Giles of Rome, OESA,
Archbishop of Bourges,
Who died on 22 December 1316.*

Thus read the inscription that graced Giles of Rome's tomb in the convent church of the Grands-Augustins in Paris, prior to its destruction during the French Revolution.¹ Such praise could easily be dismissed as so much memorializing hyperbole (*nihil nisi bonum*, after all), but in Giles's case it largely reflects the way many viewed him during his lifetime and in the decades following his death. Already in May 1287, a year and a half after Giles had taken up his post as the Augustinians' first regent master in theology, the Order declared at their general chapter, held in Florence, that from then on Giles's teachings were to be respected as their official doctrine.² At the very same time in Paris, a letter attributed to the secular theology master Godfrey of Fontaines reports that Giles "is now reputed to be the best in town in all regards" (*qui*

1 John R. Eastman, "Das Leben des Augustiner-Eremiten Aegidius Romanus (c.1243–1316)," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 100 (1989), 318–39, 338: "Hic iacet aula morum vite munditia/Archi-philosophie Aristotelis perspicacissimus/Commentator/Clavis et Doctor Theologie lux in lucem/reducens dubia/Pr. [sic] Egidius de Roma Ord. Fr. Eremit. S. Augustini/Archiepiscopus Bituricensis qui obiit/Anno D. MCCCXVI die XXII Mensis Decembris."

2 *CUP*, (eds.) Heinrich Denifle and Émile Chatelain. 4 vols. (Paris, 1891), 2:12 (no. 542): "Quia venerabilis magistri nostri Egidii doctrina mundum universum illustrat, diffinimus et mandamus inviolabiliter observari ut opiniones, positiones et sententias scriptas et scribendas predicti magistri nostri omnes nostri Ordinis lectores et studentes recipiant eidem prebentes assensum, et ejus doctrine omni qua poterunt sollicitudine, ut et ipsi illuminati alios illuminare possint, sint seduli defensores."

modo melior de tota villa in omnibus reputatur).³ A little more than a century later, in his sermon *Vivat rex*, another Paris theologian, Jean Gerson, asserted to King Charles VI and the royal court that no prince should be without a copy of Giles's most popular work, the mirror of princes *De regimine principum*.⁴ In 1473, that king's grandson, Louis XI numbered Giles among the preferred authorities in the faculties of arts and theology, along with Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Duns Scotus, and Bonaventure.⁵

In modern scholarship, Giles's reputation has fared rather less well than that of most of the other luminaries in Louis XI's edict.⁶ Over the last generation, however, Giles's contributions to later medieval intellectual culture have started attracting considerably more scholarly attention.⁷ Much of the credit for this renewed interest is due to the decision in 1982 by the Italian Unione Accademica Nazionale to launch the series *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia*, a project, originally under the general editorship of Gianfranco Fioravanti and the late Francesco Del Punta, whose goal is to publish critical editions of all surviving works that can be ascribed to Giles with a high degree of certainty (numbering seventy-two in all), as well as catalogues describing all extant and

3 Giorgio Pini, "Giles of Rome", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2006), 233–86, 240, quoting Denifle and Chatelain, *CUP*, 2:10 (no. 539).

4 "Il me samble qu'il n'est seigneur qui ne deust avoir pour soy et sez enfans le Livre du Regime des princez." Quoted in Noëlle-Laetitia Perret, *Les traductions françaises du De regimine principum de Gilles De Rome: parcours matériel, culturel et intellectuel d'un discours sur l'éducation* (Leiden, 2011), 1.

5 *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages*, trans. Lynn Thorndyke (New York, 1972), 355.

6 A search for "Giles of Rome" in the "All fields" category on the online version of the *International Medieval Bibliography*, conducted in October 2015, came up with 266 publications. Aquinas posted 3241 publications, Scotus 875, Albert the Great 659, Bonaventure 509, and Alexander of Hales 91. According to Alan Gewirth, writing in the mid-20th century, among Marsilius of Padua's "direct doctrinal opponents" were "such largely forgotten men as Egidius of Rome, James of Viterbo, Henry of Cremona, Augustinus Triumphus, Alexander of St. Elpidius." Alan Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace*, vol. 1, *Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy* (New York, 1951), 8.

7 This is not to deny the importance of such early contributions as Felix Lajard, "Gilles de Rome," in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, 30 (Paris, 1888), 421–566; Pierre Mandonnet, "La carrière scolaire de Gilles de Rome," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 4 (1910), 480–99; Giuseppe Boffito, *Saggio di bibliografia Egidiana, precede uno Studio su Dante, S. Agostino ed Egidio Colonna (Romano)* (Florence, 1911); Edgar Hocedez, "Gilles de Rome et St. Thomas," in *Mélanges Mandonnet: études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Age*, 1 (Paris, 1930), 358–410; Gerardo Bruni, especially his *Le opere di Egidio Romano* (Florence, 1936).

attested manuscripts containing these works.⁸ No small debt is also owed to the scholarly endeavors of the contributors to this volume and the many other scholars whose works appear below in footnotes and the bibliography. Thanks to their collective efforts, we are beginning to understand why Giles achieved and maintained such an esteemed reputation during the course of the later Middle Ages and Renaissance. One of the most important theologians of his generation, he was a key contributor to the early reception of Aristotelian philosophy. Giles was also a subtle interpreter of his teacher Thomas Aquinas's doctrines, the initiator of a distinct intellectual *via* and institutional mission for the Augustinian Order, one of the chief architects of the theory of papal power, and, through his *De regimine principum*, one of the most important influences on later medieval lay intellectual culture.

2 Life and Works

The chief earliest sources for Giles's life are both by fellow Augustinians: these are the *Tractatus de origine et progressu Ordinis Fratrum Eremitarum S. Augustini et vero ac proprio titulo eiusdem* of Henry of Friemar (c.1245–1340), completed in 1334, and the *Vitasfratrum* of Jordan of Saxony (c.1299–1380), finished in 1357. From these witnesses and what emerges obliquely from Giles's writings, recorded actions, and a number of references to him by those who knew him, some sense of his personality emerges.⁹ Keenly intelligent and capable of highly original thought, he also evinced an impressive work ethic, a penchant for engaging in conflict, and an ability to be at once politically astute and highly principled. Giles also had a knack for forming relationships with those in power and for positioning himself at the center of things.

It seems likely that the fifteen or sixteen year old Giles had already demonstrated intellectual promise at the time he entered the fledgling Order of

8 For this, see Claudio Leonardi's "Premessa" to Robert Wielockx, (ed.), *Apologia*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.1 (Florence, 1985), v–vi. The list of works to be edited appear in this edition on ix–xi. For a complete list and discussion of all works certain, doubtful, and spurious works ascribed to Giles, see Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* 42 (Rome, 1993), 319–41.

9 For useful surveys of Giles's life and career, see: Mandonnet, "Carrière scolaire"; Eelckco Ypma, *La formation des professeurs chez les Ermites de Saint-Augustin de 1256 à 1354* (Paris, 1956); Eastman, "Das Leben"; Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano"; Bettina E. Holstein, "A Commentary on the *De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno* by Giles of Rome on the Basis of MS Cambrai BM 487 (455)" (Ph.D. diss., Technische Universität Berlin, 2007), 16–46.

the Hermits of St Augustine at Rome in 1258/9, since he was sent almost immediately to study at the Order's newly acquired convent at Paris. Founded by order of Pope Alexander IV (Rinaldo dei conti di Segni) in 1256 and under the patronage of his relation the Roman patrician Cardinal Riccardo Annibaldi, the new Order, formed from four groups of hermits, was charged with the mission of becoming a mendicant order on the model of the Dominicans and Franciscans.¹⁰ Initially lacking any members with a university education, the Augustinians established a convent near Montmartre in 1259 for the purpose of forming a cadre of university-trained theologians.¹¹

We can assume that Giles spent six or seven years studying arts and philosophy in the Paris convent before formally commencing studies in the university's theology faculty in 1266/7. Since the Augustinians themselves had no master of theology at this time, Giles had to have attached himself either to a secular teaching master or a master of one of the other religious orders. When, from 1269 to 1272, Thomas Aquinas did his second stint in the Dominican chair at Paris, Giles seems to have become one of his students.¹² At the very least he probably frequently heard Aquinas lecture and dispute during this time, since his own early scholarly works are strongly marked by his, frequently critical, engagement with the Dominican master's teachings.¹³ In 1273 or shortly thereafter Giles attained the rank of *baccalarius formatus* and by 1277 he was likely ready to incept as a Master of Theology. It was during these years of advanced study in theology, between 1269/70 and 1277, that Giles delivered his lectures on the four books of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which survive as *reportationes*, and completed his commentary (*Ordinatio*) on its first book.¹⁴ This is also the

10 Ypma, *Formation*, 1–9.

11 According to Ypma, *Formation*, 2–5, the Augustinians still suffered in 1290 from a “pénurie pénible de religieux suffisamment instruits en théologie.”

12 Giorgio Pini suggests that Cardinal Annibaldi may have helped forge the connection between Giles and Aquinas. See his “Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order,” in *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, (eds.) Kent Emery, Jr., William J. Courtenay, and Stephen M. Metzger (Turnhout, 2012), 409–25, 411.

13 Holstein, “Commentary,” 22–4. On Giles's critical treatment of Aquinas's positions, see Concetta Luna, (ed.), *Reportatio lectionum super libros I–IV Sententiarum: Reportatio Monacensis, excerpta Godefridi de Fontibus, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia* 3.2 (Florence, 2003), 50–75.

14 Giles very likely delivered his lectures on the *Sentences* over the course of two academic years, although it is unclear whether they can be assigned to 1269–71, 1270–72, or 1271–73. Giles completed the *Ordinatio* either near the conclusion of or shortly after finishing his lectures: Luna (ed.), *Reportatio*, 16–24.

period during which Giles produced almost all his Aristotelian commentaries and *quaestiones* as well as treatments of several theological problems.¹⁵

In the spring of 1277, however, circumstances conspired to delay for several years the Augustinians' prospect of obtaining their first regent master in theology, as Giles became one of the targets of the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier's effort to purge the university of what he and his adherents believed were several dangerous Aristotelian and "Averroistic" doctrines. Although Giles was not directly affected by Tempier's main list of 219 condemned articles, he was the subject of a separate, related investigation launched by the bishop, which censured fifty-one articles culled from his commentary on Lombard's first book of the *Sentences* and which, in the estimation of Robert Wielockx, "réit-erait, au sein de la faculté de théologie, l'enseignement hétérodoxe de certains maîtres ès arts."¹⁶ Giles instead of retracting the censured positions, prepared and presented his *Apologia*, a point-by-point defense of these fifty-one articles, thereby forfeiting the prospect of receiving the *licentia docendi* in theology.¹⁷

15 According to Silvia Donati, who has established the most secure dating of Giles's works—see "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano, I: Le opere prima del 1285—I commenti aristotelici," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1 (1990), 1–111 and 2 (1991), 1–74—Giles composed the following Aristotle commentaries and *quaestiones* during these years: *Super libros Rethoricorum*; *Super libros Elenchorum*; *Super De generatione et corruptione* and *Quaestiones super librum I De generatione*; *Quaestiones metaphysicales* (in the form of a *reportatio*); *Super De bona fortuna*; *Super Physicam*; *Super De anima*. Other works that can be assigned to this period are: *De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae*; *De partibus philosophiae essentialibus*; *Theoremata de Corpore Christi*; *Quaestio de medio demonstrationis*; *De plurificatione intellectus possibilis*; *Quaestiones de resurrectione mortuorum*; and *De peccato originali*. Works from these years that are ascribed to Giles but whose authenticity is open to question are *De erroribus philosophorum* and *Super libros Politicorum*. On the first of these works, see Donati, "Studi" (1990), 20–21 and 28–31; on the second, whose claim to authenticity is even less secure, see the argument of Pawel Czartoryski, "Quelques éléments nouveaux quant au commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur la Politique," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 11 (1963), 43–48, and the qualifications expressed by Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 333, who classify it among the doubtful works "la cui autenticità deve essere ancora analizzata."

16 Wielockx, *Apologia*, 120; in the same work, Wielockx (49–59) lists the fifty-one articles and Giles's defence of each article, as recorded by Godfrey of Fontaines in his personal copy (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 15848) of Giles's commentary on Book 1 of the *Sentences*.

17 The best assessment of Giles's censure and its connection with the condemnation of the 219 articles and with the oblique attack on some of Aquinas's teachings is Wielockx, *Apologia*, 69–120 and 179–225. See also the attempted revision of Wielockx's judgments by J.M.M.H. Thijssen, "1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome," *Vivarium* 35 (1997), 72–101, and Wielockx's pointed

Although the censure must have been a painful setback to Giles and the Augustinians, his activities over the next several years were crucial to his own intellectual formation, the development of his role in the Order, and his legacy in the Order and beyond. In the months after his run-in with Tempier, he had time to reflect upon the merits of the condemned propositions, chief among them being the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form (article 48), a position he shared with Aquinas. In a series of works which date to late 1277 and early 1278, he defended this Aristotelian position and considered some of its theological implications.¹⁸ He may also have written at this time his commentary on the Song of Songs and the *De intentionibus in medio*.¹⁹

The sources are silent about Giles's whereabouts from the end of March 1277 until August 1281, when he attended the general chapter of the OESA in Padua. Nonetheless, it seems likely that he remained in France for some time, and there wrote his great work of political advice for rulers, the *De regimine principum*.²⁰ The tremendous popularity of this work guaranteed Giles's long-lasting notoriety in both clerical and lay circles as an expert on politics and warfare.²¹ There is no way to prove or disprove the supposition of certain scholars that during this time Giles served as tutor to the dedicatee of this work, the young heir to the throne of France, Philip the Fair (r. 1285–1314), since all we have to go on is the evidence of the dedication itself and the record of cordial relations between Giles and Philip IV up until the time of the controversy between this king and Boniface VIII.²² Certainly the prince's father, Philip III, was impressed

response, "Procédures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d'Aquin: réponse à J.M.M.H. Thijssen," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 83 (1999), 293–313. Also largely supporting Wielockx is Roland Hissette, "Thomas d'Aquin compromis avec Gilles de Rome en mars 1277?" *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 93 (1998), 5–26.

18 *Contra gradus et pluralitatem formarum; De gradibus formarum in ordine ad Christi opera; and De gradibus formarum accidentalium*.

19 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 331; Wielockx, *Apologia*, 89–91.

20 For the suggestion that Giles spent some time in Bayeux and Angers, see Palémon Glorieux, "Les premiers écrits de Gilles de Rome," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 41 (1974), 204–08.

21 On this, see Charles F. Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum": Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c. 1275–c. 1525* (Cambridge, 1999); Perret, *Traductions françaises du "De regimine principum"*; and below.

22 Lajard, "Gilles de Rome," 427, assumed Giles served as tutor to Philip; similarly Elizabeth A.R. Brown, "Persona et Gesta: The Image and Deeds of the Thirteenth-Century Capetians: The Case of Philip the Fair," *Viator* 19 (1988), 219–46, 232–35, seems inclined to favor such a relationship. On the contrary, Joseph Strayer rejects this, saying "Egidius was a busy man as a scholar and an official of his order; he could not have had time to supervise the details of Philip's education. This was probably the task of a young clerk, Guillaume

enough with *De regimine* to have the clerk Henri de Gauchi translate it into French, a project completed in 1282.²³ Forming a mentoring relationship with a high-born youth would not have been out of character for Giles. He had composed his commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi* (c.1274) at the request of Philip of Flanders, a son of the count of Flanders, who was studying arts at Paris at this time. Three works of the 1280s are likewise dedicated to young men of noble families: the commentary on *De anima* for Iacopo Stefaneschi, nephew of Pope Nicholas III (Giovanni Gaetano Orsini); the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* for the English cleric of noble blood Stephen de Maulay; and the *De predestinatione* and *De formatione corporis humani in utero* for Tavena Tolomei, perhaps a member of the Sienese noble family of that name.²⁴

Giles also began to play an ever greater role in the leadership of his Order. Between 1281 and 1285 he participated in six general and provincial chapters of the Order. At the general chapter meeting in Padua in August 1281, Giles served as one of the representatives of the Roman province. Two years later, at the provincial chapter of Cori, he nominated the provincial prior and the provincial representatives and fulfilled a similar role at the provincial chapter of Genazzano in 1284. In the same year, at the general chapter in Orvieto, it fell to him to manage the election process for the prior general of the Order, and in 1285 at the provincial chapter of Tuscany, he served as vicar for the prior general elected the previous year, Clement of Osimo.²⁵ Of far greater importance than these administrative contributions, however, was the imprint that Giles was beginning to make on the Augustinians' intellectual identity. This is already apparent in 1281, when he delivered a series of twenty disputed *quaestiones quodlibetales* at the Padua general chapter. Between then and when he returned to Paris in 1285 as regent master of the Augustinians, it is likely that he dedicated himself to "writing the sections devoted to study in the General Constitutions of his Order," including a system of *studia* and book-provision.²⁶

d'Ercuis." Joseph Strayer, *The Reign of Philip the Fair* (Princeton, 1980). Concurring with Strayer is Eastman, "Das Leben," 323. When, in 1293, Philip IV granted the former convent of the Friars of the Sack to the Augustinians, he did so "ob favorem potissimum dilecti et familiaris nostri fratri Egidii Romani." Strayer, *The Reign of Philip*, 7, n. 20.

23 According to the dedication in the earliest copy, Dôle, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 157, fol. 1, this translation "est translatez de latin en francois par maistre Henri de Gauchi par le comandement au noble roi devant dit [Philip III] en lan M.CC.IIIxx.II." For more on this translation, see Perret, *Traductions françaises du "De regimine principum"*, 61–66.

24 Donati, "Studi per una cronologia," (1990), 48–53 and 59–62; Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 320–21.

25 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 321.

26 Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity," 413–14.

It was also during this time that Giles wrote the *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, an introductory work on metaphysics that he probably intended for use in the Order's *studia*.²⁷

Until 1293, when James of Viterbo attained the rank of master of theology, Giles had the most advanced academic credentials in the Order, so his intellectual leadership of the Augustinian friars makes perfect sense. Yet, in addition to crafting institutional structures and practices of education, he also initiated the Augustinians' unique intellectual orientation. This entailed, on the one hand, an adoption of many of Aquinas's positions combined with an independent use thereof, with, on the other hand, "a renewed interest in Augustine's works."²⁸ Giorgio Pini, building on the work of Robert Wielockx, has been able to date Giles's "Augustinian turn" to his years of exile from the Paris theology faculty, and he is probably right to argue that it was this "forced interruption of Giles' career" that afforded him the opportunity to "return to the writings of the fathers and the 'saints', and specifically to the writings of St. Augustine..."²⁹

In spring 1285 a change of popes opened the way for Giles's return to Paris. Martin IV (Simon de Brion), who as a papal legate in 1277 had supported Templier's program of censorship, was succeeded by Honorius IV (Giacomo Savelli). Thanks to this pontiff's support, the theology faculty reexamined the previously censured propositions, lifting the sanction on many of them, while Giles for his part agreed to retract those that remained censured.³⁰ With this obstacle removed, Giles was awarded the *licentia docendi* and became the Augustinians' first chair of theology, beginning that autumn and continuing until 1293, when he ceded the Augustinian chair to his student James of Viterbo.³¹ Most of

27 Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity," 412.

28 Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity," 418–19; Adolar Zumkeller, "The Augustinian School of the Middle Ages," in *Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages*, (ed.) John E. Rotelle (Philadelphia, 1996), 11–79, 19–27.

29 Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity," 419–22; Robert Wielockx, "Une collection d'autographes de Gilles de Rome," in *Gli autografi medievali: problemi paleografici e filologici*. Atti del convegno di studio della Fondazione Ezio Franceschini, Erice 25 settembre–2 ottobre, 1990, (eds.) Paolo Chiesa and Lucia Pinelli (Spoleto, 1994), 207–253.

30 Wielockx, *Apologia*, 110–13.

31 Mandonnet, "Carrière scolaire," 494, assumed that Giles vacated his chair in 1291, since this would accord with the six quodlibetal disputations ascribed to him, one for each academic year, and with his being elected prior general of the Augustinians in January 1292. Ypma, *Formation*, 81–84, however, extended the time of Giles's magisterium to 1293, arguing, first, that the Augustinians would not have left the chair vacant for two years and, second, that in the charter of April 1393 by which Philip IV granted the Augustinians possession of the former convent of the Friars of the Sack, the king refers to Giles as *sacre*

the works Giles composed during this period can be directly tied to his teaching obligations in the faculty of theology. These include his six *quodlibeta* and several sets of *quaestiones*, but also his biblical commentaries on Romans and Corinthians (the latter now lost).³² It was also during this time that he wrote his commentaries on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and *De causis* (the latter dedicated to Benedetto Caetani, the future Boniface VIII), and the treatises *De formatione corporis humani in utero*, *De praedestinatione et praescientia*, *De materia caeli contra Averroistas*, and *De subiecto theologiae*. These works, and especially the *quaestiones* and *quodlibeta*, reveal a confident and subtle mind, fully engaged in the major intellectual debates of the time and happy to scuffle with his rivals on the faculty, Henry of Ghent in particular. However, Giles also seems to have taken care to position himself (and, by extension, his Order) advantageously within the university. Already, in January 1286, it is likely he delivered on behalf of the university a sermon of welcome to the newly crowned Philip IV, and later that year he took the side of the seculars against his fellow mendicants in the vexed question of whether those who confessed their sins to a friar should afterwards repeat their confession to their parish priest.³³ Such political sensitivity enabled Giles to convince the university to exempt the *baccalarii formati* in his Order from the statutory four-year waiting period before being eligible for the *licentia docendi*.³⁴ This and his ongoing cultivation of friendly relations with Philip IV also helped the Augustinians secure the land and money they needed to begin building their new convent, the Grands-Augustins in 1293.³⁵

Several of the texts written by Giles during these years also suggest he was making an effort to establish a standard set of teachings for the Augustinians' incipient *studia*, especially after the general chapter meeting in Florence in 1287 declared his teachings "both written and still to be written" the official

pagine professor, a title which strongly suggests he continued to fulfill a teaching role. Pini's careful analysis of the contents of Giles's quodlibets has confirmed Ypma's suspicions, showing that Giles's last quodlibet dates either to Lent 1292 or Lent 1293. Pini, "Giles of Rome," 240–44.

32 The *quaestiones* are as follows: *Quaestio de subiecto theologiae*; *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*; *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*; *Quaestiones de mensura angelorum*; *Quaestiones de motu angelorum*; *Quaestiones de compositione angelorum*.

33 Pini, "Giles of Rome," 240–41. In his second *Quodlibet*, of Lent 1287, Giles took up a closely related question, which is whether one is allowed to confess the same sin several times, and again sided with the seculars.

34 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 322.

35 On this, see below.

doctrine of the Order.³⁶ In addition, however, to fulfilling his teaching duties, Giles continued to take an active part in developing the educational policies of the OESA that were to be enshrined in the *Constitutiones* ratified in 1290 at the Orders' general chapter in Regensburg (Ratisbon). At the same meeting Giles was put in charge of choosing which of his confrères were to be sent to read Lombard's *Sentences* at Paris. The following year, in September, Giles travelled to Viterbo to participate in a chapter of the Roman province, charged with electing representatives to the next general chapter whose major task was to choose a new prior general, since Clement of Osimo had died the previous April. When the general chapter met in January, it named Giles as Clement's successor.

It may have been thanks to Clement, in his role as confessor to Cardinal Benedict Caetani, that Giles first made the acquaintance of the future pope. Certainly they got to know each other when Caetani visited Paris in November 1290 in order to resolve the ongoing conflict in the university between the seculars and mendicants. Not only did Caetani and his fellow cardinal Gerardo Bianchi find in favor of the mendicants, but Caetani, according to one chronicler, appointed Giles and the Franciscan Giovanni di Murro to inform Giles's old rival and champion of the seculars, Henry of Ghent, of his suspension from the faculty.³⁷ Silvia Donati suspects that it was shortly after this that Giles dedicated his commentary on the *De causis* to Caetani.³⁸ Giles's friendship with the future Pope Boniface was to prove crucial to the arc of his career and the direction of his intellectual endeavors.

As prior general Giles worked hard to put his Order on a par with the more established Dominicans and Franciscans. Towards this end his chief priorities were that the Order enforce regular observance and continue to develop its system of education. To effect the first goal he sent out a circular letter to the provincial friars stipulating that they make regular visitations of their houses to make sure that the Order's Rule and the recently ratified *Constitutiones* were being rigorously observed. This letter also looked to reinforce and expand the

36 See n. 2 above. Ypma, *Formation*, 64–65, was right to point out that it was precisely at this time, when the first Augustinian general and provincial *studia* were being founded, that the Order needed to set up “une homogénéité de l'enseignement,” and that Giles alone “était considéré capable de jeter les bases d'une certaine uniformité dans la théologie et philosophie,” that would be taught by the Order's lectors. Pini, “Building the Augustinian Identity,” 415–16, further clarifies that the chapter's decision *only* applied “to the teachers and the students in the Augustinian *studia* system,” rather than “to those who were to become, and those who were already, Masters of Theology at Paris.”

37 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, “Egidio Romano,” 323.

38 Donati, “Studi per un cronologia,” (1990), 67–69.

Order's educational mission. It commanded that the lectors teaching in the Order's *studia* serve as examples of strict observance, "so that on this account the lesser brothers might be moved to follow their example" (*ut ex hoc minores fratres ad observandum eorum moveantur exemplo*).³⁹ Moreover, any lector who neglected his teaching duties or did not teach in accordance with the regulations established in the *Constitutiones* was subject to being deprived of his position.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Giles encouraged the provincial priors to multiply the number of schools of grammar and theology in their provinces.

The Order's educational mission continued to be hampered, however, by inadequate facilities for its *studium* in Paris. Already, between 1285 and 1288, the Order, frustrated by the inconvenient distance between their convent in Montmartre and the university district, had acquired a site in the rue Saint-Victor, just inside the city walls.⁴¹ The new location, though undoubtedly far better situated for the purposes of a *studium*, seems not to have been ideal. This would explain why Giles worked out an arrangement, with the help of his friend Philip the Fair, whereby in April 1293 the king granted the Augustinians the convent in Pontoise of the suppressed order of the Friars of the Sack and gave them permission to purchase, with the proceeds of the sale of that property, land on the Left Bank of the Seine, near the Latin Quarter, and there build what was to become the great convent of the Grands-Augustins. Philip did this "on account of the tremendous favor [we have] for our beloved friend, Brother Giles of Rome" (*ob favorem potissimum dilecti ac familiaris nostri fratris Egidii Romani*).⁴²

Most of Giles's tenure as prior general coincided with a long vacancy of the papal see, from the death of Nicholas IV in early April 1292 until the coronation of Celestine V (Pietro del Morrone) in July 1294. Hailed as the "angelic pope" by his Spiritual Franciscan and Angevin supporters, Celestine found himself utterly overwhelmed by the responsibilities of his new post and resigned five months later, reportedly on the advice of Cardinal Caetani. Eleven days later, on Christmas Eve, Caetani's fellow cardinals elected him pope.⁴³ Four months

39 For this see Eric Saak, *High Way to Heaven: The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292–1524* (Leiden, 2002), 21–22.

40 "Lectores quidem si suas non continent lectiones, sicut in Constitutionibus est expressum, debita provisione priventur." *Analecta Augustiniana* 4 (1911), 203.

41 Ypma, *Formation*, 16–21.

42 Ypma, *Formation*, 83–84; Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 20. The deal required considerable finesse on Giles's part, as he had to steer clear of excommunication by the bishop of Paris, who claimed jurisdiction over the convent in Pontoise. See Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 323.

43 Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, *Boniface VIII: une pape hérétique?* (Paris, 2003), 76–90.

into his papacy, Boniface VIII, with Philip IV's approval, appointed Giles to the archbishopric of Bourges, one of the most important sees in France.⁴⁴ After being consecrated personally by Boniface, Giles participated in the Augustinians' general chapter in Siena in May, delivering the last of his *quodlibeta*, which does not survive.⁴⁵

During his first nine years as archbishop, Giles spent far more time at the *curia* than in his see. He was resident at Bourges from sometime in the summer of 1295 to June 1296, and again from August 1299 to the end of 1301. For much of the second residence, Giles was involved in two disputes, one with his own cathedral chapter over the issue of visitations, and the other with Bernard de Castanet, the bishop of Albi, over matters of jurisdiction. Indeed, one gets the sense that Giles may have provoked a good bit of ill will in his diocese and province. According to one of his bitterest enemies, the Cistercian abbot of Chaalis, Jacques de Thérines, Giles was unwelcome there from the start. The abbot claimed that when Giles arrived to take possession of his new see in 1295, the members of his household and retinue preyed on the people and property of the town and diocese. Giles's response to the ensuing complaints, "What do you want? They aren't angels!" so infuriated the members of his flock that he had to flee the town and did not dare return for quite some time.⁴⁶ Jacques also accused Giles of having forced himself and his entourage on the exempt Cistercian abbey of Loroi, and when the abbot offered them only the humble vegetarian fare allowed by his Order's Rule, Giles's entourage "violently seized and slaughtered two pigs, and when the prior of that place complained and offered resistance, they handled him so roughly and beat him so brutally that from that attack he lost an eye shortly thereafter."⁴⁷

The validity of these stories is certainly open to challenge, as *Contra impugnatores exemptionum*, the tract in which Jacques de Thérines made his accusations, was, to be sure, polemical. A product of the highly charged debate at the

44 In doing so, Boniface removed Jean de Savigny, an appointee of Celestine V, and had him transferred to the see of Nevers. See Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 323.

45 Pini, "Giles of Rome," 235–36.

46 Noël Valois, "Jacques de Thérines, Cistercien," *Histoire littéraire de la France* 34 (1914), 179–219, 195. For the context of the conflict between Jacques and Giles, see William C. Jordan, *Unceasing Strife, Unending Fear: Jacques de Thérines and the Freedom of the Church in the Age of the Last Capetians* (Princeton, 2005), 40–55.

47 "[S]ui proprii famuli violenter ibidem duos porcos rapuerunt et mactaverunt: Prioremque dicti loci contradicentem ac resistentem taliter tractaverunt et inhumaniter verberarunt, quod ex illa laesione amiserit oculum intra breve temporis intervallum." In Ewald Müller, *Das Konzil von Vienne, 1311–1312: Seine Quellen und seine Geschichte* (Münster, 1934), 512, n. 65.

Council of Vienne in 1311–12 over the suppression of the Templars, Jacques's treatise was written in defense of the exempt status of monastic orders, which Giles had just a short time before attacked in his *Contra exemptos*. In that work Giles had not only argued that the Templars' exempt status had encouraged their descent into error and sacrilege, but that *all* currently exempt orders and foundations, with the notable exception of the mendicant orders, should be subject to the visitation and correction of their diocesan.⁴⁸ Thus, Jacques's vilification of his opponent fit into his larger point, this being that episcopal jurisdiction in fact posed more of a threat to the regular observance of monks and other exempt clergy than did their exempt status. In portraying Giles as a veritable wolf among the lambs, he was able both to give fair warning of the abuses that Giles's program would encourage and to show that the author of *Contra exemptos* wrote with the ulterior motive of facilitating his own predations.⁴⁹

While such a negative portrayal must surely be taken with more than a grain of salt, it reminds us that Giles had a forceful personality and was not slow to argue forcefully for what he believed and to push aggressively in pursuit of those privileges to which he thought he, his Order, and those he supported were entitled. This was bound to make him some enemies along the way; thus the enmity of Henry of Ghent, Stephen Tempier, and Jacques de Thérines, and the disputes with his chapter and the bishop of Albi. This same quality can be observed in Giles's refusal to give in to the archbishop of Bordeaux, Bertrand de Got's efforts to free his diocese from the primacy of Bourges: a refusal that would later expose Giles to that prelate's revenge when he became Pope Clement v.

This same personality also, of course, made him an effective advocate and powerful ally of those he supported. Thus the long periods of time he spent at the *curia*, which his enemies likely thought were proof of a neglectful pastor and favor-hunting *curialist*, can alternatively be seen in the more positive light of a sincere effort on his part to solidify the foundations of the Augustinian Order by binding it more closely to papal power.⁵⁰ After all, the OESA was still a relative newcomer compared to the Franciscans and Dominicans. Unlike them, it had yet to create a compelling narrative of its origins and early history, to establish a tradition of intellectual achievement, and to forge multiple and

⁴⁸ See Lambertini below.

⁴⁹ Jordan, *Unceasing Strife*, 42, writes that "Nothing short of loathing can explain the vituperative excesses of the polemical tracts he circulated while at Vienne to counter what he considered the Augustinian Hermit's poisonous invective."

⁵⁰ Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 19–41.

interlinked ties of patronage among both the laity and clergy. Giles and the other leaders of his Order were surely aware of this, and it seems that he was keen to take advantage of his amicable relationship with Boniface to help strengthen their position. But events quickly transpired that turned what might have been no more than a cozy patronage relationship into a key element of the Augustinian identity: the strong support of papal supremacy.

After becoming pope, Boniface soon became embroiled in controversy by opposing the efforts of the kings of France and England to tax their clergy in support of their war against one another. Indeed it may well have been owing to Philip IV's angry response to the publication on 21 April 1296 of the pope's bull *Clericis laicos*, which forbade the clergy of his realm to pay the tax, that Giles felt compelled to take leave of his see and travel to Rome sometime in June or July. Meanwhile closer to home, Boniface's efforts to aggrandize his family raised the ire of the Colonna family, whose two cardinals, Giacomo and Pietro, countered this by challenging the very legitimacy of his papacy, arguing that the abdication of his predecessor was invalid, thereby nullifying Boniface's own election. Faced with threats from both France and Rome, and aware that he was losing the support of the French clergy, Boniface acted. He sought to mend his frayed relations with King Philip by allowing the tax (in February 1297), rescinding *Clericis laicos* (in July), and completing the canonization process of Louis IX (in August).⁵¹ As for conflict with the Colonna, here Boniface received signal help from Giles, who offered a point-by-point refutation of their arguments in his *De renuntiatione papae*.⁵² Thanks to improved relations with France and Giles's intellectual support, the pope was able to bring the Colonna cardinals to the negotiating table. Here Giles again lent his support as a member of the team that convinced them to drop their opposition to Boniface in the autumn of 1297.⁵³

It is unclear how Giles occupied himself from late 1297 until his return to Bourges nearly two years later. Perhaps he worked as a kind of in-house intellectual consultant for Boniface.⁵⁴ One work ascribed to him, but now lost, that seems to belong to this period, was a critical examination, written at the pope's

51 Strayer, *The Reign of Philip IV*, 251–55.

52 See also, John R. Eastman, "Giles of Rome and Celestine V: The Franciscan Revolution and the Theology of Abdication," *Catholic Historical Review* 76 (1990), 195–211.

53 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 324.

54 Eastman, "Das Leben," 330–31. Interestingly, Eastman in "Die Werke des Aegidius Romanus," *Augustiniana* 44 (1994), 209–31, dates two of the three works he assigns to this period to 1296. This seems less likely than the period from late 1297 till mid-1299, since Giles only left Bourges for Rome in late June of 1296 and was probably preoccupied with the matter of the clerical tax.

behest, of the Spiritual Franciscan Peter Olivi's *Lectura super apocalypsim*.⁵⁵ Two others which may date to this period are associated with the Christian missions to the Mongols and the attempts to form an alliance with the Il-khan Ghazan against the Mamluks.⁵⁶ One of these works, now lost, is purported to have been an introduction to the Catholic faith directed at the Christian king of Armenia (*Isagoge, sive introductio in fidei ad regem Armenie*) and the other, which survives, is the *Capitula fidei christianae ad Tartarum maiorem*.⁵⁷

In July 1301 Philip IV initiated the legal proceedings (on suspicion of treason) against Bishop Bernard Saisset of Pamiers that sparked one of Middle Ages' greatest conflicts between Church and State. Under different circumstances, the move against Saisset would probably have been settled by negotiation. It quickly became apparent to Philip's judges, after all, that Saisset posed no real threat, and proceedings against him were suspended by late in November.⁵⁸ In this case, however, Boniface took particular offence. First, he himself had created the see of Pamiers, carving it out of the diocese of Toulouse, and then made Saisset, a good friend, its first bishop.⁵⁹ Secondly, the pope was already angry over King Philip's efforts to undercut the activities of papally-appointed inquisitors in the Languedoc, so the move against Saisset seemed to him (and probably was, in fact) part of a larger effort on the part of the king to erode papal influence in the Midi. Finally, Boniface connected these moves in the Languedoc to the intrigues of his old enemies, the Colonna, who had married into some of the noble families there.⁶⁰ Prompted then by anger and

55 This is the so-called *Contra expositionem Petri Joannis de Narbonna super Apocalypsim ex mandato Bonifacii VIII*. See David Burr, "The Persecution of Peter Olivi," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 66 (1976), 77.

56 On the missions and the negotiations toward an alliance, see J.R.S. Phillips, *The Medieval Expansion of Europe*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1998), 78–95 and 115–31.

57 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 332, are inclined to assign this to Giles's next sojourn at the *curia*, "forse fra il 1301–02 e il 1303." I am of a mind to think that both works date to Giles's earlier stay. The likely intended recipient of the *Isagoge* was Sempad, who seized the kingdom of Cilician Armenia from his brother Hetoum in 1296 and was himself cast out of power by his younger brother Constantine in 1298. Boniface lent Sempad his support in 1296, which suggests that he was the likely dedicatee. It makes sense to think that the *Capitula fidei* was intended as a kind of companion piece for Ghazan, given his willingness to form alliances with Armenia against the Mamluks. Sirarpie Der Nersessian, "The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia," in *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 2. *The Later Crusades, 1189–1311*, (eds.) Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (Madison, 1969), 630–59, 656–57.

58 Strayer, *The Reign of Philip*, 265–66.

59 Robert W. Dyson, ed., *Giles of Rome's "On Ecclesiastical Power": A Medieval Theory of World Government* (New York, 2004), xiv.

60 Strayer, *The Reign of Philip*, 260–63.

resentment, on 4 and 5 December Boniface promulgated three inflammatory bulls threatening to excommunicate Philip, restoring the ban of *Clericis laicos*, demanding the release of Saisset, and accusing the king and his ministers of tyrannizing the Church and people of his realm. Worse still, the last published of these bulls, *Ausculta fili*, baldly stated that Philip was a “fool” if he thought he was “not subject to the head of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.”⁶¹

Giles was likely still in his diocese when he and the other bishops of France received a summons that December from Boniface to attend a synod in Rome the following November. He left for Rome soon thereafter and between his departure and the opening of the synod composed his masterpiece of high-papalist ecclesiology and political theory, the *De ecclesiastica potestate*. As Lambertini discusses in this volume, Giles seems to have at first worked out some of his ideas on the relationship of papal and temporal power in the sermon *De potentia domini papae*.⁶² Perhaps he had already delivered the sermon by April of 1302, given the disparaging comments made about him at the meeting of the Estates General that assembled during that month.⁶³ One cannot help but be struck by the rapidity with which news travelled between Paris and Rome during these months, for while writing *De ecclesiastica potestate* Giles seems to have had occasion to see one of the earlier drafts of John of Paris’s defense of royal power, the *De potestate regia et papali*, a work which was itself, originally, a response to certain hierocratic positions taken by James of Viterbo in his teaching at Paris. James, for his part, was aware of Giles’s positions in *De ecclesiastica potestate* as he wrote his *De regimine christiano*.⁶⁴

Although Boniface had the support of other polemicists besides the two Augustinians—the Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta and the canonist Henry of Cremona, for example—“they were the ones who developed the papal political theory to its highest degree in composing its classic expressions.”⁶⁵ It was, moreover, to be Giles’s treatise which provided the theoretical

61 Dyson (ed.), *Giles of Rome’s “On Ecclesiastical Power,”* xiv–xv.

62 See also Roberto Lambertini, “Il sermo De potestate domini papae di Egidio Romano e la difesa di Bonifacio VIII: acquisizioni e prospettive della storiografia più recente,” in *Le culture di Bonifacio VIII. Atti del Convegno organizzato nell’ambito delle Celebrazioni per il VII Centenario della morte, Bologna 13–15 dicembre 2004* (Rome, 2006), 93–108.

63 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, “Egidio Romano,” 325.

64 On this, see Lambertini below and Lambertini, “Sermo,” 105–08. For a strikingly different interpretation of why John of Paris wrote *De potestate regia et papali*, see Andrew A.K. Theng, “Why Did John of Paris Write *De potestate regia et papali*? A Reconsideration,” in *John of Paris: Beyond Royal and Papal Power*, ed. Chris Jones (Turnhout, 2015), 151–87.

65 Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 28–29. Here Saak refers also to Augustinus Triumphus (Augustine of Ancona), OESA, who wrote his *Summa de ecclesiastica potestate* as a response to Marsilius of Padua’s *Defensor pacis* of 1324.

underpinnings for Boniface's bold statement of papal supremacy in the bull *Unam sanctam*, promulgated by him at the Roman synod on 18 November.⁶⁶ In supporting Boniface, however, Giles and James were also working out a distinctly Augustinian theory of the Church and of their Order's place in it. In this sense, then, the dispute between Boniface and Philip was the stimulus that inspired these Augustinian friars to formulate the theoretical justification for the power on which their Order had relied since its foundation.⁶⁷ The close relationship between the papacy and the Augustinians, and more personally between Boniface and Giles, was mutually beneficial. For in return for their intellectual and institutional support for the pope, the Order received from Boniface a number of privileges between 1295 and 1303, which together gave them "a legal basis equal to that of their two largest competitors [the Franciscans and Dominicans]," including putting them "under the special protection of the pope."⁶⁸

In the end, of course, Boniface's bid for supremacy over Philip was doomed to end disastrously for him at his palace in Anagni in September 1303. Physically and emotionally broken by the shock of having been threatened with arrest by Philip's counsellor Guillaume de Nogaret and with physical harm by Sciarra Colonna, he died a few weeks later.⁶⁹ Giles, deprived of papal protection, put off returning to Bourges until a partial rapprochement had been arranged between Philip and the Holy See, under Benedict XI (Niccolò Boccasini) the following spring. Giles was now at the low point of his career and was subjected to particular hardship when, in the early weeks of 1306, his old enemy Bertrand de Got, recently crowned Pope Clement V, so thoroughly despoiled the ecclesiastical foundations of the archdiocese of Bourges as to reduce Giles to having to accept the charity of his cathedral chapter.⁷⁰ Perhaps he received some consolation from being asked in 1305/6 to preside over the commission of Paris theologians that censured John of Paris for his writings on the Eucharist. The fact of his having been given this charge surely suggests that his prospects after the fall of Boniface were not uniformly bleak.

It did not take long for Giles to begin searching for new patrons. He offered his *Hexaemeron*, originally dedicated to Boniface, to Robert of Clermont,

66 On the key theoretical similarities and differences between *De ecclesiastica potestate* and *Unam sanctam*, see Francisco Bertelloni, "Sobre las fuentes de la bula *Unam Sanctam* (Bonifacio VIII y el *De ecclesiastica potestate* de Egidio Romano)," *Pensiero politico medievale* 2 (2004), 89–122.

67 Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 28–41.

68 Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 25–28.

69 Strayer, *The Reign of Philip*, 277–81.

70 Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 325.

Philip's uncle and husband to Beatrice of Bourbon, whose lands lay partly in Giles's diocese. He probably also exploited his connection with James of Viterbo, who had become archbishop of Naples in 1302, to procure the patronage of King Robert of Naples. Giles probably met Robert at Avignon in 1309, shortly after the latter's coronation. Robert then commissioned one of his chaplains to make him a copy of *De regimine principum*, and Giles, for his part, dedicated to Robert his completed commentary on the second book of Lombard's *Sentences*.⁷¹

Thanks to Philip IV's ruthless campaign, initiated in October 1307, to destroy the Knights Templar, Giles was presented with an opportunity to mend fences with his estranged friend and, perhaps, to score points against Clement V, who at first opposed Philip's campaign of persecution. Giles attended the pope's consistory held in Poitiers on 29 May 1308, where Philip's counsellor Guillaume de Plaisians delivered a long and rather threatening speech exhorting Clement to lift the suspension of the inquisition against the Templars that he had imposed in February. When Plaisians finished his oration, Giles was one of two bishops, the other being Gilles Aycelin, the notoriously pro-royal archbishop of Narbonne, who publically spoke in favor of Guillaume's demand.⁷²

The issue of the Templars was eventually settled by their suppression at the Council of Vienne in 1311–12. This act, promulgated in Clement's bull *Vox in excelso*, allowed the pope to at once bow to Philip's pressure while at the same time reserving some papal autonomy, since the king wanted the Order not just suppressed but condemned.⁷³ Giles attended the Council and, as has already been mentioned, made his own distinctly pro-episcopal and pro-mendicant argument against the Templars in the treatise *Contra exemptos*. He also served there on a commission charged with examining the doctrines of the Spiritual Franciscan Peter Olivi (d. 1298), whose commentary on the Apocalypse he had previously critiqued for Boniface VIII. Giles took it upon himself to draw up a list of twenty-four erroneous doctrines in Olivi's writings, the *Impugnatio doctrinae Petri Iohannis Olivi*; this seems to have served as the basis for Clement's bull *Fidei catholicae fundamento* (May 1312), which censured three of those doctrines (though without condemning Olivi himself).⁷⁴

71 Samantha Kelly, *The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309–1343) and Fourteenth-Century Kingship* (Leiden, 2003), 27 and 30–31.

72 Malcolm Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2006), 88–115, 111.

73 Barber, *Trial*, 259–69.

74 Burr, *Persecution of Peter Olivi*, 79–80; Sean Field, *The Beguine, the Angel, and the Inquisitor: The Trials of Marguerite Porete and Guiard of Cressonessart* (Notre Dame, IN., 2012), 200–01.

Vienne marked the end of Giles's engagement in controversies. During his final years he seems mostly to have resided at Bourges, holding his last provincial synod there in 1315. Ever the intellectual, shortly after the conclusion of the Council he wrote one final work, the *De divina influentia in beatos*. Already in 1310, when he had probably reached sixty-seven years of age, Giles began making arrangements for the disposition of his possessions at the time of his death. At the end of August he drafted a will leaving some property he had acquired in the diocese of Sovana north of Rome to the Augustinians' *studium* in Paris. Five years later he turned the administration of this property over to a member of the Paris convent, Jean de Verdun. Sometime shortly before his death he travelled to Avignon, perhaps to be present at the consecration of the new pope, John XXII (Jacques Duèze) in September. On 19 December 1316 he made his final will, bequeathing his books to the library of the Grands-Augustins. He died three days later and, according to his wishes, his body was transported to Paris and interred at his beloved convent there.⁷⁵

3 Legacy

In life Giles was ever a devoted brother of the Augustinian Order. And because he was the Order's intellectual leader during its formative years, he in turn had a profound and lasting influence on the OESA's identity and orientation. Since his was the official doctrine of the Augustinians, Giles's copious writings formed a large part of the core curriculum of the Augustinians' *studia*. Likewise, he was one of the architects of the Augustinians' system of education and had himself hand-picked many of the other early intellectual leaders of the OESA. The most notable of these were James of Viterbo and Augustinus Triumphus, and together Giles and they built the foundation for what Eric Saak has called the "Augustinian Platform", which combined adherence to regular observance, a creative development of many of Aquinas's positions with a devotion to the teachings of St Augustine, a hierocratic conception of Christian society, and a close identification with the See of St Peter. Augustinian theology continued to evolve throughout the later Middle Ages, undergoing a particularly marked modification thanks to the teachings of Gregory of Rimini in the mid-1300s. Yet the core identity remained, and Giles's writings continued to exercise a strong influence on the OESA well into the 1700s.⁷⁶ Efforts by the

⁷⁵ Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 326.

⁷⁶ Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, 1–159.

OESA to obtain Giles's canonization met with partial success when, in 1672, he was beatified.⁷⁷

Some outside the Order chose to remember Giles less fondly. Whereas by the 16th century the Augustinians were referring to him as their *doctor fundatissimus*, others joked that he was the *doctor verbosus*. Giles's reputation among Jacques de Thérines's Order, the Cistercians, remained questionable, certainly until the mid-1300s when a member of the Order, Peter of Zittau characterized him as an ambitious opportunist who accepted the archbishopric of Bourges from Boniface as a bribe for offering his support.⁷⁸ Moreover at least one 17th-century Protestant, Pierre Allix, took umbrage at Giles's attack on John of Paris's theology of the Eucharist, saying of him that "he boasted of his excellence in all things" (*in omnibus praestare se gloriabatur*).⁷⁹ In death, as in life, Giles had a way of making enemies.

Giles was also one of the leading scholars of his time and several of his works stood the test of time in the arts and theology curricula of the universities. As the several contributions to this volume show, Giles was a key interpreter of Aristotelian and Averroistic philosophy and made many ingenious and original contributions to logic, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, psychology, and metaphysics. Several of his Aristotle commentaries continued to be standard university texts in the 14th and 15th century, and later scholars regarded him as *the* commentator on the *Rhetoric* and *Sophistici elenchi*, and as second only in authority to Aquinas as an expositor of the *Physics*.⁸⁰ His *Rhetoric* commentary, to give one example, not only stood the test of time as the later Middle Ages' key *accessus* to Aristotle's text but also bound it more closely to moral philosophy than to dialectic in the *divisio scientiarum* of the arts curriculum.⁸¹ Indeed, Giles's conception of rhetoric as the master discourse of political life had a profound effect on his ideas about political education and thus on the form and content of his *De regimine principum*; and it was through *De regimine* that Giles was to have a formative influence on the teaching of the entire moral philosophy curriculum.⁸² This exhaustive and creative synthesis of Aristotle's

77 Eastman, "Das Leben," 339.

78 Eastman, "Giles of Rome and Celestine V," 210–11.

79 Quoted in Gianluca Briguglia, "Theology, Sacramental Debates, and Political Thought in John of Paris: The Case of the Eucharist," in *John of Paris: Beyond Royal and Papal Power*, ed. Chris Jones (Turnhout, 2015), 401–18.

80 See the chapters by Donati and Trifogli, Pickavé, and Marmo below.

81 See Marmo below and Charles F. Briggs, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the Later Medieval Universities: A Reassessment," *Rhetorica* 25 (2007), 243–68.

82 On the connection between the *Rhetoric* commentary and *De regimine principum*, see Ubaldo Staico, "Retorica e politica in Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi* 3 (1992), 1–75. See

moral philosophy quickly became a chief ancillary text for the study of the *Ethics* and *Politics*, a fact attested by its inclusion among the *pecia* exemplars of books of philosophy stocked by the Paris bookseller and university stationer André de Sens in 1304.⁸³ *De regimine* continued to fulfill this function during the next two centuries, as witnessed by the text's survival in scores of surviving copies with university provenance and its frequent inclusion in the library catalogues of medieval universities and colleges, and mendicant *studia*.⁸⁴ Its popularity with this scholarly audience can also be gauged by the numerous and varied alphabetical indexes, compilations, and abbreviations of it which survive.⁸⁵

Giles was also one of the most distinguished theologians of the generation after Aquinas. And if the influence of Aquinas can be seen throughout Giles's own work, the student was no mere epigone of the master; Giles repeatedly

also, Matthew S. Kempshall, "The Rhetoric of Giles of Rome's 'De regimine principum,'" in *Le prince au miroir de la littérature politique de l'Antiquité aux Lumières*, ed. Frédérique Lachaud and Lydwine Scordia (Mont-Saint-Aignan, 2007), 161–90 and his *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400–1500* (Manchester, 2011), 460–79. In this latter work Kempshall proposes that Giles's *Rhetoric* commentary and *De regimine* may have contributed to the scholastics' downgrading of the value of historical writing. There are several excellent analyses of the ways in which Giles appropriated and interpreted Aristotle in *De regimine*. See Lambertini's contribution below and the works cited in his notes. To these should be added Roberto Lambertini, "Il filosofo, il principe e la virtù: note sulla recezione e l'uso dell'*Etica Nicomachea* nel *De regimine principum* de Egidio Romano," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 315–70; Janet Coleman, "Some Relations between the Study of Aristotle's *Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Politics* in Late 13th- and Early 14th-Century Arts Courses and the Justification of Contemporary Civic Activities (Italy and France)," in *Political Thought and the Realities of Power in the Middle Ages*, (eds.) Joseph Canning and Otto Gerhard Oexle (Göttingen, 1998), 127–57, 147–53. Matthew S. Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford, 1999), 130–56; Daniele Taranto, "Egidio Romano e il *De regimine principum*. Mutazioni concettuali dei paradigma degli specula," *Il pensiero politico* 37 (2004), 360–86.

83 Denifle and Chatelain, *CUP*, 2: 111.

84 Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum"*, 50–51 and 91–145; Charles F. Briggs, "Moral Philosophy in England after Grossteste: An 'Underground' History," in *The Study of Medieval Manuscripts of England: Festschrift in Honor of Richard W. Pfaff*, (eds.) George H. Brown and Linda E. Voigts (Tempe, AZ., 2010), 359–88.

85 Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum"*, 108–45 and 180–87; and Charles F. Briggs, "Moral Philosophy and Dominican Education: Bartolomeo da San Concordio's *Compendium moralis philosophiae*," in *Medieval Education*, (eds.) Ronald B. Begley and Joseph W. Koterski (New York, 2005), 182–96. At least three 14th-century Augustinians, John Kervyle, Bartolomeo da Urbino, and Leonino da Padova, made compilations of *De regimine*.

refined, redirected, and criticized Aquinas's positions, and frequently struck off in entirely new directions. Works of his that seem to have attained particularly authoritative status are his *Quodlibeta* and *Super librum primum Sententiarum* as well as the *De peccato originali* and *Theoremata de Corpore Christi*.⁸⁶

A sense of Giles's elevated reputation among his contemporaries can be gleaned from the 1304 list of *pecia* exemplars in the shop of André de Sens.⁸⁷ André's shop catered to the Dominicans, whose convent of Saint-Jacques was located close by, so it comes as no surprise that Aquinas is the theologian best represented in the list, with some thirty works.⁸⁸ Nonetheless Giles is the second best represented, with twenty-six works, followed by the Dominicans Albert the Great, with twenty-one, and Nicholas Gorran, the former prior of Saint-Jacques (d. c. 1295), with eight. Lending further support to this impression are the thirty-two surviving manuscripts from the medieval library of the Sorbonne containing Giles's works. With a few exceptions, all the manuscripts are products of the late 13th and early 14th centuries. Moreover, eight of them came to the Sorbonne by way of Godfrey of Fontaines and six were bequests to the college by Peter of Limoges.⁸⁹ Several Aegidian manuscripts also survive

86 This assessment is based on the evidence of surviving manuscripts described in the Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia catalogues of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana and French libraries and from those catalogued in Bruni, *Opere di Egidio Romano*, 113–15, 120–21, 127–30.

87 Denifle and Chatelain, *CUP*, 2: 107–12.

88 Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, *Manuscripts and Their Makers: Commercial Book Producers in Medieval Paris, 1200–1500*, 1 (Turnhout, 2000), 81–93.

89 The manuscripts are Bibliothèque nationale de France, mss. lat. 15350 (s. xiii^{ex}; Godfrey of Fontaines); lat. 15353 (s. xiii^{ex}); lat. 15449 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ; Godfrey); lat. 15450 (s. xiv); lat. 15763 (s. xiii^{ex}); lat. 15819 (s. xiii; Godfrey); lat. 15848 (s. xiii^{ex}; Godfrey); lat. 15851 (s. xiv^{1/4}); lat. 15860 (s. xivⁱⁿ); lat. 15861 (s. xivⁱⁿ); lat. 15862 (s. xivⁱⁿ); lat. 15863 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ; Peter of Limoges); lat. 16080 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ; Godfrey); lat. 16092 (s. xiii); lat. 16096 (AD 1278; Godfrey); lat. 16097 (s. xivⁱⁿ); lat. 16104 (s. xiii^{ex}); lat. 16121 (s. xiv); lat. 16122 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ; Peter); lat. 16123 (s. xivⁱⁿ); lat. 16124 (s. xiii^{ex}; Peter); lat. 16154 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ); lat. 16157 (s. xiii^{ex}; Peter); lat. 16158 (s. xivⁱⁿ); lat. 16170 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ); lat. 16195 (s. xiii^{ex}); lat. 16297 (s. xiii^{ex}; Godfrey); lat. 16533 (s. xiv, after AD 1347); lat. 16595 (s. xiii^{med.3/4}); lat. 16607 (s. xiii; Godfrey); lat. 16616 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ; Peter); lat. 16681 (s. xiii^{ex}/xivⁱⁿ; Peter). MSS described in Concetta Luna (ed.), *Catalogo dei manoscritti* (294–372), *Francia (Parigi)*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, 1.1/3** (Florence, 1988), 183–274; Luna, *Reportatio*, 8; or listed in Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum"*, 172–73. Reinforcing evidence for the large number of manuscripts containing Giles's works in the medieval library of the Sorbonne can be found in Leopold Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale*, 3 (Paris, 1881), 9–114.

from the medieval libraries of the abbey of Saint-Victor (9) and from the Grands Augustins (8).⁹⁰

In France outside Paris, the evidence of extant Aegidian manuscripts suggests the continuing influence of his writings in the Augustinian Order, as two of the three largest institutional survivals come from the libraries of the convents of Bordeaux and Toulouse. Interestingly, the Cistercians of Clairvaux also appear to have put together a significant collection (8 MSS).⁹¹ Beyond France, some sense of the impact of Giles's works on teaching in the arts and theology faculties in England's universities comes from a sampling of evidence from the medieval catalogues and book lists of the college libraries in Oxford (Merton, with 10 manuscripts) and Cambridge (King's, 9 or 10; Pembroke, 6; Peterhouse 9 or 10).⁹²

As a philosopher and theologian Giles contributed one important voice among many, but as a dispenser of learned advice on the education and conduct of princes and aristocrats his authority among medieval authors came to be unequalled. Scholarly clerics therefore were not the only readers of *De regimine*; moreover, in keeping with Giles's own hope that it would be translated,

90 Luna, *Catalogo dei manoscritti* (294–372), 3–18, 29–30, 33–40, 47–51, 55–56, 68–70, 130–82. The manuscript (Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 15101) not described by Luna is listed in Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum"*, 173. The catalogue of books in the library of Saint-Victor compiled by Claude de Grandrue in 1514 lists sixteen manuscripts containing Giles's works: Gilbert Ouy and Véronika Gerz-von Buren, *Le catalogue de la bibliothèque de l'abbaye de Saint-Victor de Paris de Claude de Grandrue, 1514* (Paris, 1983), 43, 49–50, 52–53, 60, 207–08, 210–11, 383–87, 403.

91 Francesco Del Punta and Concetta Luna, eds., *Catalogo dei manoscritti* (239–293), *Francia (Dipartimenti)*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, 1.1/3* (Florence, 1987), 23–44, 46–48, 150–69, 175–200.

92 F.M. Powicke, *The Medieval Books of Merton College* (Oxford, 1931), 98, 108–09, 153, 164–65, 169–70, 195, 201, 206–07; Peter D. Clarke (ed.), *The University and College Libraries of Cambridge*, Corpus of British Medieval Library Catalogues 10 (London, 2002). The materials edited by Clarke reveal a total of between forty-nine and fifty manuscripts containing texts by Giles in the several libraries of medieval Cambridge. To these should be added the surviving manuscripts from the Cambridge friars that came to the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana by way of Cardinal Marcello Cervini (Pope Marcellus II): MSS Ottob. lat. 196 (Oxford University and then probably at one of the convents of Cambridge friars); Ottob. lat. 468 (Cambridge Augustinians); Ottob. lat. 613 (Oxford University and then Cambridge Augustinians); Ottob. lat. 862 (Cambridge Augustinians); Ottob. lat. 2071 (Cambridge Augustinians); Ottob. lat. 1102 and Ottob. lat. 1166 (probably from one of the convents of friars in Cambridge). Barbara Faes de Mottoni and Concetta Luna, eds., *Catalogo dei manoscritti* (1–95), *Città del Vaticano*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, 1.1/1 (Florence, 1987), 40–43, 45–56; Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum"*, 170–71.

a number of them took on the task of rendering it in the vernacular for the benefit of the work's ostensible target audience.⁹³ Its earliest translation was also the most widely circulated. Henri de Gauchi's abbreviated and simplified version in French, which was made, as mentioned above, at the request of Philip III in 1282, survives in thirty-six manuscript copies. Many of these copies bear signs of having been made for or owned by readers of high social status, including several kings of France and England and members of both their families, several popes, the dukes of Milan and Ferrara, and an assortment of other nobles. Some copies, though, belonged to readers of lesser status, including knights and members of the urban middle class. Despite the considerable popularity of this version, however, six further independent French translations survive, each of which is represented by only a single exemplar, all bearing signs of having been presentation copies for the original intended reader. There is little doubt that each of the translators and their patrons knew of the existence of de Gauchi's version, so it seems likely that their efforts were motivated by a combination of wanting to make improvements on de Gauchi's abridged text and the desire to signal the prestige and learning of the intended recipient, which in the case of these translations included King Charles V of France and Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy.

The demand for a vernacular version was hardly limited to Francophone readers, however. Already in 1288 an Italian translation had been made from de Gauchi's French version,⁹⁴ which version again served as the base text for an independent translation by one Giovanni di Nicholo da Guanto, now in a 15th-century manuscript. Three other Italian versions are from the Latin; a fourth, by Giuliano Giraldi, is now lost.⁹⁵ In early 14th-century Italy the *De regimine*, as

93 Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, 2.2.8 (Rome, 1607; repr. Aalen, 1967): "Sic ergo morale negocium scire expedit ab iis qui cupiunt principari: ut si omnes alias scientias ignorarent, adhuc studere debent, ut eis moralia vulgariter et grosse proportionentur: quia per ea princeps sufficienter instruitur, qualiter debeat principari, et quo se et cives inducere debeat ad virtutes"; 2.3.20: "vel legeretur ad mensam liber de regimine principum, ut etiam ipsi principantes instruerentur, qualiter principari deberent; et alii docerentur, quomodo est principibus obediendum. Haec ergo, vel alia utilia tradita secundum vulgare idioma, ut omnes per ea edoceri possent, in mensis regum et principum legenda essent."

94 Nine copies, five complete and four partial, survive of this translation: Paolo Di Stefano, "Preliminari per un'edizione critica de 'Libro del governmento dei re e dei principi,'" *Medioevo romanzo* 9 (1984), 65–84. See also Fiammetta Papi, "Il vocabolario delle virtù nell'Egidio volgare: Umiltà, virtù *honoris amativa*, magnanimità," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 4 (2012), 379–413.

95 Bruni, *Opere di Egidio Romano*, 104; Di Stefano, "Preliminari," 67; Perret, *Traductions françaises du "De regimine principum"*, 35–36.

well as several other of Giles's philosophical works, also attracted the attention of the Jewish scholar of Rome, Yehuda Romano. He made several partial translations into Hebrew, including one of *De regimine* 2.1.14, which warns princes against seeking the counsel of their wives.⁹⁶ Sometime later, probably in the 15th century, another Hebrew translation, this time of virtually the full text (it breaks off in the middle of 3.2.31 in the only extant copy), was made by an Italian named Moshe, who writes at the beginning that Giles "compiled it from the writings of the philosophers and especially Aristotle."⁹⁷

In 1343 the Carmelite Arnau Stanyol produced a Catalan translation for Jaume, count of Urgel, which was later glossed by a "mestre Alexis". Several copies of this glossed version survive.⁹⁸ Between 1344 and 1350 a Castilian translation of extracts from *De regimine* with extensive glosses appeared, which has traditionally been ascribed to the Franciscan friar Juan García de Castrojeriz. Twenty-two copies of this version survive.⁹⁹ A Portuguese translation, now lost, was prepared at the command of the infante Dom Pedro in 1438, who we know also owned a copy in Latin.¹⁰⁰

The earliest non-French translations in northern Europe are an abridged Flemish version of the first half of the 14th century, probably derived from de Gauchi, and the roughly contemporary Swedish mirror, *Um styrilsi konunga ok höfþinga*, that is heavily dependent on *De regimine* but also cites several other authorities.¹⁰¹ In German-speaking lands the Augustinians played a key role in translating *De regimine*. In the late 1300s the friars Johann von Vippach of

96 Caterina Rigo, "Egidio Romano nella cultura ebraica: le versioni di Yehudah b. Mosheh Romano," *Documenti e studi* 5 (1994), 397–437.

97 Abraham Melamed, "The Anonymous Hebrew Translation of Aegidius' *De regimine principum*: An Unknown Chapter in Medieval Jewish Political Philosophy," *Documenti e studi* 5 (1994), 439–61, 450.

98 Jukka Kiviharju, *Las glosas del mestre Aleix de Barcelona en su edicion catalana del "De regimine principum" de Egidio Romano y su version navarroaragonesa* (Helsinki, 1995).

99 María Jesús Díez Garretas, José Manuel Fradejas Rueda, and Isabel Acero Duránte, *Los manuscritos de la versión castellana del "De regimine principum" de Gil de Roma* (Tordesillas, 2003). The traditional ascription to Juan García de Castrojeriz has been challenged by the authors, 12–18.

100 Perret, *Traductions françaises du "De regimine principum"*, 36–38.

101 Dirk Van den Auweele, "Un abrégé flamand du 'De regimine principum' de Gilles de Rome," in *"Sapientia doctrina": Mélanges de théologie et de littérature médiévale offerts à Dom Hildebrand Bascour*, (eds.) Roland Hissette, Guibert Michiels, and Dirk Van den Auweele (Louvain, 1980), 327–58; Corinne Péneau, "Um styrilsi konunga ok höfþinga, un miroir inspiré de Gilles de Rome dans la Suède de la première moitié du XIVe siècle," in *Le prince au miroir de la littérature politique de l'Antiquité aux Lumières*, (eds.) Frédérique Lachaud and Lydwine Scordia (Mont-Saint-Aignan, 2007), 191–216.

Erfurt and Johann von Brakel of Osnabruck prepared translations. Von Vippach's *Katharina divina* was a mirror in East Middle German largely derived from *De regimine* and dedicated to the margravine of Meisen, while von Brakel made a complete translation into Middle Low German which he directed not to a prince but to "jedermann". Not long thereafter and certainly before 1412, Brother Leopold Stainreuter of Vienna translated into Middle High German his *Puech von der Ordnung der Fursten* which was destined for either Duke Leopold III or Leopold IV of Austria.¹⁰² In addition to these Augustinian products, there are a late 14th-century West Middle German translation of *De regimine* 2.1–2, entitled *Van der regeronge der stede*, a fragment from c. 1400 of a Middle Low German translation of de Gauchi's version, and an East Middle German abridgement entitled *Welch furste sich vnde syne erbin wil in synem furstethum festin* (c. 1400). This last was evidently rather popular as it is extant in five copies.¹⁰³

In England at the end of the 14th century, the Oxford theologian John Trevisa made a translation from the Latin for his patron, the West Country nobleman Thomas Lord Berkeley. Although this version failed to circulate, for reasons that are probably unrelated to reader demand, Giles's work found an avid lay readership in de Gauchi's French translation and in several other mirrors of English authorship that relied heavily on Giles's mirror.¹⁰⁴ Berkeley's decision to patronize a translation of *De regimine* is significant, since there is every indication that he and Trevisa engaged in what was in effect the first attempt in England since the time of Alfred the Great to promote a program of English vernacular translation of a corpus of key learned texts. Trevisa also translated for Berkeley Ranulf Higden's *Polychronicon* and the *De proprietatibus rerum* of Bartholomeus Anglicus, thus providing Berkeley "a complete analysis of the created world...(*Properties*); a complete depiction of human activity (in Higden's universal history); and a model for the exercise of control over the world (*De regimine*)."¹⁰⁵

So many translations into so many languages surviving in so many copies owned by so many readers is ample evidence of *De regimine*'s popularity with

102 Michael Menzel (ed.), *Die "Katharina divina" des Johann von Vippach: Ein Fürstenspiegel des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne and Vienna, 1989), 12–15.

103 Perret, *Traductions françaises du "De regimine principum"*, 40–41.

104 Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum"*, 53–90; Ulrike Grassnick, *Ratgeber des Königs: Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherideal im spätmittelalterlichen England* (Cologne, 2004).

105 Ralph Hanna, "Sir Thomas Berkeley and His Patronage," *Speculum* 64 (1989), 878–916, 898; see also Fiona Somerset, *Clerical Discourse and Lay Audience in Late Medieval England* (Cambridge, 1998), 62–78.

a lay audience in the Late Middle Ages. Having thus become, in the estimation of Wilhelm Berges, “der am weitesten verbreitete abenländische Fürstenspiegel und überhaupt eines der meistgelesenen Bücher des späten Mittelalters,” there is good reason to think that *De regimine* exercised considerable influence on lay political culture. This supposition is confirmed by the frequent citing of the text by numerous authors writing in the vernacular, including Dante in the *Convivio*, Juan Manuel in the *Libro de los Estados*, Alfonso de la Torre in his *Visión deleitable*, Diego de Valera in the *Doctrinal de príncipes*, King Duarte of Portugal in his *Leal Conselheiro*, Fernão Lopes in the *Crónica do Rei D. Pedro*, Honoré Bouvet in the *Arbre des batailles*, Christine de Pizan in her *Fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles v* and *Livre du corps de policie*, John Gower in the *Confessio Amantis*, Chaucer in the *Canterbury Tales*, Thomas Hoccleve in the *Regiment of Princes*, and the anonymous authors of the Castilian *Castigos y documentos del rey don Sancho*, and the French *Avis aux roys* and *L'estat et le gouvernement comme les princes et seigneurs se doivent gouverner*.¹⁰⁶ It was, as already mentioned, recommended by Jean Gerson to Charles VI of France, but also a few years earlier by Philippe de Mézières in the *Songe du viel pelerin* and Pedro López de Ayala in the *Rimado de Palacio*, who counselled: “Qual regimiento deuen los principes tener/es escripto en los libros que sol-emos leer;/Egidio el Romano, omne de grant saber; in regimine principum lo fue buen componer.”¹⁰⁷

Giles's advice on military matters in *De regimine* 3.3, culled largely from Vegetius, helped bring “Vegetian teaching and ideas regarding the ‘discipline of war’ to a wider readership,” while also alerting readers to “some of the more philosophical aspects” in Vegetius, including the idea of the army's principal role being that of service to the nation and its ruler in defense of the common

106 Briggs, *Giles of Rome's “De regimine principum”*, 18; Jacques Krynen, *L'empire du roi: idées et croyances politiques en France, XIIIe–XVe siècle* (Paris, 1993), 200–01; Alastair J. Minnis, “I speke of folk in seculer estaat’: Vernacularity and Secularity in the Age of Chaucer,” *Studies in the Age of Chaucer* 27 (2005), 25–58, 34–35; Stephen H. Rigby, “Aristotle for Aristocrats and Poets: Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* as Theodicy of Privilege,” *The Chaucer Review* 46 (2012), 259–313, 264–67 and “Worthy but Wise? Virtuous and Non-Virtuous Forms of Courage in the Late Middle Ages,” *Studies in the Age of Chaucer* 35 (2013), 329–71; Saturino Alvarez Turienzo, “El tratado ‘De regimine principum’ de Egidio Romano, y su presencia en la baja Edad Media hispánica,” *Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía* 22 (1995), 7–25, 18–22.

107 Briggs, *Giles of Rome's “De regimine principum”*, 18; Dora M. Bell, *L'idéal éthique de la royauté en France au Moyen Age* (Geneva and Paris, 1962), 79 and 93; Alvarez Turienzo “Tratado”, 19.

good, as well as the prime importance of prudence in military command.¹⁰⁸ Denis the Carthusian drew from it when writing his *De vita et regimine principum*, as did the Scottish herald Adam Loutfut who, at the end of the 15th century made a Scots translation of William Caxton's English translation of Christine's adaptation of Vegetius and Giles, the *Livre de fais d'armes et de chevalrie*.¹⁰⁹ The anonymous chaplain of Henry V who composed the *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, said that the king relied on Giles's advice when laying siege to Harfleur in 1415; the preceding year a sermon was preached before this same king recommending that he and his nobles and knights attend to the "many sotell questions and conclusions in mater of werre and armes" found in Vegetius and "Gylus, De Regimine, parte vltima."¹¹⁰ Also in 1415, at the siege of Ceuta, King João I of Portugal was reported to have followed Giles's advice.¹¹¹

During the 14th and 15th centuries, then, aristocratic lay readers and their clerical counsellors regarded Giles as one of the chief authorities on matters of governance and warfare. Stephen Rigby has recently said of Giles's teachings that they "were the commonplaces of the political thought of [Chaucer's] day," a judgment echoed by John Watts, who has said of late medieval England and France that their "dominant literature of political theory was mostly Egidian in its assumptions."¹¹² For Jacques Krynen, *De regimine* "était appelée à devenir une source obligée dans le domaine de la réflexion politique séculière," while Alastair Minnis has credited it as being one of the chief texts through which Aristotle's ideas informed the distinctly secular, lay culture that developed in the late Middle Ages.¹¹³ That Giles's legacy made itself felt, paradoxically, both in a religious Order that assiduously promoted the ideal of a hierocratic Church and Christian society and, conversely, in a more vigorous and self-confident secular discourse of politics and society testifies to his considerable impact on Western intellectual culture.

¹⁰⁸ Christopher Allmand, *The "De re militari" of Vegetius: The Reception, Transmission and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2011), 238 and 263; Craig Taylor, *Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War* (Cambridge, 2013), 49 and 249.

¹⁰⁹ Allmand, *The "De re militari,"* 79 and 235–36.

¹¹⁰ Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum,"* 64.

¹¹¹ Briggs, *Giles of Rome's "De regimine principum,"* 65.

¹¹² Stephen H. Rigby, *Wisdom and Chivalry: Chaucer's "Knight's Tale" and Medieval Political Theory* (Leiden, 2009), 19; John Watts, *Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship* (Cambridge, 1996), 20–21.

¹¹³ Krynen, *L'empire*, 187; Minnis, "I speke of folk in seculer estaat."

Theology

Richard Cross

1 Introduction

Scholastic thought—and, so, *a fortiori*, scholastic theology—was an intensely dialectical undertaking. Theologians generally worked out their ideas in dialogue and debate with their contemporaries and immediate predecessors, with the authority of patristic theologians (pre-eminently Augustine and John of Damascus), Church Councils (to the extent that they were known), papal teachings, and, in a different way, non-Christian philosophers (notably Aristotle and Avicenna), as both sources and controls. Understanding theologians' ideas therefore almost always involves, among other things, some sense of the identity of their conversation partners, and some idea of the hermeneutical strategies they used in interpreting philosophers and Church Fathers.

Detailed knowledge of this close context is particularly important for understanding Giles of Rome's theology, since he adopts a rather idiosyncratic approach to the theologian's dialectical task. It was typical to engage with a large range of contemporaries, and—at least among theologians not affiliated with one of the two great unified mendicant orders, Franciscan and Dominican—to have as positive influences a rather syncretic group of theologians. What stands out in Giles's theology is a focus on just one figure: his (probable) teacher, Thomas Aquinas. By and large, Giles simply follows Aquinas in theology, sometimes even getting into trouble for defending positions held by Aquinas.¹ But it is also the case, typically, that when he engages an opinion with which to disagree, it is Aquinas's view that he targets.² Giles's approach is rather catlike: he tugs at loose threads in Thomas's weave, and keeps pulling to see how much will come unravelled. Unlike his feline analogues, however, Giles spends a great deal of time trying to reknit the materials into some new

1 On this, see the commentary in Robert Wielockx's edition of Giles, *Apologia*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.1 (Florence, 1985), 179–224.

2 See Concetta Luna's discussion in the introduction to her edition of Giles, *Reportatio*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.2 (Florence, 2003), 50–75. In Giles's lifetime, there was some hostility to his theology amongst card-carrying Thomists. See, for example, Robert Orford's *Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum*, (ed.) Andrew P. Vella, Bibliothèque Thomiste 38 (Paris, 1968).

and better-fitting garment. And, to put it coarsely, the theological disagreements with Aquinas generally result from Giles's divergence from Aquinas in two key philosophical areas: action theory and moral psychology, on the one hand, and metaphysics, on the other. And in both of these cases, Giles's distinctive views were formulated on the basis of philosophical disagreements with Henry of Ghent—in the former case (action theory and moral psychology) with the events of 1277 in the foreground. The chapters by Pickavé and Eardley in this volume make the contours of these debates abundantly plain.

My argument, then, will be that Giles's theology, in its central thrust, is, and remains, broadly Thomist. Scholars have, of course, drawn attention to the great significance of Augustine for Giles. Robert Wielockx has shown, for example, that Giles, particularly in the years after 1277, and even more so after 1285, paid particular attention to close study of a very wide range of Augustinian texts,³ and Giorgio Pini has suggested, developing Wielockx's conclusions to discern something of Giles's intellectual development, that:

We can assess to what extent Giles became indebted to Augustine in his later years if we consider his theological masterpiece, his commentary on the second Book of the *Sentences*, which he finished after 1309, when he had been Archbishop of Bourges for some fifteen years. If we compare what he says in the later work with the parallel treatments of the same issues in the disputed questions dating from the beginning of his regency at Paris (such as the *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, the *Quaestiones de mensura angelorum* and the *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*), the presence of Augustine in the later work turns out to be pervasive.⁴

Pini suggests too that the close study of Augustine's texts, characteristic of the 14th century more generally, and of the Augustinian friars more particularly, can likely be traced in part to Giles's example.⁵ But, as Pini notes, current research has yet to yield sufficient information concerning Giles's substantive

3 Robert Wielockx, "Une collection d'autographes de Gilles de Rome," in *Gli autografi medievali: Problemi paleografici e filologici*, (eds.) P. Chiesa and L. Pinelli (Spoleto, 1994), 207–53.

4 Giorgio Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Augustinian Order," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, (eds.) Kent Emery Jr., William J. Courtenay and Stephen J. Metzger (Turnhout, 2012), 423. Pini has himself done important work on this: see his "La dottrina della creazione e la ricenzione delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino nelle *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (qq. 1–7) di Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi* 3 (1992), 271–304, 491–559; also "Ex defectu intellectualis luminis: Giles of Rome on the Role and Limit of Metaphysics," *Quaestio* 5 (2005), 205–19.

5 Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity," 423–24.

theological commitments: “Admittedly, if the extent of Augustine’s influence on Giles is unquestionable, its details must still be assessed.”⁶ Concetta Luna has made some progress in this respect, noting certain ways in which Giles’s early theology (in the *Reportatio*) favors Aquinas’s later, more Augustinian view over his earlier one on the question of the impossibility of avoiding mortal sin without grace.⁷

My chapter here is intended to constitute, among other things, a small contribution to this task, that is, to determining the extent to which Giles’s theology may be called “Augustinian”. And while acknowledging that much work remains to be done, I have found, in my research for this chapter, and on Giles’s theology more generally, no evidence to defeat the view that in crucial ways the central academic *theological* concerns articulated by Giles are no more distinctively Augustinian than Aquinas’s are, despite his deep familiarity with a huge portion of the Augustinian corpus. Indeed, as I shall establish below, in at least one very crucial respect Giles diverges from some central Augustinian claims about grace to which Aquinas himself remains, at least in his late work, markedly faithful. And Giles makes the divergence clearer—articulating it in much more detail—towards the end of his life, in his magisterial commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences*.

In this chapter I shall focus on that part of Giles’s university-based literary production (including work directly inspired by academic pedagogical forms) that bears directly on his theology.⁸ Among that corpus, I take the following works to represent Giles’s settled, mature (post-1285) positions in theology: the *Quodlibeta*, the commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences* (the *Ordinatio*), and the *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*.⁹ The commentary on Book 1 of the *Sentences* (the *Ordinatio*) is early (1271–3), from around the same time as the *Reportatio*, on the first book of which it is evidently based.¹⁰ Likewise early is the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, a text in which Giles begins to develop the

6 Pini, “Building the Augustinian Identity,” 423.

7 See Luna’s edition of Giles, *Reportatio*, 57–69, referring to Giles, *Reportatio* 2.68, 348–50 and 2.69, 350.

8 I take theology rather narrowly. I ignore angelology, for example, because for us the interest in almost all medieval discussions of this issue is metaphysical and psychological, rather than specifically theological.

9 For a thorough analysis of Giles’s theological quodlibets, see Giorgio Pini, “Giles of Rome” in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, (ed.) Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2006), 233–86.

10 The *Reportatio* on Book 1 survives only in fragmentary state: an abbreviation by Godfrey of Fontaines gives us the prologue and distinctions 2 and 3; more complete versions of distinctions 37 and 39 are included in the same manuscript that contains Books 2 to 4.

very characteristic theory of modes that characterizes much of his later metaphysical thinking. This theory enables him to engage with the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent on the question of essence and existence, something that he first expounds some time later than the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, in the *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, building on the mode-theory developed in the earlier *Theoremata*.

2 Free Will and Its Theological Problems

Like Aquinas, Giles of Rome takes Augustine's teachings on grace and predestination as the starting point for his own.¹¹ Central to the views of Augustine and Aquinas (and Giles) is the doctrine known as "single predestination". According to this theory God predestines certain people for salvation and gives them the assistance—grace—sufficient for the achievement of this state;¹² God gives no help to other people, and thus on the basis of his knowledge of their sins denies salvation to them.¹³ (The contrasting view is double predestination, later found in Calvin: God predestines some to salvation, and others to damnation. On the single predestination view, damnation is the consequence of human sin; on the double predestination view, damnation, and thus the sinfulness sufficient for damnation, is the consequence of predestination.)

On the face of it single predestination is an inherently unstable position since, while it does not make damnation the result of a divine action, it certainly makes it the result of a divine omission and thus, seemingly, the result at least of a divine choice. Still, on an appropriate and seemingly uncontroversial theory of causation—according to which omissions are never causally salient—this instability can be moderated. After all, how can non-events, or non-existents, more generally, *cause* anything? Now, as thus laid out, neither view on predestination allows for the possibility that God's initial offer of grace might be resisted. And I take Augustine explicitly, in some passages, anyway, to deny the resistibility of such grace, and Aquinas to deny it at least by

11 For a treatment of Giles's teaching on grace and predestination as found in his introductory treatise, *De praedestinatione et praescientia, paradiso et inferno*, see Bettina E. Holstein, "A Commentary on the *De praedestinatione et praescientia, paradiso et inferno* by Giles of Rome on the Basis of MS Cambrai BM 487 (455)" (Ph.D. diss., Technische Universität Berlin, 2007).

12 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.40.1.2 (Venice 1521, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968), fols. 210vQ-211rA.

13 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.40.2.1, fol. 213rbF-H.

implication.¹⁴ Be this as it may, affirming its resistibility, and positing a method by which grace can be resisted, seems to mark a definite and explicit step away from the ambiguities of Augustine's position: judicious silence would be a more faithful response.

Now, accepting the irresistibility of grace makes it clear how it is that God is able to foreknow the identity of the saved: he chooses them, and infallibly knows his own choices. But suppose the offer of grace is resistible. Is this view compatible with single predestination? On the face of it, one way of making it so is to make the relevant foreseen fault precisely the rejection of the divine gift of grace. And this is just what Giles proposes—a stance rather problematic if it is assumed that Giles is a particularly Augustinian theologian.

In the *Reportatio*, Giles claims that God offers to everyone sufficient preparatory help—"such as inspirations and devotions"—but that some choose to resist this help, and thus do not receive grace.¹⁵ In Book 2 of the commentary on the *Sentences*, Giles elaborates on this picture, though without changing its fundamental contours. Building on a structure first set out by Aquinas, Giles discerns four logically ordered moments in the reception of grace: a divinely-given provocation to accept grace (an *impulsio* or *impetus*); a choice to accept God; a choice to reject sin; and the infusion of justifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*).¹⁶ As with Aquinas, this final stage consists in the infusion of

14 Augustine is a fluid thinker, and not always as clear as we might like. Christopher Kirwan has shown that, even in his late works, there is some ambiguity between "God's causing <a person> to have the power to make <good decisions>" and "God's causing him to make them." Kirwan, *Augustine* (London and New York, 1989), 113. But there are clear passages in which Augustine asserts the latter: for example, free decision "is ascribable to the grace of God ... not only for its being but also for its being good, that is, converted to doing the Lord's commands." *De peccatorum meritis* 2.6.7 (CCSL, 60), 77 and "<Free> will ... has to be attributed to God's gift not only because it comes from free decision, which was created with us in our natures, but also because God acts on us, by our being persuaded by what we see, to will and to believe ... God works in men to will and to believe and his mercy precedes us in everything." *De spiritu et littera*, 34.60 (CCSL, 60), 220; translations from Kirwan, *Augustine*, 114, slightly adapted. While Aquinas never speaks in ways that suggest that grace is resistible, I nevertheless cannot find a passage in which he expressly affirms its irresistibility. But he notes that the preparation for grace is "an act of free will moved by God" and that God's intending to bestow grace is sufficient for its bestowal, passages that it would be hard (though perhaps not impossible) to reconcile with a belief in the resistibility of grace. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.112.2 and 3, corp. See also n. 16 below.

15 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.70, 352.

16 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.26.2.3 (Venice 1581, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968), 2:330aD. For Aquinas, see *Summa theologiae* 1–2.113.8, corp. Note that Giles shifts Aquinas's schema in

an accidental quality, a supernatural disposition or habit in virtue of which a person is rendered appropriately valuable to God.¹⁷ The initial provocation, so Giles thinks, consists of one or more of the following: God's infusing regret for sin, or God's infusing good thoughts—whether directly or “through Holy Scripture”.¹⁸ These provocations are resistible, and if actually resisted none of the subsequent steps follows:

When God thus inserts (*immittit*) good thoughts into us, and thus calls us through them, it is in our power to will to follow him, or not to follow. And if we follow him, grace is infused into us; and if <we do> not, then we are excluded from it. Therefore, preceding the infusion of grace there is, first, the divine calling or the insertion of divine thoughts; then there follows <the movement> of free choice (*liberi arbitrii*) to God; and then the infusion of grace.¹⁹

Giles is careful to note that there is a sense in which this last stage—the infusion of grace—is also voluntary: it is not coerced, or something against our will. But this act of will is nevertheless the result of God's moving the will and, I take it, at this point in the process, irresistibly so. Thus, *after* the free “consent and acceptance <of good thoughts> by free choice” there follows “a divine motion by which <God> moves the mind to accept grace.”²⁰ And logically subsequent to that there “follows ... the infusion of grace.”²¹

the direction of resistibility. Aquinas's first step, the infusion of grace, consists in God's (irresistible) action, moving the human will. The second two stages are the will's two-fold motion, and the final stage is the reception of justifying or habitual grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) as in Giles. There is, also, a significant terminological shift between the *Reportatio* and the commentary, one that reflects a similar change between Aquinas's commentary on the *Sentences* and his *Summa theologiae*. In the *Reportatio*, just as in Aquinas's *Sentences* commentary, these antecedent gifts are referred to as *gratia gratis data*. See Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.70, 351; see Aquinas, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* 2.28.1.4, corp.; later, Giles—like the later Aquinas—uses “*gratia gratis data*” to refer to gifts given to people other than the subject of conversion, as aids in that person's conversion. Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.26.2.2, 2, 327bB-C; see Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.111.1, corp.

17 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.26.1.1, 2:316aD–bA. On its status as an accident, see *Ordinatio* 2.26.1.2, 2:318aC. For Aquinas, see *Summa theologiae* 1–2.110.2, corp.

18 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.28.1.3, 2:366aB.

19 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.28.1.3, 2:366aC–D.

20 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.28.1.4, 2:369bB.

21 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.28.1.4, 2:369bC.

Now, on the face of it Aquinas proposes something not dissimilar. Two people hearing the same preaching, for example, can react in very different ways. One might accept the teaching, and the other not. But for Aquinas these differences in reaction are explained by the intervention of saving grace *prior* to the reaction. Aquinas uses this phenomenon as an argument in favor of the necessity for grace.²² For Giles, the causal order is reversed: the different reactions explain the presence or absence of saving grace. But, of course, pushing the example in this direction is on the face of it incompatible with a strong doctrine of predestination. God offers grace to everyone, but only certain people accept it. But since such acceptance is up to the individual, talk of predestination seems, after all, to be reducible to talk of foreknowledge: God gives grace on the basis of his knowledge of their reaction to human or divine prompting. At any rate, Giles is clear on the causal issue: God, and God alone, gives grace, without any foreseen merit. And our preparation for grace “is not sufficient ... without a divine motion or divine calling.”²³

So we could not accuse Giles of any kind of Pelagianism, despite his affirmation of the resistibility of grace. But the problem about the coherence of predestination with free will remains, and as far as I can see Giles does not know how to resolve it (though I do not think he saw the force of the worry, either). Giles tackles the issue by supposing that the problems raised by predestination are the same as those raised by God’s knowledge of contingent facts in general. He deals with this latter issue in the standard Boethian way: God knows contingent facts by their being present to his timeless eternity; God thus “sees” rather than “foresees” them. And this *scientia visionis* no more imposes necessity on such facts than does my knowing contingent facts by seeing them—despite the fact that, of course, it is necessary that, if *x* knows that *p*, then *p*, even if the consequent (and hence the antecedent) of this conditional is contingent.²⁴

Now, God’s predestination is necessary. And one way to account for this is by appealing to the fact that his predestination is necessary merely in the sense that his knowledge of contingent facts is necessary in the harmless way just outlined.²⁵ However, as Giles seems to notice, this is not sufficient as an account of the necessity of predestination. After all, predestination is a matter of *divine* choice, and the point about the Boethian account of foreknowledge is that it is intended to make foreknowledge compatible with merely *human*

22 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 2–2.6.1, corp.

23 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.28.1.3, 2:366aD.

24 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.36, 261 and *Quodlibet* 3.3 (Louvain 1646, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1966), 136a.

25 See e.g. Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.40.1.1, fol. 210vaM and *Ordinatio* 1.40.2.1, fol. 212vaM.

choice. So Giles proposes a second account of the mechanism of predestination: predestination is a matter of divine choice, and this “divine plan is fulfilled necessarily (*divinum propositum de necessitate impletur*).”²⁶ Giles insists that the order of causes in the divine plan requires that necessary causes cause necessarily, and contingent causes contingently:

Just as God, from eternity, foresaw that this person was to be saved, so this person will be saved. So all those causes which God saw from eternity to co-cause the salvation of this person do co-cause it. And there is a complete order of causes that was foreseen by God from eternity, and all of these causes taken together impose (*inferunt*) a certain necessity on the effects. But freedom of choice is not taken away by this necessity or certainty, since free choice is counted among these causes.²⁷

In an attempt to explain how this can be, Giles argues that such contingent events are necessary in relation to divine willing, but contingent in relation to created causes.²⁸ Aquinas had argued much the same in relation to God’s foreknowledge: “Things known by God are contingent in virtue of their proximate causes, even though God’s knowledge, which is the first cause, is necessary.”²⁹ God knows things by causing them; but in relation to their immediate, created causes, such things can be contingent even though they are necessary in relation to God’s knowledge, given God’s prior causal activity.

I must confess that it is not at all clear to me what this is all supposed to amount to. On the face of it, these are very different kinds of explanation: the appeal to immutable foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom, in the sense that merely knowing such-and-such an object does not impose any necessity on it, and could indeed be causally dependent on the object. The appeal to God’s immutable will, however, is not so compatible: God infallibly knows such-and-such an object by his having caused that object. (In fact, Giles in any case denies that God’s *scientia visionis* depends in any way on its object: so it looks as though any appeal to such knowledge turns out to be theoretically or explanatorily vacuous.)³⁰

Setting these difficulties aside, note that the theological teaching here—about the resistibility of grace—remains in essence the same, despite

²⁶ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.40.1.1, fol. 210vaM; 1.40.2.1, fol. 212vaM.

²⁷ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.40.2.1, fol. 212vaM-vbN.

²⁸ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.40.2.1, fol. 212vbP.

²⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.14.13, ad 1.

³⁰ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.1, 352b–353a.

the philosophical shifts between the *Reportatio* and the later works, noted by Eardley in his contribution to this volume. (Indeed, as Wielockx has shown, the teaching on the will contained in the *Reportatio* is in large part a copy of Aquinas's *De malo*, q. 6).³¹ In fact, the shifts make part of the later account easier to understand. After all, the later Giles has a theory—the bifurcated will—that can in principle explain how it is that humans can freely choose between things.³² But this later, libertarian, approach raises a problem: how can it be that the reception of grace itself—the fourth stage in Giles's account of the bestowal of grace—counts as a free act, given that it is not one over which the agent has any power?

In the *Quodlibets* Giles addresses a closely analogous problem, and in so doing moderates the libertarian requirement for freedom. It turns out that some free acts involve genuinely alternate possibilities—the bifurcated will—but that the presence of alternate possibilities is not a necessary condition for freedom. The issue in the quodlibet is this: if an agent's will is moved by some other agent, can this activity count as meritorious?³³ Giles notes that it is simply contradictory for the will to be *coerced* since coercion consists in being made to do what is against one's will. If on the other hand the will is *moved* by another agent, then the activity is in accordance with the will and thus "from" the will (even if caused by something external to the agent). This is sufficient for the action to be rendered morally praiseworthy (or blameworthy). Giles's example is the conversion of St Paul.³⁴ So here Giles's moves in a compatibilist direction would solve the problem of predestination; but only at the cost of sacrificing the libertarianism that he is by and large so anxious to maintain. Of course, Giles can use this account for its intended purpose—to show how the reception of grace is morally praiseworthy even if caused by something external to the agent. But he cannot use it as a general solution to the question of the compatibility of predestination and free will, on pain of contradiction.

I think it is fair to say that the later Giles, irrespective of the presence of this concession to compatibilism, remains more inclined to some kind of

31 Robert Wielockx, "Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome à la lumière de la bibliothèque de Godfroid de Fontaines," in *L'Aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du débat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome*, (eds.) Valérie Cordonier and Tiziana Suarez-Nani (Fribourg, 2014), 181–211.

32 On the bifurcated will, see Eardley's contribution to this volume as well as his "Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Will," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56 (2003), 835–62 and "The Foundations of Freedom in Later Medieval Philosophy: Giles of Rome and his Contemporaries," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 44 (2006), 353–76.

33 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.13, 400b.

34 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.13, 402a.

voluntarism than, say, Aquinas is. That is to say, he persistently emphasizes the role and importance of the will. Indeed, his interest in the *theological* centrality of will predates his shift towards a more libertarian view of free will under the influence of 1277. We can see something of this if we look at the ways in which Giles engages with—and rejects—Aquinas's view that theology is a theoretical science whose proper subject is God.³⁵ In the early *Reportatio*, Giles objects to Aquinas's claim that God is the subject of theology for the rather technical reason that the subject of a science is not simply an object, but an object considered under a certain description. The relevant description in the case of theology must be some aspect of God that is "in no way knowable by human reason."³⁶ And this aspect is "God as restorer or rewarder of all."³⁷ In the *Ordinatio*, Giles makes his reasoning clearer. Since some things are, in some sense, the subjects of many sciences, it is necessary to specify the ways in which those things are the subjects of a science, lest there be "mixing (*confusio*) of the sciences."³⁸ Giles's view—that God as restorer and glorifier is the subject of theology³⁹—is clearly influenced by the view of Hugh of St. Victor that Giles reports immediately before giving his own view, that the subject of theology is simply "the works of restoration."⁴⁰

Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that Giles believes theology to be oriented to activity—achieving the final, glorified goal of human existence, the beatific vision—and not merely theoretical speculation. Giles makes it clear that we should think of theology as neither properly theoretical nor properly practical: not theoretical, because it is "ordered to the love of God"⁴¹ and not practical, because it is ordered specifically not to external moral activity but to the internal activity of loving God.⁴² Giles holds that, to the extent that it could

35 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.1.4 and 7, corp.

36 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.3.1, 493. For Giles on the subject of theology, see Peter W. Nash, "Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology," *Mediaeval Studies* 18 (1956), 61–92; Concetta Luna, "Una nuova questione di Egidio Romano *De subiecto theologiae*," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 37 (1990), 397–439; 38 (1991), 129–72.

37 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.2, 492.

38 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 3vbN.

39 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 3vbN.

40 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 3vaM, referring to Hugh, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, prol., 2 (PL 176), col. 183A–C.

41 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.3.5, 495; see *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 7vbQ–8raA.

42 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.3.5, 495; *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 8raB. The whole discussion here is reminiscent of Bonaventure, who points out that theology is "wisdom, which means both cognition and affect (*affectum*).” See his *In Sent.* 1.prooem.3 c (Opera Omnia; 10 vols., Quaracchi, 1882–1902), 1:13b.

be considered both a theoretical and a practical science, theology is “more theoretical than practical”: beatitude consists in the vision of God, and the vision of God is in itself something cognitive, albeit having, as we shall see in a moment, strongly affective components.⁴³ In the *Ordinatio*, Giles follows the *Summa fratris Alexandri* and Albert the Great in maintaining that theology is not strictly theoretical or practical, but rather affective.⁴⁴ As Giles puts it:

Because charity is simply speaking the goal of theology, as is proved—because charity is increased in it throughout as its principal goal—it should be named from it, and because charity is in the affect (*affectu*) and not the intellect ... theology should properly speaking be called neither theoretical nor practical but affective, because it principally induces to affection. For this reason it is well said that it is more wisdom (*sapientia*) <than science> from the fact that it induces to the taste (*saporem*) of divine things.⁴⁵

In line with this, Giles believes that it is more accurate to think of theology at its heart as wisdom (*sapientia*) rather than as science.⁴⁶ It can be considered as a science to the extent that it treats of human things “as a consequence” of its treatment of divine matters.⁴⁷ But to the extent that it treats of God, it is wisdom.⁴⁸ In this context, Giles appeals to Bernard of Clairvaux’s avowedly speculative etymology of “wisdom” (*sapientia*),⁴⁹ to suggest something as much affective as cognitive. For Giles *sapientia* is not, as he states, from “*sapiendo*’

43 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 8raB. In making this concession, Giles follows Aquinas. See Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.1.4, corp. Note, however, that Aquinas does not in this context make Giles’s distinction between external and internal activity, and does not classify sciences as practical (or not) on the basis of this distinction.

44 *Summa fratris Alexandri*, 1.1.1 (*Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica*; 4 vols., Quaracchi, 1924–28), 1:2b; Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae* 1.1.3.3 (*Opera Omnia*; 3 vols., Paris, 1890–99), 34.1:13b.

45 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1, prol., fol. 8raAB. See M. Olszewski, “The Beginning of the Discussion of the Practical or Theoretical Character of Theology: The Positions of Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great and Giles of Rome” *Studia Mediewistyczne* 34/35 (2000), 129–46.

46 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.3.5, 495, though throughout his discussion he assumes that theology is in some sense a science. See too the passages cited in the next two notes.

47 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 6vbO–Q, f. 7raA.

48 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 6vbO, f. 6vbQ.

49 Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Cantica canticorum* 85.8 (*Opera Omnia*; 9 vols., Rome, 1957–77), 2: 312: “Forte ‘sapientia’ a sapore denominatur.”

which means ‘by understanding’, but from ‘*sapore*’⁵⁰ which means *taste*. (The silent appeal to Bernard’s etymology was a commonplace.) A discussion in the *Summa fratris Alexandri*, doubtless known to Giles, makes the affective component explicit: “*sapientia*” is “from the taste of *affection*” (*a sapore affectionis*).⁵¹

This emphasis on affectivity makes itself felt too in Giles’s treatment of the beatific vision. In the *Reportatio*, Giles maintains that beatitude is more properly an act of will than an act of intellect.⁵² In this he is clearly rejecting the view of Aquinas according to whom beatitude is identified as “union with the uncreated good,”⁵³ where such union is achieved through an act of the intellect as opposed to an act of the will.⁵⁴ Giles develops his view in much more detail in the *Quodlibeta*. Asking whether a rational creature is united to God in the beatific vision “more through loving than through understanding,”⁵⁵ he concludes in the affirmative. The beginning point of Giles’s positive discussion, the *sed contra*, consists of a quotation from Hugh of St. Victor’s commentary on Ps.-Dionysius’s *De coelesti hierarchia*: “love enters, where knowledge stays outside.”⁵⁶ The context is important: the quoted words are the premise of an argument proposed by Hugh to show that “love surpasses knowledge and is greater than intelligence.”⁵⁷ And the context in Hugh is important too, because what Hugh writes is an interpretation of Ps.-Dionysius’s claim, in the *lemma* that Hugh is commenting on, that the Seraphim—the highest

50 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1-3.5, 495. The position is more or less repeated at *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 8raB.

51 *Summa fratris Alexandri*, 1.1.1, 1:2b. Godfrey of Fontaines’s incomplete notes on Giles’s teaching in Book I do not make it explicit that Giles taught in his lectures that theology is an affective science. But everything about this *Reportatio* text—the reference to wisdom as affect, the denial that theology is strictly either theoretical or practical—seems to make it plausible to suppose that he maintained from the beginning that theology is an affective science. And Giles attests as much elsewhere: “This science of God is called loving or affective, as we have clearly proven in the questions on the first book of *Sentences*,” i.e., presumably, including the oral lectures reported in the *Reportatio*. Giles of Rome, *In canticum*, prooem. (in Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia*; Parma, 1863, 14:388B). I am grateful to Stephen Dumont for this reference. So the stress on will and affectivity here predates Giles’s later concessions to explicit libertarianism.

52 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.24, 483.

53 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1-2.3.3, corp.

54 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1-2.3.4, corp.

55 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 276b.

56 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 276b, quoting Hugh, *Expositio in hierarchiam coelestem* 6 (PL, 175, col. 1038D), commenting on Ps.-Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia* 7 (PL, 122, col. 1050B).

57 Hugh of St. Victor, *Expositio in hierarchiam coelestem* 6 (PL, 175), col. 1038D.

order of the celestial hierarchy—are “fire-makers”, as contrasted with the Cherubim—the next highest order—who are “carriers of wisdom”.⁵⁸ Granted, Ps.-Dionysius never explicitly makes the association between Seraphim (and the fire-makers), on the one hand, and love, on the other. Rather, this is something provided by Hugh, borrowing from John Scottus Eriugena’s commentary on Ps.-Dionysius’s *De coelesti hierarchia*.⁵⁹ Be this as it may, Giles clearly finds Hugh’s repurposing of Ps.-Dionysius congenial to his broadly voluntarist approach. He deals with the issue in a typically scholastic way, focusing hard on the psychological mechanisms involved in knowing and loving to try to flesh out what Hugh might have had in mind.

Giles has three strategies for defending Hugh’s view. The first compares the act of cognition with the act of volition. The basic tag is “the act of understanding assimilates, but the act of love transforms.”⁶⁰ What Giles means is that cognition always involves mental representation in virtue of which the cognizer has a mental “likeness” of the object even if this likeness is not something causally *prior* to the act of cognition. Love, contrariwise, simply reaches out to its object: “It brings about ecstasy, placing lovers outside themselves... For love does not permit a lover to belong to himself, but forces (*cogit*) the lover to belong to the beloved.”⁶¹ Indeed, according to Giles, “love wants to make the lover the same as the beloved.”⁶² For these unitive purposes the act of love *requires* the presence of its object simply for the sake of the object itself.⁶³ Giles’s claim that cognition always involves representation does not mean that he considers the presence or absence of the object not to make a difference to the act: indeed its presence gives “fuller” understanding. But to the extent that the presence of the object is desired for purposes of cognition, it is so merely for the sake of the act of cognition: to make that act more perfect.⁶⁴ So love transforms, and in doing so requires the presence of the object. (Two ways, I suppose, in which an act of love unites us to God more than an act of cognition does.) Giles immediately cites a *catena* of texts from Ps.-Dionysius’s *De divinis nominibus*:

58 Ps.-Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia* 7 (PL, 122), col. 1050B.

59 For discussion of the issue in Hugh, and its remoter background, see Paul Rorem, *Hugh of Saint Victor* (Oxford, 2009), 172–76. I use Rorem’s translations of Hugh and Ps.-Dionysius in this paragraph.

60 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 277a.

61 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 277a-b.

62 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 278b.

63 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 277b.

64 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 277b.

This is clear through Dionysius, c. 4 of *De divinis nominibus*, recounting the words of Hierotheus, that “all love is a certain unitive power,” saying that “we call love, whether divine, or angelic, or intellectual, or animal, or natural, a unitive power.” And Dionysius shows in the same place that love therefore transforms, because it places the lover outside himself and locates him in the beloved, saying, “what brings about ecstasy? The divine love, not letting the lovers belong to themselves, but to the beloved.”⁶⁵

The second strategy compares the object of the two acts: an act of cognition involves the object merely “as it is in us” (i.e. through a representation); an act of love requires the object “in itself”. Since a cognitive object is received “in the manner of” the recipient, it follows that God as cognized is cognized “in our manner”, whereas God as loved is loved “as in himself”.⁶⁶ The third and final strategy is relatively straightforward: love follows cognition, so “union in cognition is the beginning, and <union> in love the consummation.”⁶⁷

This is not to say that Giles believes the cognitive aspect of the beatific vision to be unimportant. Later in the same *quodlibet* he devotes a detailed discussion to the ways in which the mind is united to God through its cognition of the divine essence, focusing in particular on the claim that cognition requires a representation. As Giles understands cognition in general, it requires three things, each dependent on the earlier ones: an object of cognition, or (in the absence of such an object) a mental representation of the object—an intelligible species; an act of cognition; and a “perfect” or defining concept (a mental “word”) of the object, produced by the act.⁶⁸ The beatific vision is an act of cognition had in the presence of its object. So no prior intelligible species is required.⁶⁹ Neither is there any need for a concept of the object to be produced by the act, since—again—such a concept is required only in the absence of the object.⁷⁰ Rather,

The blessed will not find <God> in a <mental> word that is really different from the divine essence; but they will find the divine essence in themselves, which is therefore said to be a concept belonging to the mind, like a

65 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 277b. The first quotation is from Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* 4.15 (PL, 122), col. 1137A; the second a close paraphrase of *De divinis nominibus* 4.13 (PL, 122), col. 1136A.

66 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 278a.

67 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 278b.

68 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.9, 290a.

69 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.9, 291a.

70 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.9, 291a.

<mental> word ... The divine essence ... is not only related to us as a word (on the grounds that it is apprehended and is something found in itself), but also related as something formed in us, as the Apostle says to the Galatians, c. 4: "My little children, with whom I am in labour again until Christ be formed in us again," that is, until his beauteous one (*formosus*) appears in us. Then God will be formed in us, because the beauteous one appears in us.⁷¹

This might sound suspiciously inconsistent with the love case just discussed. But the two questions are part of the same disputation, and charity requires us to assume that they are compatible. So what Giles must mean is that there is no mental likeness of God (other than the act of cognition itself, since we learn from the Dionysian quodlibet that cognition always requires a likeness). The divine essence "represent[s] itself";⁷² but the created act of cognition, "a thing distinct from the divine essence," is something that "perfects and informs the intellect, as something inherent in the intellect—which the divine essence is not capable of."⁷³ The whole rather complex sequence is supposed to allow for what some later thinkers will call intuitive cognition—immediate intellectual apprehension of an object present—and none of this undermines Giles's intensely mystical focus on the will in this context, and its consummate act of love.

3 The Metaphysics of Theology

The central issue that drives much of Giles's modification of Aquinas's theological metaphysics is Giles's rather distinctive theory of modes. The theory is present neither in the *Reportatio* nor in Book 1 of the commentary on the *Sentences*. Giles first formulates it, or an inchoate version of it, in the context of his early Eucharistic treatise, the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*.⁷⁴ The theory is a key part of Giles's more general category theory. Giles takes as his starting point the claim—soundly Aristotelian—that one and the same thing cannot belong to more than one category, on pain of failing to count as one thing (because not one *kind* of thing).⁷⁵ But, he claims, it is clearly true that substances and qualities are *extended*, and that substances, quantities, and qualities, can

⁷¹ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.9, 293a.

⁷² Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.9, 292b.

⁷³ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.9, 293b.

⁷⁴ It is found too in the *Physics* commentary, which I take to be contemporaneous with the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*. See Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 1.8 (Venice 1502), fol. 22rb.

⁷⁵ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27 (Rome 1554), fol. 16va-b.

be *related* to other such things, and so on. So while these categorial items are each located within their proper categories, each can derive a *mode* from its conjunction with items in other categories.⁷⁶

Giles's standard example is quantity. The basic view is that quantity and matter are two things, and that the union of quantity and matter entails that matter receives a new mode: extended being. The extension of matter necessarily involves two elements, first, the inherence of a quantity-thing—where matter is itself a (further) thing: “In matter existing under quantity, there are two extended things <viz. quantity and matter>”;⁷⁷ and, second, that this inherence cause matter to participate in quantity—that it cause a quantity-mode in matter:

If matter should be extended by quantity, two things are required, though these two things cannot be separated from each other. First, there is a requirement that quantity is in matter; second, that matter is caused to be actually extended by the existence of quantity in matter, and participates in quantity.⁷⁸

In this passage Giles talks about participation, but he clearly understands talk of participation to be equivalent to talk about modes:

The essence of matter has a two-fold mode of existence: one under privation, and then it is called potentially such-and-such; and another under form, and then it is called actually such-and-such. Therefore matter participating in form is the essence of matter itself, not taken in just any way, but with this mode of being (*modo se habendi*), that it is made to be actually the such-and-such that it was potentially. Therefore the participation of form is a certain mode of being (*modus se habendi*) which pertains to matter as it is under a form.⁷⁹

Not only does Giles think that there are two extended things: he thinks that the parts of the quantity are distinct from the parts of the extended matter.⁸⁰ Still, Giles is clear that these two extensions belong to different classes of being:

76 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27, fol. 16vb.

77 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentiae* 8 (Venice 1503; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 15vb.

78 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentiae* 8, fol. 16vb.

79 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentiae* 8, ad 6, fol. 17vb.

80 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 30, fol. 18vbD: “Although matter has parts through quantity, nevertheless the parts of matter are other than the parts of quantity.”

one is a thing, and the other a mode. The mode does not *inhere*, and does not “imprint” anything on its matter. So there is, Giles maintains, no danger of any kind of regress of extensions.⁸¹

Now for Giles, the quantity-thing is really distinct from matter, whereas the quantity-mode is not distinct in this way: “The extension of quantity is not a thing other than quantity; rather quantity is essentially extension itself; and the extension of matter is not a thing other than the matter. Such extension is not quantity, but a participation in quantity.”⁸² Giles usually speaks of this mode as a participation in extension, and quantity itself as essential extension: “The extension of quantity is essential; the extension of matter by participation.”⁸³ In addition, matter, in virtue of its conjunction with quantity, is in some sense distinct from that same matter without quantity:

Let us posit matter that is not perfected by quantity, but is deprived of quantity and thus not extended. After this same matter, or this same essence of matter, is perfected by quantity, it is made to be extended. Matter taken in these two ways does not differ in essence, because it is the same essence of matter that is first understood as non-extended and deprived of quantity, and that is later made to be extended and perfected through quantity. But matter thus understood differs according to being (*secundum esse*), as it has extended being and non-extended being. For since in reality the extended is really different from the non-extended (this can be doubtful to no one), <and> since matter as such is not really diversified in itself, it must be diversified according to *esse*, that is, according to its mode of existing that it has under a form, or according to different relations (*habitudinem*) to form.⁸⁴

It is easy to see why one might want to think this: matter with and without quantity, or matter with the privation of quantity and matter with quantity, are the subjects of different predicates, and thus non-identical. (Note a potential terminological confusion here: matter is extended *secundum dici*; in virtue of this, it differs from itself *secundum esse*. Quantity—a quantity-thing—is extended *secundum esse*, and is a distinct *essence* or *thing* from matter.)

What Giles says for quantity goes for quality as well: “We can distinguish between quality *secundum esse* and quality *secundum dici*. Quality *secundum esse*

81 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.14, 307b.

82 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentiae* 8, f. 16vb.

83 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentiae* 8, f. 15vb.

84 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.14, 308a.

is in the category of quality, but quality *secundum dici* is that which is in other categories.”⁸⁵ Quality *secundum esse* is the quality-thing; quality *secundum dici* the quality-mode. So, for example, it is true of both substance and quantity that, in virtue of unity with a quality-thing—a ϕ -thing—they are both ϕ , and have an intrinsic ϕ -mode. (Giles’s language is flexible: he sometimes talks of a contrast between thing and mode;⁸⁶ sometimes between nature/essence and *esse*;⁸⁷ and sometimes between having a property *secundum esse* <according to being> and *secundum dici* <according to predication>.)⁸⁸

Giles is clear that, of the accidental categories, only quantity and quality are things. So of the various modes, only quantity-modes and quality-modes result from union with a distinct categorial thing (a quantity-thing or a quality-thing). In the cases of the other accidental categories, the relevant modes supervene in virtue of the substance’s relations to extrinsic things.⁸⁹

Giles puts this theory of modes to a great deal of theological work. The discussion I have outlined so far gives some idea of how the theory might work, for example, in the case of the Eucharist. When separated from its substance in the Eucharist—that is, when the quantity of the bread is separated from the bread—quantity gains a substance-mode enabling it to exist independently.⁹⁰ From his earliest work onwards, Giles takes up his metaphysical position

85 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.8, 219b.

86 See for example, in addition to the passages quoted here, Giles, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27, fol. 17raA-B; *Quodlibet* 5.14, 309a.

87 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.14, 308a.

88 See for example, in addition to the passage just quoted, Giles, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27, f. 17rbB. Why adopt such a mode-theory? After all, it seems to involve a kind of “doubling” of properties (recall that an extended substance somehow involves *two* extensions, that of quantity and that of the substance). More generally, it seems very susceptible to third-man worries: why think that the item formally responsible for explaining that such-and-such is ϕ should itself be ϕ , and if so, does its being ϕ not itself require explaining (by a further ϕ -thing)? Giles, as I noted, has a response to the regress worry, but this does not seem to touch the general metaphysical extravagance. One way into the issue is this. Suppose that facts—e.g. that a substance x is ϕ —are appropriately explained by things. So x ’s being ϕ requires as part of its explanation a ϕ -thing. But what is to be explained—that x is ϕ —is something wholly *intrinsic* to x . So x ’s being ϕ involves (among other things) a ϕ -mode. Or think of it like this: for substance to be ϕ requires that it acquire a ϕ -mode. But this mode cannot derive from the substance or its essential properties. So it must derive from some other thing—a ϕ -thing.

89 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27, f. 16vb-17raC.

90 See e.g. Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27, f. 17raD–rbA and 39, f. 26rbD. On this, see Marilyn McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham* (Oxford, 2010), 186–90.

in explicit contrast to that of Aquinas. In the *Reportatio*, Giles's basic insight against Aquinas has to do with the sort of existence that can be ascribed to an accident. According to Aquinas, accidents are fully abstract particulars, and simply *are* the relevant intrinsic accidental feature of the substance: "the being of an accident is to be in a substance (*accidentis esse est inesse*)."⁹¹ Now, given that there is some sense in which accidents depend on their substances, Aquinas holds that the possible separate existence of an accident is secured by the general claim that God can do directly whatever he can do by means of a secondary cause—in this case, sustain an accident in existence without its substance.⁹²

Giles agrees with this causal principle (let us label it "P").⁹³ But he disagrees with Aquinas's explanation of the way in which God does this. According to Aquinas, while it is true that "the being of an accident is to be in a substance," it is not unqualifiedly true:

Being-in-a-substance (*inesse*) does not pick out the essence of an accident absolutely, but rather a mode of being (*modum essendi*) that pertains to it from an order to the proximate cause of its being. And since, if we take away the order of the accident to the proximate cause, its order to the first cause can remain—according to which it is not the case that the mode of its being is being-in-a-substance, but rather being-from-something-else—it follows that God can make an accident that is not in a substance. And neither in this case is the being (*esse*) of the accident taken away from the accident; rather, a mode of being <is thus taken away>.⁹⁴

As Giles reads this, he interprets it to mean that the accident's *inesse* is something that follows on the accident's being or *esse*.⁹⁵ And he objects: *inesse* is, rather, something *prior* to an accident's quiddity, explaining the kind of thing that an accident is (in contradistinction, presumably, to substance).⁹⁶ Aquinas's view is tantamount to positing a quiddity without its proper effect, like "making a subject white without the form of whiteness."⁹⁷ But by making *inesse* the cause rather than the effect of an accident's quiddity, Giles is able to

91 Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* 4.12.1.1.1, obj. 1.

92 Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* 4.12.1.1.1, corp.

93 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.9, 464.

94 Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* 4.12.1.1.1, obj. 1.

95 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.9, 464.

96 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.9, 464.

97 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.9, 464.

appeal to P, and claim that in the Eucharist God can give the accident “a different mode of being, such that the accident exists independently (*per se*).”⁹⁸

None of this gives us much idea of what is actually involved in the reception of a substance-mode. But Giles’s later work goes into a great deal of detail, exploiting the mature mode-theory that he began to develop in the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*. In that work, Giles repeats his adherence to P, but without appealing to the priority of *inesse* over quiddity.⁹⁹ Rather, he outlines various ways in which an accident causally depends on its substance, identifies efficient causation as the relevant category, and simply asserts that God can take on this efficiently causal role, conserving an accident without its substance.¹⁰⁰ And if God does so, the accident loses the mode of existence that it has in virtue of its substance (i.e. *inesse*), and gains a substance-mode.¹⁰¹

But what is involved in the reception of a substance-mode? To answer this, we need to consider a further bit of the mode-theory, one that Giles develops in the *Theoremata de esse et essentiae*, some time later than the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*. Basically, Giles comes to argue that the independent existence of causally contingent things requires their union with an existence-thing, giving to each contingent thing an existence-mode analogous to the quantity case just considered. The context is the extensive debate with Henry of Ghent on the whole question of the relation between a thing’s essence and its existence, outlined in Pickavé’s chapter in this volume. The fundamental thought is that an existent substance consists of an essence-thing, along with an existence-mode that is formally explained by an existence-thing united to the essence thing. The logical relations between these various components are just as outlined for the matter-quantity case.

We can show this by arguing in a couple of stages. First, Giles maintains explicitly that created things include an *esse*-thing and an essence-thing.¹⁰² Secondly, he holds that the essence-thing participates in the *esse*-thing:

We should therefore know that the essence of a creature is supposed to be related to *esse* in the same way as matter in its way is related to quantity. Just as, therefore, matter is a non-extended thing, such that, if it should

98 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.9, 465.

99 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 39, fol. 26rb.

100 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 38, fol. 26ra, and particularly 39, fol. 26rb: “A subject’s causality in relation to <its conservation of> an accident is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.”

101 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 39, fol. 26rb.

102 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 10, fol. 23ra.

be extended, it is necessary that a quantity which is essentially extension itself be added to it, so every created essence is something that is not existent of itself, such that for it to exist it is necessary for an *esse* which is essentially existence (*existere*) to be added to it.¹⁰³

Furthermore, this participation relationship is spelled out in terms of the mode-theory:

Let us suppose that *esse*, in so far as it is of itself, does not participate in anything else; and other things can participate in *esse*, but *esse* itself, in so far as it is of itself, can participate in nothing else ... *Esse* in itself implies nothing other than actuality.¹⁰⁴

An *esse*-thing does not have modes; it is in some sense a pure actuality.

Inherent accidents—the accident-*things*—have an existence-mode, too, but this existence-mode derives from the existence-thing of the substance, in some kind of transitive explanatory sequence. The substance's existence-thing explains the existence-mode of the substance, and thence explains the existence-mode of any accident inherent in the substance:

One existence (*existere*) and *esse* in one thing is sufficient for the fact that all exist and are through it, just as one quantity in one thing is sufficient for all things being extended through it. Through the same quantity through which matter is extended, since it is subject to extension, other accidents are extended too, since they are received in the extended thing. So it is not necessary that there are as many quantities as there are extended things (if we should suppose that a substance is extended because it is perfected by quantity, and other accidents are extended because they are received in the extended thing). Thus too in the case at hand, the substance of each creature exists because it is perfected by *esse*, and accidents exist because they are received in the existent. Accidents however are not beings but of a being (*non sunt entia quia sunt entis*)¹⁰⁵ as is said in *Metaphysica* VII;¹⁰⁶ thus we can say that they are not existent things (*existentia*) except because they are of an existent.¹⁰⁷

103 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 10, fol. 23rb; see also fol. 23vb.

104 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 10, fol. 23vb.

105 The Latin here reads “non sunt entia quia non sunt entis,” but I take it that this is a mistake.

106 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.1, 1028a18.

107 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 10, fol. 23rb. See also Giles's *Quodlibet* 2.2, 51b, where he casts the discussion in terms of *esse existentiae* and *esse subsistentiae*.

It follows that, if the accident were separated from the substance, it would require a *new esse*-mode—deriving from an *esse*-thing—of its own:

If whiteness were separated from its subject, it could not exist unless some other *esse* were communicated to it ... Since a created essence cannot exist without any *esse*, it follows that <an accident> existing in a subject exists in virtue of its being in an existent, and existing in virtue of the *esse* of the subject.¹⁰⁸

The teaching in this last passage is clear enough, albeit expressed without explicit reference to the mode-theory. What it is, then, for an accident to have the mode of a substance is for it to be joined to its own existence-thing.

Giles uses the same theory to give an account of the Incarnation.¹⁰⁹ He holds that Christ's human nature is related to the second person of the Trinity in the kind of way that an accident is related to a substance: "The human nature in Christ, even though it is a substance, nevertheless has a certain mode of an accident, since it comes to the Word after complete *esse*."¹¹⁰ So just as the human nature gains its concrete reality from the second person of the Trinity, so the second person—a *suppositum*, in technical scholastic jargon—of the Trinity gains a human-mode from the human nature. Giles makes a gesture towards the first point here:

It is well said that the human nature in Christ is indeed not an accident, but has a certain mode of an accident; for, just as an accident does not constitute a *suppositum*, but is sustained in a *suppositum* already constituted in existence (and in this way exists by the existence of the *suppositum*, such that an accident does not exist except in so far as it belongs to an existent), so the human nature in Christ does not constitute a *suppositum*, but is sustained in a *suppositum* already constituted in existence.¹¹¹

(See too, more explicitly, the next but one quoted passage.) And he makes the second point here:

If *esse* is taken for the relation which a *suppositum* gains from its nature, then there are in the *suppositum* of the Son of God many *esse*, since from

¹⁰⁸ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.3, 52b.

¹⁰⁹ For a fuller account of Giles's Christology see Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 2002), 89–104, 263–69.

¹¹⁰ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27, fol. 17rb.

¹¹¹ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.2, 52b.

the divinity he has the *esse* of God, and from the humanity the *esse* of a human being, and is true God and true man.¹¹²

What it is for a substance, that is, Christ's human nature, to have the mode of an accident is for its existence (its intrinsic existence-mode) to be explained by the existence-thing of some further substance to which it is united, in just the way that an accident's existence-mode is explained by the existence-thing of the substance in which it inheres.

What would happen if the human nature were separated from the second person of the Trinity? Just as in the case of a separated accident, it would need to gain its own *esse*-mode from a new *esse*-thing:

Since the human nature could not exist unless it were joined to some *esse*, and if it were separated from the Word it would not exist through the *esse* of the Word, and it would not be sustained in the *suppositum* of the Word ... it would be necessary <if it were separated from the Word> for some other created *esse* to be communicated to it, in which case it would constitute some created *suppositum*, and would be sustained in a created *suppositum*. For just as, for the human nature to exist in the Word is for it to exist through the *esse* of the Word, and <for it> not to form a proper *suppositum* but to be sustained in the *suppositum* of the Word, so, for the human nature to be separated from the Word is for it to exist through its own *esse* (*per esse suum*), and to form its own *suppositum* (*facere suppositum proprium*), and to be sustained in that *suppositum*.¹¹³

What explains the subsistence of an individual substance-nature, then, is its own proper *esse*.

On the face of it, what Giles says here is closely related to what Aquinas has to say. According to Aquinas, Christ's human nature exists *in* the second person of the Trinity and thus has no *esse* of its own:

Since the human nature is united to the Son of God hypostatically or personally ... and not accidentally, it follows that no new personal *esse* comes to him in virtue of the human nature, but only a relation of the preexisting personal *esse* to the human nature, such that the person can

¹¹² Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.3, 273a-b.

¹¹³ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.2, 52a.

now be said to subsist not only according to the divine nature, but also according to the human.¹¹⁴

But if we look at the metaphysics involved, we can see that this similarity is only surface deep. Aquinas radically distances himself from the view that the union of human nature and divine person—the hypostatic union, in the jargon—is most like that of a substance and accident, and maintains that it is most like that of a concrete whole with one of its concrete parts. Thus, Aquinas believes that Christ's human nature gains concrete existence from the divine person not because the human nature is anything like an accident of that person, but because it is something like a concrete part of that person. And Aquinas holds that concrete parts, unlike accidents, do indeed gain their concrete existence from the substantial whole of which they are parts. Trying to find an analogue for the hypostatic union, Aquinas appeals to the image of having a head, that is, having a concrete part: "Having a head (*esse capitatum*), being bodily (*esse corporeum*), and being animate (*esse animatum*) all pertain to the one person of Socrates; and therefore from all these there is made just one *esse* in Socrates."¹¹⁵ In line with this metaphor, the reason that the human nature gains existence from the divine person, or comes to exist "in communion with that complete *esse* <namely, of the divine person>,"¹¹⁶ is not that the nature has the mode of an accident, but that it is like a concrete part of that person. If the human nature were like an accident, contrariwise, then Christ would fail to have unity of *esse*: "If the human nature came to the Son of God...accidentally, then we would have to posit two *esse* ... just as two *esse* are posited in Socrates, one as he is white, and one as he is human."¹¹⁷ Indeed, Aquinas is explicit that something substantial, such as Christ's human nature, cannot have an accidental mode.¹¹⁸ Giles, it seems, disagrees in some quite radical ways with Aquinas's account of the Incarnation.

Giles's view on the real distinction between essence and existence is used by him, further, to solve a puzzle in the doctrine of creation—one that he could have encountered in Henry of Ghent, and that owes its origins to Aquinas, who is Giles's conversation partner for the purposes of this discussion. According to Aquinas, creation is merely a relation between a creature and God: "Creation,

¹¹⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.17.2, corp.

¹¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.17.2, corp.

¹¹⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.2.6, ad 2.

¹¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.17.2, corp.

¹¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* 4.41.

in a creature, is nothing other than a certain relation to God, as to the principle of its existence."¹¹⁹ But, it seems, the *relata* of a relation must be logically or causally antecedent to the relation itself. And this generates a contradiction: the creature is both causally dependent on God, and yet causally antecedent to God's creative activity.¹²⁰ Aquinas sketches an answer to this objection by appealing to a view that he defended in an article earlier, to the effect that the relation involved in creation is strictly speaking a case of passion, that is, of a creature's undergoing divine creative activity.¹²¹ Thus, considered as an activity, creation is prior to the creature; but considered as a relation it is indeed posterior to the creature and dependent on it.¹²² This theory, of course, leaves much unanswered: for example, what is the relation between items in the category of passion and items in the category of relation, since the earlier article identifies creation *both* as a relation and as a passion, and the response to the objection seems to posit a distinction between relation and passion in this context. More, at least, needs to be said.

In Henry of Ghent, the problem arises in a very specific, related, form. Henry agrees with Giles that it is necessary to posit some kind of distinction between a creature's essence and a creature's existence, that is, between a creature's *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae*, as Henry puts it. But these two kinds of being—*esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae*—are understood to be *relations* to God: to his formal and efficient causality, respectively.¹²³ And this seems to require either that there is nothing absolute to ground these relations, or that the absolute ground of these relations is something that falls outside the purview of God's creative power, both of which seem absurd.

Giles has a rather elegant solution to both of these problems, formulated, as mentioned, in response to the problems that seem to arise in Aquinas's view. Giles's position is that creation consists fundamentally in the communication of *esse* to an essence. But the communication of *esse* is nothing other than the *esse* that is communicated, *in* the essence that receives the *esse*, just as being heated is nothing other than the heat in the object that is heated.¹²⁴ More precisely, creation consists in an act of divine will that has as its consequence

119 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.45.3, corp.; see too *Summa theologiae* 1.45.2, ad 2 and 1.45.3, ad 2.

120 For the objection in Aquinas, see *Summa theologiae* 1.45.3, obj. 3.

121 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.45.2, ad 2.

122 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.45.3, ad 3.

123 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 10.9 (Opera Omnia; Leuven, 1979-), 14:151–152. For Giles's very different take on the distinction between *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae*, see *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 9, fol. 20rb.

124 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.4, 365b.

the existence of creatures;¹²⁵ this act has a corresponding passion¹²⁶—being created—and this passion is the communicated *esse*.¹²⁷ But this *esse*, just as in the case of heat, is a non-relational thing, the *foundation* of any subsequent dependence-relation on the part of the created item.¹²⁸ And—solving Henry’s problem—this dependence relation is founded in the whole substance, the composite of essence and *esse* (in just the way that a composite of form and matter depends in its entirety on its efficient cause), and it can do so because the *esse* is received *in* the essence as its subject: “We say that it is not the case that, through creation, the essence is made *per se*, or the *esse per se*, but that the essence is made under *esse*, and the *esse* in the essence; just as it is not the case matter is made *per se* through generation, or form *per se*, but that matter is made under form, or form in matter.”¹²⁹ The one absolute (non-relational) item is the ground for its relation to God as cause.

When it comes to God, Giles’s metaphysics of modes has no application, and his view on the identity of essence and *esse* in God amounts to much the same as Aquinas’s, even though the composition or distinction that that belief negates is of course rather different, since for Giles the creaturely distinction involves the theory of modes, whereas for Aquinas it involves no such thing.¹³⁰ But as Aquinas understands the identity of essence and *esse* in God, we cannot argue from this identity to the conclusion that God’s existence is self-evident: that “God exists” is *a priori*, as we would say. As Aquinas puts it: “The proposition ‘God exists’, as it is in itself, is self-evident, because the predicate is the same as the subject ... But because we do not know of God what his essence is, it is not self-evident with respect to us (*quoad nos*), but needs to be demonstrated through those things that are more known to us.”¹³¹ Here, the notion of self-evidence “in itself” seems to be a logical or semantic notion in the analytical sense while the notion of self-evidence “with respect to us” is an epistemic one. “God exists” is analytic, but its truth can be known only *a posteriori*.

In both the *Reportatio* and the *Ordinatio* Giles rejects Aquinas’s view, and in the *Ordinatio* he takes great care to describe it almost verbatim.¹³² Basically,

¹²⁵ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.4, 366b-7a.

¹²⁶ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.4, 367a-b.

¹²⁷ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.4, 368b.

¹²⁸ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.4, 369a. For the existence of such relations, see 367b: “A relation always follows the action of an agent.”

¹²⁹ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.4, 368a.

¹³⁰ For Aquinas’s well-known teaching, see e.g. *Summa theologiae* 1.3.4, corp.

¹³¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.2.1, corp.

¹³² Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.2, fol. 21vaI-K. For discussion of this whole issue in Giles, see M.D. Gossiaux, “Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Existence of God as Self-Evident,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 77 (2003), 57–81.

his view is that, since God's essence is just God's existence, it is impossible to think of the divine essence without thinking of the divine existence: "the quiddity cannot be thought not to be."¹³³ In the *Ordinatio*, Giles notes three ways in which a proposition might be self-evident. It could be such that the subject includes the predicate (presumably a logical or semantic notion); it could be such that the proposition cannot be (truly) directly denied; and it could be such that its truth is seen immediately (these last two presumably being epistemic notions). Giles claims that "God exists" is self-evident in all three ways.¹³⁴

Giles adapts Aquinas's distinction between something self-evident in itself, and self-evident to us: something can be self-evident "to the wise ... but not to all."¹³⁵ And he does not believe that for these purposes it is necessary to know the *essence* of God in itself or the *quod quid est* of God. All that is required is knowledge of the meaning of the term "God"—in this case, as signifying something that includes existence in its very essence.¹³⁶

In affirming the self-evidence of the proposition "God exists", Giles seems in effect to think that analyticity is sufficient for being *a priori*. About this, however, he is clearly mistaken. There is nothing about the concept of a necessary being that requires that concept's instantiation: whether or not it is instantiated is a *further* question, as Aquinas rightly saw.¹³⁷ Scotus, a few years later, sorts all this out. We can know, according to Scotus, that the proposition "God exists", when appropriately construed—that is, such that "God" signifies the divine essence under a real and not merely nominal definition—is *a priori*, but

133 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.9, 500; *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.2, fol. 21vaL. Giles perhaps derived this view from Bonaventure, who had argued similarly some twenty years earlier: "That which is true is most certain in itself to the extent that it is a true proposition that is first and most immediate: in which not merely is the cause of the predicate contained in the subject, but also it is utterly the same *esse* that is predicated and that is the subject. Therefore, just as the union of things that are maximally distant is utterly incompatible with our intellect—since no intellect can think that some one thing simultaneously is and is not—so the division of one undivided thing is utterly incompatible in the same thing. Therefore, just as for the same thing to be and not to be <is incompatible with our intellect>, and for the highest being to exist and at the same time in no way exist is most evident in its falsehood, so the existence of the first and highest being is most evident in its truth ... Therefore God's existing is true without doubt." Bonaventure, *De mysterio trinitatis*, 1.1, corp. (Opera Omnia; 10 vols., Quaracchi, 1882–1902), 5:49b.

134 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.2, fol. 21va-vbM.

135 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.9, 500; *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.2, fol. 21vbL.

136 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 1.9, 500; *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.2, fol. 21vbL.

137 Still, it is a mistake he makes in good philosophical company, for, in addition to Bonaventure, Descartes seems guilty of just the same one.

(at least *pro statu isto*) we cannot know this on the basis of *understanding* what “God exists”, thus construed, means. Against Giles’s thought that analyticity is sufficient for being *a priori*, Scotus notes that any concept of God that we can gain by our natural powers is composite, and that conceptual analysis can by no means establish whether the two simple intensions joined in the complex concept are joined in reality too.¹³⁸

4 Giles, Thomas, and 1277: Three Test Cases

I will end by considering three issues that arose in Giles’s 1277 condemnation.¹³⁹ The three topics have in common that they were defended by Aquinas and that, as Wielockx has shown, they were nevertheless considered acceptable opinions in Paris after 1286.¹⁴⁰ But they illustrate rather nicely the various ways in which Giles adopts and adapts Aquinas’s theology. They reveal too something of the intellectual rigour that Giles generally brought to his theological task.

The first issue is that of the number of substantial forms in a human person. Aristotelian principles require that a substance have exactly one substantial form. In the case of a human being, that form is the intellectual soul. But this view turns out to generate theological problems. For example, when Christ died, his soul was separated from his body. According to Church doctrine, the body of Christ retained its identity when he died. But if there is no other substantial form in Christ apart from the intellectual soul, then it will not be possible for the body to retain its identity, since the matter will need a new substantial form.¹⁴¹ Oddly, given the controversy the issue raised, it did not arise in Etienne Tempier’s 1277 condemnation of 219 unacceptable propositions. But it arose in Giles’s condemnation a few weeks later. Article 48 condemns the view that “in each composite there is <just> one form.”¹⁴² Like

¹³⁸ On this, see Richard Cross “Duns Scotus on Divine Necessity,” *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 3 (2015), 128–44.

¹³⁹ On this, see Briggs’ chapter in this volume.

¹⁴⁰ Not so in Oxford, however. The first of the issues I discuss here, the unicity of substantial form, was condemned in 1277 by Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury: see *C.U.P.*, (eds.) Heinrich Denifle and Émile Chatelain. 4 vols. (Paris, 1891), 1:559 (no. 474); and again in 1286 by John Pecham, his immediate successor: see Pecham, *Registrum epistolarum*, (ed.) C.T. Martin, Rolls Series (London, 1882–85), 3:923.

¹⁴¹ For these arguments, and those defending them, see for example Roberto Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (Louvain, 1951), 317–19.

¹⁴² Giles of Rome, *Apologia* 48, 59, quoting Giles, *Ordinatio* 1.37.2.3, fol. 198vaM.

Aquinas before him, Giles persistently taught this view. But unlike Aquinas he notices—and attempts to solve—a problem that it raises for Eucharistic theology. In his *Reportatio* discussion of the issue he first notices the problem and a few years later, in the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, he is able to propose a solution.¹⁴³

According to Catholic teaching, in the Eucharist the substance of the bread is converted or transubstantiated into the substance of Christ's body, with no substrate persisting between the two substances. Aquinas had interpreted this through the lens of his Christology. Christ includes body, soul, and divinity.¹⁴⁴ The end terms of transubstantiation are bread and body. So, as Aquinas puts it, from the "power of the sacrament" what comes to be present is Christ's body. His soul and divinity come to be present "by natural concomitance", which here means as a natural consequence of their union with the body.¹⁴⁵ In the case of the soul Aquinas explains the distinction very simply. Suppose someone had said mass while Christ was dead, in the period between his crucifixion and resurrection. In this case, the bread would have been converted into the body, but *not* into the soul—which shows that the soul lies outside the strict ("from the power of the sacrament") end term of the conversion.¹⁴⁶ In the *Reportatio* Giles accepts this view,¹⁴⁷ but is unable to figure out what to say about the relation between the form of the bread and the form of Christ's body.¹⁴⁸ But a couple of years later, in the *Theoremata de corpore Christi*, he has a proposal, one that proved rather notorious. He also sets out far more clearly than in the *Reportatio* what he takes the initial problem to be.

The issue is this. According to Giles, nothing material can be converted into anything immaterial. So while there is no difficulty with the matter of the bread's being converted into the matter of Christ's body, it is not possible for the form of the bread to be converted into Christ's soul.¹⁴⁹ So the bread is converted merely into Christ's body. But a body is simply a (proper) *part* of a human being, since we cannot predicate "body" of the whole composite human being. (Supposing that I am a composite of body and soul, it is not true that I am a body, though it is true that I have a body.) So "body" cannot refer

143 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories*, 102–05.

144 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.76.1, obj. 1.

145 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.76.1, corp.

146 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.76.1, ad 1.

147 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.8, 451.

148 At *Reportatio* 4.8, 462–63, Giles considers three options, without deciding between them. The third is closest to his later view, but in the *Reportatio* Giles proposes certain unresolved difficulties for the view.

149 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 32, fol. 20vbA.

to any composite of matter and substantial form.¹⁵⁰ Neither can it refer to a composite of matter and accidental form, since such a composite is merely an accidental whole and a body is something substantial, or a part of a substance: and no accidental whole can be part of a substance.¹⁵¹ So “body” must refer simply to matter.¹⁵² But of course Giles, as a good Aristotelian on the issue of prime matter, holds that matter cannot exist by itself, one of the things, indeed, for which he was condemned in 1277.¹⁵³ Giles develops, yet again, his doctrine of modes as a solution to this problem.

Giles’s basic insight is that the term “body” should be understood to refer to the matter of Christ’s body along with its quantity-mode.¹⁵⁴ Giles understands the quantity-mode to amount to the body’s organization—the kind of spatial structure that is required prior to a human body’s being informed by the intellectual soul (“as is common *mutatis mutandis* to every animal”).¹⁵⁵ This priority allows the body, thus understood, to exist logically independently of the whole human person, body and soul. And the quantity-mode, in line with Giles’s standard mode-theory, is distinct from the categorial quantity—the quantity-thing—that explains the presence of the quantity-mode in matter.¹⁵⁶ And “body” in this context refers to the matter+quantity-mode without referring as well to the quantity-thing that is responsible for the matter’s extension.¹⁵⁷ Hence “body” refers to a substance (matter+quantity-mode) and not to an accidental whole ([matter+quantity-mode]+quantity-thing): thus not violating the original worry that body without substantial form could be no more than an accidental whole. Giles summarizes:

Because matter, taken alone, can be called a body, it follows that if the substance of the bread is converted into the organized matter existing in Christ, then, because organized matter implies merely matter, as has been shown, which can be called a body, the bread can also be said to be converted into the body of Christ, even though the conversion of the bread is brought into matter alone.¹⁵⁸

150 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 26, fol. 16ra.

151 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 26, fol. 16ra.

152 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 26, fol. 16rb.

153 Giles of Rome, *Apologia* 47, 59, quoting *Ordinatio* 1.36.2.4, fol. 189rbE.

154 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 28, fol. 17vbC.

155 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 28, fol. 17rbD.

156 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 28, fol. 17vaA.

157 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 28, fol. 17vbB.

158 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 28, fol. 17vbC.

Giles does not believe that the same theory of body applies in the case of non-organic substances (elements and homoeomeric substances). The discussion is informative. Such a substance does not have any structure presupposed other than that explained by its substantial form. So there is no bodily organization in the absence of substantial form, and thus in such cases no referent for “body” other than the whole substance.¹⁵⁹ So the kind of organization that the quantity-mode provides in the case of animate substances must include some kind of distinction into organs and, more generally, the body’s heteromeric structure. Quite how quantity might perform this task (since extension as such surely seems homoeomeric) remains unclear to me.

Note that Giles is not denying that Christ’s soul is, standardly, present in the Eucharist. His point, just as in Aquinas, is that its presence is not an intrinsic feature of the Eucharistic conversion, which is from substance to body. It is there “by natural concomitance”: as an automatic consequence of the Eucharistic conversion, provided, of course, that the soul is united to the body at the time of the conversion.¹⁶⁰

The second issue is the possible eternity of the world. Giles’s condemnation includes three relevant articles: article 30, “that a creature could have been eternal,” article 31, “that it does not belong to the definition of motion to have begun, because it could be from eternity,” and article 50, that God “could have made the world from eternity.”¹⁶¹ Tempier’s general condemnation of 219 propositions, it is worth noting, includes analogous articles, for example, articles 87 and 89.¹⁶² Aquinas, at least at times, taught that it was simply true that the world could have lacked a beginning.¹⁶³ There is no thought that the world in fact lacks a beginning. Indeed, both Aquinas and Giles insist that the data of revelation make this plain.¹⁶⁴ Rather the issue is this: does the notion of a beginningless world, or even a beginningless but created world, raise difficulties of a conceptual kind? Are such notions simply incoherent? Basically, the position of Aquinas and Giles is that they are not.

Now, this view raises difficulties clustered in two distinct domains. One has to do with the thought that eternal creation seems to be incompatible with

159 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 31, fol. 20vbA-B.

160 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 32, fol. 20vbA.

161 Giles of Rome, *Apologia*, 55, 59.

162 *La condamnation parisienne. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire*, (ed.) David Piché (Paris, 1999), p. 106.

163 See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi* (Opera Omnia; Rome, 1882-), 43:86a.

164 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.46.2, sed contra; Giles, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.1, in contrarium, 46b.

the view that creation is *ex nihilo*, or that eternal creation undermines the distinction between creation and conservation. The other is more general: that it suggests in various ways that an actual infinity is possible, which goes against standard Aristotelian assumptions. For example, the infinite antiquity of the universe requires that there have been infinite days prior to this one, and it is not possible to traverse an actually infinite extension, for then how could one get to the end? And—a particularly challenging objection from al-Ghazālī—it seems to follow that there might now be, and always have been, infinitely many things in existence: supposing, for example, that God had decided to create an immortal soul on every one of these infinite days.

Aquinas's attempts to respond to these objections are rather uneven in quality. On creation *ex nihilo*, Aquinas rightly points out that the objection misleadingly supposes that *ex nihilo* entails "existence after non-existence".¹⁶⁵ But this turns out to be a problem of the scope of the negation: saying that something was created out of nothing is a misleading way of saying that it is not the case that it was created out of something. And this does not obviously require existence after non-existence.¹⁶⁶ ("Nothing" should not be understood to be a referring term.) Aquinas likewise deals nicely with the worry about traversing infinitely many days:

Traversal is always understood to be from one end to another. But whatever past day is pinpointed, there are finitely many days from that one to this; and these can be traversed. The objection proceeds as though there are infinitely many intervening days, given the extremes.¹⁶⁷

Aquinas thus puts his finger precisely on the mistake in the opposing argument. The opponent, in this case Bonaventure, is thinking of the extension the wrong way round, as it were.¹⁶⁸ It is not as though we have to reach a point infinitely far from us; this is impossible since there is no such point. Rather, we have already traversed the magnitude, and it is bounded at the *present* end.

But this, of course, still relies on the possibility of an actual infinite—there is, after all, the set of all past days, and this set is infinite. The infinite-soul argument from al-Ghazālī puts particular pressure on this point, and Aquinas is not quite sure what to say. In the *Summa theologiae* he gives solutions proposed by others, but that he would reject—for example, al-Ghazālī's assertion that an

¹⁶⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.46.2, obj. 2.

¹⁶⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.46.2, ad 2.

¹⁶⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.46.2, ad 6.

¹⁶⁸ See Bonaventure, *In sent.* 2.1.1.2, 2:21a-b.

actual infinite is possible¹⁶⁹—and then comments, rather indecisively, that the objection relates merely to human beings, not to creation in general.¹⁷⁰ Elsewhere, Aquinas takes a different and more radical path, agreeing (against his view in the *Summa theologiae*) with al-Ghazālī's affirmation of the possibility of an actual infinite: "Besides, it has not been proven that God could not create an actual infinite."¹⁷¹ Of course, Aquinas himself had spent many years endeavouring, as a good Aristotelian, to prove just that.

Giles, even in the *Reportatio*, is able to tidy up some of this Thomist mess, and in the *Ordinatio* does so yet more decisively. The basic line in the *Reportatio* is that, "the existence of the world depends totally on the divine will; but God could have willed the world from eternity. Therefore <the world could have been from eternity>."¹⁷² On the creation *ex nihilo* worry, Giles limits himself to commenting that non-being is causally but not necessarily temporally prior to being.¹⁷³ He has more—and better—things to say about the infinity problems. On the question of traversing an infinite distance, he develops in a very novel direction the hints that can be found in Aquinas. There are two kinds of infinite extension: those unbounded at either extreme; and those unbounded only at one extreme, and bounded at the other (think of the contrast between the integers and the natural numbers, for example). Focus on the second kind: in Giles's example, the contrast between the set of natural numbers greater than 9 and the set of natural numbers greater than 99. In such cases, the number of components in the sequence is the same. One is not "greater than the other (*unum non est maius altero*)" but the second sequence is nonetheless a part of the first.¹⁷⁴ As Giles rather laconically notes, usual principles about parts and wholes have no application to infinite magnitudes.¹⁷⁵

By any lights, this is a remarkable discussion, overturning Aristotelian assumptions about the infinite, and doing so in a way that says exactly what needs to be said—and anticipating the central insight of the transfinite mathematics developed by Georg Cantor in the 19th century. Oddly, Giles does not deal quite so well with al-Ghazālī's infinite soul objection. Giles restricts his mathematics of the infinite to processes (what he following standard practice labels "successives (*successiva*)"), not realizing that what he says could apply

169 See al-Ghazālī, *Metaphysics* 1.1.7. In *Algazel's Metaphysics: A Medieval Translation*, (ed.) J.T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), 41–2.

170 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.46.2, ad 8.

171 Thomas Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi*, 43:89b.

172 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.7, 205.

173 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.7, 205.

174 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.7, 207.

175 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.7, 207.

to extended magnitudes more generally.¹⁷⁶ What he says is, nevertheless, not unintelligent (though still unsuccessful). He maintains that al-Ghazālī's problem, in the *Reportatio* analysis, can be solved by attention to the scope of the relevant quantifiers:

If there are infinite days before this one, then on any designated day (*qualibet die signando eum*), God can create one intellective soul. But if we take all <the days> together, God cannot make one soul on every day (*in qualibet die*); rather, of necessity there are some on which he cannot <make an intellective soul>, even though these <days> cannot be designated: just as we can designate a point in any part of a continuum (*in omni parte continui est assignare punctum divisim*), but not in every part (*non coniunctim*).¹⁷⁷

(Slightly more formally: for every day, it is possible that God create an intellective soul on that day [divided sense]; but it is not possible that, for every day, God create an intellective soul on that day [composed sense].) A good effort. But one might reasonably worry that the divided sense of the proposition is supposed to exclude the possibility of actually infinitely many souls. And it does so only on the assumption that the proper parts of an infinite set are themselves all finite. Giles knows, or should know, that this assumption is false, since it is inconsistent with his true claims about the infinite sequence of natural numbers.

The discussion in the *Ordinatio* is in some ways even more impressive. Giles develops further the kinds of insight that we find in the *Reportatio* discussion. But he adds a crucial qualification concerning the dialectic of the debate, and it is one that slightly moderates his commitment to the possibility of an eternal world.¹⁷⁸ Basically, Giles discerns “three” (in fact four) possible attitudes that one might take to the proposition that the world could have lacked a beginning. The strongest—which Giles mentions in passing but then ignores—is to subscribe to the view that the world did indeed lack a beginning.¹⁷⁹ Weaker is

176 Among the Augustinian friars, this insight has to wait until Gregory of Rimini, whose own ground-breaking insights on the infinite must surely have been formed under the influence of Giles. On Gregory, see Richard Cross “Infinity, Continuity, and Composition: The Contribution of Gregory of Rimini,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 7 (1998), 89–110.

177 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.7, 206.

178 For the whole discussion, see Giles, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:57bB–C. On the dialectic, see Thomas Bukowski, “Understanding St Thomas on the Eternity of the World: Help from Giles of Rome?” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 58 (1991), 113–25.

179 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:47aB.

the assertion that it is possible that the world lacked a beginning. Weaker still, the view that it cannot be demonstrated that the world lacked a beginning. As Giles notes, “many things are true for which we cannot have demonstrations.”¹⁸⁰ Finally, the weakest view of all: not that it cannot be demonstrated that the world lacked a beginning, but that the demonstrations that have thus far been proposed can in principle be refuted, even though we do not as yet know what these refutations are. As Giles notes, “many things that can be determined for which we do not have demonstrations.”¹⁸¹ Of course, there is an alternative: the view of “certain great theologians”, that we can show that the world has a beginning.¹⁸² Giles asserts the weakest view—the demonstrations that have thus far been proposed in favor of the eternity of the world can in principle be refuted, even though he does not know as yet what these refutations are—on the basis of the authority of John of Damascus.¹⁸³

Still, in line with this, Giles spends considerable time refining his arguments against the efforts of theologians to prove that the world could not have been eternal. In response to the claim that, on the supposition of an eternal but created world, there would be no distinction between creation and conservation, Giles appeals to his view that creation just is a creature’s *esse*, outlined above. Since a creature’s *esse* is the same throughout the existence of a creature, it seems open to Giles simply to accept the consequence that there is no substantive metaphysical difference between creation and conservation. And this is what he does: “to conserve ... is not to add something to a thing, but to keep in it what it has.”¹⁸⁴ Still, despite this identity, the terms “creation” and “conservation” are not substitutable *salva veritate*, because the notion of conservation requires, while creation does not, that a thing already have existence.¹⁸⁵

The discussion of infinity relates more closely to the *Reportatio* treatment, while developing it in a number of directions. Basically, Giles outlines five ways in which philosophers can be misled into thinking that the notion of the infinite is contradictory. First, they imagine that because the infinite can never have more or fewer members it cannot receive addition. But, Giles reasons, the falsity of this can easily be seen in cases in which the infinite is unbounded

180 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:57bB.

181 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:57bB.

182 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:47aB.

183 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:57bC-D, referring to John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.8 § 4 (Louvain/Paderborn, 1955), 32–33.

184 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:64aC-D.

185 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:64aD-65bA.

only at one extreme.¹⁸⁶ Secondly, they suppose that the fact that the infinite cannot have parts with as many constituents as the whole renders it contradictory. Giles refutes this with the example of the natural numbers that he used in the *Reportatio*.¹⁸⁷ Thirdly, they suppose that the fact that the infinite contains infinitely many finite sets of different sizes renders the notion of the infinity impossible. But Giles points out that the size of the parts in the case of an infinite magnitude makes no difference to the size of the whole.¹⁸⁸ The fourth “deception” is simply an instance of this: the number of revolutions of the sun in relation to the number of revolutions of the moon.¹⁸⁹ The fifth deception is the impossibility of traversing an infinite extension, which Giles deals with in the same way as he dealt with it in the *Reportatio*.¹⁹⁰

Still, even with all of these clarifications, Giles does not see the applicability of his theory of the infinite beyond the domain of infinite processes—for example, to the case of infinitely many souls in actual existence. But he silently abandons the *Reportatio*’s failed quantifier-scope solution to the logical problem, and adopts a more agnostic attitude:

If the world were from eternity, and human beings from eternity, God could have found a way such that there were not infinite souls, either that way which we have suggested, or he could have found some other way far more appropriate for the investigation of which our intellect is not sufficient.¹⁹¹

The “inappropriate” suggestion is reincarnation—the “recirculation” of souls.¹⁹² No wonder Giles is reluctant to postulate that.

The final issue is a nice example of a case in which Giles, following Aquinas, is more Augustinian than his theological opponents (most notably, Henry of Ghent). According to Giles, what distinguishes the three divine persons from each other are their relations.¹⁹³ This might perhaps be thought uncontroversial. After all, Augustine persistently teaches, “[l]et us hold this above

186 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:62aD-bA.

187 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2., 1:62bB-C.

188 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:63aB-D.

189 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:63bA-D.

190 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:63bD-64aA.

191 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1:67bA.

192 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.1.4.2, 1: 67aC-D.

193 On Giles’s Trinitarian theology, and its relation to Aquinas’s, see Concetta Luna, “Essenza divina e relazioni trinitarie nella critica di Egidio Romano a Tommaso Aquino,” *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 3–69.

all, that whatever is said of that most eminent and divine greatness is said substantially; but whatever <is said> to another (*ad aliquid*) is said not substantially but relationally.”¹⁹⁴ Aquinas had followed Augustine’s general thrust, and inferred that “action” terms in the Trinity—such as “beget” and “being begotten”—“signify in God not something absolute, but only relation.”¹⁹⁵ But this view, articulated by Giles, was condemned in 1277: “‘To beget (*gignere*)’ and ‘to be begotten (*signi*)’ properly signify not act but relation.”¹⁹⁶ Wielockx quotes a passage from Henry that teaches the exact opposite:

In God, active generation should be said to be a true action, so that it is false to say that it is not a true action but a relation. Rather, it should be called a true action, but a relational one. And for the same reason passive generation should be said to be a true passion, but a relational one.¹⁹⁷

Giles himself, in the *Apologia*, glosses his own view as follows:

“Generating (*generare*)” in God simply speaking means a relation, but in the mode of act. So it does not simply mean act, because generating is not in the category of action, but relation. For since there are two categories in God—relation and substance—generation, since in God it does not belong to all, does not simply imply an essence (*quid*), and is not in the category of substance, but of relation.¹⁹⁸

As thus presented, the views of both Giles and Henry involve a certain amount of qualification. But the simple divergence is nevertheless apparent, and it seems as though Giles’s teaching, just as much as Aquinas’s, is closer to Augustine’s—namely, that there are only two kinds of categorial predications in God: substance and relation. In fact, the view defended by Giles was certainly acceptable after 1286. Russell Friedman’s recent meticulous and vast analysis of medieval Trinitarian theology from 1250 to 1350 shows that the debate about the status of the personal properties—as relations or actions/passions—is one of the central points of discussion throughout the period,

¹⁹⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate* 7.8 (CCSL, 50), 215.

¹⁹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia* 9.9, ad 3, quoted in Wielockx’s commentary on Giles, *Apologia*, 191.

¹⁹⁶ Giles of Rome, *Apologia* 9, 51; the article is taken from Giles’s, *Ordinatio* 1.7.3, ad 1, fol. 45rbF.

¹⁹⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* 59.2; 2 vols. (Paris, 1520), 2: fol. 142rL.

¹⁹⁸ Giles of Rome, *Apologia* 9, 51.

systematically dividing Dominicans from Franciscans and, for that matter, Giles from Henry.¹⁹⁹

The teaching makes a difference to a further question, related to the so-called *filioque*, the view that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son. The question is this: suppose (*per impossibile*) that the Holy Spirit proceeded merely from the Father. Would there in that case be any way of distinguishing Son from Spirit? Views such as that of Giles and Aquinas reply negatively. If the Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would be no relation between them, and thus—since only relations distinguish in God—no distinction between them. In the absence of the *filioque*, there would be no Trinity of persons. But views such as Henry's can respond differently: what distinguish the persons are the actions and passions that are involved in their production. And these actions/passions in the Trinity are of two different kinds: generation and spiration (the productions of Son and Spirit respectively). So the Son includes a passion, as it were, different in kind from that included in the Spirit. Thus, even though the *filioque* is true, according to the Western theologians, denying it does not *ipso facto* involve denying the Trinity of persons.

Giles deals with this issue in his first quodlibet, which, as Pini has shown, represents his immediate response to the events of 1277 on being admitted as a Regent Master in theology, at Paris, in 1285.²⁰⁰ Giles establishes on the basis of Anselm that opposed relations are the only ways of distinguishing between the persons,²⁰¹ and counts Henry's diverse modes of origination as "disparate" relations: relations that, as Friedman has put it, "are not mutually implicative."²⁰² *Being a generator* and *being generated* are opposed relations; *being generated* and *being spirated* are disparate, for example: both are relations, but each is logically independent of the other. Giles argues that, in general, disparate relations are not sufficient to secure distinction of person. According to Giles, relations can be distinct from each other in one of two ways: in existence (*esse*), and in quiddity. Relations in God cannot be distinct in *existence*, because they are all the same as the one divine essence:

199 Russell L. Friedman, *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2012); On Giles, see 1:282–85. Friedman does not situate the discussion in the context of the 1277 condemnations.

200 Pini, "Giles of Rome", 255–62.

201 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.6, 13a.

202 Russell L. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge, 2010), 41.

Since in God, as is generally held, relation remains ... only according to its quiddity; according to existence (*esse*) it merges with the divine substance. So we cannot distinguish a relation <from another relations> according to its existence unless there is a distinction according to substance or something absolute ... But since <relation in God> cannot be distinguished <from another relation> in these ways, it follows that there will not be any distinction of relation in God according to existence, but only according to quiddity.²⁰³

But, despite this sameness, it is possible for (some of) the relations in God to be distinct in *quiddity* without being distinct in existence. Obviously, not in terms of their belonging to different non-relational foundations, because there is only one such in God—the divine essence. But Giles identifies a further way in which relations might be distinct (in quiddity) from each other:

Since the notion of the quiddity of a relation is to be directed *to* something else, it follows that, in this way (i.e. in quiddity) a relation is distinguished only from the thing *to* which it is related.²⁰⁴

The idea is that one way for relations to be distinct in quiddity without being distinct in existence is for them to be distinct as correlatively opposed to each other. And this is the only way for them to be distinct from each other in the divine case. So only opposed relations in God are distinct from each other. And since relations are the only way in which the persons are distinguished from each other, then unless the persons are distinct by opposed relations they will not be distinct from each other at all. In the case at hand, unless the *filioque* were true, the Son would indeed not be distinct from the Spirit, and the doctrine of the Trinity would be false. A very clear and lovely (and radical) shot at Henry's orthodoxy, from Giles's new-found position of institutional power and respect.²⁰⁵

203 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.6, 14a-b.

204 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.6, 14a.

205 Thanks to Stephen Dumont for help of many kinds in preparing this chapter, and for comments on an earlier draft.

Natural Philosophy

Silvia Donati and Cecilia Trifogli

1 Introduction

Natural philosophy occupies a central place in Giles's works and thought. Giles wrote a very extensive commentary on the eight books of Aristotle's *Physics* in which he provides both a literal explanation of Aristotle's text and a systematic discussion of all relevant exegetical and doctrinal points. Giles's *Physics* commentary is second only to that of Aquinas's for its popularity in the later Aristotelian tradition. Fourteenth-century philosophers recognized the great value of Giles as a commentator of the *Physics* by giving him the title of *novus expositor*—new, that is, in comparison to Aquinas, who was simply the *expositor*. The novelty of Giles with respect to Aquinas is not only temporal. Although there is no doubt that his *Physics* commentary and more generally his natural philosophy is much influenced by Aquinas, it is also clear that Giles was an innovative thinker. On many controversial issues his views are either in open contrast with Aquinas's or develop them in an original direction. In this chapter we would like to offer a fairly comprehensive account of Giles's natural philosophy by presenting his treatment of four major topics: matter, motion, place, and time.

2 Matter

Aristotle introduces the notion of matter in his investigation of the principles of change in Book 1 of the *Physics*. He distinguishes a triad of principles: a couple of contraries, that is, a form and its privation, and the underlying substrate. This triad is first used in the analysis of accidental change, and subsequently applied to the analysis of change in the category of substance.¹ For Aristotle, the term “matter” in its proper and primary sense indicates the substrate of substantial change, although it can also be used for the substrate of accidental change.² As to the controversial notion of first matter, according to a classic interpretation of Aristotle's theory, this is the underlying substrate of a particular

¹ Aristotle, *Physics* 1.7–9.

² Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* 1.4, 320a2–5.

class of substantial changes, namely, the mutual transformations of the four elementary bodies. In Aristotle's physical system these are the simplest sensible bodies so that the substrate underlying their mutual transformations, being simpler than the elementary bodies themselves, cannot be a corporeal matter.

From the foregoing, we arrive at the idea of a substrate that is more basic than the four elementary bodies and in itself only potentially a body. This substrate is "first matter", the incorporeal substrate lacking any formal determinations, the discovery of which has been linked to Aristotle by a long exegetical tradition.³ Aristotle's analysis in the *Physics*, however, is far from being an exhaustive investigation of the very complex notion of matter. Scholastic thinkers tried to complete Aristotle's treatment in the *Physics* by referring to other Aristotelian treatises, notably the *Metaphysics*, the *De caelo et mundo* and the *De generatione et corruptione*, as well as to the Aristotelian commentaries available to them. Specifically, the philosophical tradition to which Giles of Rome belonged was most indebted to Averroes, whereas, among his contemporaries, Giles himself was more strongly influenced by Thomas Aquinas.

In the scholastic tradition the analysis of the notion of matter is not confined within the limits of a purely philosophical investigation; on the contrary, it is often the case that it is precisely the discussion of theological issues that offers the opportunity to test this notion. This is also the case with Giles of Rome, who develops his doctrine of matter in a number of philosophical and theological works that span a period of over thirty years, from the end of the 1260s until the beginning of the 14th century.⁴

3 Matter as Absolute Potentiality

For Giles, the expression "matter" or, more precisely, "first matter" indicates potency in the category of substance. In this respect, he follows Averroes, who had disambiguated the Aristotelian concept of matter by maintaining that the term "matter" properly indicates the substrate of substantial change, whereas it is used only equivocally for the substrate of accidental change. In another respect, however, Giles's understanding of matter differs from Averroes's. For

3 See, for example, Howard M. Robinson, "Prime Matter in Aristotle," *Phronesis* 19 (1974), 168–88. This traditional interpretation has been frequently criticized in the last fifty years and many Aristotelian scholars have argued that there is no notion of "first matter" in Aristotle.

4 On Giles's literary production and on the date of his works, see Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati, Concetta Luna, "Egidio Romano," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* 42 (Rome, 1993), 319–41.

Averroes, matter is primarily a physical principle: its constitutive role is that of being the substrate of substantial change. This implies that matter can only exist in substances underlying substantial change. In contrast to Averroes, for Giles, as for Thomas Aquinas, the role of matter as the substrate of substantial change is only one among its several functions, some of which are not connected to physical change. Accordingly, in Aquinas and Giles, in addition to its role as a physical principle, matter acquires another more general role, namely, that of a metaphysical principle as the substrate of substantial form. For Giles, the description of matter as potency in the category of substance captures the essence of matter, that is, its nature as one of the constitutive principles of a material substance. In this description matter is contrasted with the substantial form—the other constitutive principle of a material substance—which is in turn defined as actuality in the category of substance.

The definition of matter as potentiality in the category of substance describes matter as an absolute entity, neglecting the relation of matter to substantial form. Giles, however, also provides a “relational” description of matter by introducing a second notion of potentiality, according to which the potentiality of matter is a relational entity (*respectus*) or, more precisely, a relational mode (*modus relativus*), which is different from, albeit based on, the substantial potentiality of matter. The relational potentiality of matter can be further subdivided into potentiality with respect to the substantial form actually informing matter and potentiality with respect to a substantial form actually absent from matter. The second kind of relational potentiality is sometimes metaphorically called by Giles the “appetite” (*appetitus*) of matter, and can be viewed as potentiality conceived in a dynamic sense. It is this dynamic kind of potentiality, implying the absence of the form and the aptitude to it, that is constitutive of matter in its role as a physical principle. In short, for Giles, matter is considered the substrate of substantial change in accordance with the original Aristotelian model, in which the privation of the form is one of the principles of change:

In the genus of substance we can distinguish potency and act, for, as the form is essentially the act itself, likewise matter is essentially the potency itself. Hence, potency can be defined in two ways: either insofar as it indicates a relation (*respectum quendam*) based on the very substance of matter or insofar as it is in the genus of substance and indicates the very essence of matter. Thus, the potency that is a relation is based on the potency that constitutes the substance of matter ... Moreover, since it is not impossible for different relations to be founded on the same thing, the potency that indicates the relation to the form can be conceived in two ways: in a way, insofar as it is joined to the act (*coniuncta actui*), in

another way insofar as it is lacking the act (*abiciens actum*). For, in a certain sense, the relation of matter to form insofar as it is under the form is different from its relation to form insofar as it is lacking the form ...⁵

For Giles, insofar as it is the substrate of substantial form, matter is absolutely devoid of form and thus absolutely potential. Indeed, Averroes had previously made this point. Since substantial form is the most basic determination and the first actuality of substance, so Averroes argued, the substrate of substantial change must be completely devoid of determinations belonging to the category of substance; otherwise substantial change itself would be reduced to accidental change.⁶

The idea of prime matter as absolutely potential is central to Aquinas's and Giles's understanding of matter. Consistently with this idea, Giles strongly rejects the doctrine of prime matter as endowed with some degree of actuality, a doctrine that enjoyed some success between the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century, especially within the Franciscan school. For instance, in the *Ordinatio* of his late commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences*, Giles maintains that to ascribe some degree of actuality to matter is a philosophical mistake similar to that of the Presocratic philosophers, who conceived the material principle of bodies as a corporeal substance.⁷ More generally, as he argues in his earlier questions *De materia caeli*, since the unity of a composite substance is guaranteed by one of its two components being actual and the other being potential, to ascribe a degree of actuality to matter is tantamount to destroying the essential unity of the composite substance.⁸ In the

5 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 1 (Venice, 1502; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 23ra: "In genere substantiae possumus distinguere potentiam et actum; nam, sicut forma est essentialiter ipse actus, ita materia est essentialiter ipsa potentia. Potentia ergo dupliciter potest definiri: vel ut nominat respectum quendam fundatum in ipsa substantia materiae vel ut est in genere substantiae et dicit ipsam essentiam materiae. Et sic potentia quae est respectus fundatur in potentia quae est substantia materiae. Rursus, quia non est inconueniens in eadem re plures fundari respectus, potentia quae dicit respectum ad formam dupliciter sumi potest: uno modo ut est coniuncta actui, alio modo ut est abiciens actum. Est enim aliquo modo alius et alius respectus quem habet materia ad formam ut est sub ea et ut est privata illa, ipsa tamen substantia materiae successive est sub utroque respectu et sub utraque potentia ..."

6 Averroes, *Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo* 1.63 (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 38raC.

7 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.12.3.1, 2 vols. (Venice, 1581; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 1:542a B-bA.

8 In this work, Giles uses this line of reasoning in order to show that celestial matter cannot be essentially different from sublunary matter (for otherwise it would be endowed with some degree of actuality). See Giles of Rome, *De materia caeli* 2 (Venice, 1500; repr. Frankfurt am Main,

descending order of beings from supreme actuality to supreme potentiality, first matter occupies the lowest degree because of its nature as a pure potentiality. It is the lowest manifestation of being, at the boundary between being in act and absolute non-being. According to Giles, this ordering of matter in the hierarchy of beings enjoys the approval of the most authoritative philosophers and theologians.⁹ Indeed, Averroes describes matter as something intermediate between being and non-being.¹⁰ Augustine, by contrast, had described it as something approximating nothingness, but not identical with it.¹¹

Aquinas had drawn two corollaries from the assumption of the absolute potentiality of matter. One is that matter cannot exist without any form. Granted that to exist means to be in act and that matter in itself and without any form is pure potentiality, Aquinas concluded that the hypothesis of matter existing without any form is contradictory. Indeed, such a prospect is absolutely impossible, so that not even God can produce matter without any form.¹² The other corollary relates to the cognition of matter. Since only what is endowed with some degree of actuality can be grasped by the intellect, Aquinas concluded that matter could not be known in itself or in its essence. Rather, it can only be known in its correlation to the principle of actuality, namely, form, that is, as the substrate of substantial form.¹³ Despite some oscillations, Aquinas's ultimate position seems to be that these limitations in the cognition of matter apply not only to the human intellect, but to any kind of intellect, including the divine intellect. Accordingly, he only allows a divine idea of matter as a constitutive part of the composite substance and not in itself.¹⁴

1982), fol. 88rb-va: "Sed tunc quaeramus de illa materia: aut dicit puram potentiam aut non, quod scilicet secundum essentiam suam non dicat puram potentiam, sed dicat aliquid in actu. Arguemus contra eos ex eorum dictis quod numquam ex duobus in actu fit unum per essentiam ... Nam, tota causa quare ex duobus fit unum est quia unum illorum respectu alterius se habet ut potentia, aliud vero ut actus nec est in hoc alia causa quaerenda ... Si ergo ex ratione potentialitatis ad actum sumit<ur> ratio unitatis in rebus compositis ex potentia et actu, ubi invenitur essentialis ratio potentialitatis, ibi invenitur essentialis unitas ... Dicamus quod ex potentia pura et forma magis fit unum, ceteris paribus, quam ex duobus in actu ... Igitur in caelo aliquid <est> quod est potentia pura et materia caeli puram potentiam nominabit."

9 Giles of Rome, *De materia caeli* 2, fol. 89rb-va.

10 Averroes, *Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo* 1.70, fol. 41rbE.

11 Augustine, *Confessions* 12.7.7 (CCSL 27), 220.

12 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.66.1 (Turin-Rome, 1952), 322.

13 Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De trinitate* 4.2, 5.3 (Opera Omnia; Rome-Paris, 1992), 50:123; 50:147.

14 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.15.3, ad 3, 92. On the evolution of Aquinas' views on this issue, see John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington D.C., 2000), 321–26.

Aquinas's conclusions are partly accepted by Giles. In his early questions on the *De generatione*, Book 1, he maintains that matter can be separated from form neither in existence nor in intelligibility since matter is absolute potentiality and substantial form is the first actuality of a substance. It is thus the ultimate principle of both existence and intelligibility. In this work, however, Giles restricts his speculation to the purely philosophical level, which does not allow the consideration of supernatural events. He therefore refrains from taking a position on the issue of the separability of matter with respect to divine causality.¹⁵ In an earlier theological work—the *Ordinatio* of Book 1 of the commentary on *Sentences*—Giles had maintained the impossibility of God causing the separate existence of matter. Departing from Aquinas, however, he had allowed for the possibility of God having a distinct knowledge of matter in itself and independently of any substantial form.¹⁶ That is, he maintained that the distinct knowledge of matter in itself is impossible *only* for the human intellect, owing to the fact that it acquires knowledge through a progress from potentiality to actuality. Such progress in turn requires a mover—the object of knowledge—that is in act.¹⁷

Giles's view that God cannot cause the separate existence of matter was censored by the commission of theologians that in March 1277 examined the *Ordinatio* of his commentary on Book 1 of the *Sentences*. This occurred in the context of the reaction of the conservative faction of the Parisian faculty of Theology against the radical Aristotelianism prevalent in the faculty of Arts

15 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione* 1 (Venice, 1505; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1970), fol. 58va: "Ab actu vero qui est forma nec intellectu nec existentia separari potest. Intellectu non, quia, cum sit de se potentia pura (prima ed.), non poterit facere motum in intellectu nisi ut est actu*<i>* coniuncta. Ideo I *Physicorum* dicitur quod materia non intelligitur nisi per analogiam ad formam; immo, quia quod quid est est obiectum intellectus et materia non videtur pertinere ad quidditatem nisi ut est coniuncta formae, cum omnes partes definitionis et quidditatis si<n>t quodam modo formae, non poterimus per intellectum percipere materiam nisi ut est sub forma vel ut habet analogiam ad formam. Quod autem existentia non possit ultra separari a forma patet, cum non possit ultra separari ab esse et esse absque forma esse non possit. Utrum autem hoc miraculo fieri posset, non est praesentis speculationis ... Ab omni autem forma nec separari potest intellectu nec existentia, licet separari possit ab hac forma vel ab illa ..."

16 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.36.2.4 (Venice, 1521; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 189raD: "Materia vero prima quodam modo et universalia ideam habent quam imitantur, sed habent eam distinctam solum cognitione, non actu nec opere nec existentia."

17 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.36.2.4, fol. 189rbH: "Ad primum dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster est potentia pura in genere intelligibilium, nihil cognoscit quod per sui actualitatem non possit ipsum movere; et quia materia prima est potentia pura, nullo modo cognoscitur ab intellectu nostro nisi per analogiam ad formam."

and even, some argue, against Thomistic Aristotelianism.¹⁸ Despite the censure, Giles persisted in his rejection of the possibility of the separate existence of matter even after his reintegration into the Parisian faculty of Theology as a master in 1285. A late witness to Giles's position is his treatise on *Hexaemeron*. In this treatise Giles leaves absolutely no doubt that he regards the hypothesis of the separate existence of matter as contradictory. This fact entails, according to Giles, that it is absolutely impossible, in which case not even God can achieve it: "according to Boethius and according to the truth, any being (*esse*) derives from a form; hence, what lacks any form lacks any being. Consequently, if there were something completely devoid of form, according to this hypothesis there would be something that has no being; thus, that thing would be and not be, which is contradictory."¹⁹

4 Matter and Quantity

Aristotle provides no systematic discussion of the relationship between matter and quantity. According to an authoritative interpretation, for Aristotle dimensions have no privileged status in the metaphysical structure of sensible substances, but are just one accident among others.²⁰ It was only later, in the late ancient tradition, that the notion of three-dimensionality acquires a primary role in the analysis of sensible substances.²¹ This new approach is further testified by the discussions of some Arabic philosophers about the first corporeal form as well as by Averroes's doctrine of indeterminate dimensions. Averroes

18 On the circumstances of Giles's condemnation and his defense, see Robert Wielockx's edition of Giles of Rome, *Apologia*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.1 (Florence, 1985).

19 Giles of Rome, *Hexaemeron* 1.1 (Rome, 1555; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 1vaB: "Secundum Boethium et secundum veritatem, omne esse est a forma; quod ergo caret omni forma, caret omni esse. Si ergo esset aliquid omnino informe, esset secundum hanc hypothesim aliquid quod nullum haberet esse; ergo illud esset et non esset, quod contradictionem implicat." For Giles's position on the intelligibility of matter in his late works, cf. *ibid.* 1.3, fols. 2vaA-3rbB; *id.*, *Quodlibet* 2.13 (Louvain, 1646; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966), 83–86.

20 See, e.g., Michael Frede and Günter Patzig, *Aristoteles "Metaphysik Z". Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar*. 2 vols. (Munich, 1988), 2:45.

21 For an overview of the debate in the late-ancient and in the Arabic tradition as well as for basic bibliographical information, see Silvia Donati, "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 149–233, esp. 152–63; Silvia Donati, "Materia e dimensioni tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle *dimensiones indeterminatae*," *Quaestio* 7 (2007), 361–93, esp. 361–67.

develops his theory in opposition to Avicenna's doctrine of the *forma corporeitatis* as a form belonging to the category of substance and inhering in matter before dimensions. In his treatise *De substantia orbis*,²² which was enormously successful among Latin commentators, Averroes distinguishes two kinds of dimensions: determinate dimensions, i.e. a three-dimensional extension or volume of a determinate measure, and indeterminate dimensions, i.e. a three-dimensional extension or volume considered in itself, apart from any determinate measure. For Averroes, indeterminate dimensions inform matter before substantial form; their function is to account for the division and multiplication of forms in matter. Granted that matter in itself is absolutely potential and devoid of form—which entails that matter in itself is one and undivided—in order to account for the fact that, by being received in matter, forms acquire extension and divisibility, it is necessary to posit that the substrate of substantial form is informed by dimensions. This role, however, cannot be performed by determinate dimensions, since these dimensions are ontologically dependent on substantial form, as is proved by the fact that their actual measure is determined by the form to which they are joined. Therefore, the dimensions accounting for the division and the extension of substantial forms in matter must be the indeterminate dimensions, which inhere in matter prior to form.

For Giles, as for many other scholastic authors, Averroes's doctrine provides the philosophical framework for the discussion of the problem of the relationship between matter and quantity.²³ Compared to those of his contemporaries, however, Giles's interpretation of Averroes's theory displays a degree of originality that has long been recognized by scholars.²⁴ Giles uses the traditional notion of indeterminate dimensions in order to express the idea of a quantity of matter (*quantitas materiae*) different from and more basic

22 Averroes, *Sermo de substantia orbis* 1 (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1962), fols. 3ra-5vb. For an English translation, cf. Averroes, *De substantia orbis. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English Translation and Commentary*, by Arthur Hyman (Cambridge Mass./Jerusalem, 1986), 39–73.

23 For an overview of the medieval Latin debate in the 13th century and at the beginning of the 14th century, see Donati "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate"; Donati, "Materia e dimensioni"; Silvia Donati, "The Doctrine of *dimensiones indeterminatae* in the Commentary Tradition of the *Physics* in the XIIIth and in the Early XIVth Century," in *The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy*, (eds.) Cees Leijhorst, Christoph Lüthy, Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen (Leiden, 2002), 189–223.

24 Cf. Anneliese Maier, "Das Problem der *quantitas materiae*," in Anneliese Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert* (Rome, 1966), 26–52; Edith D. Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion with respect to Quantity of the Eucharist," in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, ed. Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Rome, 1981), 105–41.

than three-dimensional extension. This innovative concept, which has been regarded as an anticipation of the modern notion of quantity of matter, is introduced by Giles in his earliest works, dating from the end of the 1260s and the beginning of the 1270s.²⁵ In later works, Giles's doctrine would lose some of its innovative edge and would accommodate a somewhat more conventional interpretation of Averroes's theory.²⁶

Giles's starting point in working out the notion of *quantitas materiae* is the analysis of rarefaction and condensation, which is a kind of quantitative change. His basic intuition is that in order to achieve a correct understanding of rarity and density, the traditional notion of quantity understood as three-dimensional extension or corporeal volume is not sufficient. Accordingly, it is necessary to posit also a quantitative determination different from and more basic than extension. He identifies this quantitative determination—which he sometimes describes as *multitudo materiae* or as *tantitas materiae* or even as *quantitas materiae*—with indeterminate dimensions. He begins with the definitions of “rare” and “dense” and argues as follows. A body is defined as dense when a large amount of matter is contained within small dimensions (*dimensiones parvae*), whereas it is defined as rare when a small amount of matter is contained within large dimensions (*dimensiones magnae*).²⁷ Since the expressions “small dimensions” and “large dimensions” in these definitions indicate the extension or volume of the body, the following question arises: what is the referent of the expressions “a large amount” or “a small amount” of matter? Giles maintains that these expressions refer to determinations that, on the one hand, are different from extension, but on the other hand cannot be traced back to matter itself and belong to the category of quantity.

Despite the conceptual differences between Averroes's and Giles's views, there is a basic agreement between the two commentators about the relevant metaphysical assumptions. One of them is that matter is an entity that in itself is absolutely devoid of formal determinations, and is thus absolutely potential. The second is that the formal principle of division must be a determination belonging to the category of quantity. From the assumption of the absolute potentiality of matter, Giles draws the conclusion that matter in itself can be

25 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.44, 49, 51; *Excerpta Godefridi de Fontibus* 2.6, ed. Concetta Luna. Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.2 (Florence, 2003), 279–82, 292–93, 300–02, 519–24; Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 8.4–5 (Venice, 1501; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966), fols. 34va–35va (cf. MS Bruges, Stadsbibliothek, 491, fols. 121ra–122rb); Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 44 (Rome, 1554; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fols. 30vb–32rb; id., *In Physicam* 4, fol. 96va.

26 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.1, 195–202.

27 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 4, fol. 96va.

neither a large amount nor a small amount, and that these characteristics must be imparted to matter by some formal determination. From the assumption that quantity is the formal principle of divisibility, he draws the conclusion that, since *multitudo* and *paucitas* entail a plurality of parts, the formal determination on which these characteristics are grounded must belong to the category of quantity.²⁸ Hence, Giles is led to distinguish two kinds of quantity or dimensions existing in the matter of corporeal substances. These are the quantity in virtue of which matter occupies a space of such and such dimensions—in other words, the extension or corporeal volume of a certain measure—and the quantity in virtue of which matter is a large or a small amount. Giles identifies the first kind of quantity with determinate dimensions, whereas he identifies the second kind of quantity with indeterminate dimensions.²⁹

In accordance with the realist orientation of his metaphysics, Giles provides a distinctively realist interpretation of the distinction between determinate and indeterminate dimensions. He describes the two kinds of dimensions as two really distinct entities, which both belong to the category of quantity and are related to one another in the same way in which the two constitutive principles of substance—matter and form—are. In using the analogy with the relationship between matter and form, Giles wants, on the one hand, to call attention to the fact that indeterminate dimensions are related to determinate dimensions as a potential principle to its actuality and determination. On the other hand, for Giles, the distinction between matter and form is the paradigmatic case of a real distinction as opposed to a conceptual distinction. Hence, by referring to it, Giles wants to stress that indeterminate and determinate dimensions are related to each other as two different entities (*res*) and not just as two different descriptions of the same entity.³⁰

28 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 44, fol. 31rbC-D: “Et quia essentielle est materiae esse in potentia, quicquid actualitatem aliquam vel distinctionem importat, non habet materia de se, sed acquirit illud ut est sub tali forma accidentali vel substantiali. Oportet ergo dare formam et perfectionem aliquam per quam materia est tanta et tanta et per quam occupat tantum et tantum locum. Hoc autem necesse est esse quantitatem, quia quicquid importat magnitudinem et pluralitatem aliquam secundum quam accipitur aliqua partialitas molis necesse est illud quantitatem esse. Cum ergo competat materiae habere partem et partem <ex eo quod est tanta et tanta et> ex eo quod occupat tantum et tantum locum, oportet ei utrumque horum per quantitatem convenire.”

29 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 44, fol. 31vaA: “Quantitas illa per quam materia est tanta possunt dici dimensiones indeterminatae, sed dimensiones determinatae dici possunt quantitas per quam materia occupat tantum locum.”

30 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 8.5, fol. 35va: “Sicut materia, quae realiter et essentialiter diversa est a forma, terminatur per formam, sic dimensiones proprie

The preceding analysis makes clear that for Giles extended quantity is a metaphysically complex entity, which includes a potential and an actual element, analogous to the components of a material substance. In his view, this ontological complexity is peculiar to quantity, setting it apart from any other accidental category; specifically, it accounts for its metaphysical status as the most basic accidental determination of sensible substances.³¹ Indeed, for Giles indeterminate dimensions are an immediate and unchangeable determination of matter. Not only do they remain unchanged when determinate dimensions change but, more generally, they are not even affected by the action of any natural agent. For if indeterminate dimensions inhere in matter prior to substantial form, and the “deepest” change that a natural agent can produce is a change in substantial forms, then, indeterminate dimensions cannot be reached by the action of a natural agent. Indeed, according to Giles, only the action of God can reach the level of indeterminate dimensions. For just as God has the power to create new matter or to annihilate some existing matter, likewise he also has the power to transform a small amount of matter into a large one or, conversely, a large amount into a small one.³²

The innovations introduced by Giles in the doctrine of indeterminate dimensions raise some difficulties. As has been stressed by scholars, while in Averroes’s view the notion of indeterminate dimensions indicates indeterminate extension, in Giles’s doctrine it indicates a determinate quantity different from extension.³³ Indeed, the quantity of matter, which in classical physics is associated with the notion of weight, is a determinate quantity different from

indeterminatae, quae realiter et essentialiter sunt diversae a terminatis, terminantur per <dimensiones> terminatas.”

31 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 45, fol. 32rbB-C.

32 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.6.18, 523–24: “Nunc est ita quod ipsa materia non est rara vel densa de se, quia non est partibilis de se -aliter non esset in potentia ad omnia-, sed rara vel densa sive multa vel pauca est per quantitatem. Et quia natura non potest resolvere nisi usque ad formam substantialem, ideo non potest facere de paucis multum nisi per rarefactionem et additionem. Item, agens naturale nichil potest facere nisi per transmutationem. Subiectum autem transmutationis non est materia omnino prima, sed quanta; ergo pauca vel multa; ergo non potest facere de paucis multum, quia tunc solum materia prima subiceretur ... Sed Deus, sicut potest creare materiam de novo, ita potest creare in materia paucum vel multum, et sic de paucis facere multum sine additione et rarefactione, sicut agens naturale facit materiam sub caliditate esse sub frigiditate sine additione materie. Sed Deus potest immediate quicquid est in potentia materie, et ideo, manente eadem substantia materie, potest de paucis facere multum sine rarefactione materie. Sicut enim materiam creavit de nichilo, ita potest eam facere multam ex paucis.”

33 Sylla, “Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion,” 114.

the volume of a body. It is obvious, then, that Giles's merely negative description of the quantity of matter as "indeterminate dimensions" is not adequate to capture its specific nature as a quantity distinct from extension; indeed, it is rather misleading. In fact, the ambiguity seems to lie not only in Giles's description of the theory, but also in the theory itself. This is because, for Giles, indeterminate dimensions do not merely play the role of quantity with respect to matter; they additionally play the role of being the principle of multiplication and division of a substantial form—a role that clearly points to quantity in the sense of extension.³⁴ In joining together these two notions of indeterminate dimensions, Giles seems to have been led by some superficial similarities between them, namely, the fact that both designate a quantity inhering in matter prior to form. In later works the ambiguity of his theory becomes fully apparent. On the one hand, he describes indeterminate dimensions as the dimensions that are determined by two-dimensional extension—a description that obviously applies only to *three-dimensional* extension. On the other hand, he still ascribes the role of *quantitas materiae* to them. As Giles puts it: "the very quantity of matter in itself is called indeterminate dimensions, and the same quantity, insofar as it is joined to this or that quantity (*alii et alii quantitati*), that is, this or that surface (*alii et alii superficiei*), will be called determinate dimensions."³⁵

5 Hylomorphism

When discussing to what kind of substances hylomorphic composition applies Giles is faced with two opposing positions.³⁶ One of them is Averroes's

34 Donati, "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate," 191–95.

35 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.1, 198–99: "Ipsa quantitas secundum se, a qua numquam absolvitur materia, dicitur dimensiones indeterminatae, ipsa etiam quantitas, ut est coniuncta alii et alii formae substantiali vel ut est coniuncta alii et alii qualitati, dicitur dimensiones determinatae ... Dicemus ergo quod materia fuerit concreata cum sua quantitate, per quam habet quod sit multa vel pauca, a qua quantitate numquam fuit absoluta et in quam nullum agens naturale naturaliter nec habet nec habuit posse, sed omnes resolutiones formarum factae per naturale agens praesupponunt tam materiam quam quantitatem eius et omnes formae mobiliter inductae adveniunt materiae iam quantae ... Ipsa quantitas materiae secundum se dicitur dimensiones indeterminatae et ipsa eadem quantitas, ut est coniuncta alii et alii quantitati, utputa alii et alii superficiei, dicetur dimensiones determinatae."

36 For the philosophical background of the 13th-century debate on these issues, see Silvia Donati, "La discussione sulla materia nella tradizione di commento della *Fisica*:

position, and the other is the theory of so-called “universal hylomorphism”, which is normally traced back to the Arabic philosopher of Jewish origin, Avicenna. As mentioned earlier, Aristotle had used the term “matter” both in a strict sense to indicate the substrate of substantial change, and in a wider sense to include the substrate of accidental change. It is matter taken in this wider sense that he ascribes to the celestial bodies, since they do not undergo generation and corruption, but only local motion, i.e. celestial rotation, their matter is in potency only to local motion.³⁷ In contrast to Aristotle, Averroes had only considered matter in the strict sense as the substrate of substantial change. Consequently, for Averroes, only sublunary bodies are composed of matter and form, whereas celestial bodies are simple substances, and insofar as they undergo local motion can be called “material”, albeit only equivocally.³⁸ If Averroes confines matter to the sublunary world, universal hylomorphists take the opposite stance, since they ascribe hylomorphic composition to all created substances. As might be expected, their opposing position is based on a different concept of matter. Being centered on the function of substrate of substantial change, Averroes’s concept is eminently a physical concept. In contrast to Averroes, the concept of matter embraced by universal hylomorphists does not focus on the role of matter as a principle of the physical world. Rather, it focuses on its role as the principle of the general features that are common to all of (created) being, such as being composed of act and potency, being included in the categories, etc. In other words, it focuses on the role of matter as a metaphysical principle, and hence it is a metaphysical rather than a physical notion.

Following Aquinas, Giles adopts an intermediate position between these two extremes, ascribing hylomorphic composition to both sublunary and celestial corporeal substances.³⁹ In criticizing Averroes’s position Aquinas had

commentatori inglesi degli anni 1240–1270 ca.,” in *Il commento filosofico nell'occidente latino (secc. XIII–XV)*, (eds.) Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi and Stefano Perfetti (Turnhout, 2002), 185–232, esp. 207–10 and the bibliography listed there.

37 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 8.1, 1042a32–b6; 8.4, 1044b6–8; 9.8, 1050b16–24; 12.2, 1069b24–26.

38 Averroes, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII* 8.12 (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1962), fol. 220rbE–vaH; Averroes, *Sermo de substantia orbis* 2, fol. 6vaG–H. English translation in Averroes, *De substantia orbis*, 82.

39 On Giles’s position concerning the nature of celestial bodies, see Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.45, *Excerpta Godefridi* 2.4, 283–88, 513–16; Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 8.2–3, fols. 33rb–34va (cf. MS Bruges, Stadsbibliothek, 491, fols. 115vb marg. inf., 116ra–va); Giles of Rome, *De materia caeli*; Giles of Rome, *Hexaemeron* 4–9, fols. 3rb–8rb; Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.12.3, 1:550–558. On Giles’s position concerning the nature of spiritual substances, see Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.20, 228–30; Giles of Rome, *In librum Sententiarum* 2.3.1.1, 1:160–70. On the 13th-century debate on these two issues, see Silvia Donati,

argued that hylomorphic composition is necessary to explain not only substantial change, but also sensible determinations. Accordingly, since celestial bodies are sensible substances, we must assume that they are material substances; if they were immaterial, they would be intelligible and not sensible substances.⁴⁰ Although Giles agrees with Aquinas in rejecting Averroes's position, he regards Aquinas's objection as insufficiently precise. As he points out in the late *Ordinatio* of his commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences*, quantity is the only accidental determination that unquestionably requires hylomorphic composition in its subject, whereas this is not evident in the case of other sensible determinations.⁴¹ Therefore, in order to reject Averroes's immaterialism regarding celestial bodies, one should argue not generically from the fact that these bodies are sensible, but more precisely from the fact that they are extended.

In criticizing the theory of universal hylomorphism,⁴² however, Giles follows Aquinas more closely and repeats Aquinas's main objections.⁴³ One of them is based on the role of quantity as the principle of divisibility and multiplication. As we have seen, to account for a plurality of material substances we must assume that matter is extended; but extended quantity only exists in corporeal substances; hence, the theory of the hylomorphic composition of spiritual substances entails that just one such substance exists. The second objection focuses on the specific activity of spiritual substances, namely, intellectual activity. For Giles, this kind of activity is incompatible with hylomorphic composition. To the theory of universal hylomorphism, Giles imputes a basic metaphysical error, namely the idea that the notion of potentiality, which is common to all created substances, applies to them univocally. From this assumption the supporters of this theory erroneously draw the conclusion that all created substances share the same kind of potentiality, namely first matter. Giles's contention is that the potentiality belonging to spiritual

"La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alla fine del tredicesimo secolo," *Medioevo* 12 (1986), 229–80; Donati, "La discussione sulla materia nella tradizione di commento," 207–18, and the bibliography listed there.

40 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.66.2, corp., 324.

41 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.12.3.3, 1:553aB–C: "Etsi possit aliquis dubitare de aliis accidentibus sensibilibus, de ipsa tamen quantitate dubitare non potest. Nullus enim sanae mentis diceret quod forma possit subici quantitati sine materia, cum habitum sit per Philosophum formam non posse dividi et, per consequens, nec extendi sine materia. Ex accidentibus ergo caeli manifeste probatur substantiam in caelo esse compositam ex materia et forma."

42 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.3.1.1.1, 1:161b–164b; 1:166a–b.

43 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.50.2, corp., 253.

substances is radically different from matter: whereas matter is absolute potentiality, spiritual substances are in potency only in a restricted sense. This is because they are endowed with some degree of actuality and only in potency with respect to further determinations.⁴⁴

If Giles agrees with Aquinas in ascribing hylomorphic composition to all corporeal substances, he disagrees with him on one substantial point. To explain the fact that celestial bodies do not undergo substantial change, Aquinas had assumed that their matter must be essentially different from the matter of sublunary bodies, in the sense that their respective matters are potentialities related to different kinds of forms. Whereas sublunary matter is in potency with respect to the forms of all generable and corruptible bodies—and thus can change from one form to the other in the process of generation and corruption—celestial matter is in potency only with respect to the celestial form by which it is actually informed, so that it is not suited to receive other forms in the process of generation and corruption.⁴⁵ The hypothesis of two essentially different kinds of matter is firmly rejected by Giles both in the version endorsed by Aquinas and in later versions, as for example that proposed by Henry of Ghent.⁴⁶ Giles's basic objection is that this hypothesis is inconsistent with the theory of the absolute potentiality of matter. Granted that form and actuality are the principle of any distinction, it is impossible to assume two essentially different pure potentialities because there would be no ground for their distinction:

Matter according to its nature (*per se*) is pure potentiality; but act is the principle of any distinction; thus, if you take away actuality, you will take away distinction, as the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 9. And since the matter of the heavens is pure potentiality and the matter of these

44 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.3.1.1, 1:169aC-bA: "Quod autem addebatur de potentialitate et quod potentialitas per se et primo convenit materiae, et ideo quicquid habet potentialitatem habet per materiam, dici debet quod potentialitas materiae et animae vel cuiuscumque substantiae spiritualis est omnino aequivoce, quia potentia materiae est potentia pura, nihil autem est in substantia spirituali quod sit pura potentia ... Habent tamen quandam analogiam ad invicem, quia, sicut dicitur potentialitas materiae quia potest habere hoc vel carere vel quia per illud est perfecta, sic et potentia in spiritualibus sumitur vel respectu indeterminationis, quia respicit hoc et oppositum, vel respectu perfectionis, ut ideo ibi potentialitas esse dicatur, quia per actum perficitur quasi potentia per suum complementum."

45 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.66.2, corp., 324.

46 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 4.16 (Paris, 1518; repr. Louvain, 1961), fol. 131–34; Donati, "La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti," 248–50.

sublunary bodies is pure potentiality, if they were devoid of any form, this matter and that matter would have no principle of distinction, since no distinction can exist in a pure potentiality.⁴⁷

According to Giles, in whatever way the difference between the two kinds of matter is accounted for it implies a distinction of degrees in the two potentialities; this, in turn, entails some degree of actuality, which is obviously incompatible with pure potentiality. Granted that the principle of distinction is actuality, any distinction can be expressed in terms of different degrees of actuality or, alternatively, in terms of distance from absolute actuality. Giles elaborates on this point by appealing to the well-known principle according to which forms and, more generally, beings are like numbers. Just as numbers differ from each other by being at different distances from the unity, so beings differ from each other by existing at different distances from absolute actuality. Given its position as the limit between being and non-being, however, absolute potentiality has an indivisible nature (*natura punctalis*), which does not allow differences in degree. This is because even the addition of the lowest degree of actuality would cause it to become an actual being, whereas any further degree of potentiality would reduce it to absolute nothingness. As Giles polemically argues against the supporters of the theory of two specifically different matters, the only way to account for the difference between two absolute potentialities is to assume two absolute actualities. Granted that two absolute potentialities cannot be located at a different distance from pure actuality, they could still differ from each other if they were related to different absolute actualities. On this hypothesis, they would differ not because of a different distance but because of a different point of reference. As Giles says:

If you want to retain two essentially different matters and absolute potentialities, posit two pure actualities and two first principles and two gods, and say that this pure potentiality is essentially different from that pure potentiality because this pure potentiality derives from the first of those two acts and from that god, whereas that pure potentiality derives from the second of those two acts and from that other god.⁴⁸

47 Giles of Rome, *De materia caeli* 2, fol. 88vb: "Nam, materia per se est potentia pura, sed actus est qui distinguit; tolle ergo actum, tollis omnem distinctionem, ut probat Philosophus IX *Metaphysicae*. Et quia materia caeli est potentia pura et materia istorum inferiorum est potentia pura, si absolverentur ab omni forma, materia haec et illa non haberent per quid differrent, quia in pura potentia non potest esse distinctio."

48 Giles of Rome, *De materia caeli* 2, fol. 89rb: "Quod, si velles salvare duas materias primas et duas potentias puras essentialiter differentes, ponas duos actos puros et duo prima

It is noteworthy that in Aquinas's view, the theory of two different kinds of matter is not in contrast with the principle that the ground for any distinction is actuality. In fact, he maintains that the two different kinds of matter differ from each other exactly because of their relationship to different acts, i.e. as potencies ordered to different acts. Since the relationship to actuality belongs to the essence of potentiality, the actuality to which a potentiality is related essentially defines what that potentiality is. Therefore, matters ordered to different kinds of actualities, as sublunary matter and celestial matter are, will differ from each other essentially.⁴⁹

Aquinas's explanation is rejected by Giles, who argues against the assumption that there can be two pure potentialities essentially ordered to different acts. As Giles points out, if sublunary and celestial matters were essentially ordered to different kinds of forms, then the different degrees of actuality and perfection belonging to these forms would be mirrored by the corresponding matters. The result is that those matters too would be characterized by a different degree of actuality and perfection. But this again would imply that at least one of these two matters would not be a pure potentiality. In other words, for Giles, absolute potentiality is not only incompatible with any distinction of degrees, but also with being bound to any specific kind of actuality: insofar as it is a pure potentiality, matter must be equally suited to receive all material forms.⁵⁰

Granted that celestial matter is essentially the same as sublunary matter, then it is also in potency with respect to sublunary forms. Giles is therefore

principia et duos deos, et dicas quod hoc modo haec potentia pura differt essentialiter ab illa potentia pura, quia haec derivatur ab illo actu primo et ab illo deo, illa autem derivatur ab illo alio actu secundo et ab illo deo."

49 Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis* 6 (Opera Omnia; Rome, 1969), 40:51: "Materiae autem proprium est in potentia esse; hanc igitur materiae distinctionem accipere oportet non secundum quod est vestita diversis formis aut dispositionibus, hoc enim est praeter essentiam materiae, sed secundum distinctionem potentiae respectu diversitatis formarum: cum enim potentia id quod est ad actum dicatur, necesse est ut potentia distinguatur secundum id ad quod primo potentia dicitur."

50 Giles of Rome, *Hexaemeron* 9, fol. 7vaD-vbC: "In potentia autem pura non potest aliqua esse distinctio ... Nec ex parte actus ad quem ordinatur, quia una potentia pura (quantum est de se) non magis ordinatur ad alium actum essentialiter quam alia, quia non sunt duo actus essentialiter differentes quin unus sit nobilior alio ... Si ergo duae potentiae purae ex hoc essentialiter differrent, quia una de se ordinaretur ad alium actum essentialiter magis quam alia, quia duo actus essentialiter differentes non sunt aequae nobiles, consequens esset quod una huiusmodi potentia ordinaretur de se (ut supra tetigimus) ad nobiliorem actum quam alia et esset de se nobilior quam alia et, per consequens, esset magis prope Deum et minus prope nihil quam alia et, per consequens, non esset potentia pura sicut alia."

faced with the problem of explaining why celestial bodies, unlike sublunary bodies, are ungenerable and incorruptible. If celestial matter is in potency with respect to the forms of sublunary bodies, why is it the case that it does not strive to realize this potency in a process of generation and corruption? Giles's solution is that the explanation for the various kinds of behavior of sublunary and celestial matter is not to be found in the nature of these matters but in the nature of their respective forms. Of the difference between sublunary and celestial forms Giles gives different accounts in his works. His final solution is based on the notion of contrariety. Potency conceived in its dynamic sense, i.e. as the attitude of matter to receive a form not actually inhering in it or, in other words, as the "appetite" of matter that sets forth the process of generation and corruption, is only associated with forms linked to each other by the relation of contrariety. But such are the forms of sublunary bodies only, not also those of the celestial bodies. This is why matter is a principle of generation and corruption only in sublunary bodies.⁵¹ As to the reasons why the celestial and the sublunary matters are informed by different kinds of forms, in Giles's view this difference is not grounded in the nature of matter itself, but in a purely extrinsic factor, namely God's free will. It was God's free choice, at the moment of creation, to introduce a corruptible form in a certain piece of matter and an incorruptible one in another piece of matter. He could have chosen otherwise at that moment and He can still impart an incorruptible form on a piece of matter presently underlying a corruptible one or the other way round.⁵²

6 Matter as a Physical Principle

We mentioned previously that the 13th-century philosophical tradition distinguishes two notions of matter: matter conceived as a physical principle, that is, as the substrate of change, and matter conceived as a metaphysical principle,

⁵¹ See Donati, "La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti," 260–76.

⁵² Giles of Rome, *Hexaemeron* 9, fol. 8raB: "Quod si quaeratur ulterius unde hoc competit materiae caeli, quod suscipiat formam non habentem contrarium et complementum totum appetitum, cuius contrarium accidit in istis inferioribus, dicemus quod hoc est voluntate creatoris, qui voluit in materia caelestium imprimere talem formam complementum totum appetitum et in istis inferioribus imprimere formam non complementum. Potuisset enim, si voluisset, et adhuc posset, si vellet, in materia horum inferiorum imprimere formam caeli et in materia caeli imprimere has formas inferiores. Nam, cum dicimus quod materia caeli non est in potentia ad aliam formam, intelligendum est hoc secundum rationes seminales, prout materia subicitur agentibus naturalibus. Non est autem hoc intelligendum secundum rationes oboedientiales, prout materia subicitur agenti divino."

that is, as the substrate of substantial form. Matter as a physical principle and matter as a metaphysical principle are sometimes labelled "*materia naturalis*" or "*materia physica*" and "*materia metaphysica*", respectively.⁵³ Although the distinction between these two notions of matter plays some role in Giles's doctrine, it is clear that it is much more crucial for those authors who endorse the theory of universal hylomorphism, and thus extend the application of the notion of matter far beyond the limits of the physical world, accentuating its metaphysical connotations. This distinction is often regarded as immediately grounded in reality, in the sense that a higher degree of conceptual complexity is attached to a higher degree of ontological complexity. The result is that the referent of the physical notion of matter is conceived as ontologically more complex than the referent of the metaphysical notion. More precisely, physical matter is understood as a complex entity, resulting from the addition of some specific properties to the more basic metaphysical matter. In identifying the properties that are distinctive of matter as a physical principle, 13th-century authors followed different routes. Relevant to our discussion is the view that posits that the distinctive property of physical matter is an "active potency of matter", which is sometimes also called "inchoative form".

The theory of an active potency of matter or of an "inchoative" existence of form in matter seems to be alien to the Aristotelian tradition and rather rooted in the Augustinian one. In the 13th century, this theory is considered as one of the distinctive features of so-called "Augustinianism" as contrasted with Thomistic Aristotelianism. In the context of the theology of the period, this theory was associated with the Augustinian doctrine of the *rationes seminales*, that is, with the idea that at the moment of creation God introduced "seeds" or forms into matter. Moreover, the theory held that God did this with respect to all natural beings that would be produced after creation, and in so doing, initiated the natural process of generation and corruption. One of the most famous versions of the theory of the active potency of matter conceived as an inchoative existence of form is Albert the Great's doctrine of the *inchoatio formae*.⁵⁴

A central issue in the theory of inchoative form is how to account for the distinction between natural motion, which, according to Aristotle's definition of

53 On the concept of physical matter and on the related notions of the active potency of matter, *inchoatio formae* and *ratio seminalis* in the 13th-century philosophical tradition, see Donati, "La discussione sulla materia nella tradizione di commento della *Fisica*," 218–27 and the bibliography listed there.

54 Albertus Magnus, *Physica* 1.3.3, 1.3.10, 1.3.16 (Opera Omnia; Münster, 1987), 4:41–44; 4:56–57; 4:70–73.

nature as an intrinsic source of change, is based on a principle that is intrinsic to the moveable thing, and violent motion, which, on the contrary, exclusively derives from an external cause.⁵⁵ In particular, the core problem of this theory is how to explain the natural generation of a new form in matter. The notion of active potency of matter or inchoative form was introduced in order to reject two opposite solutions, which were regarded as equally incorrect. One of them posited that the production of the new form is completely from inside (*ab intra*), in the sense that the form either derives from the essence of matter or else pre-exists in matter, as in Anaxagoras's doctrine of the *latitatio formarum*. The other solution posited that the new form is imparted on matter completely from outside (*ab extra*), in virtue either of an act of creation or of an informing act by a *dator formarum*. Departing from both these solutions, the doctrine of the inchoative form posited that the production of a new form is partly from inside and partly from outside (*partim ab intra, partim ab extra*). The new form comes partly from inside because there exists an active potency in matter prior to the process of generation of this form. It also comes partly from outside, however, because the active potency needs to be stimulated by an external agent in order for the new form to be actualized in matter. From the ontological point of view, the active potency is regarded as something different from matter, which in itself is a purely receptive and passive entity, and is identified with a quasi formal entity (*natura quasi formalis*) or as a still undeveloped stage of the form itself. This formal but still undeveloped nature of the active potency is precisely captured by Albert the Great's description of it as *inchoatio formae*.

Like Aquinas, Giles firmly rejects the doctrine of the active potency of matter or *inchoatio formae*.⁵⁶ Obviously, a major difficulty in this doctrine is how to explain, at the ontological level, the distinction between the form as pre-existing in a sort of incomplete way in matter, and the complete form, which is the end of the process of generation. Many regarded this distinction as incompatible with the principle according to which a form is a simple and indivisible entity, which rules out being able to draw a distinction between a less complete and a more complete mode of existence. One of Giles's main objections to the theory of the active potency of matter is centred precisely on this difficulty.⁵⁷ In his analysis of the notion of nature in his *Physics* commentary,

55 Aristotle, *Physics* 2.1, 192b20-23.

56 On Giles's doctrine of matter as a physical principle and on his theory of the *rationes seminales*, see Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.51, *Excerpta Godefridi* 2.5, 294-302, 516-19; Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 2, fol. 28ra-28rb; Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio*, 2.18.2.2, 2:79b-92.

57 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.51.18, 295, lin. 13-16.

Giles follows Aquinas and argues against the theory that a natural movement does not necessarily require the existence of an active principle in the mobile. On the contrary, so Giles argues, the natural character of a motion is sufficiently accounted for by the presence in the mobile of a merely passive principle. This is the case, for example, with the elementary bodies, whose mutual transformations are caused by the action of an external agent on the passive and receptive potency of matter.⁵⁸

A more thorough investigation of the factors involved in a natural change is provided by Giles in his discussion of the theological notion of *ratio seminalis* in the two versions of his commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences*. Giles understands the *rationes seminales* as a correlation (*ordo*) instituted by God between natural agents and patients at the moment of creation, and he distinguishes two kinds of *rationes seminales*, namely those pertaining to natural agents and those pertaining to natural patients. Thus, for Giles, the *rationes seminales* have the ontological status of real relations: the *rationes seminales* pertaining to natural agents are relations based on their active powers, whereas those pertaining to natural patients are relations based on their passive potencies. More precisely, Giles links the notion of *ratio seminalis* related to matter with what we have labelled the potency of matter conceived in a dynamic sense, namely, the potency ordered to a form not actually inhering in matter or, in other words, the attitude of matter to receive that form and its “appetite” for it.⁵⁹ As was noted above, for Giles, this attitude is still completely passive and receptive, despite being to a certain extent ordered to a specific form. It is this attitude, however, that transforms matter from a static entity into a dynamic factor of natural processes, so that it is this attitude—and not an alleged active

58 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 2, fol. 28ra-b. On Aquinas’s position, cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio* 2.1 (Turin, 1965), 74.

59 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.51.18, 295–97: “Propter hoc aliter dicendum quod in materia est duplex potentialitas. Quedam est in genere substantie, secundum quod dicitur quod in quolibet genere est una prima contrarietas, scilicet actus et potentia; et sic in genere substantie potentia idem est quod materia prima, et actus idem quod forma. Alia est potentialitas que est in genere relationis, et hec potentialitas est quidam ordo materie ad formam. Et iste ordo est duplex, secundum quod duplex est potentialitas in materia: quedam est abiciens actum, quedam non abiciens. Ita quidam est ordo materie ad formam secundum quod forma dat esse et perficit materiam, et sic secundum istum ordinem materia <est> non abiciens actum. Alius est ordo materie ad formam secundum quod forma educitur de materia, et sic materia est abiciens formam, id est non est sub forma ... Ex quo patet quod ratio seminalis in materia non est nisi quedam relatio sive ordo in virtutibus passivis materie, secundum quem forma educitur ex materia ...”

potency of matter or inchoative form existing in it—that, from the side of matter, is the foundation of the cosmic correlation between natural agents and patients, that is, of the *rationes seminales*.

In his interpretation of the Augustinian theory of the *rationes seminales* within the framework of Aristotle's triad of the principles of change (form, privation, and substrate) in the *Reportatio* of his commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences*, Giles maintains that the concept of *ratio seminalis* can be linked to the Aristotelian notion of privation, which precisely indicates the attitude of matter with respect to a form not actually existing in matter.⁶⁰ In his later *Ordinatio*, however, he maintains that the Augustinian notion of *ratio seminalis* describes the third factor of natural change more adequately than the Aristotelian notion of privation. There he stresses that of the two elements involved in the notion of potency conceived in a dynamic sense, namely, the lack of a form and the attitude with respect to it, the notion of *ratio seminalis* immediately refers to the positive element, i.e. the attitude. The notion of privation, by contrast, primarily refers to the negative element, i.e. the lack of form. Also, whereas the notion of privation can only be used in connection with the passive principle of change, the notion of *ratio seminalis* can also be used in connection with the active principle.⁶¹

In tracking the Augustinian notion of the *ratio seminalis* to the active and passive powers of natural beings, Giles once again follows Aquinas.⁶² Yet, by giving a more precise classification of the *rationes seminales* as real relations based on those powers, Giles stresses their nature of being items added to the powers. The reason why this further item is necessary to explain natural processes is clarified by Giles in his *Ordinatio*. Although God, in creating natural beings, endowed them with active and passive powers, those powers were nonetheless too feeble to be able to initiate the interaction that brings about natural processes on their own. In other words, those powers had by themselves a merely static nature, and, after creation, an additional divine action was required to start their mutual interaction. As Giles puts it, "we must assume that the feebleness of a creature is such that, in order for natural effects to be produced by creatures, it was not enough that creatures were created by God endowed with active and passive powers; it was necessary that, by virtue of His word and His Power, passive powers were impregnated with, laid under or joined with the active ones, and from that some relationships (*habitudines*) and some arrangements (*ordines*) between agents and patients

60 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.51.18, 300.

61 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.18.2.2, 2:83bB-84aD.

62 Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* 2.1.2 (Paris, 1929), 452–54.

originated, so that the natural effects could be produced by their mutual action and passion.”⁶³

7 Motion

In the medieval Aristotelian tradition, the most debated general issue about motion was related to its ontological status, namely that of establishing what kind of entity it is.⁶⁴ For scholastic philosophers, this is a question to which Aristotle did not provide a clear-cut answer. The main source of the scholastic debate, especially in the 13th century, was Averroes, who devoted a short but very illuminating discussion to this problem.⁶⁵ Giles himself is strongly influenced by Averroes’s approach but he is not entirely happy with the latter’s solution. He regards Averroes’s view as not entirely adequate because it fails to distinguish motion from permanent entities and, in particular, from forms. Aquinas had raised this objection to Averroes’s account and proposed an alternative solution. It is Aquinas’s solution that Giles finally adopts.

Aristotle claims that motion is the act of what is potentially insofar as it is potentially, as the famous definition of *Physics* 3.1 states.⁶⁶ Giles is willing to accept this definition but he has to do some exegetical work to show that it is correct. The problem is that in Aristotle’s metaphysics every form is an act; but a primary assumption to be preserved about motion is that it must be distinct at least from the final form acquired by the mobile substance through motion. For example, the building of a house (which is a motion) is something else from the form of the house induced in the bricks as a result of the building. This is clear from the fact that the building of the house and the form of the house in the bricks do not exist at the same time. The building occurs when the form of the house does not yet exist in the bricks, and when the form of

63 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.18.2.2, 2:83aB: “Debemus enim imaginari quod tanta est imbecillitas creaturae quod non sufficit Deum creaturas produxisse cum virtutibus activis et passivis ad hoc quod ex eis fierent naturales effectus, sed oportuit quod verbo Dei et virtute eius infunderentur, subderentur vel insererentur passiva activis et essent ex hoc quaedam habitudines et quidam ordines inter activa et passiva ut ex mutua actione et passione producerentur naturales effectus.”

64 With “motion” we translate the Latin term *motus*, which in the Aristotelian tradition signifies not only local motion, but all kinds of change (qualitative, quantitative, substantial change).

65 The most comprehensive survey of the scholastic debate still remains that of Anneliese Maier in *Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik* (Rome, 1958), 59–143.

66 See Aristotle, *Physics* 3.1, 201a9–11.

the house exists in the bricks the building comes to an end. How then can we distinguish between motion and its final form if they are both an act? By distinguishing two kinds of act, Giles replies:

It must be noted that act is of two kinds: one in becoming (*in fieri*), as the building of a house and universally motion, and the other in complete being (*in facto esse*), as the house and universally every form. Therefore, if it is the case that before the building of a house or before an action occurs there is no motion and after that the house has been built and the form has been induced there is no longer motion, it is necessary that motion be in the becoming itself and in the incomplete act itself. And since an incomplete act is that which belongs to a being in potency insofar as it is in potency, it is necessary that motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency.⁶⁷

Thus, it is the notion of act in becoming or incomplete act that applies to motion and it is this notion that Aristotle intends to express by his definition, not the notion of an act in complete being.

The distinction between the two kinds of act is not an original contribution of Giles. It was rather a common exegetical tool that Aristotelian commentators used to make sense of Aristotle's definition. An alternative but equivalent distinction, used both by Giles and other scholastics, is that between successive and permanent beings. Successive beings are those whose parts cannot all exist at the same time, whereas permanent beings are those whose parts can exist at the same time.⁶⁸ Successive beings correspond to beings in incomplete act whereas permanent beings correspond to those in complete act. Thus, the claim that motion is a successive being or an incomplete act is uncontroversial.

67 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 3, fol. 53ra: "Notandum autem quod duplex est actus: unus in fieri, ut aedificatio et universaliter motus, alius autem in facto esse, ut domus et universaliter omnis forma. Si ergo antequam aliquid aedificetur vel agatur non est motus, et postquam facta est domus et est forma non est amplius motus, oportet quod motus sit in ipso fieri et in ipso actu incompleto. Et quia actus incompletus est entis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi, oportet quod motus sit actus entis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi."

68 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 3, fol. 53rb: "Dicendum quod totalitas in successivis et permanentibus non sumitur eodem modo. In permanentibus enim accipitur totalitas ex similitudine partium. Tunc enim permanentia sunt cum partes eorum simul sunt. In successivis enim, ut alias ostenditur, accipitur totalitas ex ordine partium. Sufficit enim ut successiva sint quod partes eorum habeant debitum ordinem ad se invicem. Sufficit ergo ut motus sit <quod> una pars motus debite ordinetur ad aliam."

It merely reflects a primary assumption to be preserved about motion rather than providing a positive answer to the question of its ontological status. The controversial question is whether in order to account for the successive being of motion it is necessary to think of motion as a thing totally distinct from permanent things and in particular from forms.⁶⁹

In the passage quoted above Giles seems to suggest a positive answer to this question, since he radically distinguishes motion from form, making the claim that every motion is an act in becoming, whereas every form is an act in complete being. In particular, with this claim Giles seems to rule out the existence of incomplete forms or forms in becoming. This is a very controversial move. It goes against the authoritative view of Averroes, who admitted the existence of incomplete forms and identified motion with such a form. For Averroes the motion through which a form is acquired is nothing else than the form acquired with it in an incomplete and diminished degree. For example, heating—the motion by which a body acquires the form of heat—is the same kind of entity as the form of heat itself (*ire ad calorem est calor quoquo modo*), differing from the heat finally acquired by the body only in degree of completion (*secundum magis et minus*). Heating is the form of heat in an incomplete state.⁷⁰

Giles is well aware of Averroes's view, which was quite popular at the time, and devotes to it a specific question: whether motion is the same as an incomplete form.⁷¹ In replying to this question, Giles admits the existence of incomplete forms, but he strongly rejects Averroes's reductionist claim that motion is nothing else than an incomplete form. Giles does not spend much time in clarifying what exactly an incomplete form is. He simply seems to assume that in a motion towards a final form *F* every form acquired by the mobile body during that motion before acquiring *F* is an incomplete form. For example, in the change of a body from being cold to being hot, the complete form is the final form of heat and the form of "tepidity" (*tepiditas*), which is acquired by the body in the course of becoming hot, is an incomplete form. Also, Giles uses the expression "disposition towards a form" (understood as disposition towards the final form) as equivalent to "incomplete form". The relevant point he makes is that motion cannot be the same as an incomplete form. The reason for this is that the identification of motion with an incomplete form is not

69 For a more detailed presentation of this question, see Cecilia Trifogli, "Change, Time, and Place," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, (ed.) Robert Pasnau, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2010), 1:268–72.

70 Averroes, *Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo* 3.4, fol. 87raC–rbE. On Averroes' view, see Trifogli, "Change, Time, and Place," 1:269–70.

71 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 3, fol. 54ra.

adequate to save the primary assumption that motion must be distinct from its terminus, that is, its final form. Indeed, every incomplete form can be the end point of a motion. Suppose, for example, that some water is being heated. The form of heat is that in which the heating of water would naturally end. It can well happen, however, that the heating stops before reaching the form of heat, for example, at the form of “tepidity”, which is an incomplete form. This is the illuminating example used by Aquinas to reject Averroes’s identification of motion with an incomplete form.⁷² Giles formulates the point of Aquinas’s example in more concise and abstract terms: if motion were an incomplete form, then whenever there is an incomplete form there would be motion; but this is false, as the example of the incomplete heating of water clearly shows.⁷³

Now Giles thinks that Averroes’s view is not totally wrong; rather, it just needs to be modified. The notion of incomplete form is indeed an essential component of the correct notion of motion, but it cannot be the only component. For both Aquinas and Giles, the other component—that which is missing in Averroes’s account—is a relational element: the ordering of the incomplete form to a further completion. It is only when an incomplete form, like “tepidity”, is actually ordered to a more complete form—so that something else is still to be acquired—that it is a motion rather than the end point of a motion. Thus heating, for example, is not the incomplete form of “tepidity” as such, but it is this form with an actual order to completion; accordingly, the mobile substance having that form still needs to acquire further and more complete formal determinations. Giles formulates the distinction between the two notions involved in the concept of motion in terms of a “material” and a “formal” aspect of motion:

It must be replied that *materially* motion is in a certain way the same as an incomplete form or as a disposition towards a form, but *formally* motion is not the same. For motion also adds to an incomplete form or to what is already acquired a further ordering to what is still to be acquired. Thus, we can say that action, passion, motion, and incomplete form are in some way materially the same. For heating or also the form of heat

72 Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio* 3.2, 145. On Aquinas’s view, see Trifogli, “Change, Time, and Place,” 1:271–72; Trifogli, “Thomas Wylton on Motion,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 77 (1995), 147–51.

73 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 3, fol. 54ra: “Dubitaret forte aliquis cum actus incompletus videatur esse quaedam forma incompleta, utrum sit motus idem quod forma incompleta. Videtur autem quod non, quia si esset idem quod (et *ed.*) forma incompleta, non posset esse aliqua forma incompleta quin in ea (eo *ed.*) esset motus, quod apparet esse falsum. Oppositum videtur velle Commentator.”

itself insofar as it is in becoming and has incomplete being can be an action, a passion, a motion, and an incomplete form. But it is an action insofar as it derives from an agent, it is a passion insofar as it is received in a patient, it is an incomplete form in virtue of the perfection already acquired, and it is motion insofar as an ordering to completion is added to what has already been acquired, in such a way that if that ordering ceased to exist and there were no longer a succession of parts, motion would come to an end.⁷⁴

For Giles, the incomplete form and the order of this form to a further completion are analogous to the matter and the form of a composite substance respectively, in the sense that as the form of a composite substance, it determines the kind of entity that that substance is. This substance, however, can only exist in matter, so the order to a further completion is the distinctive aspect of motion but can only be grounded in an incomplete form. In particular, it is the order to a further completion that makes motion a successive being rather than a permanent one.

The ontological status of the order to a further completion is not explained in detail by Aquinas and Giles. It seems, however, that the two commentators do not think of it as a thing distinct from the incomplete form, although existing in it, but rather as a mode of being associated with an incomplete form. It represents the way in which an incomplete form exists when it is an intermediate state in a change as distinct from the way in which the same form exists when it is the end of a change. Thus, Aquinas's and Giles's view on the ontological status of motion can be classified as a modification of Averroes's view. It was a modification, however, that was very influential in the last quarter of the 13th century among supporters of a reductive ontology of motion, since it avoided some obvious problems with Averroes's original formulation. It reflects, however, the same type of reductive ontology. As for Averroes, so also

74 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 3, fol. 54ra: "Dicendum quod motus materialiter aliquo modo idem est quod forma incompleta vel quod dispositio ad formam, sed formaliter non idem est. Addit autem supra formam incompletam vel supra illud quod acquisitum est ordinem ad illud quod ulterius acquirendum restat. Possumus ergo dicere quod materialiter aliquo modo idem sunt actio et passio, motus et forma incompleta. Calefactio enim vel ipsa etiam caloris forma dum est in fieri et habet esse incompletum potest importare actionem, passionem, motum, et formam incompletam. Sed actio est ut est ab agente, passio ut suscipitur in passo, forma incompleta est ratione perfectionis acquisitae, motus autem est prout supra id quod est acquisitum additur ordo ad complementum, ita quod si ordo ille intercideretur (intercrederetur *ed.*) et non acciperetur ulterius pars post partem, cessaret motus."

for Aquinas and Giles, motion is not a thing distinct from the relevant permanent things involved in the motion of a body because it is essentially the same as one of those permanent things, namely, the final form. The order towards further actuality does not add some new ontological entity to the final form. Rather, it merely represents a mode of existence of this form.

8 Place

According to Aristotle, the natural philosopher must investigate the nature of place because of its connection with the primary object of natural philosophy, namely, motion, and more precisely, local motion, which is a change with respect to place. Here Aristotle clearly has in mind the connection between place and local motion at various stages of his extensive treatment of place in *Physics* 4, 1–5. The general view of Aristotelian commentators, however, both ancient and medieval, is that Aristotle's notion of place is not totally adequate to account for the connection between place and local motion or rest in a place. This is also the view of Giles. He clearly points out the problems involved in defining local motion and rest in a place using Aristotle's notion of place. He thinks that he can solve these problems by a slight modification of the original Aristotelian definition. As a matter of fact, however, the modification he introduces is so substantial that it amounts to an alternative notion of place.⁷⁵

Aristotle defines the place of a body A as the surface or limit of a body B that contains A and is in contact with A (for short, the limit of the containing body).⁷⁶ Using an Aristotelian example, the place of the water contained in a vessel is the internal surface of the vessel in contact with the water. The essential point of this definition is that the place of a body is given by something that surrounds or contains it. Giles emphasizes that the role of place as limit is very similar to that of the form of the located body. Both the form of the located body and its place are limits of its extension, the difference being that the form is something inseparable from the located body while place is separable from it. For example, both the form of the water and the surface of the vessel in contact with it are limits of the extension of water, but while the form of water is inseparable from it, the surface of the vessel is separable.

75 For an extensive presentation of Giles's notion of place and its reception in the later exegetical tradition, see Cecilia Trifogli, "La dottrina del luogo in Egidio Romano," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 235–90. A short presentation is also found in Pierre Duhem's classic study, *Le Système du Monde*, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913–1959), 7:181–85.

76 Aristotle, *Physics* 4.4, 212a2–7.

Giles agrees with Aristotle that the understanding of place as limit has the ontological advantage of making it possible to define the location of a body simply in terms of other bodies, that is, in relation to surrounding bodies, without positing the existence of an incorporeal space. He also points out that this view offers a good explanation of many common assumptions about the location of bodies. For example, the assumptions that an infinite body could not be in a place and that a body cannot be in two places at the same time.⁷⁷ Giles also thinks, however, that being the limit of a located body cannot be the only property of place. Another essential property of place is that of being immobile. In Giles's view it is this property of place that is relevant for the definition of local motion and rest in a place: "Every motion occurs with respect to something immobile. For we could never imagine a motion unless we imagined something immobile with respect to which something is said to move."⁷⁸ For Giles, then, in addition to being the limit of the containing body, place must also be a frame of reference for the description of local motion and rest, and to have this role it must be immobile.

The role of place as frame of reference clearly appears in Giles's discussion of a well-known problem in Aristotle's theory, namely that of the place of the heavens.⁷⁹ The problem arises from the fact that the heavens, being the outermost body in the universe, do not have an external body containing them, and therefore do not have a place in the Aristotelian sense, that is, a place as limit. On the other hand, since it is commonly assumed that the heavens move of local motion (rotation), they must be in a place. What is then the place of the heavens? Aristotelian commentators formulated a number of solutions to this problem, some of which also tried to adapt the notion of place as limit to the case of the heavens.⁸⁰ Giles, however, rejects any attempt to define the place of the heavens as a limit. He adopts the solution proposed by Averroes, who posits that the place of the heavens is the central and immobile earth

77 On Giles's treatment of place as limit, see Trifogli, "La dottrina del luogo," 237–54.

78 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 4, fol. 83rb: "Omnis enim motus fit respectu alicuius immobilis. Numquam enim possumus imaginari motum nisi imaginemur aliquid immobile respectu cuius aliquid dicatur moveri."

79 Aristotle, *Physics* 4.5, 212a31–b22.

80 On the debate on the place of the heavens in the ancient and medieval traditions, see Cecilia Trifogli, "Il luogo dell'ultima sfera nei commenti tardo-antichi e medievali a *Physica* IV.5," *Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana* 68 (1989), 144–60. For a classic study on this issue and on the immobility of place, see also Edward Grant, "The Medieval Doctrine of Place: some Fundamental Problems and Solutions," in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, eds. Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Rome, 1981), 57–79.

around which the heavens rotate.⁸¹ Clearly, the central earth is in no way a limit or a container of the heavens, but for Giles it is perfectly suitable for being the frame of reference for the description of the motion of the heavens.⁸² For Giles, it is essential that the earth is at rest and hence immobile: this guarantees that we can assess with respect to the earth the rest of the heavens as a whole, that is, the absence of translation, and the translation of their parts.

If being immobile is an essential property of place, is this property compatible with the primary property of Aristotelian place, that of being a limit or container? Aristotle gives a positive answer to this question. In his final definition of place, he adds the requirement of immobility: place is the immobile limit of the containing body.⁸³ Despite Aristotle's confidence, Aristotelian commentators find the requirement of the immobility of place very problematic. It seems indeed to be incompatible with the ontological status of place as limit of the containing body. This is because the containing body, being a natural body, is subject to motion and therefore, when it moves, it carries along its limit. In other words, on this view, the place of the contained body *also* moves.⁸⁴

The common 13th-century strategy for solving the problem of the immobility of place is to resort to the fixed points of the universe: the central earth and the celestial poles, which define as it were the cosmological frame of reference. This is commonly regarded as the privileged frame of reference, the one that we implicitly assume in order to judge whether a body is at rest or in motion. The general idea behind this strategy is very sound. Since the immobility of place is necessary for the description of local motion and rest, and since the cosmological frame of reference is the one that we use for this description, then it seems that a proper account of the immobility of place must be in

81 Averroes, *Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo* 4.43, 4.45.

82 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 4, fol. 83rb: "Tertia via sumitur ex parte eorum quae debemus salvare circa locum. Sic enim tribuendus est alicui locus ut per motum eius localem mutet locum. Si enim ponemus caelum nullo modo esse in loco, ut posuit Alexander, vel si ponemus ipsum esse in loco solum secundum partes, ut posuit Themistius, vel si diceremus ipsum esse in loco ratione superficiei ultimae, ut quidam alii posuerunt, numquam per motum eius mutaret locum. Sed si ponimus ipsum esse in loco per comparisonem ad centrum vel per comparisonem ad terram, cum totum caelum semper respicit eandem terram, partes vero caeli non semper respiciant easdem partes terrae, salvabimus in caelo quod per eius motum mutet locum et salvabimus quod quantum ad eius partes mutet locum secundum substantiam, quantum ad se totum mutet locum secundum dispositionem ..."

83 Aristotle, *Physics* 4.4, 212a14-24.

84 For a concise presentation of the medieval debate, see Trifogli, "Change, Time, and Place," 1:275-78.

terms of the cosmological framework. The problem remains, however, of how to connect this framework to place as limit of the containing body.

In dealing with this problem Giles is much influenced by Aquinas, who believes that the requirement of the immobility of place can be saved by introducing a “cosmological qualification”, so to speak, into Aristotle’s notion of place as limit of the containing body. For Aquinas, place is not simply the limit of the containing body, but this limit insofar as it is related to the cosmological frame of reference, that is, in Aquinas’s words, insofar as it has an *ordering* to the whole universe (*ordo ad totum sphaericum caeli*). It is only when the limit of the containing body is considered to have an ordering or position (*situs*) in the cosmological frame of reference that this limit becomes the place of the body contained by it, properly speaking, and it is the limit so considered that is immobile. “Therefore, in this way, although this part of containing air or this part of water flows and moves insofar as it is this water, however, insofar as this water has the *ratio* of place, that is, of a position and ordering to the whole sphere of the heavens, always remains at rest.”⁸⁵

Aquinas’s account of the immobility of place was not successful, as 14th-century commentators were quick to point out.⁸⁶ What is germane in this context, however, is that in this account the two relevant elements—the limit of the containing body and the ordering in the cosmological frame of reference—are thought of as two distinct components of one notion of place: the ordering to the universe is grounded in the limit of the containing body and is inseparable from it. Both elements are also present in Giles’s account but, as we shall see, they tend to become independent from one another.

As in the case of motion, so too in the case of place, Giles uses the analogy with matter and form to describe the two elements involved in the notion of place. Just as motion is materially an incomplete form and formally the ordering of this form to a further completion, so place is materially the limit of the containing body and formally an ordering or position in the cosmological frame of reference. Following Aquinas, Giles thinks that it is the cosmological element that guarantees the immobility of place.⁸⁷ Giles expresses this point

85 Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio* 4.6, 227: “Sic igitur, licet haec pars aeris quae continebat vel haec pars aquae effluat et moveatur in quantum est haec aqua, tamen secundum quod habet haec aqua rationem loci, scilicet situs et ordinis ad totum sphaericum caeli, semper manet.”

86 See Trifogli, “Change, Time, and Place,” 1:277–78.

87 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 4, fol.74va: “Possumus ergo dicere quod in loco duo est considerare, videlicet illud quod est materiale in loco, ut superficies corporis continentis, et illud quod est ibi formale, ut ordo ad universum. Locus ergo materialiter moveri potest quia ultimum corporis continentis potest esse quid mobile; ordo tamen ad universum

in terms of the analogy with matter and form: "place is immobile formally, but mobile materially."⁸⁸ It was common among 14th-century commentators to refer to Giles's view as positing a distinction between material place and formal place.⁸⁹ Furthermore, Giles very often uses the concept of distance to specify that of ordering in the cosmological framework: formal place is defined by the distance from the fixed points of the universe.

Giles's view, however, is not simply a different formulation of Aquinas's view. It also involves a substantial difference concerning the notion of formal place and its relation to material place. While Aquinas consistently regards the ordering or position in the cosmological frame of reference as a property of the limit of the containing body, Giles more frequently regards it as a property of the contained or located body *itself* and not that of the body containing it. The prevailing view in Giles is that formal place is the ordering or distance of the located body from the cosmological frame of reference. As he puts it: "place is immobile because, although while you are at rest the air around you or some other body surrounding you can be subject to motion, you are nonetheless always said to be in the same place because you are always at an identical distance from the center and the poles."⁹⁰ In this passage the distance from the fixed points of the universe that define formal place is not that of the air or another surrounding body but that of the located body. This is a significant change: it implies that material place and formal place are two distinct things. Material place is the limit of the containing body, and thus something existing in the containing body, whereas formal place is the distance of the located body from the fixed points of the universe, and thus something existing in the located body. Moreover, since the containing and the located bodies are two distinct bodies and hence separable, material place and formal place also are separable.

Giles himself stresses the independence of each of these two kinds of place from the other while presenting several cases of locomotion and rest. Consider the case of a ship anchored in a river. The ship is in the same formal place because it always maintains the same distance from the fixed points of the universe; it is not in the same material place, however, because the water

semper manet immobilis. Locus ergo ut locus est et quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso nec per accidens moveri potest."

88 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 4, fol. 81ra: "Sciendum igitur quod, ut potest patere per habita, locus est immobilis formaliter, mobilis vero materialiter."

89 On the reception of Giles's distinction see Trifogli, "La dottrina del luogo," 275–90.

90 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 4, fol. 81rb: "Nam, ut consequenter ponitur, ideo locus est immobilis quia, licet te quiescente possit moveri aer qui est iuxta te vel aliquod aliud corpus circumdans te, semper tamen diceris esse in eodem loco, quia semper es in eadem distantia ad centrum et ad polos."

containing it flows continuously.⁹¹ Consider on the other hand the case of a glass of wine carried around. The wine is in the same material place because it is always in the same container, but it is not in the same formal place, because its distance from the fixed points of the universe varies continuously.⁹² Since we define being at rest as being in the same place and being in locomotion as always being in different places, Giles makes it clear that the relevant place in these definitions is formal place and not material place. As Giles puts it, it is inappropriate or accidental to take into account the identity and diversity of material place in the description of local motion and rest. For example, we simply say that a ship anchored in a river does not change place, and in doing so we disregard the fact that it changes its material place.⁹³ Thus, material place—the Aristotelian place as limit of the containing body—does not play any significant role in the description of local motion and rest.

9 Time

For Aristotle, time is not something that exists over and above temporal events as a separate entity in which such events take place and by means of

91 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.8.2.2, 1:371bB-C: "Propter primum sciendum quod aliquando alietas loci est materialis tantum, aliquando autem est formalis, ut navis existens ligata ad stipitem in aqua fluente semper est in eodem loco formaliter, quia semper habet eundem ordinem ad universum, sed non est in eodem loco materialiter, quia, cum semper aqua fluat, semper habet aliam et aliam aquam sub se. Sic etiam aliquis existens in aere, vento flante et removente totum aerem circa eum, erit in alio loco materialiter, quia habebit alium aerem circa se, sed non erit in alio loco formaliter, quia habet eundem ordinem ad universum."

92 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.24.2.5, 2:289bA-B: "Potest autem esse et econverso quod aliquid sit in eodem loco materialiter, non formaliter, ut si vas plenum vino portaretur ad alium locum, esset illud vinum in eodem loco materialiter, quia esset in eadem superficie vasis, sed non esset in eodem loco formaliter, quia non haberet eundem ordinem ad universum."

93 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.8.2.2, 1:371bC-D: "Advertendum tamen quod alietas loci materialiter non est proprie alietas sed improprie vel secundum quid. Si quis enim stet immobilis, quantumcumque aer circa ipsum moveatur, non dicitur esse in alio loco, et navis ad stipitem ligata, quantumcumque aqua subter eam fluat, locum mutare non dicitur." Id., *In Physicam* 6, fol. 159ra: "Nam ad identitatem localem magis est consideranda dispositio et ordo loci quam substantia eius, ut si aliquid sit in aere magis est in eodem loco propter eundem ordinem quem habet ad universum quam ex eo quod idem aer secundum substantiam circundat ipsum. Nam, ut dicebatur in quarto, si vento flante tolleretur (poneretur *ed.*) aer circumdans et non tolleretur ordo ad universum, non tolleretur identitas loci nisi materialiter et secundum quid."

which we measure their duration. Time is rather an attribute of motion, and thus something that depends on motion for its existence. As to what attribute of motion time is, this is declared in Aristotle's well-known but obscure definition of time as the number of motion according to the before and after.⁹⁴ Despite this explicit definition, the ontological relation between motion and time was a much-debated issue among medieval commentators.⁹⁵ Giles takes a reductionistic position in this debate, claiming that time is not really distinct from motion. This reductionistic view, on the face of it, seems similar to the one strongly suggested by Aristotle himself.⁹⁶ Giles, however, significantly departs from Aristotle's view about two important properties that the latter ascribes to time: unity and continuity. Aristotle argues that there is only one time, despite the fact that there are many motions.⁹⁷ He also argues that time is continuous, that is, that it is composed of extended temporal parts and is divisible *ad infinitum* into such parts. In particular, he claims that instants—indivisible temporal points analogous to the points of a line—are not components of time, but simply boundaries of its parts.⁹⁸ Although Aristotelian commentators find the unity of time difficult to reconcile with the ontological status of attribute of motion that Aristotle ascribes to time, the dominant view in the 13th century was that the unity of time could nonetheless be preserved. Giles departs from this general tendency and admits that there are many times, indeed, that there are as many as there are motions. Much less controversial among Aristotelian commentators is the continuity of time. Giles, however, offers an interpretation of Aristotle's definition of time that makes it compatible also with the notion of a discrete time, namely that which is composed of instants.⁹⁹

94 Aristotle, *Physics* 4.11, 219b1-2.

95 For a concise presentation of the medieval debate about the relation between time and motion, see Trifogli, "Change, Time, and Place," 1:272-75. The most comprehensive survey of the medieval reception of Aristotle's theory of time still remains that of Anneliese Maier in *Metaphysische Hintergründe der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie* (Rome, 1955), 47-137.

96 Aristotle argues that the existence of time as the number of motion depends on the human soul, thus implying that time as number is not an extra-mental thing distinct from motion. See Aristotle, *Physics* 4.14, 223a15-29.

97 Aristotle, *Physics* 4.14, 223a29-b12.

98 Aristotle, *Physics* 4.13, 222a10-20; 6.1-2.

99 For a detailed examination of the various aspects of Giles's interpretation of Aristotle's theory see Cecilia Trifogli, "La dottrina del tempo in Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi* 1 (1990), 247-76.

Like most medieval commentators, Giles uses the formula “time is an attribute (*passio*) of motion” to describe in the most general terms the ontological status of time. This description seems to suggest that motion and time are two distinct things, like, for example, a wall (the subject) and the whiteness of the wall (its attribute). Giles, however, makes it clear that this suggestion is wrong. The description of time as an attribute of motion simply points out that time depends on motion for its existence, but not that it is a thing that is distinct from motion. It simply inheres in it the way that whiteness inheres in a wall:

Therefore, time is said to be an attribute of motion because the aspect (*habitus*) of time is founded on the aspect of motion. For, although motion and time denote the same thing, that thing, however, has the property of being motion and of being the act of the mobile prior to that of being time or the number according to the before and after. Indeed, one of these aspects is founded on the other, and because of this time is said to be an attribute of motion: not because it adds another thing to motion but because it adds an aspect that follows from motion and is founded on motion.¹⁰⁰

The important point in the foregoing passage is the negative claim that time and motion are not two distinct things. With this claim Giles rejects those strongly realist positions about time advocated by earlier 13th-century commentators, who posited that time is a quantity that is really distinct from motion and inheres in it.¹⁰¹ On the contrary, for Giles, there is only one thing, and motion and time are two distinct aspects (*habitudines*) of one and the same thing. One aspect—that of being the act of the mobile, which was Aristotle’s definition of motion—corresponds to motion as such, and the other—that of being the number according to the before and after, which was Aristotle’s definition of time—corresponds to time. The point here is that the *habitus* of motion is ontologically prior to that of time. It is because motion, which is a thing, is the act of the mobile body that it also has the aspect of being a

100 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.2.1.4, 1:128bD-129aA: “Dicitur ergo tempus esse passio motus quia fundatur habitudo temporis in habitu motus. Nam etsi eandem rem dicit motus et tempus, tamen res illa prius habet quod sit motus et quod sit actus mobilis quam quod sit tempus vel quam quod sit numerus prioris et posterioris. Fundatur enim una istarum habitudinum in alia, propter quod tempus dicitur esse passio motus, non quod addat rem aliam supra motum, sed quia addit habitudinem quandam consequentem motum et fundatam in motu.”

101 On these realist positions, see Cecilia Trifogli, *Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century* (ca. 1250–1270) (Leiden, 2000), 219–30.

number according to the before and the after. Giles also seems to think of the *habitus* of time as a mode of being (*modus essendi*) of motion.¹⁰²

In giving a more specific description of time as the habit or mode of being of motion, Giles relies on Aristotle's definition of time as the number of motion according to the before and after. In the natural reading of the Aristotelian formula, the primary notion is that of number, while the notion of succession—the “before and after”—is a secondary notion that qualifies the number relevant for time. Following this natural reading and taking number strictly speaking as quantity, one arrives at a conception of time as successive quantity of motion, a view supported by many medieval authors. This is not, however, Giles's view. Contrary to the natural reading, Giles appears to consider succession as the primary notion. Moreover, he does not take number in the physical sense of quantity but in the metaphysical sense of plurality. Number understood as plurality is then subordinated to succession as a necessary condition for it. This is because a succession, which is an order of before and after, can only exist in a plurality of items. Thus, for Giles, the distinctive property of time is that of being a succession, while time as the mode of being of motion expresses the successive being of motion.¹⁰³

Giles's emphasis on succession as the distinctive property of time has some important consequences. One is that time exists not only in physical motions but also in the operations of the angels. The successive acts that constitute the intellectual cognition of angels, since they can occur only successively, are in time.¹⁰⁴ Another consequence is that time is not necessarily a quantity. The reason for this is that the nature of a succession is determined by the nature of the things that are in succession. Accordingly, while the time of physical motions is a quantity because the things that are in succession in this case are phases of motion, which are quantities, the time of angelic operations is a quality, because the relevant succession is a succession of qualities.¹⁰⁵ Finally, according to Giles, time is not necessarily continuous.

102 This is suggested by Giles's comparison between time and the *aevum*. See Trifogli, “La dottrina del tempo,” 252–54.

103 See Trifogli, “La dottrina del tempo,” 254–57.

104 Giles of Rome, *De mensura* 8 (Venice, 1503; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 64ra: “Si enim in intelligentia sunt multae formae, non potest omnibus illis actualiter informari nec potest secundum omnes illas formas simul actu intelligere. Oportet ergo quod nunc intelligat per unam formam sive per unam intellectionem et nunc per aliam, quod sine successione esse non potest. Est itaque in operationibus intelligentiae successio et cadit ibi tempus.”

105 Giles of Rome, *De mensura* 10, fol. 72vb: “Sic<ut> ergo loquendum est de rebus ad quas applicatur numerus, accipiendo numerum large pro omni pluralitate, sive illa pluralitas

Let us consider this last consequence a little more closely. In a (continuous) motion there are two structural elements: the so-called *moveri*, that is, the extended phases of a motion, and the so-called *mutata esse*, that is, the indivisible elements analogous to the points on a line and constituting the boundaries of the *moveri*. When motion is described in temporal terms, the *moveri* correspond to the extended parts of time whereas the *mutata esse* correspond to the instants of time. Now, the crucial point is that in a motion there is both a succession of *moveri* and a succession of *mutata esse*, and therefore both a succession of extended temporal parts and a succession of instants. Since for Giles succession is the distinctive property of time, then the succession of *mutata esse*/instants is *also* time, and not only that of *moveri*/extended temporal parts:

In a motion one must consider some elements that are indivisible, that is, the *mutata esse*, and others that are divisible, as the *moveri* themselves. In a motion then the before and after can be taken with respect to both these elements. Indeed, one *mutatum esse* is before another and one *moveri* is before another ... As motion can be taken both insofar as one *moveri* falls between two *mutata esse* and insofar as one *mutatum esse* falls between two *moveri*, so also time can be taken either insofar as one time is enclosed between two instants or insofar one instant falls between two times. In whatever of these two ways time is taken, it seems to be a number, namely, the number of motion according to the before and after. For if time is taken as if it were the number of motion insofar as one *mutatum esse* falls between two *moveri*, since those *moveri* are such that one is before and the other after ... it is necessary that time taken in this way is the number of motion according to the before and after. Again, if time is taken insofar as it is enclosed between two instants or insofar as a *moveri* is enclosed between two *mutata esse*, since it is never the case that two instants enclose a time nor two *mutata esse* enclose a motion unless one is before and the other after, also time taken in this way is the number of motion according to the before and after."¹⁰⁶

sit species quantitatis et sit constituta ex uno quod est principium numeri, sive sit in aliis generibus et constituta ex uno quod secundum generalem acceptionem cum ente convertitur, sic loquendum est de ipso numero vel de ipsa pluralitate. Et <quia> tempus nostrum est numerus numeratus, qui est numerus applicatus ad ipsas quantitates, ideo (idem *ed.*) est in praedicamento quantitatis. Sed tempus de quo loquimur non est <numerus> numeratus qui (quod *ed.*) sit applicatus ad quantitates, immo, potius est applicatus ad qualitates; ideo non erit in praedicamento quantitatis, sed potius qualitatis."

106 Giles of Rome, *In Physicam* 4, fol. 105ra: "Dicendum est quod in motu est considerare aliqua quae se habent quasi indivisibilia, ut ipsa mutata esse, aliqua vero quae se habent

Thus, according to Giles, a succession of instants also satisfies Aristotle's definition of time. However, the actual existence of a pure succession of instants (without intervening *moveri*), that is, the actual existence of a discrete time, depends on the existence of a change that is a pure succession of *mutata esse*. There are such changes in Giles's view: for example, the motions of the angels and the illumination of air. Also, if the existence of a void were admitted, then the motion of a body through it would be a pure succession of *mutata esse*, and the time associated with this motion would be a purely discrete time. We shall return to this last case in a moment.

As to the issue of whether there is only one time or many times, it seems clear that Giles cannot avoid positing many times, indeed, as many as there are motions. Indeed, two numerically distinct motions have numerically distinct successions of *moveri* or *mutata esse*, and hence numerically distinct times. This is contrary to Aristotle's view and to that of his most authoritative commentator, Averroes, who both posited the existence of only one time. In the discussion of this issue Giles seemingly wants to avoid an open conflict with Averroes, but his agreement with him is only apparent.

Using the idea that time is related to motion as an attribute to its subject, Averroes had maintained that time is an attribute of only one motion, that is, of the celestial motion or first motion. Only this motion is the subject of time, and this guarantees that there is only one time. As to the sublunary motions, none of them is a subject of time, or equivalently time is an attribute of none of them, although time, that is, the time of celestial motion, serves as the measure of all sublunary motions.¹⁰⁷ This view was hard for Giles to reconcile with his understanding of the relation of subject-attribute applied to motion

ut divisibilia, ut ipsa moveri. Secundum utraque in motu potest accipi prius et posterius. Unum enim mutatum esse est prius alio et unum moveri est prius alio ... Dicendum quod sicut motus potest considerari prout inter duo mutata esse cadit unum moveri et prout inter duo moveri cadit unum mutatum esse, sic et tempus potest accipi vel prout inter duo nunc clauditur unum tempus vel prout inter duo tempora intercipitur unum nunc. Quocumque autem modo accipiatur, tempus videtur numerus esse, supple motus secundum prius et posterius. Nam si accipiatur tempus ac si esset numerus motus prout inter duo moveri cadit unum mutatum esse, cum illa moveri sic se habent quod unum est prius, aliud vero posterius ... oportet quod secundum hunc modum accipiendi tempus sit numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. Rursus, si accipiatur tempus prout clauditur inter duo nunc vel prout unum moveri clauditur inter duo mutata esse, quia numquam duo nunc claudunt aliquod tempus nec duo mutata esse claudunt unum aliquod moveri nisi unum sit prius, aliud posterius, etiam sic acceptum tempus est numerus motus secundum prius et posterius."

107 Averroes, *Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo* 4.98, fols. 178rbF-179vaH.

and time. As we saw, for Giles, time is an attribute of motion in the sense that it is a habit or mode of being of motion, namely the succession of motion. But all motions are successive, and thus have the same kind of mode of being. Therefore all motions have time. Yet, in the context of the discussion about the unity of time, Giles reserves the term “time” for the time of the celestial motion, while he uses the term “when” for the time of any other motion. Using this terminology, Giles can say that there is only one time, but he also adds that there are many “whens”, as many indeed as there are sublunary motions. Both time and the “when” satisfy Aristotle’s definition of time as the number of motion according to the before and after. The difference is that time, being the succession of an eternal and uniform motion, is suitable for being a measure of the duration of all motions, whereas the “when” belongs to temporally finite and non-uniform motions, and is thus not suitable for being a measure.¹⁰⁸

Another distinction used by Giles in this context is that between intrinsic and extrinsic duration. Giles calls the time founded in sublunary motion its intrinsic duration and the time grounded in celestial motion its extrinsic duration. Again, in accordance with Averroes, he maintains that extrinsic duration is one for all motions: indeed, the extrinsic duration is by definition the time of the celestial motion only. But he departs from Averroes in positing that each sublunary motion has its own intrinsic duration so that there are many intrinsic durations. He argues that, contrary to Averroes’s view, in order for the extrinsic duration to measure sublunary motions, there must be in these motions something homogeneous to the extrinsic duration, and this is the intrinsic duration.¹⁰⁹

108 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.2.1.2, 1:109bA: “In ipsis tamen temporalibus non est tempus, sed quando, quod ideo est quia propter variabilitatem quam habent ista temporalia, numerus prioris et posterioris repertus in motibus eorum non habet rationem mensurae et per consequens non habet rationem temporis, sed dicitur esse quando, quod idem sonat quod esse aliquando.” Since the “when” exists in every temporally finite motion, it also exists in the parts of the celestial motion. See Giles of Rome, *De mensura* 2, fol. 39va: “Motus caeli est corruptibilis secundum partes, quia hoc est de natura cuiuslibet motus et cuiuslibet successivi quod una pars sit prior, alia vero posterior, et quod parti priori succedat pars posterior, et quod desinat pars prior, adveniente parte posteriori. Ideo in ipso motu caeli est tempus et quando secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Est enim ibi tempus ut ille motus est sempiternus, est autem ibi quando ut est corruptibilis. Tempus vero magis fundatur in illo motu secundum se totum.”

109 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione* 1, fol. 61vb: “Motui debetur duplex duratio, una intrinseca et alia extrinseca. Duratio extrinseca est ipsum tempus. Et quia haec duratio non dependet ex ipsis motibus mensuratis, ideo manens una mensurat omnes motus et est unum tempus mensura omnium temporalium, sicut quia una

A clear indication that, despite these distinctions, Giles does posit the existence of many times is the way in which he deals with the notion of simultaneity. He assumes that “simultaneous” means to be in the same instant, but he also thinks that it is necessary (at least in some contexts) to specify to what time this instant belongs. For example, in interpreting the axiom of non-contradiction—that it is impossible for two contradictories to exist simultaneously—he qualifies it as follows: “That two opposites exist simultaneously in the same instant of their proper measure is impossible ... but it is not absurd that two opposites exist simultaneously in the same instant of the alien measure.”¹¹⁰ Here the proper measure is the intrinsic duration while the alien measure is the extrinsic duration distinguished above.

Relying on the notion of discrete time and on his views of the multiplicity of times and of simultaneity, Giles gives a very original treatment of a famous and controversial argument of Aristotle against the existence of void space. Aristotle had argued that motion along a void space (e.g., the fall of a heavy body in the void) would not properly be a motion because it would take place instantaneously rather than in an extended period of time.¹¹¹ Aristotle’s argument is puzzling because it conflicts with our intuitions about the traversal of space. There are non-overlapping parts in space and it seems that a body cannot occupy two non-overlapping parts simultaneously. How can a body be simultaneously up and down if “up” and “down” are two separate positions in space? Accordingly, it will be first in one part, say up, and later in another, say, down, and thus it will not traverse this void space in just one instant.¹¹²

est mensura extrinseca respectu pannorum, posset una ulna mensurare omnes pannos. Sed praeter hanc durationem extrinsecam competit ipsis motibus mensuratis quaedam duratio intrinseca, sicut praeter quantitatem ulnae, quae est extrinseca quantitas panni, competit ipsis pannis quaedam quantitas intrinseca. Immo, sicut si non esset quantitas intrinseca panni (competit ipsis pannis ... panni *om. hom. ed.*), cui applicata quantitas ulnae mensurat pannum, pannus ab ulna mensurari non posset, sic nisi esset duratio et successio intrinseca cuilibet motui, quae, relata ad tempus, mensuratur ab eo, motus a tempore mensurari non posset.”

110 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.7, 379–80: “Duo ergo opposita esse simul in eodem instanti mensurae propriae est impossibile, quia tunc illa opposita essent simul ... sed in eodem instanti mensurae alienae esse opposita simul non est inconveniens.” For a fruitful application of this distinction to the classical problem of the instant of change, see Cecilia Trifogli, “Giles of Rome on the Instant of Change,” *Synthese* 96 (1993), 93–114.

111 Aristotle, *Physics* 4.8, 215a24–216a11.

112 This is a standard objection raised by Aristotelian commentators. See Cecilia Trifogli, “Giles of Rome on Natural Motion in the Void,” *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1992), 151–53.

For Giles, Aristotle's claim about the instantaneity of motion in the void can be reconciled with our intuitions about the traversal of space. In his view, to distinct positions or parts of void space occupied by the mobile body there correspond distinct and successive *mutata esse* in its motion (with no *moveri* intervening between them), and hence distinct instants of the time intrinsic to this motion. Accordingly, the intrinsic time of this motion is a pure succession of instants, each *mutatum esse* or instant corresponding to a position in the void space occupied by the moving body. For Giles, it is this succession of intrinsic instants that saves the intuition that a body cannot occupy distinct positions in space simultaneously. Indeed, the body will be in distinct positions of space in distinct and successive instants of the time intrinsic to its motion. On the other hand, its motion would take place in one and the same instant of the extrinsic time of this motion, that is, of the celestial time. Accordingly, the fall of a heavy body through a void would occur simultaneously with respect to the celestial time, and successively with respect to the intrinsic time.¹¹³

Having distinguished between being in the same instant of the intrinsic measure and being in the same instant of the extrinsic measure or celestial time, Giles also claims that the simultaneity of two events is more appropriately defined with respect to their intrinsic measure. So although the heavy body is below and above in the same instant of the celestial time, it is not there simultaneously, properly speaking.¹¹⁴

113 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.7, 379: "Cum ergo quaeritur utrum in eodem instanti, si (si post utrum *ed.*) corpus moveretur in vacuo, esset sursum et deorsum, aut quaeris de instanti mensurae propriae aut de instanti mensurae non propriae, cuiusmodi est tempus quod est passio primi motus. Si de instanti mensurae propriae, non in eodem instanti erit sursum et deorsum, immo quot erunt ibi successiones mutatorum esse tot erunt ibi successiones instantium; sed inter illa instantia non cadet tempus medium, sed succedent sibi immediate ad invicem ... Sed si quaeris de instanti[a] mensurae non propriae, sic in eodem instanti erit corpus sic motum sursum et deorsum, quia omnibus illis instantibus non respondebit nisi unum instans in caelo."

114 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.7, 379–80.

Metaphysics

Martin Pickavé

1 Introduction

Issues in metaphysics occupied Giles of Rome throughout his remarkable career at the University of Paris and elsewhere. Not only did he write a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, he also treated metaphysical themes in his theological writings, such as his commentary on the *Sentences* and his *Quodlibets*. He also dedicated specific works to metaphysical questions dear to him. His *Theorems on Being and Essence* are a good example of the latter. Unfortunately, Giles's contributions in the area of metaphysics are rarely appreciated in their own right. His defense of the distinction between essence and existence seems to overshadow in the mind of many modern commentators much else of what he has to say in metaphysics and still contributes to the somewhat misleading impression of Giles as having been an early Thomist.¹ After his return to the University of Paris in 1285, Giles engaged for some years following in a remarkable academic three-way battle with Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. The quodlibetal questions each of these authors debated in that period are full of punches targeted at their professional rivals. And although they make for fascinating reading, the polemical overtones of these texts and the ad hominem attacks they contain make them a less than an ideal gateway to Giles's teachings.²

In this chapter I hope to avoid these pitfalls by attempting to give a fairly neutral introduction to some of Giles's key views on metaphysics. I shall start by outlining what he thinks the science of metaphysics is actually about, and then follow his lead by developing his metaphysical teachings "in a human way"

1 For an excellent case study of the relationship between Giles's and Aquinas's teachings see Giorgio Pini, "La dottrina della creazione e la ricezione delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino nelle *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (qq. 1–7) di Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 3 (1992), 271–304 (Part 1); 491–559 (Part 2).

2 On this debate see especially Edgar Hocedez, "Gilles de Rome et Henri de Gand sur la distinction réelle (1276–1287)," *Gregorianum* 8 (1927), 358–84; Jean Paulus, "Les disputes d'Henri de Gand et de Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence," *ADLMA* 13 (1940–42), 323–58; Concetta Luna, "Nouveaux textes d'Henri de Gand, de Gilles de Rome et de Godefroid de Fontaines. Les questions du manuscrit Bologne, Collegio di Spagna, 133. Contribution à l'étude des questions disputées," *ADLMA* 65 (1998), 151–272.

(*modo humano*), namely, by looking at the ontological make-up of the sensible world. That part of my exposition will closely follow Giles's *Theorems on Being and Essence*, since they give us a fairly concise account of Giles's mature metaphysical thought. After a short section on issues related to the real distinction between being and existence, I will turn to the issues of individuation and the nature of accidents. I shall end with some brief remarks on Giles's philosophical theology.

2 Metaphysics as Ontology

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Giles raises the surprising question: "Do all human beings desire metaphysics?" To be sure, Aristotle begins his *Metaphysics* with the claim that all human beings by nature desire to know (980a21). But should we take this to mean that we also desire metaphysics? In his response, Giles admits that in one sense of course not everyone desires metaphysics. Many people do not even know what metaphysics is; how can they therefore desire what they do not know? In another sense, however, the claim is true. For in pursuing any form of knowledge human beings are ultimately pursuing wisdom. It is in this sense that they pursue metaphysics, namely, insofar as it is wisdom and "the ultimate goal or happiness of a human being, a happiness that human beings can acquire purely by their natural capacities."³

The first thing to notice about this bold statement is that metaphysical knowledge is for Giles something we can arrive at purely on the basis of our natural capacities (*ex puris naturalibus*). In this respect metaphysics is different from theology, for the latter draws on cognitive resources beyond our natural capacities. But even then the claim about metaphysics as goal and happiness remains quite surprising. What we are to make of it hangs of course on what the science of metaphysics actually is. And since the nature of a science depends on what the science is about, we are consequently led to the question: what is the subject-matter of metaphysics?

In all of his works, Giles is a clear proponent of an ontological conception of metaphysics (as opposed to a theological one): metaphysics examines "being insofar as it is being" (*ens inquantum ens; ens in eo quod est ens; ens absolute et generaliter sumptum*).⁴ Despite the fact that metaphysics is sometimes

3 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.4 (Venice 1501; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1966), fol. 3ra; 1.1, fol. 2rb: "... et ideo metaphysica est finis sive beatitudo ipius hominis, loquendo de felicitate quam potest homo sibi acquirere in hac presenti vita ex puris naturalibus."

4 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 4.1, fol. 22. For Giles's understanding of metaphysics as a *scientia* see Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den*

referred to as “divine science” by Aristotle and his medieval readers, God is not strictly speaking its subject-matter. For this conclusion Giles provides two arguments, which illustrate how closely he follows Aristotle’s account of the nature of a science (*scientia*) as it is laid out in the *Posterior Analytics*. First, every science presupposes the existence of its subject-matter. The botanist, for instance, does not bother demonstrating whether plants exist; she simply examines the nature of plants, including what kind of plants there are and the parts out of which plants are composed. Therefore, if God were the subject-matter of metaphysics, it could not be the task of the metaphysician to prove the existence of God. Yet this would be odd, for no other science can prove the existence of God (not even natural philosophy) and clearly, Giles believes, we can give demonstrative proofs for it. Giles concludes this Avicennian line of argument by affirming that although demonstrations of God’s existence do indeed belong to metaphysics, God as such is not its primary subject.⁵ Second, we seem to agree that the distinction between substance, quality, quantity, etc., in short, the ontological categories, are dealt with in metaphysics. Similarly metaphysics, rather than any other science, is concerned with the notions of actuality and potentiality, sameness and difference, cause and effect and so on. Other sciences employ these notions without examining them in any depth. It is difficult to understand how these notions belong to a metaphysical science conceived of as theology, whereas it is fairly straightforward to appreciate how they must belong to metaphysics as ontology. For the categories represent different *types* of being (*ens*), while actuality, potentiality and the like are *modes* of being (*ens*).⁶

Still, it is not entirely mistaken to think of God as the subject-matter of metaphysics in some sense. For the subject-matter of a science can be taken in two ways: either it is that which is “first and per se” (*primo et per se*) considered in any given science or it is that which is, as a consequence of what is considered “first and per se”, actually primarily studied in a science. According to the first understanding, being insofar as it is being is the subject-matter of metaphysics; but according to the second, God and substance can be called

Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Texte und Untersuchungen (Leuven, 1998), 168–85; Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris, 1990), 108–30.

5 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 4.5, fol. 3rb-va. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* 1.1, (ed.) S. van Riet (Louvain/Leiden, 1977), 4–5.

6 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.5, fol. 3va. Giles does not here use the terminology of types and modes himself. He refers to what I have called types of being as “parts of being” (*partes entis*); modes of being are usually referred to as *passiones entis*.

its subject-matter, since they exemplify the nature of being more truly and to a higher degree than anything else.⁷ This fits well with Giles's commitment to the so-called "analogy of being." Not everything we call "being" is a being in the same degree; rather, "being" is predicated analogically of the different types of being such as substances, accidents, and God. However, since analogy is not the same as equivocity this does not jeopardize the unity of metaphysics as a science.⁸

There is a further reason why metaphysics cannot strictly speaking have God as its subject-matter. According to Giles, all human knowledge draws on sensory experience. So metaphysics too is grounded in what we can arrive at from the senses. Metaphysical knowledge is of course very remote from what is immediately given to us in sensory experience, but this simply means that the concepts we use in metaphysics involve several degrees of abstraction. Now because of how all the "knowledge discovered in a human way" originates (*scientia secundum modum humanum inventa*), God cannot be the subject-matter "first and per se" of a science that we arrive at purely on the basis of our natural capacities. For our cognitive capacities in this life are simply not capable of having a direct cognition of God. On the contrary, we acquire knowledge about God naturally only insofar as we understand him under the aspect of being.⁹ So the philosophical study of God can only take place in a science that has being as its primary subject-matter.

It immediately follows from the conception of metaphysics as ontology that metaphysics is a universal science, because in considering being it not

7 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.5, fol. 3va: "Est enim quoddam subiectum principale de quo primo et per se intenditur in illa scientia, et tale est subiectum principale in illa scientia; aliud est subiectum principale quod non est principale per se et primo, sed ex consequenti ... similiter dico quod in metaphysica ens inquantum ens est subiectum principale per se et primo; et quia ratio entis melius et verius salvatur in deo quam in aliquo alio ente propter hoc dico quod deus est subiectum principale illius scientiae non per se et primo sed ex consequenti." See also *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.8, fol. 4va, and 1.9, fols. 4vb-5ra. For the view that substance is the subject-matter of metaphysics, see Giles's *Ordinatio* 1 prolog., fol. 2rbG (Venice 1521; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968): "Substantia potest dici aliquo modo subiectum in metaphysica, quia ratio entitatis magis reservatur in substantia quam in aliis entibus." And also *Quodlibet* 3.2 (Louvain 1646; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1966), 128 and 130-31.

8 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 4.3, fol. 22v; see also Alessandro Conti, "Giles of Rome's Questions on the *Metaphysics*," in *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, (eds.) Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo (Leiden, 2013), 255-75, at 258-61. For the unity of metaphysics see also Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 4.3, fol. 22rb-va; for the analogy of being see Giles's *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 1 (Venice 1503; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1968), fol. 2rv.

9 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.7, fol. 4rb. See also *Ordinatio* 1 prolog., fol. 3vaL.

only deals literally with everything there is, but also because it deals with that which is common to everything there is. However, this does not mean that the particular sciences become superfluous in the presence of metaphysics. Even if the same thing can be an object for both the metaphysician and the practitioner of any of the particular sciences, it is considered differently by each of them. The metaphysician will consider the object only insofar as it is a being, whereas the practitioner of the particular science will consider it under the aspect proper to that science.¹⁰ Conversely, neither is metaphysics superfluous as a maximally universal science. This is because, on the one hand, its task is to consider the first principles of all beings. No particular science does this, even though the particular sciences rely on first principles and their own principles are grounded in them.¹¹ On the other hand, no other humanly invented science deals with the highest being, i.e., God or that which is “best in the genus of beings.” These two aspects also account for why metaphysics is called wisdom and is said to be superior to any other humanly invented science.¹² Moreover, like other forms of human knowledge, metaphysics proceeds by way of demonstration. But whereas it is typical of the natural sciences to proceed from what is posterior (*a posteriori*), i.e., to move from the effects to the knowledge of the causes, and thus from what is better known to us to what is better known in itself, metaphysics takes the opposite route and starts from what is prior (*a priori*), i.e., from what is better known to us and in itself,¹³ i.e., from the concept of being. Thus the special status of metaphysics is further grounded in the fact that this science is about the first both in the sense of the highest being (i.e., God) as well as in the sense of what our intellect grasps first on the basis of our sensory experience of the natural world (i.e., being). All this explains why metaphysics is the “goddess of the sciences” (*dea scientiarum*), although absolutely speaking theology is the real “goddess”.¹⁴

10 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.22, fol. 10rb.

11 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.26, fol. 11vb; *Ordinatio* 1, prol., fol. 4vbP.

12 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 4raB and fol. 4vbO; *De regimine* 2.2.8 (Rome 1556; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 183rv.

13 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.16, 241a. However, in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, Giles clarifies that the metaphysician only proceeds demonstratively in a broad sense. See Giles of Rome, *In libros Posteriorum*, prol. (Venice 1488; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967): “Ipse enim metaphysicus proprie non demonstrat, nisi velimus accipere demonstrationem large pro omni certa cognitione, quod maxime competit metaphysico. Metaphysici enim non est demonstrare, sed eius est declarare quidditates ac rerum essentias.”

14 See Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.2, 131. For theology as *dea et domina scientiarum* see *De regimine principum* 2.2.8, fol. 184r; *De ecclesiastica potestate* 2.6, (ed.) R. Scholz (Weimar, 1929), 6.

Giorgio Pini has recently argued that Giles's attitude towards metaphysics changed quite dramatically after his return to the University of Paris in 1285. Whereas earlier in his career Giles was more optimistic with respect to the pretensions of a metaphysical science, he later started to develop a much more pessimistic outlook.¹⁵ Two factors are, according to Pini, responsible for this reevaluation. First, Giles emphasizes that the discursive nature of human knowledge is more a result of the defectiveness of our intellectual powers than a positive feature. Because we do not possess a sufficiently powerful intellectual light in the present life, we are incapable of an intuitive understanding of our world and must thus rely on discursive reasoning. However, once our soul is separated from our body, the soul can, at least in principle, know by means of intellectual intuitions. This makes it sound as if the human sciences, which all proceed discursively, are phenomena limited to our present state. Second, Giles develops an increasingly pessimistic view of our intellectual capacities' ability to attain truth. The intellect's reliance on sensory input in this life is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the senses provide the intellect with content for thought, but on the other hand they also cloud it. So left to their own devices our cognitive abilities are rather weak. Metaphysics, Pini therefore concludes, becomes for Giles at most a "temporal remedy for human weakness," while at the same time being "incapable of carrying out its own task autonomously."¹⁶

Note, however, that even if Giles adopted a much bleaker view of our cognitive abilities later in his career, he is not singling out metaphysics for special criticism. In none of the texts discussed by Pini does Giles explicitly argue for our feebleness in acquiring metaphysical knowledge as such.¹⁷ Rather, Giles's pessimism seems to be directed at all forms of "knowledge discovered in a human way" (*scientia secundum modum humanum inventa*). Furthermore, Giles lays the blame for the discursive nature of our understanding in our present state squarely on the body and, in particular, on the fact that, insofar as it is

15 Giorgio Pini, "Ex defectu intellectualis luminis: Giles of Rome on the Role and Limits of Metaphysics," *Quaestio* 5 (2005), 527–41. For the chronology of Giles's works see Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati, and Concetta Luna, "Egidio Romano," *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* 42 (Rome, 1996), 319–41; Francesco del Punta and Cecilia Trifogli, "Giles of Rome," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4 (London, 1998), 72–78; and the contribution by Charles Briggs in this volume.

16 Pini, "Ex defectu intellectualis luminis," 541.

17 Pini discusses *Quodlibet* 3.16, 240–43 and *Quodlibet* 5.7, 284–86. However, in the prologue to his commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, written ca. 1288–89, i.e., during the same period in which he discussed the two quodlibetal questions, Giles explicitly says that the metaphysician "makes many infallible arguments" (*multas infallibiles rationes facit*).

conjoined with the body, the intellective soul acquires knowledge only “through parts” (*per partes*).¹⁸ It is natural to take this to mean that ultimately the senses are to blame here. But this is entirely in line with Giles’s earlier writings. In his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, for example, Giles discusses the question of whether metaphysics is the type of knowledge with the highest degree of certainty. His response is boldly affirmative, but then he adds an important qualification. Metaphysics is most certain *per se*, but *per accidens* it is not certain at all! It is most certain because the objects of metaphysics are most appropriate to the nature of our intellect, but since our intellect always relies on sensory representations (the so-called “phantasms”) taken from the senses we are prone to mistakes and deception.¹⁹ All this is to say that we have to take Giles’s statements about the preeminent status of metaphysics with caution. In principle, metaphysics is the ultimate goal and happiness of a human being in this life; yet this goal is, like many other things, very difficult to achieve.

3 Matter, Form, Essence, and Existence

Despite its elevated status, in metaphysics too we have to “philosophize in a human way” (*philosophari modo humano*).²⁰ This means that the best way to arrive at metaphysical insights is by way of an analysis of the metaphysical

18 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.16, 243: “Immo, quia <anima> conjuncta corpori acquirit scientiam per partes, separata vero infunditur scientia tota simul, et quia acquisitioni scientiae per partes competit discursus et maxime cum naturale sit, quod sic procedatur.”

19 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 1.24, fol. 11rb: “Debemus dicere quod ista scientia est certa per comparisonem ad nos per se, sed per accidens non est certa in comparisonem ad nos, quoniam oportet simul intelligere et phantasmata speculari sicut dicitur in 3^o De anima. Et propter hoc quod oportet ita speculari sive simul cum speculatione phantasmatis speculatione quidditatis uti. Et in isto usu phantasmatis convenit error et deceptio et propter hoc in speculatione potest per accidens contingere error et deceptio.” See also *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 2.5–8, fols. 14v–15v, on the possibility of knowing the truth and the difficulty attached to this. As Concetta Luna has pointed out, Giles already mentions discursiveness as a result of the deficiency of our natural intellectual light in the *principia* to his lectures on the *Sentences* (i.e., around 1269–71). See her article “Theologie und menschliche Wissenschaften in den *principia* des Aegidius Romanus,” in *Scientia und ars im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter*, (eds.) Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 1994), 528–47, at 545.

20 The insistence on philosophizing *modo humano* and in the *modus humanus* is something like a leitmotiv for Giles. See, e.g., Giles’s *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 5, (ed.) Edgar Hocedez (Louvain, 1930), 19; *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 2vbP; *Reportatio* 2.2, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.2 (Florence, 2003), 192.

composition of material objects, i.e., the objects that are subject to the senses. Now on the hylomorphic picture that Giles accepts, material objects are composites of matter and form, and the nature of such a hylomorphic composition becomes clearest if we look at how material objects come into existence.

Take the case of natural generation, in which one material substance generates another material substance. According to Giles, there are always three main features involved in such a process: an agent, a patient, and the mode of acting. Giles holds that natural agents have genuine causal efficacy.²¹ But they are not sufficiently powerful to bring about their effects on their own, which is why they rely on the cooperation of a passive principle, i.e., matter. Moreover, natural generation is not instantaneous, it requires time. A fire or an animal bringing about another fire or another animal create their effects via causing change and a transformation through which the matter receiving the new substantial form is first prepared for the reception of that form. With the reception of the substantial form in the matter, the process of generation comes to an end and a new substance, say, a new fire or a new animal, comes to be.²²

Various consequences follow from this picture of natural generation. One is that once a substance has ceased to exist no natural agent can ever bring it about that the exact same substance comes into existence again. The main reason for this is that natural agents necessarily operate through change. And since the new generation of the same substance would happen through a change different from the one involved in the original generation, the form induced in matter will be numerically different from the original form. For a different cause leads to a different effect, even if the effects are very similar. As a result there will be an entirely new substance.²³

But most importantly for our purposes, in the process of generation we have to distinguish between two things: (a) the induction of a new form in matter

21 Giles explicitly argues against occasionalist accounts of causation and other, in his view mistaken, theories of causation. See his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 4, fols. 8ra-9vb. See also Girolamo Trapè, "Causalità e partecipazione in Egidio Romano," *Augustinianum* 9 (1969), 91–117, at 94–95.

22 For this scenario see, e.g., Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 7 and his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 6, fols. 11va-12ra.

23 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.3, 457: "Quod igitur agens naturale non potest inducere eandem formam in materiam que prius fuit, non est causa quia de ratione forme est quod est non interrupta, sed hoc est propter hoc quod agit de necessitate per motum et transmutationem. Et quia formam in materia <inducit> per alium motum quam prius, eo quod motus corruptus non potest redire unus numero—ad diversitatem autem cause sequitur diversitas effectus—, ideo necesse est quod forma inducta sit alia in numerum quam prius fuit." See also Giles's *Theoremata in corpore Christi* 1, fol. 1ra-vb; and his *Quodlibet* 1.4, 10.

and (b) the being of the new substance. Now it is arguably somewhat natural to think of these two as coinciding and, if not as identical with one another, then at least as two aspects of the same process. Giles, however, rejects this assumption. For him the induction of the form is the immediate endpoint of natural generation, while the existence (*esse*) of the new composite of form and matter is a further effect. In generating a new matter-form composite the natural agent first generates something that is in potency towards existence (*esse*) and then causes it to exist.²⁴ This picture seems odd, for is it not the role of the (substantial) form that is received in matter to immediately give, among other things, being to the whole form-matter compound? And does separating the reception of the form from the acquisition of existence not jeopardize hylomorphic composition? Now it looks as if a material substance is not only composed of matter and form but includes some third element.

To understand Giles's account it is necessary to get clearer about the role that forms play. In fact, Giles, following Avicenna, distinguishes two forms in material objects: the "form of the whole" (*forma totius*) and the "form of the part" (*forma partis*).²⁵ The form of the part is the substantial form proper, for instance, the human soul in the case of a human being. It is called the form of the part because it is the form of the human body, which is a part of a human being. The form of the whole is the nature or essence of the material object—the human being's humanity (*humanitas*), in our present example. Although the latter is not strictly speaking a substantial form, it still has the character of a form because it makes the "supposit" (*suppositum*), the individual human being, into that which it is.²⁶ The standard medieval slogan that forms are the principles of being (*esse*) can now be spelled out with more precision, for we can ask ourselves with respect to each type of form how it causes the being (*esse*) of the material object.²⁷

24 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 7, 38–39; see also 12, 71–72; 13, 82–83.

25 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 8, 45: "[Q]uare si in homine est anima et humanitas et utrumque habet rationem formae, differenter tamen quia anima dicit partem et est forma partis, humanitas vero dicit totum et est forma totius, bene dictum est quod in homine est forma partis et forma totius." See also propositions 16 and 17. This distinction can also be found in Thomas Aquinas, who like Giles attributes it to Avicenna. See Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia* 2, *In libros Metaphysicorum* 7.9, and Armand A. Maurer, "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies* 13 (1951), 165–76 (repr. in *Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers* [Toronto, 1990], 3–18).

26 On the notion of *suppositum* in Giles, see Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to John Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 2002), 263–69.

27 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 8, 44–46.

The first thing to note is that for Giles the substantial form proper (i.e., the form of the part) is a necessary, but not sufficient cause of the being (*esse*), in the sense of “existence”, of a material substance.²⁸ One of the primary effects of the substantial form is to give intelligibility to a material substance.²⁹ But the substantial form of a material object is not that which gives the whole its complete actuality, it rather makes the matter-form composite into something that is in potency towards existence. In Giles’s words, “form signifies act with respect to matter and it signifies potency with respect to being (*esse*).”³⁰ Second, the two forms are of course closely related. The form of the whole, i.e., the essence or nature of a material substance, is taken both from its substantial form (i.e., the form of the part) and its matter. A human being, for instance, is not just identical with an intellectual soul. Rather, it is essentially embodied, and thus its nature includes matter. However, the substantial form is what most of all determines the essence or nature (i.e., the form of the whole) of a material substance. But if it is true that the substantial form in the strict sense is not the sufficient cause of the object’s existence, then neither is the essence or nature.

However, it is very natural to think that it is in virtue of its form (be it the *forma totius* or the *forma partis*) that a thing is what it is, and it seems to be this intuition that finds its expression in the medieval slogan of the form as principle of being. So Giles is forced to draw a distinction between being (*ens*) and existence (*esse*). In his *Theorems on Being and Essence* he writes that “every thing is a being (*ens*) through its essence, nevertheless, because the essence of a created thing is not a complete act but is in potency to existence (*esse*), its essence is not sufficient to account for the thing’s actual existence, unless some existence (*esse*), which is the act and the completion of the essence, is added to it.”³¹ The causality of the form of the whole or essence (or in other words, the form of the part together with matter) thus consists in making something a being (*ens*), independent from that being’s existence.

Why does a material substance not possess existence through its essence? In a certain way it does, namely, as a necessary cause, as we just saw. This is why Giles sticks to the talk of essence as a cause of being (*esse*). Yet in another

28 For the multiple meanings of *esse* see Giles’s *Quodlibet* 3.3, 272–73.

29 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 10, 58: “Verum quia sufficit actualitas formae ad hoc quod res intellegantur, licet non sufficiat ut existant, licet sine forma res non possint existere nec intellegi, sine esse vero possunt intellegi, licet sine eo non possint existere.” However, in the following proposition 11, Giles goes on to clarify that the agent intellect is also required for the actual intelligibility of material substances.

30 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 12, 72: “Nam forma dicit actum respectu materiae et dicit potentiam respectu esse.”

31 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 13, 83.

way the essence is not the cause of a thing's existence, but some other agent responsible for the generation of the substance (possessing the essence) is what causes the substance to exist. For existence and essence are not identical, according to Giles, and that is the main reason why an essence is not sufficient for a thing's existence. This leads us to the famous doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence. Giles argues for this distinction in many places in his writings, yet if we take all these arguments together we can distinguish roughly two strands. First there are theological arguments. According to Giles, it is impossible to save the idea of creation if the essences of creatures are not really distinct from their existence.³² I will leave these considerations aside here. A second set of arguments consists of genuinely philosophical ones. Since I cannot do justice to all of them in this short space I want to mention only one, which takes the form of a *reductio*. Suppose that the opposite to the real distinction obtains, namely, that an essence is not really distinct from its existence, i.e., that essence and existence are not two different things. For instance assume that *my* essence is not really distinct from *my* existence. Then it would follow, according to Giles, that it is impossible for me not to exist. For my existence would then be part of what it is to be me, like the sum of angles equaling two right angles is part of the essence of a triangle and not really distinct from it. In other words, I would necessarily exist. Clearly this is not the case, since it is characteristic of material objects such as myself to have the capacity to exist and not to exist. Being and essence must thus be two different things (*res*).³³

32 Giles draws this connection, for instance, in his *Quodlibet* 1.7, 16: "Ex hoc etiam patere potest quomodo fit creatio rerum. Nam si ... non esset ibi compositio inter essentiam et esse, non video quomodo creari possent." The same holds for the idea that creatures participate in being: *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 9, fol. 19ra: "Sed si considerat quid importatur nomine participationis salvare non possumus quod esse creaturae sit esse per participationem nisi essentia substernatur ipsi esse et nisi sit ibi realis compositio ex essentia et esse."

33 In different works, Giles proposes different sets of arguments. In the *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 9, he presents three main arguments (fols. 20vb-21vb); Hocedez counts eight different arguments in the *Theoremata de esse et essentia*; see the introduction to his edition, (37)-(39). For arguments in favor of the real distinction see also: *Ordinatio* 1.8.2.1.2, fol. 52r; 1.8.2.1, fol. 54r; 1.19.1.2.2.1, fol. 106r; 1.37.1.2.3, fol. 192r; 1.42.2.2, fol. 221r; *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 29 (Rome 1554; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968); *Super librum de causis* 16 (Venice 1550; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 88-92; 29, 97-98; *Ordinatio* 2.3.1.2, (Venice 1581; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 1:170-73. The last text provides a good summary of Giles's arguments. For a discussion of some of these arguments see John F. Wippel, "The Relationship Between Essence and Existence in Late-Thirteenth-Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo," in *Philosophies*

Before we have a closer look at the real distinction between being and essence in the next section I would like to go back to the distinction between the form of the whole and the form of the part and have one final look at the causal role of forms. We have already seen that the form is not the sufficient cause of a substance's existence (*esse*). But do proponents of hylomorphism not traditionally hold that the substantial form as the form of the part (i.e. of matter) causes matter to be, since matter taken by itself has no actuality? Giles agrees that the *forma partis* gives being (*esse*) to matter, but argues that this being is different from the being that constitutes a composite along with the essence. Rather, the being that matter has from the form is nothing other than a mode or determination of matter, but not a third thing besides matter and form. As Giles puts it:

[M]atter itself is determined and perfected by a substantial form and there is no intermediate being between matter and form, unless we might want to call 'being' (*esse*) the mode of being (*modum essendi*) or the determination that matter has from form. But talking in this way we would mean to equivocate with respect to being (*esse*), because by being taken in the strict sense we understand that which constitutes a composite along with essence, and it is really distinct (*realiter differens*) from the essence.³⁴

The upshot of Giles's reasoning is that it allows him to attribute different causal roles to the *forma partis* and the *forma totius* in material substances. When we say that being "flows and is caused" by form this can mean two things. We might either have in mind (1) the being caused by the *forma partis*, i.e., the being of matter, which is not actually a really distinct being (*esse*) but rather a mode of being, or (2) the *forma totius*, which is in some sense a cause of being (*esse*) that is really distinct from the essence.³⁵ Note, however, that when the essence causes this really distinct being (*esse*), i.e., existence, it does so only insofar as it is somewhat like the material cause receiving existence in it,

of *Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, (ed.) Parviz Morewedge (New York, 1982), 131–64, at 134–41. However, according to Richard Cross, the "basic motivation" for Giles's theory of the real distinction is "the need to explain the facticity of an individual essence." See *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, 94–101, at 99–100.

34 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 16, 109. For the form giving a *modus essendi* to matter see also *Quodlibet* 3.14, 306–10; In *Quodlibet* 5.3, 272, Giles is emphatic about the importance of distinguishing these types of *esse* and remarks that the poverty of our philosophical vocabulary causes us "much harm" (*multa mala*).

35 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 8, 45–46.

although Giles is quick to add that unlike matter, essence does not exist before it receives that to which it is in potency.³⁶

Giles employs the distinction between mode of being (*modus essendi*) and being (*esse*) ingeniously in his reply to a famous argument against the plurality of forms. It is well known that Giles taught, like Thomas Aquinas, that each material substance has only one substantial form. In fact, the unicity of the substantial form is mentioned among the 51 articles that were the basis of Giles's condemnation in 1277.³⁷ Yet, being a proponent of the unicity of substantial form does not mean that Giles cannot at times be critical of other supporters of the same view. For some of them maintain that a plurality of substantial forms would lead to a plurality of acts of being and thus render substantial unity impossible. For what has different acts of being is distinct in being and can at most make up an aggregate.³⁸ Giles rejects this line of reasoning because the multiplicity of forms would only amount to a multiplicity in forms of the part (*formae partis*). A human being, for instance, would then be composed of matter and various forms inhering in matter, such as the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the intellectual soul. But these forms do not cause different acts of existence (*esse*), they merely cause different modes of being in matter, and it is not clear why this should jeopardize substantial unity.³⁹

Apart from expressing Giles's commitment to the thesis that one substance has only one singular act of existence, this last line of thought has also important implications for how Giles understands the being of accidents. In the same way that a multitude of substantial forms would not cause different acts of being (*esse*), so multiple accidental forms do not cause various accidental

36 See, e.g., Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 5, 21; 6, 26.

37 Article 48 reads: "In quolibet composito est una forma." See Robert Wielockx's edition of Giles's *Apologia*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.1 (Florence, 1985), 59 and 169–70. On Giles's development with regard to the question of the unicity of the substantial form see Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici," *Documenti e studi* 1 (1990), 1–111, at 20–24; Concetta Luna, "La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul Libro 111 delle Sentenze (Clm. 8005) e il problema dell'autenticità dell'Ordinatio," *Documenti e studi* 1 (1990), 113–225, at 158–78.

38 See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.76.3, corp.: "Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae dominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus. Si igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, scilicet ab anima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit animal, scilicet ab anima sensibili; et ab alia quod sit homo, scilicet ab anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset unum simpliciter..."

39 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 17, 111–121.

acts of being (*esse accidentalia*). Accidents merely determine their underlying subjects, and if we want to refer to this as giving being to the subject, we should once more talk about mode of being (*modus essendi*) rather than being taken in an absolute sense (*esse*).⁴⁰ Accidents take part in the existence (*esse*) of the individual in which they inhere, but they do so differently from substantial forms. As we saw earlier, substantial forms are in some qualified sense the cause of the existence of the individual substance, but with accidents the relation is the opposite: the accidents' existence (*esse*) is identical with the existence of the individual substance, although they in no way causally contribute to that existence.⁴¹ The reason why accidents form an accidental unity with the subject, and multiple substantial forms do not, is that each accident has its own essence or nature and an accidental composition thus leads to a composite of things with multiple distinct natures, whereas a multitude of substantial forms does not result in multiple essences or natures.⁴²

Given the importance of Giles's distinction between a mere mode of being and being simpliciter, i.e., being that is really distinct from essence, it would be good to have some more information as to what each of these types of being are. Unfortunately, Giles is not always very forthcoming in this regard. Being simpliciter, or existence, is called a "certain actuality and a certain perfection of the essence" and a "complement" (*complementum*).⁴³ On the other hand, the mode of being of matter or a subject is often called their "determination" (*determinatio*) and perfection." Clearly, Giles believes there is a big difference in the way in which each of them is a perfection. But that he fails to spell out their difference in greater detail invites criticism. In particular how Giles characterizes being simpliciter, or existence, seems to make it hard to see how it can be another thing (*res*). Existence is closely related to the essence, which it perfects; their relation seems much closer than that of two separate things. For these and similar reasons Henry of Ghent introduced a less than real distinction that he called "intentional distinction", for the lack of a better name.

40 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 17, 116. See also John F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy* (Washington, D.C., 1981), 210–212, and Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, 91–94.

41 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 17, 119.

42 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 17, 114. For a similar argument see Giles's *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 10, fols. 22vb–24ra.

43 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 5, 20: "Nam esse est quaedam actualitas et quaedam perfectio essentiae"; 13, 82: "Et si quaeras quid sit esse et nos quaeremus quid sit forma. Et si dicas quod forma est quidam actus et quaedam perfectio materiae, et nos dicemus quod esse est quidam actus et quaedam perfectio formae." For *complementum* see, e.g., Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 5, 21 and 7, 39.

But Giles does not consider this a plausible move and in various works he denounces Henry's intentional distinction as unintelligible.⁴⁴

The general metaphysical picture described here is of course not restricted to material substances. It also applies, in slightly modified form, to separate ones. Since separate substances do not possess matter, the distinction between the form of the whole and the form of the part becomes superfluous, but other than that, these substances exhibit the same distinctness of essence and existence. It could even be argued that they are the main motivation behind Giles's defense of the real distinction between being and essence. For if being and essence were not two really distinct things out of which all creatures are metaphysically composed, separate substances would turn out to be absolutely simple entities. It would be impossible to understand, according to Giles, how they can at the same time actually exist, but also have the power not to exist, if the actuality and the potency are not rooted in two distinct principles. With matter and form there seem to be, at least at first glance, different principles available to explain why material substances are contingent things.⁴⁵

Earlier we saw that Giles distinguishes between being (*ens*) and existence (*esse*), where something is a being (*ens*) on account of its essence. Although this being (*ens*) has by itself no existence (*esse*) one might wonder whether we should not attribute some sort of being to it, for how can something be a being (*ens*) without having being (*esse*)? In some of his works, e.g., his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Giles thus employs a distinction that one can also find in many of his contemporaries, namely, the distinction between "essential being" (*esse essentiae*) and "actual being" (*esse actuale*), where actual being is

44 On Henry's intentional distinction see my "Henry of Ghent on Individuation, Essence, and Being," in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*, (ed.) Gordon A. Wilson (Leiden, 2011), 181–209, and the literature mentioned there. For Giles's criticism of the intentional distinction see his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 9, fol. 19va. Henry replied to Giles in his *Quodlibet* 10.7, to which Giles in turn replied in questions 12 and 13 of his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*. Here again he accuses Henry of proposing an unintelligible distinction. A short time after (in 1287), Henry replied in his eleventh *Quodlibet* (q. 3), accusing Giles of misunderstanding the nature of the intentional distinction by failing to see that it is a distinction *sui generis*. For secondary literature on this debate see the items mentioned in n. 2 above.

45 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 19. Note that Giles is vigorously opposed to so-called "universal hylomorphism", according to which separate substances (such as angels) also possess matter, although not of a corporeal nature. For his opposition to this view see the contribution by Silvia Donati and Cecilia Trifogli in this volume. See also John F. Wippel, "Metaphysical Composition of Angels in Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Godfrey of Fontaines," in *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy*, (ed.) Tobias Hoffmann (Leiden, 2012), 45–78.

nothing other than actual existence.⁴⁶ However, in other works, such as the *Theorems on Being and Essence*, this terminology is completely absent. And with good reason, for the talk of “essential being” can easily mislead the reader by falsely suggesting that uninstantiated objects have some sort of diminished existence.

However this may be, referring to something as being (*ens*) on account of its essence as opposed to existence (*esse*) sheds some interesting light on what we have said in the previous section about the subject-matter of metaphysics. For if metaphysics primarily considers being insofar as it is being, and being (*ens*) is distinct from existence (*esse*), then it looks as if metaphysics is mostly concerned with essences. This is also confirmed by the various passages in which Giles talks about the object of the intellect. For, according to Giles, the object of the intellect is the quiddity or the “what it is” (*quod quid est*) of something,⁴⁷ and quiddity and “what it is” are other expressions for essence. Metaphysics, as with any other human science, is a habit of the intellect, and the subject-matter of metaphysics must somehow be included in the object of the intellect. It follows therefore that Giles’s conception of metaphysics is mainly an essentialist one.⁴⁸

4 The Parts of Substances and the Real Distinction

The analysis of material substance has shown that for Giles such substances are composed of three main parts: matter, substantial form, and existence. The strangeness of this proposal comes from the fact that we may think of matter and form as the only real parts (*partes reales*) of material substances; existence is somehow not on par with the other two. However, if we apply Giles’s definition of a real part—namely, a part that really differs from its whole and can thus not be predicated of the whole—then each of the three comes out equally as such a part.⁴⁹ That we think of matter and form as different from existence seems to come from their role in the constitution of an essence. For

46 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 7.7, fol. 30va: “Dicendum quod duplex est esse, scilicet essenziale et esse actuale.” See also *In libros Posteriorum* 2, fol. N1rb-va.

47 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 16, 110: “... quod quid est sive quidditas est obiectum proprium intellectus ...”

48 This point has also been highlighted by Peter W. Nash in “The Accidentality of Esse According to Giles of Rome,” *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), 103–15.

49 See, e.g., Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales* 7.9, fol. 31rb: “Nam pars realis realiter differt a suo toto et ideo non praedicatur de suo toto.”

this reason Giles calls matter and form “essential parts” (*partes essentielles*) of substances.⁵⁰ Existence, in contrast, is obviously not an essential part.

In proposition 19 of the *Theorems on Being and Essence*, Giles defends this metaphysical picture by considering three alternatives: (a) that existence is not a real part because it is nothing over and above the union of the essential parts; (b) that existence is not a real part because it is merely a relation to an agent; and (c) that existence is not a real part because it is nothing other than a determination of a subject. Giles rejects alternative (a) also on the ground that in some substances, namely, immaterial separate ones, there is no union of essential parts, for there is no essential part other than form. Alternative (c) is rejected on the ground that the determination of a subject would require the presence of something intrinsic doing the determining. Yet it is impossible that existence is just a determination of the essence, for without existence being present in the substance, the essence could not be determined to existence in the first place. Alternative (b) is historically the most interesting, since it is often considered to be Henry of Ghent’s view.⁵¹ Giles rejects this alternative because he thinks that it gets the priorities wrong. Something does not just start and cease to exist because of a relation to some agent. Relations are grounded in non-relational properties, the loss or acquisition of which make something related or not. For instance, when I grow bold I become related to other bold men by the relation of similitude etc. In other words, relations are posterior to their foundational properties. And even if it were possible for the natural order between relation and foundation to be reversed in some cases, there is no relation without a foundation. So existence cannot just be a relation, for there would also have to be something added to the essence once it comes into existence.⁵²

However, when Giles talks about parts of material substances he will most of the time just talk about essence and existence (*esse*), for this schema also applies to creatures that are not material substances, i.e. separate substances that are composed only of form and existence. It is important to notice how Giles articulates the distinction between essence and existence (*esse*). You might say that if his arguments for the real distinction succeed, all Giles has shown is that there is a real difference between an object’s essence and its existence in the sense that this difference is not just a rational difference, i.e. not

50 See, e.g., Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 19, 125.

51 See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 1.9 (Opera Omnia 3; Leuven, 1979), 53–54; *Quodlibet* 10.7 (Opera Omnia 14; Leuven, 1987), 151.

52 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 19, 125–35. See also his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 9, fol. 19vb and 12, fols. 29vb–30ra.

just a matter of how we think of or speak about objects. In this sense, “real difference” or “being really distinct” just means that the distinction is grounded somewhat *ex parte rei*. But Giles draws a more explicit conclusion. If essence and existence are really (*realiter*) distinct, then they are distinct in the way that two things (*res*) are distinct, and essence and existence are just two things.⁵³ And if they are two things, then every object having essence and existence is a real composite of two things.⁵⁴ Needless to say, some of Giles’s contemporaries objected to this strong formulation of the real distinction. Henry of Ghent, for instance, agrees with Giles that being and existence are somehow distinct *ex parte rei*, yet he refrains from talking about a distinction between two things, for the simple reason that he does not think existence (*esse*) is a thing (*res*).⁵⁵ Obviously, Giles has a much looser understanding of what counts as a thing.⁵⁶

This raises the question of what sort of thing existence (*esse*) is. Many of Giles’s contemporaries objected to the real distinction as a difference between two *res* on the ground that it remains completely unintelligible as to how existence can be a thing; and even more sympathetic modern commentators suggest that Giles’s “terminology is at least unfortunate.”⁵⁷ For if existence is a thing, it should belong to one of the ten categories, i.e., be either a substance or an accident belonging to one of the nine categories of accidents. But it seems as if existence cannot be a substance, for then every substance would in fact be a composite of two substances and there would be no simple substances. Furthermore we would have to ask what sort of substance existence is: matter, form, or a substance composed of both? Each of these options leads to further

53 It is important to highlight this point. For not every instance where something is really distinct from something else is an instance of a distinction between two *res*. On this point, see Giles’s *Quodlibet* 4.14, 309.

54 See, e.g., Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 19, 127: “esse et essentia sunt duae res, ita quod esse nihil est aliud quam quaedam actualitas realiter superaddita essentiae ex quo esse et essentia realiter componitur omne creatum.”

55 For Henry, a thing is “whatever is a nature or some absolute essence having an exemplary reason in God”; see Henry’s *Quodlibet* 5.6 (Paris 1518; repr. Louvain, 1961), fol. 161rK. For Henry’s understanding of *res* see also my *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Leiden, 2007), Chapter 4.

56 In particular, Giles does not think that being and essence signify two essences! See his *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 29, fol. 18va: “Videtur enim absurdum quod essentia et esse dicantur duae essentiae.”

57 John F. Wippel, “Essence and Existence,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, (eds.) Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge, 1982), 385–410, at 397; see also Hocedez in his introduction to the edition of Giles’s *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, 56.

problems. Nor can existence be an accident. For accidents are supposed to be ontologically posterior to substances.⁵⁸

Giles responds to this objection by pointing out that existence (*esse*) indeed belongs to the category of substance, not because it is itself a substance, but because it is the terminus or “limit” (*terminus*) of substance. Take a similar case, that of a point. Under which category does a point fall? Giles suggests that a point belongs to quantity, not because a point is itself a quantity—points by definition are not extended—but because it is the limit of a line, and lines fall under the category of quantity. Similarly, existence is a limit of essence and thus belongs to the same category as the essence to which it is superadded, and this is primarily the category of substance.⁵⁹ This response explains why Giles is not worried that the composition of essence and existence jeopardizes the simplicity of created substances. There would be a problem if existence were indeed a *different* substance or a *different* accident from the essence with which it joins a real composition, but this is not the case. These responses give only a glimpse of Giles’s elaborate defense of the real distinction as a distinction between two *res*. Yet I still hope, to use Giorgio Pini’s words, that they help to make clear that Giles’s way of “conceiving being and essence as two different things is not so much an unfortunate phrasing and a distortion of Thomas’s doctrine as a sophisticated position.”⁶⁰

The response to the last objection indicates that Giles has two conceptions of substance: (1) *actual substance*, with its three real parts: matter, form, and existence; and (2) *substance in the sense of an essence*, which has only two parts and to which existence belongs as something superadded. We may wonder whether this does not inevitably lead to further problems. For is a substance not a *per se* being? How can it be plausible to talk of substance in the sense of an essence if it requires existence (*esse*) to actually be? Giles’s response gives us a glimpse of his realist understanding of the categories. Something is called a substance if its nature or essence does not depend on an essence belonging

58 See, for instance, Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 1.9, 51–52. For more on this type of argument see Ruedi Imbach, “Averroistische Stellungnahmen zur Diskussion über das Verhältnis von *Esse* und *Essentia*: von Siger von Brabant zu Thaddeus von Parma,” in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, (eds.) Alfonso Maierù and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani (Rome, 1981), 299–339.

59 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 9, fol. 20vb. For Aquinas’s similar response to the same objection see, e.g., his *Quodlibet* 12.4.1 (Opera Omnia 25; Rome, 1996), 404.

60 Giorgio Pini, “Being and Creation in Giles of Rome,” in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, (eds.) Jan A. Aertsen et al. (Berlin, 2001), 390–409, at 408. In his chapter, Pini examines the real distinction from a somewhat different background.

to any of the other ten categories. Conversely, something is an accident if its essence depends on an essence belonging to another category. Qualities, for instance, depend on the essences of substances, and relations depend on the essences of their foundations etc. "Although substance is in this way a per se being (*ens*) it is nevertheless not inconvenient that it be a being, i.e. something existing (*existens*) through something else, namely, through something added to it."⁶¹

5 Individuals, Individuation, and Universals

Let us follow Giles once more in his *modo humano* approach to metaphysics. But now the question will not be about the fundamental elements of material (and separate) substances. This time I would like to start from the fact that we experience our everyday objects as individual objects. Is there any explanation we can give why there are individuals? Or is individuality a brute fact?

Like every later medieval philosopher Giles endorses the principle that "being" and "one" are convertible. Unity is a (necessary) property of being, a *passio entis*, in the same way as being capable of laughter is a (necessary) property of human beings. Giles thinks it is easy to show why every being is one. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* he writes: "Undividedness (*indivisio*) is the nature of 'one'. For something is said to be one if it is undivided from itself (*indivisum a se*) and divided from something else (*divisum ab alio*). But now it is so that the property of undividedness ... follows all being. For from the same thing from which something possesses being, from that it also has that it is distinct from everything else and undivided from itself." What causes a thing to be what it is? Its form and matter. So Giles continues: "From the same form and matter from which I derive that I am a human being I also derive that I am not a donkey ... and that I am distinct from everything else."⁶² In the *Theorems on Being and Essence*, however, Giles seems to be more precise as now he only mentions form as the principle of being and unity.⁶³ This makes it sound as if

⁶¹ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 9, ad 10, fol. 22rb.

⁶² Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 4.6, fol. 23vb. See also 10.5, fol. 38ra, where Giles defines being one as being undivided in itself (*in se indivisum*) and divided from others (*divisum ab aliis*) and his *Theoremata in corpore Christi* 27, fol. 16vab. The *Quaestiones metaphysicales* contain a whole series of questions on transcendental unity: see, Book 4, questions 5–11.

⁶³ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 13, 78: "Sciendum est quod quaelibet forma dat rei quod sit ens et dat ei quod sit una. Nam quaelibet res per formam suam est aliquid et est indistincta a se et distincta ab aliis."

the form is, according to Giles, what most of all accounts for the individuality of an individual.⁶⁴

In principle it should be easy to determine which factor, if any, accounts for the individuality of individuals. As we saw, an actually existing substance is composed of only three sorts of things: matter, form, and existence. Accidents seem not to contribute anything in individuation, since they are ontologically dependent on substances and thus posterior. They are individuated through the substances in which they inhere. Accidents might help us to distinguish between individuals: Plato's location, date of birth, shape, height etc., distinguish him, say, from Socrates or Cicero. Yet none of these accidents is the ultimate cause of his individuality.⁶⁵ Similarly, nothing is individuated, strictly speaking, by something extrinsic to it.⁶⁶ In a broad sense it is true that I am the individual person I am because of my parents who caused my existence and thus also my individuality. However, I still remain an individual once my parents are no longer in existence or when other extrinsic features change. When we ask about what accounts for the individuality of an individual we are rather after some intrinsic feature of the individual. And this leads us back to matter, form, and existence.

Of the three real parts, existence does not seem to be doing much work in individuating individuals, despite Giles's insistence that every object has only one being (*esse*).⁶⁷ It rather looks as if *this* existence is *my* individual existence because it is the actuality and perfection of my individual nature. And despite what Giles says about the form's role in giving a thing undividedness with respect to itself and dividedness with respect to others, form too does not seem to do the job. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Giles explicitly addresses whether individuals have their own forms. Some, according to Giles, believe they do, "because only actuality (*actus*) distinguishes and divides; from the nature of potentiality no distinction arises." Thus individuals such as Socrates and Plato are distinct through what makes them actual human beings, namely, their individual forms.⁶⁸

Notwithstanding the *prima facie* plausibility of the foregoing line of thought, Giles counters it with arguments of his own, in which he rejects the idea that individuals are distinct through forms of their own. The last of these

64 Note that in the *Librum super de causis* 9, fol. 35v, the phrase *indivisum a se et divisum ab aliis* is used as definition of *individuum*.

65 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.25, 236.

66 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.17, 474: "Nihil autem individuatur formaliter per se per illud quod est extra se."

67 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 10, fol. 23rb.

68 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 7.7, fol. 30rab.

arguments is based on the causality of forms in cognition. According to Giles, the intellect does not have direct knowledge of particulars. Rather, we know particulars directly through the senses, and our intellects are capable of knowledge of particulars only indirectly. The reason for this is not to be located in a defect of the intellect but in its immaterial nature. While the senses are affected by forms insofar as these are in matter, the intellect as an immaterial power receives forms entirely without matter. But because the intellect receives the same form when it has an intellectual cognition of Socrates and one of Plato, it cannot directly think of them as distinct individuals. It would only be able to do so if Socrates and Plato each had respective forms of their own.⁶⁹ Here it is important to add a clarification. In a sense Socrates and Plato do indeed have their own forms, since each of them has a form that is numerically one and which, by virtue of being a part of their substance, is their own. But in another sense they do not have their own forms, since the form of Socrates is not distinct from the form of Plato by anything formal, i.e., a formal difference. For if their forms were formally distinct in this way, Socrates and Plato would no longer fall under the same species, human beings, but belong to two different species. In line with this line of thought Giles elsewhere defends the view that all human souls are equal. Differences in our mental abilities derive from differences in our bodily constitution.⁷⁰

This leaves us with only one candidate to account for individuation: matter. And indeed there is no shortage of passages in Giles's works where he talks about matter as the principle of individuation. Most prominently, he defends this view in his *Quodlibeta*.⁷¹ In his first quodlibetal disputation, which he debated in 1285/86, shortly after his return to the University of Paris, he could not have been more explicit. "Individuation", he writes, "occurs in this way: because it belongs to matter to be extended by quantity and because different forms are received in different parts of matter, forms are divided, and as divided, they are individuated by extended matter."⁷² The individuation of forms immediately leads to individual substances, which are just composites of individual forms and the portion of matter in which these forms inhere. Why does the extension of matter lead to the division and individuation of forms? It belongs to the nature of the forms in question to inhere and to be received in matter and, as

69 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 7.7, fol. 30rb.

70 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.74, 367–68; *Ordinatio* 2.32.2.3, 2:470–73.

71 Also, see Martin Pickavé, "The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in *Quodlibeta* (1277—ca. 1320): A Forest Map," in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, (ed.) Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2007), 17–79, at 35–43. For Giles's mature view on individuation see *Ordinatio* 2.3.2.1–4, 1:179–204.

72 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.11, 24; see also 1.8, 18.

Giles constantly reminds his readers, “everything received is received according to the mode of the receiver.”⁷³ All this makes it metaphysically impossible for numerically the same form to inhere in different portions of matter.⁷⁴

Note, however, that although matter is a receptacle, taken by itself it does not individuate forms, and therefore material substances; it can do so only because “it belongs to matter to be extended.” Would it not be more accurate then to call *quantity* the principle of individuation because “extension is caused by quantity”? Giles does not think so. There can be no quantity without a subject. So matter, in being the “cause and principle of quantity”, is “the principle of individuation, which must happen by quantity.”⁷⁵

Giles makes little effort to conceal that on his view the individuality of a material substance is due to an accident. This, however, leads to at least two major problems, which Giles tries to address. First, accidents are ontologically posterior to the subjects in which they inhere. Or to be precise: their subject seems to be the actual substance composed of matter and form. How then can they possibly individuate the forms with regard to which they are posterior? Giles counters this common objection by distinguishing between two kinds of accidents. Some accidents belong more to matter, some more to form. And it is the accident of quantity, according to Giles, that “especially” (*specialiter*) belongs to matter.⁷⁶ Thus quantity is posterior with respect to matter, but not with respect to form nor to the composite substance.

According to the second objection, Giles’s account of individuation challenges the substantiality of individual corporeal objects. If, as it appears, quantity is the subject of individual forms, individual material substances seem to fall under the category of quantity, since they derive their ontological status from their immediate subjects. In his response, Giles introduces an important distinction between the extension of matter and the extension of quantity. It is true that quantity causes the extension of matter, for by itself matter has no extension. But the extension of matter is different from the extension of quantity. For the parts of matter—having parts is what it means to be extended—are

73 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 2.21, fol. 21vb. This principle is fundamental in Giles’s account of individuation, so it is no surprise that he alludes to it frequently. See, e.g., *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 1, 4; 10, 56.

74 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 2, fol. 2ra.

75 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.11, 24: “Materia ergo, quae specialiter est causa et principium quantitatis, dicitur esse principium individuationis, quae per quantitatem fieri debet.” In other works Giles will sometimes emphasize the role of quantity and downplay the role of matter; see e.g., his *Reportatio* 2.25. But this is more cosmetic and does not amount to a change of opinion.

76 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.11, 24.

nothing other than matter, whereas the parts of quantity are not. This allows Giles to introduce some precision with regard to the role of quantity in individuation: quantity does not fundamentally change matter (for instance, change matter into an accident); it just adds a “mode” (*modus se habendi*) to matter and to the substance it individuates.⁷⁷

The problem with calling matter the principle of individuation is that matter does not seem to be the right kind of thing for the job. It is hard to imagine that separate substances, such as angels, are not individuals. Yet if they are, they clearly do not owe their individuality to matter, for the simple reason that they have none. For this reason, Henry of Ghent rejected the sort of account of individuation advocated by Giles on the basis that it could not, to Henry’s mind, provide us with the “precise nature and cause of individuation” (*praecisa ratio et causa individuationis*).⁷⁸ According to Giles of Rome, however, separate substances are self-individuating; they are individuals in virtue of their form and do not have to be further individuated by anything else. And as a consequence there cannot be more than one separate substance per species, since form is responsible for an object’s belonging to a species.

It is well known that this last point was the subject of one of the articles of the Condemnation of 1277, and Giles is fully aware of this.⁷⁹ In his second *Quodlibet* he explicitly addresses the condemned articles and defends his views against their prohibition. He begins his response in Question 7 by stating that he wished the condemned articles had been issued after more careful reflection. In an almost ironic tone Giles declares that it is indeed, as the condemnation says, erroneous to affirm “that because intelligences do not possess matter, God cannot produce many of the same species.” For God could have created a world in which things are ordered differently and in that world there would be many intelligences for one species. Proposing that the condemnation was only concerned with God’s absolute power gives Giles all the freedom to defend the thesis that under God’s ordained power there is only one intelligence or separate substance for each species. Although possible, it would actually be

77 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.11, 24–25. See also *Quodlibet* 4.14, 307. For this aspect of Giles’s account of individuation, see Silvia Donati, “La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano,” *Medioevo* 14 (1998), 149–233 and Damasus Trapp, “Aegidii Romani de doctrina modorum,” *Angelicum* 12 (1935), 449–501.

78 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 2.8 (Opera Omnia 6; Leuven, 1983), 47.

79 *Articuli condempnati a Stephano episcopo Parisiensi anno 1277*, (ed.) David Piché (Paris, 1999), 104: “81 (43). Quod, quia intelligentie non habent materiam, deus non posset plures eiusdem speciei facere.” Giles’s views on individuation were, however, not the subject of the separate inquiry into his teaching that the bishop conducted in the wake of his condemnation of March 7.

unfitting if God, given the order he created among the creatures, were now to multiply angels in a single species.⁸⁰

The reason why, according to the present order, there are not multiple separate substances in one species has to do with the hierarchy of forms. Forms of separate substances, such as angels, possess perfect being (*esse perfectum*), but that just means that they have all the being their form demands. On the contrary, forms of lower beings have only imperfect being (*esse imperfectum*), i.e., they do not possess all the being their form demands. That is why they are not capable of existing without matter. They thus have their being only in accordance with the capacity of the matter in which they inhere, and this is what, for Giles, accounts for the multiplication of such forms.⁸¹ It is obvious that on this understanding of separate substances and their forms it would not be fitting for God to produce (or allow for the production of) many members of one species. For if multiplication involves limitation of being (*esse*), this would just mean that God had to deny to the forms of angels their perfect being, i.e. “that God would now not give to such a form as much being as the form can receive.” God could of course do that, but it would completely change the order of separate substances and their relationship to material ones.⁸²

All this shows that Giles does indeed have a general theory of individuation. In light of his account of the individuation of separate substances it is fair to say that *all* substances are in some sense individuated by their forms. Some forms are self-individuating, others are not and thus require matter

80 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.7, 65: “Ita et in proposito dicere possumus Deum quidem posse, sed secundum hunc ordinem quem nunc positum videmus (quantum in praesenti nobis occurrit) non convenire, ut faciat plures angelos in eadem specie. Hoc tamen fatendum, conveniens fore si Deus faceret, quia tametsi hoc non esset conveniens secundum ordinem nunc positum, esset tamen secundum alium, quem Deus tunc statuisset.” See also *ibid.*, 69. On this question see also Giorgio Pini, “Giles of Rome,” in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: the Thirteenth Century*, (ed.) Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2006), 233–86, at 264–65, and *id.*, “The Individuation of Angels from Bonaventure to Duns Scotus,” in *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy*, 79–115, at 107–09.

81 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.7, 67; for this hierarchy see also *Reportatio* 2.22, 231–33; *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 3, 12–13. In the latter text, Giles proposes two more arguments for why there cannot be several numerically distinct separate substances belonging to one species. In *Reportatio* 2.52, 302–03, Giles argues from the fact that material forms are acts of bodies, whereas separate forms are not, for the non-multiplication of separate substances: “Forma que non est actus corporis, ut angelus, de se individuatur, sed forma que est actus corporis non individuatur nisi per corpus.”

82 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.7, 68. This quodlibetal question (debated in Lent 1287) received an immediate response from Henry of Ghent in *Quodlibet* 11.1–2 (Advent 1287).

for their individuation. Matter, for its part, is also not self-individuating, but individuates lower forms only insofar as it is extended by quantity, which is self-individuating.⁸³ On this picture, my form, that is, my intellectual soul, is thus my individual soul, not because it is an individual in itself, but because it has been individuated by association with the extended matter in which it inheres.

Because all material forms exist in bodies, it might strike some as misleading to talk about common forms. Nevertheless, Giles exhibits clear realist leanings with regard to forms and natures. As we have seen above, he explains the resemblance between individuals and membership in natural kinds in terms of sharing a form insofar as individuals are not distinguished in terms of their form, but in terms of their material features. And the way he speaks about material forms indicates that he attributes some sort of unity to them that is not numerical unity; he even attributes capacities to them, such as the capacity “to be in many” (*esse in pluribus*).⁸⁴ Finally, he concludes that we cannot understand things “to be numerically distinct yet belonging to the same species, unless they are composed of matter and form.”⁸⁵

All this shows that Giles does not consider resemblance to be a brute fact as the nominalist would. However, strictly speaking, universals do not exist in the things in this world. Nor are material forms universals. For if they were then every instance of these forms would be a universal, which seems absurd. In the same way that material forms are not individuals by themselves, they are not universal by themselves.⁸⁶ To have a universal, i.e. something predicable of many, we need an intellect.⁸⁷ However, the abstraction through which the intellect arrives at a universal has its foundation in the object. Hence, the universal is strictly speaking neither real nor a pure product of the mind, that is, a being of reason (*ens rationis*). For as Giles puts it: “with respect to its material being (*esse materiale*) it is something real and it exists in particular things (*in particularibus*); however, it receives its formal being (*esse formale*) from the soul in virtue of the fact that the intellect causes universality in things.”⁸⁸

83 See also Giles’s *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 36, fol. 24ra-va.

84 See, e.g., *Reportatio* 2.25, 235–36: “In sensibilibus notandum quod individuatō non est per formam, quia forma materialis, quantum est ex se, nata est esse in pluribus.”

85 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 2, 7. Giles also frequently says that to differ with respect to form is to differ with respect to kind (*species*); see, e.g., *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 2, 8; and *Quodlibet* 2.7, 68.

86 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.25, 236.

87 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 11, 63: “Intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus.”

88 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.19.1.1, fol. 110va.

6 Accidents and the Categories

So far we have mostly looked at substances, which is justifiable, since substances exemplify being in a higher degree and are thus more the focus of the metaphysician. But Giles also has a lot to say about the ontological status of accidents. First, he warns us not to believe that accidents have no being and no essences of their own. Substances are those things that are first and foremost called beings (*entia*) and accidents are said to be because they belong to substances. This does not, as we have already seen, mean that substances are the only genuine entities out there. Although accidents have no proper existence apart from the existence of the substances in which they inhere, and therefore have only diminished being (*entitas*), they are nonetheless genuine beings (*entia*).⁸⁹

Giles's positive attitude towards accidents is confirmed by his statements about Aristotle's ten categories, which he considers as ten distinct classes of being. To be precise, the ten categories provide us with a classification of natural (i.e., material) beings, and for this reason God and the separate substances do not fall under them.⁹⁰ However, this does not make them less useful if our goal is to understand the ontology of everyday objects. Giles defends the number of the categories by responding to some of the usual challenges. He argues, for instance, that relations are real and not just beings of reason⁹¹ and moreover that they have their own essences or quiddities which are not just reducible to the quiddities of their foundations.⁹² Finally, he explains why passion as a species of quality is distinct from the category of passion as such.⁹³ All this confirms Giles's realist understanding of the categories.

One particular problem associated with the Aristotelian categories is how to classify certain kinds of being. Take for instance an act of the intellect or a

89 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 6.2, fols. 26vb-27rb; *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 1, fol. 2rv. Giles appears to have changed his mind on this, for in his commentary on Book I of the *Sentences* he seems to hold the opposite. See his *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.2, fol. 28ra: "Notandum quod accidens proprie non habet essentia, quia sola substantia habet essentiam."

90 Giles of Rome, *Expositio super Praedicamenta* (Venice 1507; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 17vb. Nonetheless, in other contexts Giles is happy to take the ten categories as a classification of all kinds of created being. See, e.g., *Reportatio* 2.22, 232.

91 Giles of Rome, *Expositio super Praedicamenta*, fol. 23vab.

92 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.5, 61. For Giles's teaching on relations see Mark Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325* (Oxford, 1989), 26-29; Jos Decorte, "Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on the Reality of a Real Relation," *Documenti e studi* 7 (1996), 183-211.

93 Giles of Rome, *Expositio super Praedicamenta*, fol. 27rab.

moral virtue. Traditionally, these are counted as qualities: an act of the intellect is an occurrent quality of the intellect and a virtue is a dispositional quality of the appetitive powers. But acts of the intellect are always about something and virtues are always directed towards a certain type of action. Is the directness they both exhibit not also a good reason to count them under the category of relation? Giles denies this. One thing can only fall under one category. But accidentally it is possible for one thing to belong to another category, for "it is not unsuitable that a thing belonging to one category possesses the mode of another category." Giles explains this with the example of knowledge: strictly speaking knowledge belongs to the category of quality, but it also "has the mode of a relation from the fact that it is related to what is known and because it is from there that it originated."⁹⁴

According to Giles, each accident has its own form and nature, but they all have in common the fact that they rely on the substances in which they inhere. For this reason, accidents cannot be defined without reference to their subjects. Yet Giles is careful not to say that it belongs to the nature of an accident to inhere in a subject. We should rather say that the "aptitude to inhere" (*aptitudo inhaerendi*) is an inseparable essential feature of every accident.⁹⁵ For example, in the Eucharist we are faced with a miraculous situation in which the sensible accidents of the bread and wine are present without the substance of the bread and wine in which they once inhered. If actual inherence were a necessary feature of accidents, the Eucharist would be either impossible or completely unintelligible.

Usually, however, accidents not only have the aptitude to inhere in subjects, they actually do so. This raises the question of why, according to the order of nature, accidents exist in subjects. Presumably this is so because they depend on their subjects. Yet in what exactly does this dependence consist?⁹⁶ It is somewhat plausible to think that their subjects are the efficient and material causes of accidents. Now Giles endorses the idea that subjects are the efficient causes of their accidents insofar as some accidents come about directly from the principles of the substance. My ability to make jokes derives in this

94 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 27, fol. 16vb; *Expositio super Praedicamenta*, fol. 26ra. For Giles's general account of the categories see also *Quodlibet* 4.8, 218–221.

95 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 41, fol. 28va. The talk about an *aptitudo inhaerendi* goes back at least to Bonaventure; see his *In Sent.* 4.12.1.1.1 (*Opera Omnia* 4; Quaracchi, 1889), 271a.

96 For the following see also Marilyn McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham* (Oxford, 2010), 187–89.

way from my rational nature, i.e. my soul and my body. But this is not true of all accidents, like most of those I acquire at one point during my life (e.g., my current sun tan). But even if not all accidents are in this sense efficiently caused by the subject in this special sense, they are still somehow efficiently caused by it insofar as the subject contributes to the conservation of all its accidents.⁹⁷ Just as Giles sees two ways to understand the subject's efficient causality, so he distinguishes two ways in which the subject is the material cause of its accidents. In one sense it is the material cause of its accidents by the very fact that it is the underlying subject in which they inhere. But the material-causal role of matter is also more specific, for in the same way that matter accounts for the individuality of the material substance, so the accident's subject accounts for the individuation of the accident.⁹⁸

What has been said so far about the causal role of the subject applies easily to accidents such as quality and quantity. But Giles is also happy to allow for so-called "successive accidents", such as time and motion. These successive accidents can be traced back to the nine accidental categories, so admitting them into his ontology does not make the ten Aristotelian categories obsolete. However, since the unity of a successive entity consists in the order of the successive parts, successive accidents require more from their subjects than just their material and efficient causality. Their subjects also play the role of formal causes, because the unity of these accidents depends on the unity of the underlying subjects.⁹⁹

97 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 38, fol. 25rb: "Dupliciter etiam intelligi potest subiectum esse causa efficiens accidentis. Primo quia accidens oritur ex principiis subiecti ... Et sic subiectum non est causa efficiens cuiuslibet accidentis existentis in ipso ... Secundo modo subiectum respectu accidentis reducit ad genus causae efficientis in quantum facit ad conservationem eius. Et quia omne accidens, sive naturaliter fluat a principiis subiecti sive sit in ipso subiecto per acquisitionem sive sit a superiori agente per infusionem, semper conservatur in esse per subiectum proprium, ideo sic accipiendo causam efficientem pro conservante subiectum est causa efficiens cuiuslibet accidentis existentis in ipso."

98 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 38, fol. 25rb-va. For other texts in which Giles deals with the subject's causality in producing accidents see *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.3, fol. 28v; *Quodlibet* 6.12, 393–397. I would like to thank Simona Vucu for bringing these texts to my attention.

99 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 38, fol. 25vb: "Aliqua tamen accidentia sunt ad quorum essentialem unitatem quodammodo formaliter videtur subiectum facere. Et talia accidentia sunt omnia successiva quorum esse est in fieri et non in facto esse." Giles does not explicitly say that the subject is the formal cause of successive accidents, but this does not mean that he does not consider the subject as a genuine formal cause. The point

All of this gives us a better idea of how accidents depend on their subjects. The three general causal roles subjects can play, including the different forms of efficient and material causality, allow us to analyse accidents in more detail. Let me just mention three examples: (1) My activity of solving of a mathematical formula is a successive accident of my intellect and depends on my intellect not only efficiently insofar as my mind conserves the accident, but also materially insofar as it inheres in my intellect and is individuated by it. Moreover, it also depends on my intellect for its unity. (2) My ability to laugh, on the other hand, is only material-causally and efficient-causally dependent on my soul. (3) The quantity of an object, however, is not material-causally dependent on the subject insofar as it needs the subject for its individuation. On the contrary, quantity is self-individuating for Giles, so it only depends on the subject efficient-causally and material-causally, insofar as it requires its subject for inherence.¹⁰⁰

This is one way to distinguish between accidents, but a more straightforward one is to distinguish between them in terms of what sort of thing they add to the subject. Looking at accidents in this way we notice there is a hierarchy among the nine accidental categories. According to Giles, accidents fall into two groups: those which come to the subject as it were from the outside (*extrinsecus advenientia*) and those which come to the subject as it were from the inside (*intrinsecus advenientia*). The first group consists of accidents belonging to the six categories of action (*actio*), passion (*passio*), habitus (*habitus*), position (*situs*), where (*ubi*), when (*quando*). All characterize that in which they inhere with respect to something else. For instance, “the when belongs to a thing insofar as it is compared to time,” writes Giles. Similar accounts can be given for each of the others. The accidents of the three remaining categories—quantity, quality, and relation—are more intimately connected with the subject, but among them there is a further hierarchy. Relations are grounded in either qualities or quantities and are therefore somewhat posterior. But since quantity is related to matter and quality to form and form inheres in matter, quantity is in the literal sense the most fundamental accident.¹⁰¹ One might object that Giles’s account of the accidental categories is driven by his desire to give a philosophically acceptable account of the Eucharist. But even if that were true, we can still learn a lot about his views on accidents, since his statements are by no means ad hoc.

is that the subject is only a formal cause of the *unity* of successive accidents, so his caution is understandable.

100 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 38, fol. 26ra.

101 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 39, fol. 26vab.

Giles's views on the Eucharist are especially helpful if we want to understand how he conceives of the causal powers of material substances. Like his contemporaries, Giles holds that a material substance acts through its accidents. In his *Theorems on Being and Essence*, he writes: "In a natural agent the active power is always some accidental form, as heat is the active power of fire. The immediate principle of action is not the substantial but the accidental form."¹⁰² The picture is fairly clear. In virtue of its substantial form a substance has certain accidental forms through which it causally interacts with other things. There is no reason to limit this picture to active powers, for in the same way that a substantial form grants active powers, it also endows the substance with passive ones. Due to its form water, for instance, is cool and has the passive power of being heatable etc.

Although Giles maintains that "matter is the first potential in things and the first passive principle of change" and that "substantial form is the first actuality with respect to all other forms and ... the first active principle of change," he considers their effective role in producing change as rather limited. Matter is required as a passive principle primarily because the passive powers of a material substance need, since they are accidents, a subject to keep them in existence (*esse*).¹⁰³ Similarly, a substantial form is only required to support the active accidental forms with respect to their existence. In particular, the substantial form seems not to have any efficient co-causality with respect to what the accidental forms bring about.¹⁰⁴ All this is, of course, meant to make it possible for the sensible accidents of bread and wine to have causal interactions with the environment in the Eucharist, but I think there are also good philosophical reasons that lead Giles to adopt this picture. "As being belongs to something, so it belongs to that thing to act."¹⁰⁵ This principle clearly also applies to accidental forms, which when they exist are active according to their essence or nature.

In fact, Giles goes one step further in his analysis of the causal powers of accidents. There seems to be no controversy over whether accidents can cause other accidents of the same kind. The heat in the fire causes heat in the heated

¹⁰² Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* 7, 35–36. See also *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 4 ad 2, fol. 9vb.

¹⁰³ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpori Christi* 43, fol. 30rb–va. Presumably matter is also required for the individuation of the accidental form. But the point here is that matter is not required in any more robust causal sense.

¹⁰⁴ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpori Christi* 43, fol. 30vab.

¹⁰⁵ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpori Christi* 43, fol. 30va: "Sicut competit alicui esse, sic competit agere."

object and so on. Yet it also looks as if accidents cannot cause anything going beyond their own kind, unless they do this in virtue of something else, i.e. a substantial form.¹⁰⁶ According to Giles, this picture is correct, but it requires more precision. A look at how animals procreate proves helpful in this respect. A lion, in Giles's example, generates another lion thanks to a power in the semen, through which the substantial form is created in the animal fetus. This example not only shows that accidents can generate substances, but also that they can do so while existing apart from the substantial form, although the power in the semen is of course due to the substantial form in the first place.¹⁰⁷

7 Knowledge of God and Separate Substances

As we have seen earlier, metaphysics for Giles of Rome in some sense also considers God. And the discussion of the real distinction, which often leads Giles to talk about separate substances, is only one indication that not only God, but also separate substances fall under the scope of this science. This raises an important question: how can we actually know anything about God and separate substances if, as Giles frequently emphasizes, our cognitive capacities are so tied to the senses in this life? Giles arrives at a mostly negative conclusion: "in this life the human intellect cannot understand separate substances and the quiddities of immaterial substances," including God.¹⁰⁸ In our present condition our intellect only understands objects of which it has a sensory representation (so-called "phantasms") or which belong to other objects of which the intellect has a sensory representation. For this reason we can, at least in principle, understand the natures of things like trees and even the intellect. Of the tree the intellect is able to have proper sensory representations; with regard to itself the intellect nevertheless has sensory representations that stand in close relation to the object, even if there is no proper sensory representation of the

106 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpori Christi* 48, fol. 36vb: "Non enim videtur praeter rationem esse si dicta accidentia immutant materiam ad generationem accidentalis formae, quia accidentia non agunt ultra suam speciem, si formam accidentalem inducunt. Sed si inducunt substantialem formam videntur transcendere modum propriae virtutis et propriae speciei. Nihil enim agit ultra speciem suam in virtute propria nisi agat in virtute alterius."

107 Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de corpori Christi* 48, fol. 37ra: "Dicunt ergo accidentia facere ad generationem substantiae in virtute substantiae non quia sint coniuncta illi substantiae, in cuius virtute haec agunt, sed quia a forma substantiali habent quod possint in generationem substantiae."

108 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 2.15, fol. 18vb.

intellect itself, since the intellect is not the object of any sense power. But to be precise, the unavailability of adequate sensory representations with respect to God and the separate substances makes it impossible for us to have quidditative knowledge of them, that is, to know, philosophically, what they are (*quid sunt*). Still, this does not rule out our ability to know *that* they exist (*quia sunt*) and what they are not (*quid non sunt*).¹⁰⁹

This immediately leads to two problems, one of a more general nature, the other related to the very possibility of metaphysics. We saw earlier that Giles endorses with Aristotle the existence of a natural desire to know. The way this desire expresses itself is, among other things, that we are always drawn towards the causes of what we experience. Our natural desire to know is in this sense a natural desire to know the causes of things, and this presumably includes a natural desire to know God and other separate substances. But if we cannot understand God and other separate substances in this life, then our natural desire to know seems to be in vain. This would be quite odd, for nature does nothing in vain. Giles responds to this objection by distinguishing between knowing something insofar as it is a cause and knowing its substance or nature. When the natural philosopher, for instance, considers the first mover, she considers it only as a cause of movement, but does not consider it “according to its substance” (*secundum substantiam suam*), i.e., according to what it is in its nature. It is this second type of knowledge that is unavailable to us *in via*, but this does not mean that we are unable to know God and other immaterial things insofar as they are the causes of material ones.¹¹⁰ One important lesson we can draw from this reply is that knowing that something is the cause of something else does not count for Giles as knowing its quiddity or nature in the proper sense. In order to have the latter we would presumably have to know the intrinsic property in virtue of which God is the cause of his effects, but this is impossible, at least philosophically.

Moreover, if quidditative knowledge of God is impossible, how can God then be called the subject-matter of metaphysics in a secondary sense insofar as God exemplifies the nature of being in a more perfect degree? Would this conception of metaphysics not require that God’s quiddity be somewhat knowable even in this life? In his response, Giles insists that metaphysics deals

109 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 2.15, fol. 19ra; see also *Theoremata de corpore Christi* 41, fol., 28vb; *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.1, fol. 21rab. Aquinas has a somewhat similar view; on this, see Jan A. Aertsen, “‘Von Gott kann man nichts erkennen, außer daß er ist’ (Satz 215 der Pariser Verurteilung). Die Debatte über die (Un-)möglichkeit einer Gotteserkenntnis *quid est*,” in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, 22–37.

110 Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 2.15, fol. 19ra.

with God and the separate substances only with regard to what we can know about them philosophically. Although we do not know anything about what they are (*quid sunt*) there are still plenty of things we can know about them from creatures. And this includes the knowledge that they exist “and many other things” (*multa alia*).¹¹¹ So rather than posing a threat to the possibility of metaphysics, Giles’s statements regarding our ability to know non-material objects are meant to clarify the scope and ambition of metaphysics.

Even a quick glance at Giles’s works makes it clear that we can know quite a lot of things about God in doing metaphysics, even if knowing these things does not amount to proper knowledge of what God is. According to Giles, we can for instance know “that God is his being (*esse*) and that the being of God is included in the quiddity of God,” which even leads Giles to argue that God’s existence is in some sense self-evident to those who do metaphysics.¹¹² Another example is Giles’s arguments for why there is only one first principle, by which he intends to show that God is the first efficient cause as well as the first formal and final cause.¹¹³ Interesting in this context is Giles’s remark that we owe it to the analogy of the notion of being that we can reduce the multiplicity of effects to a unique cause. The analogy of being is thus singled out as one of the conditions for the possibility of metaphysical knowledge of God. Giles’s younger contemporary, John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308), will later famously hold the exact opposite view. For Scotus it is on the contrary the univocity of the concept of being that renders natural cognition of God possible.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* 2.15, fol. 19ra.

¹¹² Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.2, fol. 21va. See also Mark D. Gossiaux, “Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Existence of God as Self-Evident,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 77 (2003), 57–79.

¹¹³ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 1, fols. 2vb–3rb. For a detailed commentary on this question, see Giorgio Pini, “La dottrina della creazione e la ricezione delle opere di Tommaso d’Aquino nelle *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (qq. 1–7) di Egidio Romano: parte 2,” 492–501. For Giles’s parallel treatment of the same issue in his *Sentences* commentary see *Reportatio* 2.3, 194–198, and *Ordinatio* 2.1.2.3, 2:17–22. See also Giles’s treatment of some of the traditional proofs for the existence of God in *Ordinatio* 1.3.1.3, fols. 21vb–22rb.

¹¹⁴ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* 1, fol. 2rb: “Sed quia ens dicitur analogice quasi aperta est nobis ianua, ubi ex diversitate effectuum investigemus unitatem causae primae.” Compare this with John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I.3.1.1, n. 139 (*Opera Omnia* 3; Vatican City, 1954), 87: “Deus non est cognoscibilis a nobis naturaliter nisi ens sit univocum creato et increato.”

That metaphysics allows us only a limited contact with what is best and provides us only with some indirect knowledge of God should not surprise us after all. Although Giles argues on philosophical grounds for the limitations of metaphysics, his conclusions have to be appreciated as part of his general account of the human sciences. They are also meant to demonstrate the supremacy of theology, which—grounded in revelation, a cognitive source different from our own natural capacities—provides us with a more complete way to get into contact with God in this life. Theology thus emerges as an almost natural continuation and complement to metaphysics.¹¹⁵

8 Conclusion

Are Giles of Rome's metaphysical views the result of a unified philosophical vision? The traditional way of classifying Giles as an early Thomist indicates that some commentators believed so. Recently, however, interpreters have become more and more aware of the differences between Aquinas and Giles, a fact that would have come as little surprise to Giles's contemporaries, some of whom often found themselves defending Aquinas against Giles's criticisms.¹¹⁶ Alternatively, it has been proposed that Giles has a "Boethian-Proclean metaphysics" as opposed to the Aristotelian metaphysics of Aquinas.¹¹⁷ This is equally unhelpful. It is true that in his defense of the real distinction between essence and existence Giles counts Boethius, the *Liber de causis*, and Pseudo-Denys among his favorite authorities. This, however, should not surprise us given the impressive variety of sources on which he draws throughout his writings.¹¹⁸

If I had to identify one signature doctrine in Giles's metaphysics, I would be inclined to pick his theory of modes rather than his account of the real distinction. We saw that the idea of modes (of being) appears in several places in Giles's writings. It shows up when Giles explains what sort of being a form gives to matter and what an accident (e.g., a quantity) does to a subject. It plays

¹¹⁵ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1 prol., fol. 4vb and fol. 5rb-va.

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., Franz Pelster, "Thomistische Streitschriften gegen Aegidius Romanus und ihre Verfasser: Thomas von Sutton und Robert von Orford, O.P.," *Gregorianum* 24 (1943), 135–70.

¹¹⁷ Nash, "The Accidentality of Esse," 114; see also id., "Giles of Rome on Boethius' *Diversum est esse et id quod est*," *Mediaeval Studies* 12 (1950), 57–91.

¹¹⁸ See Giorgio Pini, "Le letture dei maestri dei frati Agostiniani: Egidio Romano e Giacomo da Viterbo," in *Libri, biblioteche e letture dei frati mendicanti (secoli XIII–XIV). Atti del XXXII Convegno internazionale, Assisi, 7–9 ottobre 2004* (Spoleto, 2005), 81–113.

a key role in Giles's response to a common argument against multiple substantial forms and it reemerges in Giles's explanation for why an accidental property might seem to belong to more than one category. And no doubt there are various other uses to which Giles puts modes in his theology. Maybe it is too strong to talk about an Aegidian "theory of modes" yet. But the idea is definitely worth being pursued further.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ I wish to express my gratitude to Simona Vucu for providing me with helpful and incisive feedback to an earlier version of this text.

Cognition

Giorgio Pini

1 Introduction

Giles of Rome devoted an entire series of disputed questions to the theory of cognition, namely, his *Questions on the cognition of angels* (*Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*). Cognition is also the main focus of several of his quodlibetal questions. In this chapter, I will use these two works to reconstruct some of Giles's most characteristic views on cognition in general and on human cognition in particular.¹ In general, there seem to be two distinct trends in Giles's approach to cognition.² On the one hand, Giles made a systematic effort to explain cognition entirely in terms of efficient causation. According to Giles, cognition is just a causal event, i.e. the production of a cognitive act. That specific causal event is different from other causal events only because of

1 Here I use the two following editions: Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* (Venice 1503; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968); and Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta* (Louvain 1646; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966). Both works belong to Giles's maturity, i.e. to the period following his return to Paris and his promotion to theology master. The *De cognitione angelorum* was disputed most probably in 1287. The *Quodlibeta* were disputed between 1285 and 1295. I will not take into account Giles's commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, written before 1278, as I have decided to focus on the works belonging to Giles's mature period. For the dates of the works mentioned, see Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati, and Concetta Luna, "Egidio Romano", in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* 42 (Rome, 1993), 319–41. On Giles's *Quodlibets*, see Giorgio Pini, "Giles of Rome", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages*, (ed.) Christopher Schabel (Leiden, Cologne, 2006), 233–86.

2 There are several studies devoted to specific aspects of Giles's theory of cognition. Giles's theory of abstraction has attracted particular attention, probably because of its links with his theory of the intellect and philosophical anthropology. See Peter W. Nash, "Intention in Knowledge according to Giles of Rome," in *L'homme et son destin d'après les penseurs du Moyen-Age. Actes du premier Congrès International du Philosophie Médiévale* (Louvain/Paris, 1960), 653–61; Carey J. Leonard, "A Thirteenth-Century Notion of the Agent Intellect: Giles of Rome," *The New Scholasticism* 37 (1963), 327–58; Alessandro D. Conti, "Intelletto ed astrazione nella teoria della conoscenza di Egidio Romano," *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 95 (1989), 123–64. In this chapter, I will focus on human cognition, on which Giles of Rome said much even in his questions specifically devoted to angelic cognition. On angelic cognition in Giles of Rome, see Tiziana Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d'Aquin et Gilles de Rome* (Paris, 2002).

its relata, which are an agent and a patient of the appropriate sort, i.e. beings capable of cognizing and being cognized, respectively.³ On the other hand, Giles grounded his account of cognition in a metaphysical view whose central assumption is that reality is organized as a hierarchy comprising different degrees of actuality. According to Giles, to be actual is a property that different kinds of things possess in different degrees. That property is also closely connected and at times appears to be identical with the two properties of being formal and being immaterial, which also come in degrees. Giles was just one of many thinkers, both medieval and non-medieval, who subscribed to the claim that reality is organized as an ordered series comprising different degrees of actuality. He displayed exceptional zeal, however, in presenting a particularly detailed version of that view and in applying it to his theory of cognition.

Giles's causal account of cognition is neat and sober. By contrast, the metaphysical picture on which he grounded that account is complex and obscure.⁴ As a consequence, one may be inclined to keep the first and discard the second. Indeed, this is what some of Giles's first readers did. For example, the influence of Giles's remarks on the causal role played by the intelligible species in intellectual cognition can be found even in authors who subscribed to very different accounts of the mechanisms of cognition.⁵ By contrast, Giles's description of the intelligible species as more formal than what it represents does not seem to have left a mark on other authors. There is no evidence, however, that Giles perceived any tension between the two tendencies that characterized his account of cognition, since he seamlessly moved from the one to the other as two sides of one and the same view. In what follows, I will present the interaction of those two trends in Giles's theory of cognition, without trying either to hide or to overemphasize the difference and possibly the tension

3 In this paper, whenever I use the terms "cause", "causal" and "causally" I am referring to efficient causation.

4 The contrast between those two aspects of Giles's theory of cognition may be due to the influence of two different kinds of sources, i.e. the works of Aristotle and Aquinas on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the works of Neoplatonic authors such as Proclus. Giles himself presented a central aspect of his theory of cognition, i.e. his explanation of how a species can represent a certain object, as a combination of Aristotle's and Plato's views. See Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 79ra–b. On the variety of works Giles read and used in his maturity, see Giorgio Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, (eds.) K. Emery, Jr. et al. (Turnhout, 2012), 409–25.

5 See for example Scotus's adoption of Giles's view that the inherence of an intelligible species in the intellect is an accidental feature of intellectual cognition in Johannes Duns Scotus, *Lectura in primum librum sententiarum* 3.3.2–3 (Opera Omnia; Vatican City, 1960), 16:369.

between them. First, I will present Giles's account of sensory cognition. Second, I will turn to intellectual cognition.

2 Sensory Acts

Because Giles accounted for cognition in causal terms, he held that cognitive acts can occur only if the requirements necessary for the occurrence of any causal relation between an agent and a patient are met. The first and most fundamental requirement is that of simultaneity, as Giles frequently emphasizes in his works. According to this requirement, agent and patient must be *simul*, i.e. in some sort of contact with each other. Two things can act on each other only if either (1) there is no distance between them or (2) there is an uninterrupted chain of intermediary items connecting them and transmitting the causal action from the agent to the patient.⁶

Now in addition to this fundamental requirement, it is possible to detect at least two other requirements that must be met in order to have a causal event. First, causation can occur only between things having different degrees of actuality (or formality). Specifically, only something more actual (or more formal) can act on something less actual (or less formal), and not the other way around.⁷ Second, causation can occur only between things with adjacent degrees of actuality (or formality). There cannot be a natural change from one extreme to the other without the occurrence of all the intermediary degrees.⁸

For Giles, sensory acts such as seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching (i.e. the acts of the so-called "external sense") are instances of a quality in the world acting on the organ of a living body. When I see something, the relevant action is exercised not by my eye but by a color on my eye, so that in

6 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 3, fol. 80vb: "Nam agens et patiens debent esse simul et debent se contingere, ut vult Philosophus in XI *Metaphysicae* et in primo *De Generatione*, in capitulo de activis et passivis." See also Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 5, fol. 87vb; and 6, fol. 91rb. Most likely, Giles took this requirement directly from Aristotle's characterization of moving causes as opposed to final causes; see *Physics* 7.2, 243a3. Specifically with regard to cognition, this requirement also appears to be connected to the Aristotelian claim that cognition is the union between cognizer and thing cognized, for which see Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 6.15, 402–06.

7 See for example Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.21, 329; Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 83vb and fol. 84va.

8 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 84ra: "Non enim naturaliter itur ab extremo in extremum sine medio." See also Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 83vb; Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.13, 170.

my act of seeing I am completely passive—I am being acted upon. Sensory acts of this kind occur when the three above-mentioned conditions are satisfied by the appropriate sorts of agents and patients, i.e. agents and patients capable of sensing and being sensed, respectively.⁹ Take the example of a finger in relation to the coldness of a surface. An act of touching occurs if, first, the quality of coldness is put in physical contact with the finger, second, that quality is actual and the finger has the capacity to perceive it but is not already actually perceiving it and, third, the coldness's degree of actuality is adjacent to the finger's degree of potentiality with respect to the perception of coldness—in other words, the surface is neither too cold nor lacking in cold to be perceived by the finger as cold.

While in the case of touch, agent and patient are put in physical contact with each other and (at least apparently) there is no physical intermediary between them, acts of seeing, hearing, smelling and tasting require a medium between the perceiving organ and the perceived quality.¹⁰ According to Giles, this is due to the third requirement. An eye can see a color if some appropriate medium (e.g., air or water) is posited between the eye and the color. The medium is responsible for bringing the color to a degree of actuality adequate for the eye to be able to perceive it. When a medium is needed, the first requirement is still met. Even though the eye is not in physical contact with a color, the simultaneity condition is still satisfied because the color is in physical contact with the medium, which is in physical contact with the eye. Given all the other necessary conditions, sensory acts occur as long as there is no gap in this chain connecting agent and patient.¹¹

As I have mentioned, the three requirements I have indicated are necessary for the occurrence of any causal relation. A *cognitive* act is produced only when the relata of a causal relation are such that they can produce and be the recipient of a cognitive act. The existence of such agents and patients must be assumed as a fundamental feature of reality. With regard to sensory cognition, however, Giles gave some more details about the nature of those agents and patients. The agents in the causation of sensory acts are sensible forms or qualities, i.e. qualities that are able to change something “intentionally” (namely, to produce what is called an “intentional form” in a patient). In turn,

9 I base my reconstruction of Giles's account of external sensory acts on Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fols. 76vb–77ra; 3, fol. 81va; 4, fol. 83vb; 5, fol. 87vb; Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.13, 169–71 and Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.10, 11 and 21.

10 As a matter of fact, Giles seems to have held that even in touch something plays the role of medium, but I will not take this complication into account.

11 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 83vb.

to change something intentionally can be described as to change it “in a defective way” (*modo defectivo*). This can be understood by contrasting real and intentional changes. A real change is such that a new form is produced through some transformation occurring in the patient’s matter. For example, heat is produced in water by the real transformation of water from cold to hot. By contrast, in an intentional change a new form is produced in the patient even though no real change occurs in the patient and the new form replaces no form previously existing in the patient.¹² For example, the intentional form of red is produced in the eye even though no real form previously existing in the eye is destroyed (e.g., the eye does not change color).

Not all intentional changes result in a cognitive act, however. For an intentional form can also be produced in a non-sentient medium, such as air or water. A sensory act is produced only if an intentional form is received in the appropriate sort of patient, i.e. a patient capable of perceiving that form, such as eyes with respect to colors and ears with respect to sounds. Giles insists that the reception of an intentional form in a non-sentient medium is just the same sort of causal event as the reception of an intentional form in a sentient patient. The only difference between the two cases is the nature of the patient in which the intentional form is received. In the first case, the intentional form is received in a non-sentient patient. In the second case, the intentional form is received in a sentient patient.¹³ So it seems that the difference between non-sentient and sentient patients must be assumed as primitive. Giles, however, indicated that that difference can actually be explained as a difference in degrees of materiality—sentient patients are more immaterial than non-sentient patients. So a sensory act can be described as consisting of two causal events—the first involving the sensible object and the medium, which results in the impression of an intentional form on the medium, the second involving the medium and

12 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.10, 295. See also *Quodlibet* 5.11, 301.

13 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 77ra: “Nam quod talis impressio (*pro*: impressio) sit visio in oculo et non in aere sumenda est ratio ex parte passi. Similiter enim imprimitur species soni in aere exteriori et in aere qui est aedificatus in auribus nostris et qui est nobis connaturalis. Et tamen impressio soni in aere exteriori sic est sonatio quod non est auditio, quia non est ibi virtus auditiva percipiens impressionem illam, sed impressio soni facta in aure vel in aere nobis connaturalis est sonatio et auditio quia est ibi virtus auditiva percipiens impressionem illam. Sic etiam hoc videmus in tactu, quod homo stans longe ab igne calefit ab eo et sentit calorem eius. Ille ergo calor non pervenit ad te nisi mediante aere. Oportet igitur quod aer eodem modo immutetur sicut immutaris et tu. Et tamen aer ille non sentit immutationem illam. Immutatio ergo illa in aere sic erit impressio speciei quod non erit sensatio aliqua, sed in tactu ipsa impressio speciei informans sensum erit ipsa sensatio sensus.”

the sense organ, which results in the impression of an intentional form on the organ. Giles held that an intentional form is present in the sense in a way more immaterial than the way that an intentional form is present in the medium.¹⁴

It is not immediately clear what this talk of degrees of immateriality amounts to. Clearly, it is part and parcel of Giles's metaphysical view as expressed in the second and third requirements I have indicated above, which concern the degrees of actuality and the absence of a gap in the hierarchy of degrees of actuality. Just as the medium is less material than the sensible object, so the sense organ is less material than the medium.¹⁵ It is doubtful, however, whether this appeal to the metaphysical picture of a hierarchy of degrees of immateriality does any real explanatory work.

Surprisingly, Giles characterizes any reception of intentional forms, whether this amounts to actual perception or merely the reception of a form in a medium, as a defective change, as I have mentioned. Perception and more generally intentional changes are just weak changes—a sort of partially failed physical event taking place in less than ideal circumstances.¹⁶ Neither non-sentient patients capable of receiving intentional forms (i.e. media such as air and water) nor sentient patients (i.e. organs such as eyes and ears) are naturally suited to receive the agent's sensible form. For example, neither air nor the eye are naturally suited to receive colors as real forms—they do not themselves become colored. As Giles puts it, both media and senses are “extraneous subjects” with respect to sensible forms. By this, he means that neither media nor the senses

14 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fols. 83vb–84ra: “Propter quod sciendum est quod commune est omni sensui quod sensus sit susceptivus specierum sine materia. In ipsis ergo sensibilibus sunt formae secundum esse materiale et reale, in sensu vero secundum esse intentionale et similitudinarium. Est ergo hic modus immutationis sensus quod sensibile primo immutat medium et per medium immutat sensum. Propter quod species sensibilis habet triplex esse: in organo, in medio et in re sensibili. Sed in re sensibili habet omnino esse materiale, in medio habet esse magis specialiter (*pro*: spiritualiter?) et immaterialiter, in organo vero adhuc magis specialiter (*pro*: spiritualiter?) et immaterialiter. Causa ergo quare a re sensibili non potest immediate causari sensus vel actus sentiendi est quia a forma ut habet esse in re sensibili et omnino materiale non potest immediate causari formam tantae immaterialitatis quantam requirit sensus qui magis immaterialiter et magis est susceptivus specierum sine materia quam medium. Dato ergo quod sensibile immediate immutaret sensum per illam immutationem, sensus non sentiret, quia illa immutatio non haberet tantam immaterialitatem quantam requirit sensus. Oportet ergo quod prius fiat species in medio quae habebit esse magis materiale quam species in sensu et minus quam ipsum sensibile. Non enim naturaliter itur ab extremo in extremum sine medio.”

15 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 83vb.

16 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.21, 327: “immutare intentionaliter est immutare modo defectivo.” Also, Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.11, 299–300.

are appropriate subjects for the reception of sensible forms.¹⁷ This is the reason why Aristotle described perception as the reception of a form without the matter. According to Giles, Aristotle did not mean to suggest that in sensation a form is not received in matter, for intentional forms are indeed received in some sort of matter (e.g. eyes, ears, etc., as well as air and water). Rather, Aristotle intended to say that in perception a form is received in a matter that is not the matter naturally suited to receive it.¹⁸

So the same causal account can be given for real changes and for sensory acts, but whereas real changes are proper changes, i.e. those involving the transformation of matter and the reception of a form in a subject naturally suited to receive it, sensory acts (and more in general intentional changes) are defective changes in at least two respects. First, in intentional change, the sensible thing produces a form in the patient, i.e. in the medium or in the organ, without changing its matter. Second, in such cases the patient is not naturally suited to be changed by the agent's form.¹⁹

There is a last aspect to be mentioned about the acts of external sense (i.e., seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching). Such acts are just identical with the intentional forms received in the sense organ. In other words, as far as the external senses are concerned, there is no difference between the sensory act and the sensible species, i.e. the intentional form received in the sense organ.²⁰ In other words, it is *not* the case that I first receive the form of

17 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.21, 327–28: “Nam medium sive sensus sunt subiectum extraneum ad suscipiendum colores. Nam proprium subiectum colorum, ut *supra* tetigimus, est corpus terminatum, et huiusmodi corpus ponitur in diffinitione coloris tanquam proprium subiectum in diffinitione accidentis. Medium ergo, ut aer, et sensus, ut pupilla sive visus, sunt subiectum extraneum coloris. Ideo in eis color non generatur secundum esse proprium sive secundum esse reale, sed secundum esse extraneum intentionale. Unde et pupilla dicitur esse abscolor, et etiam medium, quia talia de se nullum habent colorem proprium. Unde et consequens est quod nec ipsa sint proprium subiectum colorum. Habent enim colorem improprium et secundum esse intentionale.”

18 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.11, 299: “Dicitur enim intentionalis forma generari sine propria materia, ut intentio coloris generatur sine propria materia et sine proprio subiecto coloris. Nam color, ut patet ex libro *De sensu et sensato*, est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato. Corpus ergo terminatum est proprium subiectum coloris. Quia ergo intentio coloris generatur in corpore dyaphano, ideo dicitur huiusmodi intentio generari sine proprio subiecto et sine propria materia coloris. Inde est quod dicit (ed.: dicat) Philosophus in secundo *De anima* quod hoc est commune omni sensui, quod sit susceptivus specierum sine materia sicut cera suscipit formam sigilli sine materia sigilli, ut sine cupro.”

19 For a full account of the differences between real and intentional changes, see Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.11, 299–300.

20 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 76vb: “[S]ciendum est quod sensus exterior—ut visus, auditus et quilibet alius sensus recipit speciem ab ipso sensibili—et

redness in my eye and then I see red. Rather, my seeing red is nothing other than receiving the form of redness in my eye. For this reason, sensory acts such as seeing and hearing last only as long as their causes (i.e. colors and sounds, respectively) are acting on them. When their causes cease to act—for example because a color fades away or a sound stops—the corresponding sensory act ceases to exist.

When the external senses are actualized by the reception of the appropriate intentional forms, they become able to act on a subject capable of receiving their action, such as the so-called “internal senses”, i.e. memory and imagination. The production of acts of memory and imagining differs from the production of sensory acts such as seeing and hearing because the acts of the internal senses are not caused directly by the object remembered or imagined. Rather, those acts are caused via a sensible species, and so may be said to be caused by the sensible species itself. Accordingly, in remembering and imagining there is a distinction between the species that causes the act of remembering and imagining, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the acts of remembering and imagining—unlike what happens in the case of the external senses, where there is no distinction between sensible species and sensory act. As a consequence, we can remember and imagine things even after they have ceased to exist, for their species remain in our internal senses, replacing the objects remembered and imagined in their causal action.²¹

3 Intellectual Acts

Giles applied the same general pattern he had used to explain sensory cognition to intellectual cognition. The intellectual act of thinking about something

ipsa species recepta in sensu a sensibili est ipsa sensatio sive est ipse actus sentiendi, ut ipsa species visibilis recepta in oculo est ipsa visio et ipsa species scilicet recepta in auditu est ipsa auditio ... Actus ergo sensus exterioris nihil est aliud quam impressio facta sensui a praesentia exterioris sensibilis.”

- 21 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 77va: “Igitur quia sensus interior potest esse in actu absente sensibili, oportet quod sit ibi aliud loco sensibilis (*ed.*: sensibili), quia nunquam sensus sit aliquid in actu nisi per aliquid impressum a sensibili. Et quia sensibile non est ibi praesens per seipsum, oportet quod sit ibi per suam speciem ... Dicemus ergo quod sicut se habet res sensibilis extra ad sensum exteriorem, sic <species> se habet ad sensum interiorem. Sicut ergo nihil est aliud actus sensus exterioris nisi species impressa vel impressio speciei facta ad praesentiam sensibilis in sensu exteriori, sic nihil est aliud actus sensus interioris nisi impressio quaedam facta ad praesentiam sensibilis in memoria existentis.”

is caused by its object, and this explains both that act's occurrence and its being about what it is, i.e. its intentionality.²² The specific way Giles applied his causal explanation to intellectual cognition is probably the most original and influential part of his theory of cognition. Its most important feature is the notion of the intelligible species, which Giles interpreted not as a feature essential to the cognitive event but merely as a causal proxy for the object of the act of intellection, which is necessary only when the object itself cannot act directly on the intellect.

3.1 *The Historical Context*

From an historical point of view, Giles's notion of the intelligible species originated from the crisis that was generated by Aquinas's account of intellectual cognition.²³ Briefly, Aquinas had held that the intelligible species is an essential feature of any act of intellection. According to Aquinas, the intelligible species is a likeness of the object of intellection that plays a twofold role. On the one hand, it links the intellect to a specific object, i.e. to the object of which the species is a likeness, so that the intellect thinks about the object whose likeness inheres in it. In other words, the intelligible species accounts for the intentionality of the act of intellection. On the other hand, the intelligible species is the form that makes the intellect think about something. If no species is present in the intellect, the intellect remains in a state of potentiality—it is able to think but does not actually think. So a species is necessary in order to make the intellect actual, i.e. to bring the intellect from a mere ability to think to an occurrent state of thinking.²⁴

Since the presence of an intelligible species in the intellect is a necessary condition for the occurrence of a thought, Aquinas held that there can be no act of intellection without the presence of an intelligible species in the intel-

22 By "intellectual act" or "act of intellection" I refer to the *actus intelligendi*, i.e. the so-called "first operation of the intellect." Those acts include the forming and grasping of a new concept and occurrent thoughts about things previously learned, as well as acts of understanding.

23 A detailed account of the debate on intellectual cognition in the years immediately following Aquinas's death is still to be written. I have presented a few elements of this story in Giorgio Pini, "Il dibattito sulle specie intelligibili nel tredicesimo secolo," *Medioevo* 29 (2004), 267–306.

24 For the intelligible species as that by which something becomes present in the intellect as an object of cognition: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1.84.2. For the intelligible species as the form actualizing the intellect see Thomas Aquinas *De veritate* 8.6 and *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.98.

lect. Some problems arise, however, when this model is applied to a very special case of intellectual cognition, namely the vision of God enjoyed by the blessed in Heaven. The problem is that no finite form can be a likeness of God's infinite nature without introducing some level of mediation incompatible with the immediacy required for the beatific vision. As a consequence, no finite form is suited to play the role of the intelligible species in the intellect of the blessed enjoying the beatific vision. At the same time, the beatific vision is an intellectual act, so there must be an intelligible species making the blessed actually see God, just as in any other intellectual act there must be an intelligible species that actualizes the intellect. Aquinas's way out of this impasse was to claim that in the special case of the beatific vision God himself plays the role both of the object of the intellectual act and of the intelligible species making the intellect actual.²⁵

Aquinas's solution, however, was heavily criticized, basically because it was difficult to see how God could act as an intelligible species in the intellect of the blessed without entering into composition with it—something that sounded dangerously close to making God into a creature or a creature into God. After Aquinas, Henry of Ghent solved this problem in a radical way. He held that the intelligible species is not a necessary feature of an act of intellection. Accordingly, he argued that no intelligible species should be posited, and not just with respect to the beatific vision but to any act of intellection whatsoever.²⁶

It is at this point that Giles entered the debate. He agreed with Henry of Ghent that an intelligible species is not, by itself, a necessary feature of any act of intellection. At least in principle, there can be acts of intellection without intelligible species. In order for an act of intellection about a certain object to occur, it is only necessary that such an object be present. But against

25 Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* 4.49.1; *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.51; *Summa theologiae* 1.12.2. See Christian Trottman, *La vision béatifique. Des disputes scolastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII* (Rome, 1995), 312–17.

26 Henry of Ghent comes to the rejection of intelligible species gradually. He started with the adoption of Aquinas's position on the beatific vision in *Quodlibet* 3.1 (Paris 1518; repr. Louvain, 1961), fol. 48r–v. He then came to reject intelligible species in any intellectual act. See *Quodlibet* 4.21, 335–49, (eds.), Gordon A. Wilson and Girard J. Etzkorn (Opera Omnia; Louvain, 2011), 7:28–53; *Quodlibet* 5.14 (Paris 1518; repr. Louvain, 1961), fols. 174r–179v. See Michael E. Rombeiro, "Intelligible Species in the Mature Thought of Henry of Ghent," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49 (2011), 181–220; Martin Pickavé, "Causality and Cognition: An Interpretation of Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* v, q. 14," in Gyula Klima (ed.), *Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 2014), 46–80.

Henry, Giles contended that many acts of intellection do nevertheless require an intelligible species. The presence of a species in the intellect, however, is not needed to actualize the intellect as such, as Aquinas had maintained. Rather, an intelligible species is required only if the object cannot be present by itself in the intellect, therefore requiring a causal proxy to produce an act of intellection with respect to it. Accordingly, Giles held that what characterizes intellectual acts (like any other cognitive acts) is their being caused by the *objects* they are about, whether this causation occurs (1) directly or (2) via an intermediary—an intelligible species. The intelligible species is therefore not, so Giles thinks, a necessary feature of any act of intellection. Rather, it is present only in one of the two possible ways that objects can cause acts of intellection.²⁷

3.2 *The Species in the Intellect*

Since acts of intellection are caused by their objects, their occurrence requires that the three conditions I have mentioned above be satisfied. The way the first condition is satisfied is particularly remarkable.²⁸ Recall that that condition requires that in any causal event the agent and the patient must be *simul*, i.e. in some sort of contact. The way that this condition is satisfied in the case of sense perception is straightforward, as we saw. The sense object and the sense organ are in local contact, whether directly or through a medium such as air or water. The intellect, however, is immaterial. As such, it is not localized and so cannot be in spatial contact with anything. So when immaterial things are involved, the simultaneity requirement must be satisfied in a different way. Specifically, Giles held that, in the case of intellectual cognition, the contact is not local but “according to the essence”. And he thought that two things are in

²⁷ Giles devoted the fourth of his *Questions on the cognition of angels* to a detailed criticism of Henry of Ghent’s rejection of intelligible species.

²⁸ At first sight, there seems to be a problem in meeting the second condition, according to which the agent must be more actual than the patient, because the intelligible species seems to be caused by sensory images, which are less actual than the species itself. Giles, however, argued that it is the intellect that causes intelligible species. Sensory images are merely tools used by the intellect in the causation of intelligible species. See Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.21, 329–30. The third condition, according to which there cannot be any gap in the degrees of actuality between agent and patient, is met because the intelligible species and the act of intellection are adjacent in their degree of actuality. See Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 83vb.

contact according to their essence when one of them is *in* the other in a non-local way, so that the essence of one thing includes the essence of the other.²⁹

Now things were created, so Giles thinks, according to different ideal models present in God's mind. Those models determine what sort of thing anything is—say, a human being rather than a dog or a dog rather than a cat.³⁰ So with respect to a given intellect—whether human or angelic—all things can be divided into two classes. The first class consists of those things created according to the same model as that given intellect. It comprises that intellect itself and what is essentially included in it. The second class consists of those things created according to different models. It includes everything that is external to that intellect, namely what is essentially different from it.³¹

Now this taxonomy would appear to generate a problem for Giles. Since (a) in the case of immaterial objects two things can be simultaneous if and only if one includes the other and (b) any two things created according to two different ideal models are essentially different and (c) if two things are essentially different neither can include the other, it would appear that the intellect can understand nothing apart from itself, because it is essentially identical only with itself.³² In addition, Giles also held that God can in some way be included

29 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 5, fol. 87vb: "Propter quod sciendum quod agens et patiens debent esse simul ... Sed oportet loqui de simultate rerum sicut loquimur de ipsis rebus. Aliter enim dicuntur corporalia esse simul et aliter spiritualia. Corporalia enim, quia sunt situalia et sunt per se in loco, se attingunt et sunt simul quando se contingunt secundum situm et quando sibi invicem appropinquantur secundum locum. Sed ipsa spiritualia, de quibus secundum Boetium in *Hebdomadibus* est per se notum apud sapientes ea per se in loco non esse, non possunt per se habere ordinem et simultatem situalem. Oportet ergo quod habeant ordinem et simultatem essentialem, ut tunc talia sunt simul quando essentialiter sunt in seipsis, ut quando essentia unius est in essentia alterius. Ideo, licet corpus non agat ubi est sed agat ubi non est, quia corpus agens non est in corpore passo sed est extra ipsum attingens ipsum situaliter, substantia tamen spiritualis ubi operatur ibi est." See also Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 3, fol. 81va; 6, fol. 91rb.

30 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 79rb. Giles refers to Augustine's *De ideis*.

31 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 79ra: "Cum enim loquimur de his quae sunt alia ab intelligentia, loquimur de illis aliis quae nec sunt essentia intelligentiae vel (*ed.*: naturae) in essentia eius." In that passage, Giles is talking about angels, but the point holds for human intellects as well.

32 In the case of the human intellect, Giles even doubts that the intellect can cognize itself directly, as it lacks complete intelligibility because it is very low on the ladder of immaterial beings. See Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 77rb and fol. 77vb; *Quodlibet* 2.23, 108–10.

in the intellect of the blessed.³³ So it seems that the satisfaction of the simultaneity condition leaves only two possible objects of intellectual cognition for created intellects, i.e. themselves (with some doubt in the case of humans) and, in the beatific vision, God.

It was to address this problem that Giles invoked the need for intelligible species. It is true that things that are created according to different ideal models are external to the intellect and so cannot be present in the intellect by themselves and make the intellect think about them. This is particularly evident in the case of material things, which clearly cannot, as such, be present in the intellect—a lion is not by itself in the intellect, even when the intellect thinks about such an object.³⁴ Things external to the intellect can, however, be present in the intellect by proxy, that is to say, by an item caused by them, which in turn acts in their place in the causation of the intellectual act. That item is the intelligible species. Thanks to the presence of the intelligible species, the intellect is not locked in itself, as it were. Rather, external things can

33 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 78rb: "Ex hoc autem patere potest quomodo Deus intelligitur a beatis per essentiam suam. Non enim hoc est quod ipsa essentia sit forma inhaerens alicui intellectui creato. Sed quia ipsa per essentiam suam sive per seipsam est praesens intellectui beatorum, non requiritur ibi species alia quae suppleat vicem essentiae eius." Giles held that God can be present in the intellect of the blessed because he is a perfectly actual and intelligible object, with no "left over" of unintelligibility. See Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.14, 172–75.

34 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 78ra. On the face of it, the idea that a cognized object cannot be in the cognizer seems to clash with Aristotle's idea that a cognized object *is* actually in the cognizer, even though without its matter. Aristotle's claim, however, can be interpreted in two different ways. First, the form of the thing I am thinking about (say, a lion) and the form present in my intellect when I think about that thing may be taken to be numerically one and the same item. Second, the form of the thing I am thinking about (say, a lion) and the form in my intellect may be taken to be two numerically distinct items. Christopher Shields, who has neatly distinguished these two interpretations, calls the first "the stronger hypothesis" and the second "the weaker hypothesis". See Christopher Shields, "Intentionality and Isomorphism in Aristotle," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 11 (1995), 307–30, esp. 324–27. Thirteenth-medieval thinkers, including Giles, adopted the second, weaker interpretation. So they thought that when I am thinking about a lion, not the lion but a likeness of the lion (to be distinguished from the form of the lion) is in my intellect. It is that likeness that came to be called "intelligible species". In that respect, medieval thinkers were following Avicenna's reading of Aristotle. See Deborah L. Black, "Conjunction and the Identity of Knower and Known in Averroes," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 73 (1999), 159–84, esp. 162–63.

enter it by proxy even though not by themselves, and so the intellect can understand things different from itself and from God.³⁵

Accordingly, there are two classes of intelligible objects. First, there are those that can be present by themselves in the intellect, i.e. be essentially identical with it. As such, they can cause an intellectual act on their own. Only God and the self (at least in the case of angels) fall into this category. Second, there are those objects that cannot be present by themselves in the intellect. Because causation requires simultaneity, such objects cannot cause an intellectual act by themselves. But they can cause an intellectual act by proxy. Specifically, such objects cause a device that can be present in the intellect, which acts in their place and causes an intellectual act about those objects. That device is the intelligible species. With respect to the first class of objects, the intellect is similar to the external senses (e.g. seeing and hearing), which do not need any species and are activated by the mere presence of their objects. With respect to the second class of objects, the intellect is similar to the internal senses (i.e. memory and imagination), which need a species acting as a proxy for their objects, since their objects cannot act directly on them.³⁶

35 The view that the intelligible species acts as a proxy of the object (*ut suppleat vicem obiecti*) is present throughout Giles's works devoted to intellectual cognition. See for example Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 78ra: "Tota ergo causa quare res istae sensibiles intelliguntur a nobis per suas species est quia ipsae per seipsas non possunt esse in anima nostra nec possunt esse praesentes intellectui nostro." See also Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 84vb: "Propter quod sciendum quod ... per se requiritur species ut suppleat vicem obiecti. Quod enim ipsum obiectum faceret si esset praesens intellectui, hoc facit ipsa species ut est repraesentativa obiecti." Also, Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.21, 104–05: "Nam species requiritur quia res ipsae non possunt esse in anima, et ideo oportet quod sint in ea species repraesentativae rerum, ut quia lapis non est in anima oportet quod sit ibi species lapidis, ut innuit Philosophus in 3 *De anima*." Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.14, 172: "Respondeo dicendum quod, si bene consideremus dicta sanctorum et philosophorum, quod requiratur quidem species media ad supplendum vicem obiecti. Si vero obiectum posset esse praesens ipsi intellectui et esset intelligibile in actu per se et causaret intellectionem in intellectu, non requireretur ibi species media. Ubi enim ponimus praesentiam rei intelligibilis non ponimus ibi aliquam speciem mediam."

36 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 77va–vb: "Nam intellectus aliqua obiecta habet quasi praesentia, ut seipsum et ea quae sunt in ipso; aliqua vero quasi absentia, ut ea quae sunt extra ipsum. In cognitione ergo obiectorum praesentium se habet quasi sensus exterior, qui cognoscit praesente sensibili. In tali ergo actu intellectus non indiget alia specie sed sufficit ipsa praesentia ipsius intelligibilis ad hoc quod causetur actum intelligendi in ipso intellectu ... sed actus intelligendi eius quo intelligit quae sunt extra ipsam [scil. essentiam intellectus] assimilatur actui sensus interioris. Sicut enim sensus

Three aspects are worth stressing in Giles's views on the intelligible species as a proxy for the external object. First, the intelligible species is not an essential feature of every intellectual act. Rather, it is required only as a causal proxy for *some* objects, i.e. those objects that cannot be present by themselves in the intellect. That is, whether an intellectual act is caused via a species or not depends on the nature of the object of intellection, not on the nature of the act as intellectual or more in general as cognitive. Accordingly, the intelligible species is not as such necessary to make the intellect actual, for if the object were able to be present in the intellect, it alone would suffice to actualize it. As Giles never tired of repeating, it is merely accidental to the occurrence of an intellectual act that a species be present in the intellect. What is essential is that the object causes the act. Indeed, the intelligible species is a form inhering in the intellect (an aspect to which I will turn shortly). Because it is a form inhering in the intellect, the species does make the intellect actual. But that the species inheres in the intellect and that it makes the intellect actual is due only to the intelligible species' inability to exist by itself, not to anything required by the nature of intellectual acts.³⁷

interior quando sentit absentibus sensibilibus oportet quod habeat species illorum sensibilibus in memoria quae suppleant vices praesentiae sensibilibus, sic et ipse intellectus angelicus, quando intelligit alia a se quae nec sunt id quod ipse nec sunt in ipso, oportet quod habeat illorum species suppletes vicem praesentiae ipsorum." The point that Giles makes here about the angelic intellect can be extended to the human intellect, with the proviso that it is doubtful whether the human intellect can know even itself without a species, because of its low actuality and intelligibility, as mentioned above.

- 37 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 78rb: "Non enim oportet in intellectu ponere praesentiam speciei intelligibilis nisi ut suppleat vicem praesentiae obiecti. Quod ergo illa species informet ipsum intellectum vel non informet, hoc accidit. Per se enim est quod ab ipso obiecto intelligibili causetur actus intelligendi in ipso intellectu. Si (*ed.: sed*) obiectum illud non potest esse praesens per seipsum, oportet quod sit ibi per suam speciem. Hoc est ergo quod Philosophus ait, quod oportet vel ipsa, id est ipsas res, vel earum species esse in anima, ut *supra* tetigimus. Quod ergo species illa informet intellectum, hoc est quia non potest habere esse per seipsam. Ideo oportet <quod> inhaereat alteri. Tamen quantum ad actum intelligendi non plus facit praesentia speciei nisi quod supplet vicem obiecti." See also Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 82rb: "Non enim possumus dicere quod requiratur species in intellectu propter ipsum intellectum. Nam intellectus ipse est quid abstractum et quid separatum, ergo est de se quid intelligibile ... Verum est enim quod sicut intellectus angelicus quantum est de se non indiget aliquo alio ut sit quid intelligibile, ita quantum est de se non indiget aliqua specie informante ut intelligat, sed tota causa accipienda est ex parte obiecti intelligibilis, ut quia obiectum intelligibile non potest per se esse praesens intellectui angelico, ideo oportet quod sit ibi per suam speciem." See as well Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 1, fol. 78va; 2, fol. 78vb; 4, fols. 82–83va and fol. 93vb; *Quodlibet* 3.14, 172–75.

So Giles's idea is that, when the object cannot be present in the intellect, a species is required as its proxy. However, the species cannot exist by itself; rather, when it does exist in the intellect, it does so only by inhering in it. That intellectual cognition is in many cases a sort of information, i.e. involves the inherence of a form in the intellect, is accidental. This is demonstrated by the fact that there are instances of intellectual cognition where no species inheres in the intellect (e.g., the beatific vision and, at least in the case of angels, self-knowledge).

The foregoing account stands in striking contrast with what Aquinas had held. According to Aquinas, the intelligible species is an essential feature of the mechanisms of intellectual cognition, and one of the essential functions of the species is to be the form that makes the intellect actual. Consequently, it would have made little sense for Aquinas to ask what it would be like to understand something without an intelligible species. By contrast, Giles argues that it would actually be better for the intellect to understand something without a species. If in most cases this is not possible, that is not because of any limitation on the part of the intellect, but rather because of a limitation on the part of the object, which cannot be present by itself in the intellect due to its inability to become essentially the same with the intellect.³⁸

The second point worth stressing is that the role of the species is merely causal. In particular, the species does not replace the object as what is being thought about. Rather, the intelligible species replaces the object as what causes the act of intellection about that object. Giles was not a representationalist.

The third point worth stressing is that Giles explained the need for an intelligible species on the grounds of the simultaneity requirement. Causation can occur between immaterial things only if agent and patient are included one in the other in a non-material way. Since the object of intellection cannot be present by itself in the intellect, it must be replaced by a device that can be there and act in its place—the intelligible species. Accordingly, the presence of intelligible species in most intellectual acts is neither a brute fact nor a consequence of the view that cognition is a sort of information, i.e. the reception of a form—a view to which Giles did not subscribe. Cognition is not the intellect's

38 It may be worth stressing that the conception of the intelligible species as a device that can be disposed of in certain intellectual acts is behind Scotus's notion of intellectual intuitive cognition. Unlike Giles, however, Scotus held that the intelligible species is needed because of a limitation on the part of the intellect in the present state, and not because of a limitation in the objects of intellection. For a brief and clear treatment of intuitive cognition in Scotus, see Robert Pasnau, "Cognition", in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, (ed.) Thomas Williams (Cambridge, 2003), 285–311.

being informed by the object but the object's efficiently causing in the intellect an intellectual act, either directly or via a species.

3.3 *The Intelligible Species and the Object*

So far, I have considered why an intelligible species is needed in the intellect any time the intellect cognizes objects external to itself. Since those objects cannot be present by themselves in the intellect, they cannot cause an intellectual act on their own. Consequently, a species is needed as a proxy for those objects. It now remains to consider how the species can act as a proxy for the object.

Before turning to this issue, however, it is necessary to clear up a possible misunderstanding. That is, students familiar with Giles's theory of cognition will notice that at times Giles claims that the intelligible species acts as a proxy for an object because it represents that object.³⁹ It is clear, however, that the relationship of representation is not a special kind of relation holding between an intellectual act and its object. Once again, that relation can be explained in causal terms. All that Giles meant when he said that the species represents the object is that, when the object cannot be present in the intellect, the species acts as its proxy and causes what that object would cause if it were present in the intellect, just as a good representative is supposed to vote as his or her constituents would vote if they were able to be present in the legislature. Because what is being caused is an act of the intellect by which the object is understood, a representation also makes what it represents known. Strictly speaking, Giles even held that it is still the object that acts via the species. So even though we can say that an act of intellection is caused by an intelligible species in some sense, it would be more appropriate to say that that act is caused by the object it is about via the species. The species is a tool of the object which merely inherits the object's causal power to cause the act of intellection. By itself, a species causes, so Giles thinks, nothing at all.⁴⁰

39 See for example Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 79rb; 4, fol. 85va; 5, fol. 88rb; *Quodlibet* 2.21, pp. 104–05.

40 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 5, fol. 88rb: "Nunc autem inter causas agendi videmus hanc distinctionem, quod aliquid principaliter agit et aliquid agit in virtute alterius. Et hanc distinctionem quam videmus <est> inter ipsas rationes actionum. Nam aliquid est ratio agendi secundum se, aliquid vero est ratio agendi in virtute alterius. Dupliciter ergo in talibus potest esse defectus, primo si non agat sed sit solum ratio agendi, secundo si non sit ratio agendi secundum se sed sit ratio agendi in virtute alterius. Utrumque autem defectum habet species intelligibilis. Primo quia non agit sed est solum ratio agendi ... Secundo deficit huiusmodi species intelligibilis, quia non solum non est agens

Giles's account of how the species can act in the object's place is grounded in the principle, which is part and parcel of his metaphysical views, that nothing belonging to a certain specific kind can represent a thing belonging to another specific kind. Reformulated in causal terms, this principle states that nothing belonging to a certain specific kind can cause what a thing belonging to another specific kind would cause. Giles derived this principle from the view that things are created according to different ideal models, i.e. the so-called divine ideas. Now Giles assumed as a brute fact that a thing created according to a certain ideal model cannot represent a thing created according to another ideal model. To think the contrary is irrational (*absurdum*). By extension, nothing caused by a thing of a certain kind can represent something belonging to a different kind. Accordingly, representation is a relation that holds only within a given kind, i.e. within things created according to the same ideal model.

Now Giles held that both an intelligible species and the object it represents are created according to the same ideal model. So a thing and its intelligible species (which Giles called its "formal account" or "formal expression") differ from each other not because they belong to different kinds but because they are received in different subjects, i.e. because they are different instantiations of the same ideal model. Here we should distinguish two cases. In angelic cognition, both the object known and the species by which the angel knows that object are created by God. Because both the species and the object are derived from the same ideal model, they belong to the same kind and accordingly the species can represent the object.⁴¹ In human cognition, the intelligible species

sed est ratio agendi, sed non est ratio agendi secundum se sed magis est ratio agendi ut est repraesentativa obiecti. Propter quod, si ipsum obiectum secundum se posset esse in ipso intellectu, perfectius causaret actum intelligendi in ipso. Nunc autem, cum est (*ed.: nunc*) existens ibi per speciem, species ipsa in virtute obiecti et ut est repraesentativa eius est ratio quare hoc fiat et quare causetur actus intelligendi in huiusmodi intellectu."

- 41 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 79rb: "Nam aliqua procedunt secundum aliam et aliam rationem formalem, aliqua vero secundum eandem formalem rationem. Res enim ipsae a Deo procedentes diversificatae sunt quia sunt conditae secundum aliam et aliam rationem ... Bene ergo dictum est quod res ipsae aliae et aliae factae sunt quia alia et alia ratione conditae. Sed res <et> intentiones vel res <et> formales expressiones rerum adinvicem differunt non quia alia et alia ratione sint conditae, sed magis quia in alio et alio sint receptae. Ab illis enim eisdem ideis a quibus causatae sunt res in propria natura et secundum esse reale causatae sunt in mente angeli secundum expressionem formalem. Unde eadem res prius in verbo postea in mente angelica et in propria natura fuerunt ... Ex quibus omnibus manifeste apparet quod nulla res causata ab aliqua alia re potest sufficienter repraesentari ut possit per eam sufficienter cognosci ... Res igitur non per aliam rem sed per suam expressionem formalem repraesentari potest ... Sed

that causes the intellectual act is not received directly from God. Rather, it is caused by the object that that species represents.⁴² Even though that species reaches the human intellect in a roundabout way—i.e. not directly from God but through the object created according to a certain ideal mode—it is still an instantiation of the very pattern on which the thing it represents is modelled. That species can therefore represent that object, since it belongs to the identical kind and therefore maintains the essential characteristics associated with it. This is the reason why Giles also called intelligible species “formal expressions” of the objects they represent. In the angelic case, they are expressed or produced by the same model as what they represent. In the human case, they are expressed or produced by the things they represent. In both cases, they capture the essential aspects of what they represent in a formal way, i.e. a way suited to be present in an intellect.

Again, it should be noticed that Giles explained representation in a causal way. In the case of God, the divine essence causes everything, so it represents everything. In the human case, the intelligible species is caused by a certain object, so that it represents that object. In the angelic case, the intelligible species is caused by the same ideal model according to which a certain thing is caused, so it represents that thing.⁴³ In turn, the species’ power to represent a certain object is nothing else than its power to act as a proxy for that object in causing an intellectual act about that object. Again, representation is nothing more than the capacity of replacing the object with respect to its causal powers.

There is, however, a major problem with Giles’s explanation of why the intelligible species has the power to represent a certain object. As I have said, a central feature of Giles’s explanation is that no created thing belonging to a certain specific kind can represent anything belonging to a different specific kind. But regardless of whether the intelligible species is caused by the object

intelligibilis species vel expressio formalis rei ab eadem idea vel ab eadem ratione formali processit cum ipsa re cuius est expressio, ideo poterit eam sufficienter repraesentare.”

42 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 85va.

43 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 85va: “Dicemus ergo quod aliqui duo possunt se sic habere quod unum potest esse ratio intelligendi aliud vel quia unum est productivum alterius vel quia ambo sunt producta a tertio. Essentia enim divina est ratio intelligendi res quia est causativa rerum. Species intelligibilis in mente nostra est repraesentativa rerum non quia sit rerum causa sed quia est a rebus causata. Species in mente angeli est repraesentativa rerum non quia unum sit causatum ab altero sed quia ambo sunt causata a tertio, ut quia ab eadem idea processit res secundum propriam formam in propria natura et secundum speciem intelligibilem in mente angeli ideo potest unum repraesentare alterum.”

it represents, or by the same ideal model by which the object it represents is caused, the intelligible species is an accident in the human or angelic intellect. By contrast, the thing the species represents is quite often a substance. Since substances and accidents belong to different ontological kinds, Giles's requirement concerning representation seems to be patently violated.

Giles tried to solve this problem in a twofold way. His first solution is based on the distinction between the two ways an intelligible species can be considered: either as something real or as something intentional. Considered in the first way, a species is an accident in the intellect. Considered in the second way, a species is a representation of something else, e.g. of a substance. Now Giles contended that only when things are considered as real items do substances have more in common with other substances than with accidents. By contrast, when we consider representations, a substance and its accident may be said to have more in common than one substance with another. Specifically, an object in the world and the intelligible species representing it can be considered as entities of the same kind, even though the object is a substance and the species an accident.⁴⁴

What should one say about this solution? The distinction between considering something as a being (*in genere entis*) or as a representation (*in genere repraesentationis*) is cherished by Giles, who referred to it on several other occasions.⁴⁵ But it must be admitted that this explanation poses more problems than it solves. For what does it mean to consider something as a representation as opposed to a real thing? Why can accidents, considered as representations, be of the same kind as substances? And how can representations and objects be of the same kind if only things considered as real, and not as representations, belong to kinds?

According to Giles's second solution, an intelligible species is neither a substance nor an accident, for it belongs to no kind whatsoever, strictly speaking. By extension, however, a species can be said to belong to the kind to which the object it represents belongs, by reduction.⁴⁶ In this way, the requirement

44 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 80rb: "Dicendum quod plus convenit substantia cum substantia quam accidens in genere naturae. Sed non oportet quod plus conveniat in genere repraesentationis. Ipsae enim species in mente angelica magis sunt repraesentativae substantiarum quarum sunt species quam ipsa substantia angeli."

45 See for example Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 85ra. At fol. 85va–b Giles regards the same distinction as holding between what is *in genere entium* and what is *in genere intelligibilium*.

46 Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 2, fol. 80rb: "Vel possumus dicere quod huiusmodi species proprie nec sunt substantia nec accidens, quia non sunt in genere per se, sed per reductionem. Possunt autem reduci ad illud idem genus in quo sunt res quarum sunt species."

that something can represent something else only if it belongs to its kind is satisfied. However, this solution is achieved at the cost of introducing a class of entities burdened with a mysterious ontological status, or at least one that escapes classification in the Aristotelian categories. Also, it is not clear what it means for the species to belong to the same kind as what it represents “by reduction”. One may suspect that this is just another way to say that the intelligible species represents a certain object. So Giles’s attempt to explain a species’s representative powers by referring to some general principle about representation and causation, even though initially promising, turns out to be extremely problematic.

Giles’s remarks on the way intelligible species should be classified highlight the ambiguity of the ontological status of the intelligible species. At times, the species is considered as neither a substance nor an accident, even though it can be reduced in some way to the same category as the thing that produced it. Other times, the intelligible species is described as an item of a certain kind endowed with real being. Specifically, an intelligible species is an accident in the intellect. But when considered not as a real item but as a representation, a species can represent something belonging to a different kind. It is not clear whether Giles ever became fully aware of this ambiguity at the center of his treatment of the intelligible species or whether he thought that he had handled it successfully. The latter is doubtful.

4 Conclusion

So this is the general picture emerging from Giles’s works that treat human intellectual cognition. Since most things are not known to the intellect by themselves (because they cannot be essentially the same as the intellect), they are known by way of something produced by them. This, as we have seen, is their intelligible species, which acts as their causal proxy, i.e. can replace those things in their action of producing an act of intellection in the intellect.

Two more aspects should be mentioned about Giles’s account of intellectual cognition. First, Giles mentioned that the will plays a role in the production of the act of intellection. So in the case of intellectual cognition, the three conditions that I have mentioned above are only necessary but not sufficient to produce an intellectual act. A volitional act of turning one’s attention to a certain object is also required.⁴⁷ Accordingly, Giles listed four items that

47 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 176–80. On Giles’s theory of the will and its ability to control the intellect, see Peter S. Eardley’s “Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Will,”

concur in the production of an act of intellection: the soul's substance (i.e. a substance that is capable of intellectual cognition), the intellective power, the intelligible species, and the will turning to the species. To these four items, two others can be added, viz. the light of the agent intellect and the sensory image (*phantasma*), although Giles seemed to consider the first four more important, and was not particularly interested in mentioning the last two and so making the list longer.⁴⁸

Second, Giles also mentioned that the intellect produces not just an intellectual act of understanding but also an inner word (*verbum*). According to Giles, an inner word is like a mirror in which the object can be understood. He also held that the inner word plays a role similar to that of the species as an item in between the object and the intellect. But it is difficult to justify this last remark, since the inner word, unlike the species, does not seem to play any role similar to that of a causal proxy, for the inner word, unlike the species, produces nothing at all. So if the inner word is indeed a proxy for the object, it is not a causal proxy, but actually replaces the object as what is being thought about.⁴⁹ The notion of an inner word, however, seems to be substantially inert in Giles's account of cognition. Most probably, he took it over from Augustine and Aquinas, but was unclear about what role to assign it in his theory.

Many elements of Giles's theory of cognition are taken over from Aquinas. Others come from Giles's Neoplatonic readings. The result, however, is remarkably original. According to Giles, cognition is not a special relation holding between a cognizer and a thing cognized. Rather, it is explained entirely in causal terms, that is, as a chain of causal events starting from an object's production of intentional forms and ending with the production of an act of intellection. As far as sensation is concerned, sensory acts can be described as defective

The Review of Metaphysics 56 (2003), 835–62, as well as “The Foundations of Freedom in Later Medieval Philosophy: Giles of Rome and his Contemporaries,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 44 (2006), 353–76 and the chapter “Ethics and Moral Psychology” in the current volume. See also Tobias Hoffmann “Intellectualism and Voluntarism,” in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, (ed.) Robert Pasnau. 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2010), 1: 420–21.

48 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.23, 109: “Sciendum est ergo quod ad actum intelligendi quatuor concurrunt, videlicet substantia ipsius animae, potentia intellectiva quae radicatur in substantia, species intelligibilis quae perficit potentiam, et voluntas convertens se supra speciem. Possemus assignare et quartum (*ed.*: quintam), lumen intellectus agentis, et etiam sextum, ut ipsum phantasma, quia sine phantasmate non possumus intelligere. Sed tamen non sit nobis curae talia multiplicare.” For a mention of the will, see also Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum* 4, fol. 85va.

49 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2.23, 108–10.

natural changes in which the conditions for such changes are only imperfectly met. As far as intellectual cognition is concerned, the most noteworthy aspect in Giles's account is the utilization of the intelligible species as a causal proxy for the object, which replaces the object in causing an intellectual act when the object itself cannot be present in the intellect because it belongs to a specific kind different from that to which the intellect belongs.

Even though Giles made every effort to give a systematic account of all aspects of cognition, several problems remain unresolved. Specifically, the ontological status of the intelligible species is unclear. Accordingly, the success of Giles's explanation of a species' representative powers is at the very least dubious. It is beyond doubt, however, that some aspects of Giles's theory of cognition are worthy of serious consideration, both because of their historical influence and because of their philosophical interest. Specifically, his views on the species as a proxy for the object and his theory of representation, even though problematic, reveal the unmistakable mark of a brilliant mind. And in any case, it is an open question as to whether alternative later medieval theories of cognition fare much better in their treatment of analogous problems.

Ethics and Moral Psychology

Peter S. Eardley

1 Introduction

It is virtually impossible to understand Giles of Rome's approach to ethics and moral psychology in abstraction from its context.¹ There are two reasons for this. First, Giles's academic career traversed a particularly disputatious period in the history of medieval thought. That he was associated with the University of Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, first as a bachelor and then as a master, meant that he not only witnessed, but was also personally embroiled in some of the bitter philosophical and theological disputes that occurred there.² For not only was his intellectual formation carried out in the context of the condemnations of 1270 and 1277, but he was also personally the subject of an ecclesiastical investigation that would see his promising academic career interrupted for almost a decade. Unsurprisingly, much of his thought is a direct response to these events. This is especially true with respect to his views on such topics as the freedom of the will and the foundations of wrongdoing, which were to have a lasting impact on the development of ethics and moral psychology.³

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- 1 Several granting agencies, libraries and individuals were instrumental to the completion of this chapter, which was funded, in the first instance, by a Standard Research Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. This allowed me to spend a month as a visiting fellow at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, where I was able to begin my research. It also provided me with proximity to the library of the Augustijns Historisch Instituut. Finally, I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung/Foundation for a fellowship to the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, where I was able to complete the chapter.
 - 2 On Giles's life, see Briggs's chapter in this volume. See also, Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati, and Concetta Luna, "Egidio Romano", in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 42 (Rome, 1993), 319–41. On Giles's academic career in particular, see Giorgio Pini's "Giles of Rome", in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, (ed.) Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2006), 233–53.
 - 3 The best, and most recent general studies on the topic are Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C., 1995) and François-Xavier Putallaz, *Insolente liberté: controverses et condamnations aux XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1995). Amongst the older sources, the important ones remain Odo Lottin's *Psychologie et morale aux XI^e et XIII^e siècles*. 6 vols. (Louvain, 1942–1960) and, for the Franciscan

Second, once he was promoted to regent master of theology at Paris, Giles held a number of public disputations at which he was obliged to defend his views against any member of the university community who cared to show up to challenge them. Those against whom he was forced to clarify his views were most often, as we might expect, academic colleagues and adversaries.⁴ Because much of the textual evidence for Giles's views on ethics and moral psychology is derived from these oral disputations—published as *Quodlibetal Questions*—it is of vital importance to know which of his contemporaries he was arguing against, and why they were in disagreement.

In this chapter, then, it will be necessary to touch, not only on Giles's ideas themselves, but also on some of the institutional challenges that comprised the backdrop to this thinking. It will also be necessary to achieve some sense of how certain of his contemporaries—especially Thomas Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent—by forcing Giles constantly to reexamine his own ideas, shaped them in the process.

2 The Freedom of the Will

Giles's views on the freedom and nature of the will should be regarded as the entry point into his other views on ethics and moral psychology. This is because, to a medieval scholastic such as Giles of Rome, one's view of *voluntas*—and whether it or the intellect held primacy within the soul—usually had direct implications for one's views on such matters as the nature of happiness and the foundations of wrongdoing. We begin, then, with an analysis of Giles's understanding of the will and argue for a developmental approach to his thinking. The textual evidence shows that Giles's view on how to ground human freedom changed several times over the course of his career, and that

tradition, Ernst Stadter, *Psychologie und Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit* (Munich, 1971). For a shorter overview, see Tobias Hoffmann, "Intellectualism and Voluntarism," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, (ed.) Robert Pasnau. 2 vols. (Cambridge, 2010), 1:414–27.

4 The most recent works examining the tradition of Quodlibetal literature are Chris Schabel, (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century* (Leiden, 2006) and Id., *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century* (Leiden, 2009). For a brief summary of these *quaestiones quodlibetales*, see Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, "Medieval Philosophical Literature," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, (eds.) Norman Kretzmann, et al. (Cambridge, 1982), 21–22 as well as John Wippel's "Quodlibetal Questions, Chiefly in Theology Faculties," in *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, (eds.) Bernardo C. Bazán, et al. (Turnhout, 1985), 151–222.

Aquinas's thought had a particularly significant impact on Giles's own. That he kept returning to this question suggests that it was a topic that troubled him throughout his long career.

The essential problem faced by Giles and his contemporaries was whether it was possible to reconcile two competing and apparently exclusive desiderata: the intelligibility of choice, or the ability to give reasons for one's actions, and the freedom or autonomy of the will from these or any other antecedent causes. This dilemma was most commonly analysed in terms of the relationship between what they regarded as the two highest faculties of the soul: intellect (*intellectus*) or reason (*ratio*), and will (*voluntas*). This relationship, in turn, was analysed in terms of the Aristotelian categories of motion and causation. Now for much of the Middle Ages the problem of human freedom had been discussed under the rubric of "free decision" (*liberum arbitrium*), which Peter Lombard, in his *Sentences*, famously defined as "a faculty of reason and will (*facultas rationis et voluntatis*)."⁵ Although the history of the concept of *liberum arbitrium* is a complex one, by the time that Giles of Rome was becoming active in such debates an important transition in the discourse over human freedom seems to have taken place. That is, up until around 1270, intellect and will were seen, generally speaking, not as opposed to one another, but as working together in the generation of free human acts.⁶ After 1270, however, it became as common, if not more so, to discuss the matter in terms of the "freedom of the will" (*libertas voluntatis*) or "free will" (*libera voluntas*), than in terms of *liberum arbitrium*.⁷ Even when authors continued to use the older expression, they usually understood it to be synonymous with *free will*.⁸ In short, prior to around 1270, human freedom was commonly understood as the outcome of cooperation between intellect and will. Indeed, such cooperation is reflected in the older expression *free decision*.

In the later language of *free will*, by contrast, the two higher faculties gradually come to be seen by several prominent scholastics—such as Henry of Ghent, who was a moving force behind the articles on the will condemned in 1277—as pitted against one another. The intellect is now seen as one of the

5 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 2. vols. (Grottaferrata, 1971), 2:24, 452–53: "Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligatur gratia assistente, vel malum eadem desistente. Et dicitur 'liberum' quantum ad voluntatem, quae ad utrumlibet flecti potest; 'arbitrium' vero quantum ad rationem, cuius est facultas vel potentia illa, cuius etiam est discernere inter bonum et malum."

6 Daniel Westberg, *Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action and Prudence in Aquinas* (Oxford, 1994), 106–10.

7 Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 98.

8 Westberg, *Right Practical Reason*, 81.

influences from which the *will* must *free* itself. With the rise and spread of Arabic cognitive determinism in the Latin west, in short, the intellect came to be seen as less and less a partner in human freedom, which was increasingly seen as grounded in the will, and more and more as a threat to it.⁹ Such was the basic context that framed Giles's own attempt to find a solution to the problem of free will. He would return to this question repeatedly over the course of his career; each time his approach to the problem would bear something of the influence of Thomas Aquinas.

Giles's earliest foray into the question of whether the will is free—carried out when he was just a young bachelor—is, on the face of it, a mere reprise of Aquinas's mature statement on the subject in his *De malo*, Question 6.¹⁰ It can be found in Giles's early *Reportatio* of his Lectures on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, which has been dated to somewhere between 1269 and 1272.¹¹ As we shall see in a moment, however, Giles also departs in important ways from Aquinas, showing an independence of mind even at a young age. Consistent with the dominant concern of the time, the relevant question in the *Reportatio* is whether anything can necessitate the will.¹² This leads to an analysis of causality and motion, particularly with respect to the ways in which intellect and will cooperate in the generation of human action.

In all things that are capable of undergoing motion there is a form, which acts as the principle of change, and an appetite or tendency following that form. This is as true of inanimate objects such as fire—which possesses the nature of hotness, as well as the tendency to rise and to heat—as it is of human

9 On the cognitive determinism of Latin Averroists such as Siger of Brabant, see Putallaz, *Insolente liberté*, 1–49.

10 Although the question of whether there occurred a shift in Aquinas's understanding of the will is beyond the scope of the present chapter, we should point out that there is a debate in the literature about this. In Aquinas's early works, such as the commentary on the *Sentences* and the disputed question *De veritate*, Odon Lottin thought he observed an emphasis on the passivity of the will, while in the more mature *Prima secundae* and *De malo*, he saw Aquinas as adopting a more active approach to the will. See, for example, his "La preuve de la liberté humaine chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 23 (1956), 323–30. Others have argued, against Lottin, that Thomas consistently held the same view throughout his career and that the more mature presentation of the relationship between intellect and will should merely be regarded as a clarification of the earlier one. See, for example, Daniel Westberg, "Did Aquinas change his mind about the Will?" *The Thomist* 58 (1994), 41–60.

11 Concetta Luna, "Introduzione" to *Reportatio Lecture super libros I–IV Sententiarum. Reportatio Monacensis. Excerpta Godfridi de Fontibus*, (ed.) Concetta Luna. Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia 3.2 (Florence, 2003), 16–24.

12 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 335: "Utrum voluntas possit necessitari ab aliquo."

beings and lower animals. Unlike natural things, whose form is made individual by matter, however, humans are different. Fire never sometimes cools and sometimes heats, nor does it ever sometimes rise and sometimes fall. Rather, it only ever rises and heats. It can, in short, only act in a single, determinate way due to the singularity of its form.¹³ The human being, by contrast, is a different sort of composite. Its characteristic form is the rational soul, and its appetite follows the forms that are apprehended by the intellect. Note, however, that unlike the sensitive soul, which can only apprehend individual forms and thus tend to individual objects, the intellect apprehends universals, that is, concepts under which many particular instances fall. Because human action necessarily involves particulars, this means that the will, which follows the *forma intellectiva*, is “indeterminately related to many things” (*voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa*) and thus never necessitated to act in any single way.¹⁴

The analogy here is with the practice of an architect, who is not necessitated to build any single type of house. Rather, because he is capable of conceiving the form of “houseness” in general—under which many different instances are included—he can accordingly choose to build any number of different types of dwellings. If he happens to choose to build a circular house, say, instead of a square one, there is nothing necessary about that; all things being equal, he could just as readily have built a house of the latter type over a house of the former had he so decided.¹⁵ In the human soul, there is an identical relationship between the will and the intellect.

Still, all of the powers of the soul, the will included, undergo motion, and this can happen in two ways. Take the ability to see, whose motion can be analysed both in terms of *what* is seen, and in terms of *how* or *whether* something is seen. In terms of what is seen, the determining factor is the external object. If the object is white, then the eye undergoes change in its reception of the form of whiteness; if black, then blackness. If the object is white, the eye cannot see it as black, and vice versa. But the eye itself, regardless of what objects are presented to it, can also change insofar as it can see well or not. Sometimes my eyes are open, say, and sometimes they are closed. Obviously this has nothing

13 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 336: “[F]orma naturalis est forma <individualis> per materiam. Unde et inclinatio ipsam consequens determinata ad unum.”

14 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 336: “Sed forma intellectiva est universalis sub qua multa possunt comprehendi; et cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adaequat potentiam universalis, ideo remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa, sicut, si artifex concipiat formam domus in universali, sub qua comprehenduntur diverse figure domus, potest voluntas eius inclinari ad hoc ut faciat domum quadratam vel rotundam etc.”

15 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 335.

to do with the objects of sight, but with what the subject is *doing*. We might put the difference between the two types of motion as follows: with respect to what is seen, the relevant motion pertains to the specification (*specificatio*) of the act, for acts are specified by their objects. How or indeed whether the object is seen, by contrast, pertains to the exercise (*exercitium*) of the subject.¹⁶

When this analysis is applied to the will, it is clear that it can also be moved in a twofold way, that is, it can be moved both with respect to specification and also with respect to exercise. With respect to specification, the will is moved by the object as apprehended by the intellect, which acts on it after the manner of a formal cause. With respect to exercise, however, the will, whose object is the end, moves itself and the other powers of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause.¹⁷ This is because, as Giles puts it, “I understand what I will, and similarly use all the potencies and habits <of the soul> because I will.”¹⁸ Intellect and will, then, always act in tandem with each other to produce the free, rational act. Put otherwise, the two powers act as reciprocal causes on one another.

Now it is important to bear in mind that these acts do not happen in temporal sequence, according to Giles, but simultaneously. The will is prior in one sense, namely with respect to efficient causality, but the intellect is prior in another sense, namely with respect to formal causality.¹⁹ Still, if the intellect requires the determination of the will to activate its deliberations, and the will cannot be moved without a preceding act of practical deliberation, does this

16 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 336–37: “[C]onsiderandum quia aliqua potentia dupliciter movetur, scilicet ex parte subiecti et ex parte obiecti, ut visus nunc videt album nunc nigrum. Prima quidem mutatio pertinet ad exercitium actus, scilicet quod agatur, ut melius vel debilius agatur. Secunda immutatio pertinet ad specificationem actus, quia actus specificatur per obiectum.”

17 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 338: “Unde respectu eiusdem actus voluntas precedit in ratione finis et efficientis, intellectus vero in ratione cause formalis, tamen ostendens bonum et determinans voluntatem, non ostendens ita quod voluntas apprehendat, quia voluntas non cognoscit, sed ostendit ipsi anime mediante intellectiva, ita quod ipsa mediante voluntate inclinatur ad bonum reale extra.”

18 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 338: “Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex parte voluntatis. Nam semper potentia ad quam pertinet finis principalis, movet ad actum potentiam ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem, sicut ars militaris movet frenorum fratricem ad operandum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet se ipsam et omnes alias potentias. Intelligo enim quod volo, similiter utor omnibus potentiis et habitibus, quia volo.”

19 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 338: “Non est intelligendum quod solum operatio intellectus precedit operationem voluntatis, sed iste operationes sunt simul tempore, et talium non est inconveniens quod unum sit prius natura uno modo, aliud sit prius alio modo.”

mode of reciprocal causation not generate an infinite regress? The answer is no, because the initial movement of the will ultimately comes from God, the very ground of being, who moves it according to its own "condition" (*conditio*), which is to say, freely or as something which is related to many goods.²⁰

We may well wonder at this point in what sense, exactly, does the will move itself on such an account? After all, if the initial reduction of the will from potency to act comes from God, and thereafter every specification of the will's act comes from the intellect, then in what sense can the will be said to move itself? The answer is that, once reduced to act by the object as presented by the intellect, the will can move itself to the means. Just like the intellect, which can move itself to draw conclusions once it has apprehended, or been activated by a knowledge of the premises, so too can the will move itself with respect to means once reduced to act by *its* principle, namely the Good.²¹ Prior to the initial movements by their respective objects, will and intellect are entirely in potency. Once activated in a general sense, however, they are no longer completely in potency, and can move themselves with respect to particulars.

Does no object, then, ever determine the will? Once again, it is necessary to discuss this question in terms of specification and exercise, since the answer depends on which mode of determination one is talking about. From the perspective of the object, this must not only be regarded as "good" but must be apprehended as such *for the agent*, that is, in the particular circumstances in which he finds himself. This is what referring to the will's object as the *bonum conveniens*, that is, as the "appropriate good", means. If the object is merely good in the abstract, then it will not entice the agent and, although nonetheless considered choiceworthy, will not be chosen.²²

20 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 339: "[E]t <quia> non est abire in infinitum, necesse est quod in primo motu voluntas moveatur instinctu alicuius exterioris; hoc autem est Deus, qui solus potest super voluntatem et omnia movet secundum rationem mobilium. Sic enim movet gravia deorsum et levia sursum et voluntatem movet secundum eius conditionem libere, non ex necessitate, sed indeterminate se habentem ad multa"; *ibid.*: "Quia voluntas est potentia passiva, non potest aliquid velle nisi secundum quod excitatur ab aliquo movente; sed hec actio recipitur in voluntate per modum voluntatis, et ideo adhuc libere movetur; propter hoc etc."

21 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 338–39: "Ulterius intelligendum: licet quantum ad exercitium actus manifestum sit quod primo voluntas movet se ipsam et similiter alias potentias, non tamen sequitur propter hoc quod voluntas secundum idem sit in potentia et in actu, sicut nec intellectus, cum est in via inventionis, movet se ipsum ad scientiam in quantum ex uno modo venit in cognitionem alterius quod prius erat ignotum actu, solum notum in potentia."

22 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 339: "Si vero consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte obiecti determinantis actum voluntatis ad hoc vel illud volendum, considerandum quod

The only object that satisfies the foregoing criteria is happiness (*beatitudo*), which necessarily moves the will, but only from the point of view of specifying its act, since with respect to such an object there is no aspect under which it can be rejected by the will. From the point of view of exercise, however, the will nonetheless remains free even with respect to happiness, since it can always turn the intellect's attention away from such an object so as not to think about it and therefore not will it.²³ Needless to say, when the object is not good from every perspective, the will is *a fortiori* free with respect to willing or not willing it. This is because such an object can always be considered under either its good aspect or bad aspect, and thus chosen or rejected by the will.²⁴

Anyone familiar with Thomas Aquinas's *De malo*, Question 6 will immediately recognise its similarities with the foregoing account. Indeed, the majority of Giles's *Reportatio* Book 2, Question 65 is actually a verbatim or near verbatim adoption of Aquinas's own text.²⁵ This, of course, generates problems of exegesis. In literally copying much of Aquinas for inclusion in this early work, Giles appears to be demonstrating agreement with the gist of *De malo* 6. At the

obiectum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum. Verum si sit bonum et non apprehendatur sub ratione boni vel convenientis, non movebit voluntatem. Et quia electiones sunt intra particularia quorum sunt actus, requiritur quod id quod movet voluntatem non solum apprehendatur ut bonum in universali, sed in particulari."

23 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 339–40: "Et ideo si apprehendatur ut bonum conveniens secundum omnia particularia que possunt considerari, de necessitate movebit voluntatem. Et ideo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem, que est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus, intelligendo tamen 'ex necessitate' quantum ad determinationem actus, non autem quantum ad exercitium actus. Potest enim aliquis non velle cogitare de beatitudine, voluntas non potest <non> velle opposita beatitudinis, potest tamen nolle actu eam, quia potest avertere cogitationem beatitudinis in quantum movet intellectum ad suum actu."

24 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 340: "Si autem sit tale bonum quod non invenitur bonum esse secundum omnia sua particularia que considerari possunt, non ex necessitate movebit et quantum ad determinationem actus. Potest enim aliquis velle eius oppositum, de eo cogitans quia forte est bonum vel conveniens secundum aliquod particulare, <non bonum secundum aliud particulare> consideratum, ut quod est per se bonum sanitati, non est per se bonum delectationi, ut potio amara."

25 See Thomas Aquinas, *De malo* 6 (Opera Omnia; Rome, 1982), 23:147–50. I am grateful to Stephen Dumont for sending me a preliminary draft of his draft article, "Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome: The Case of *De Malo* Q. 6," which provides further textual evidence that Giles was relying on Aquinas here. See also Robert Wielockx, "Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome à la lumière de la bibliothèque de Godefroid de Fontaines," in *L'aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du débat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome*, (eds.) Valérie Cordonier and Tiziana Suarez-Nani (Fribourg, 2014), esp. 190–253.

same time, not everything contained in Giles's work is derived from Aquinas; some of it contains clear departures from Thomas's text which therefore represent, one assumes, Giles's own ideas. How then should we interpret those parts where Giles departs from Aquinas's text? Should Giles's own arguments in *Reportatio* Book 2, Question 65 be seen, for example, as an elaboration of what he sees as implicit in Thomas's text? Or should they be seen, rather, as an attempt by Giles to correct Aquinas?

To appreciate the difficulty of resolving this question, consider Giles's claim that one should not understand the reciprocal acts of will and intellect to take place sequentially; rather, so Giles emphasizes, one should think of them as occurring simultaneously.²⁶ Was this also Thomas's view? Recall that, for Thomas—and indeed for Giles in the *Reportatio*—while the intellect acts as a formal cause of the will's act, the will acts as an efficient cause of the intellect's and, indeed, of all of the powers of the soul, including its own.²⁷ Now it is possible to interpret such reciprocal causation in one of two ways: either sequentially or, as Giles explicitly does, simultaneously. If the former, then it becomes natural to think of the two powers as acting independently of, if not in opposition to one another.²⁸ Inevitably, on such a view, the intellect's judgement is seen as temporally preceding any act of the will. And if this is the case, then one must argue one of two things: either that the intellect's judgement exercises real causality over the will—efficient, formal or final—or simply some form of metaphorical causality.²⁹ To embrace the first option is to commit oneself to a picture of the will as a passive power that simply acquiesces in the judgements of the intellect—some species of intellectualism, in other words. To embrace the latter, however, is to be committed to the claim that the will is an active, free power that can operate independently of the intellect and either accept or reject what the latter judges best—some species of voluntarism. For

²⁶ See n. 19 above.

²⁷ See Thomas Aquinas, *De malo* 6, corp., 148–50. See also *Summa theologiae* 1–2.9.3, ad 3 (Opera Omnia; Rome, 1891), 6:78: “[D]icendum quod non eodem modo voluntas movetur ab intellectu, et a seipsa. Sed ab intellectu quidem movetur secundum rationem obiecti: a seipsa vero, quantum ad exercitium actus, secundum rationem finis.”

²⁸ Westberg, *Right Practical Reason*, 82.

²⁹ This was the strategy of voluntarists, or those who defended the primacy and autonomy of the will, such as Henry of Ghent, as we will see below, and, of course, the later Scotus. On this, see Stephen Dumont's important, “Did Scotus Change his Mind on the Will?” in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts/After the Condemnations of 1277. Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century*, (eds.) Jan Aartsen et al. (Berlin, 2001), 719–94.

the former, the locus of decision is made essentially at the level of the intellect; for the latter, it is made at the level of the will.³⁰ Since Aquinas in the *De malo* and the *Prima secundae* regards the intellect as exercising real, and not merely metaphorical causality over the will, this would seem to make him an intellectualist on any sequentially-understood model of reciprocal causality.

If, however, choice is an outcome of both reason and will operating simultaneously, then the situation is rather different. That is, if the reciprocal causality of the acts of intellect and will are coeval—the respective modes of priority taking place on a logical rather than a temporal level—then it becomes difficult to argue that Aquinas fits neatly into any of these categories of voluntarism and intellectualism, which hinge, as we saw a moment ago, on a notion of causality that is understood in terms of temporal succession. Some have insisted that this is the correct way to read Aquinas.³¹ If so, Aquinas does not make this claim explicit in any of his texts. Giles, by contrast, does. Whether Giles is elaborating on Aquinas here or, on the contrary, correcting him, then, depends to some degree on what Aquinas thought that *he* was doing in articulating the relationship of mutual causality between the will and the intellect in human action, and that is a matter of interpretation.

Despite Giles's belief that the reciprocal causality of intellect and will is simultaneous, he nonetheless, rather emphatically, stresses the passivity of the will—a feature that is conspicuous for its absence in *De malo* 6—as well as the centrality of practical reason to human action. These two features of *Reportatio* Book 2, Question 65 make the sections where Giles departs from Aquinas radically more intellectualistic in tone than the source text on which it is based. When Giles is discussing his own views on how to understand what it means to “determine” (*determinare*) the will to acting, “since it is a passive potency,” he admits that this is a “difficult” (*difficultas*) question.³² Despite this apparent difficulty, however, Giles seems to have no trouble whatever in stating that any failure to desire a right end (*finis rectus*) is the result of ignorance. “[I]f there is no defect or ignorance in us, in the universal or in the particular, so that we are seduced neither by habit nor passion, then we desire the right end from necessity ... Hence the reason why all men do not think of the end in the same way is due to some defect, because they are ignorant, in the universal or in

30 Westberg, *Right Practical Reason*, 82.

31 Cf. Hoffmann, “Voluntarism and Intellectualism,” 416–17 and Westberg, “Did Aquinas Change his Mind,” 51–58.

32 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 344: “Ideo adhuc remanet difficultas: quid determinat voluntatem ad agendum, cum sit potentia passiva.”

the particular, of the good that is choiceworthy without qualification (*bonum eligibile simpliciter*).³³

Elsewhere, Giles goes into some detail with respect to the deliberative process by which Aristotle's four principal types of moral personality—virtuous, vicious, continent and incontinent—employ the practical syllogism. In particular, he emphasizes the various ways in which practical reason can fail, which in turn leads to human wrongdoing.³⁴ We will discuss this aspect of Giles's moral psychology in greater detail in the next section. Suffice to say that Giles's insistence that wrongdoing stems from ignorance can be seen, with justification, to be radically intellectualistic. Nothing of these claims is implied in the *De malo*, much less specifically alluded to. These are Giles's own additions to Aquinas's text.

A superficial reading of Giles's *Reportatio* Book 2, Question 65, then, can generate the impression that here is a faithful, and indeed literal, commentary on Aquinas's *De malo*, Question 6. A more careful reading, however, shows that something rather different is at work. For not only does Aquinas not stress the passivity of the will and the centrality of ignorance to wrongdoing, as Giles does, he emphasizes quite the contrary. Indeed the *De malo* text, if anything, shows evidence of an emphasis on the *active* nature of the will. That is, it demonstrates an attempt by Thomas to distance himself from what philosophers today would call compatibilism. According to this view, although all acts are causally determined by antecedent conditions, it is possible to make a distinction between acts whose principle is external to the agent, and those whose principle is internal. So long as the necessitation occurs merely within the agent, so the compatibilist argument goes, the action is not coerced; rather, it can be considered voluntary.³⁵ In the *De malo*, however, Aquinas famously calls this view "heretical" (*heretica*) on the grounds that it removes merit and

33 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 344: "[S]i nullus est in nobis defectus nec ignorantia in universali nec in particulari, ut nullo nec passione nec habitu seducamur, tunc de necessitate appetimus finem rectum ... Unde causa quare omnes non ponunt finem in eodem est propter aliquem defectum, quia ignoratur in universali vel in particulari bonum eligibile simpliciter."

34 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 343.

35 Thomas Aquinas, *De malo* 6, corp., 147–48: "Responsio. Dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate movetur ad aliquid eligendum. Nec tamen ponebant quod voluntas cogereetur: non enim omne necessarium est violentum, set solum illud cuius principium est extra. Unde et motus naturales inveniuntur aliqui necessarii, non tamen violenti: violentum enim repugnat naturali sicut et voluntario, quia utriusque principium est intra, violenti autem principium est extra."

demerit from human acts.³⁶ Aquinas then goes on, as we noted above, to defend the will's ability to, in some sense, determine *itself*.

All of this seems to confirm what at least some early followers of Aquinas thought of Giles's *Reportatio*: that it was a fundamentally anti-Thomist work.³⁷ A primary example of this is an early Dominican commentary on the *Sentences*—dated to the 1290's—found in Ms. Bruges Stadsbibliotheek 491 (ff. 259–315).³⁸ So devoted to defending Thomas's thought is this anonymous commentary that its close connection to the pro-Thomist *Correctoria* literature has been suggested.³⁹ Because it specifically mentions Giles's *Reportatio*, it gives a good sense of the reception of this early work of Giles amongst Aquinas's followers. Now, it should be noted that there is little mention of Giles's theory of the will in relation to Aquinas's in Ms. Bruges Stadsbibliotheek 491. This is because the sections from Book Two where the will and free choice are usually treated in commentaries on the *Sentences* have yet to be found or else are not extant. Still, it is possible to surmise what this anonymous commentator would have thought of Giles's appropriation of Aquinas's theory of the relationship between the will and the intellect in human action. In every instance where our anonymous Dominican commentator mentions Giles's *Reportatio* explicitly, and even in those where he implicitly refers to Giles's text, he does so negatively.⁴⁰ As Martin Pickavé has put it, the general attitude of this commentator towards Giles of Rome is that he is “an opponent <of Thomas> who will finally be refuted.”⁴¹ Presumably, our Dominican commentator would also have rejected Giles's use of Aquinas in the cause of furthering the radical passivity of the will.

When Giles finally revisited the question of the freedom of the will in the late-1280s—now as regent master of theology—much had happened in the interim. For one thing, Thomas's views on the will and human freedom had come

36 Thomas Aquinas, *De malo* 6, corp., 148: “Hec autem opinio est heretica. Tollit enim rationem meriti et demeriti in humanis actibus: non enim videtur esse meritorium vel demeritorium quod aliquis sic ex necessitate agit quod vitare non possit.”

37 Cf. Martin Pickavé, “An Early Witness of the *Reportatio* of Giles of Rome's Lectures on the *Sentences*. Note on the Edition of Concetta Luna,” *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 72 (2005), 175–85.

38 Although in unpublished form at present, the text has been edited by Martin Pickavé and Wouter Goris. I am grateful to the former for sharing their transcription with me.

39 Cf. Ludwig Hödl's “Geistesgeschichtliche und literarkritische Erhebungen zum Korrektorienstreit (1277–1287),” *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 33 (1966), 81–114.

40 Pickavé, “An Early Witness of the *Reportatio* of Giles of Rome's Lectures,” 182–85.

41 Pickavé, “An Early Witness of the *Reportatio* of Giles of Rome's Lectures,” 184.

under suspicion for their putative defence of cognitive determinism.⁴² Upon his rehabilitation and return to Paris, Giles still seems intent on finding a way to incorporate Aquinas's influential solution to the problem of free will into his own. In the post-condemnations period, however, the active nature of the will and its independence from antecedent causes is, as it were, the order of the day. It seems clear that Giles was very well aware of which teachings on the will had been proscribed and which had not. Indeed his first two *Quodlibets* as regent master after his rehabilitation show a marked tendency to address the condemnations of 1277, as well as his own censure, and to defend himself in the process.⁴³ With respect to the question of human freedom, for example, although there is still need to ensure that the rationality of choice is preserved, an ability to demonstrate the will's autonomy now seems to be the priority.

Giles's *Quodlibet* 3, Question 15—dated to 1287 or 1288—represents his first and most sustained effort as a theology master to reconcile the rationality of choice with the freedom of the will.⁴⁴ As in the early *Reportatio*, Giles remains committed to the idea that the intellect must play a real, causal role in human action if the rationality of choice is to be preserved. He therefore adheres to the Aristotelian position from the *Physics* that “whatever is moved is moved by another” (*omne quod movetur ab alio movetur*).⁴⁵ Giles therefore precludes the sort of self-motion according to which something can move itself without *any* prior causal influence, since for this to happen the will would have to be in act and not in act at the same time and in the same respect, and that is impossible.⁴⁶ On the other hand, he cannot allow that this influence of the object as presented by the intellect be such as to constrain the will's ability to move itself, at least in some respects, since this would jeopardize its freedom. His

42 See, for example, John Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277,” *The Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995), 233–72 and Roland Hisette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277* (Louvain, 1977), 243–46; 254–55.

43 Pini, “Giles of Rome,” 254.

44 On the dating of Giles's *Quodlibets*, see Pini, “Giles of Rome,” 243. For a discussion of Giles's theory of self-motion, see Peter S. Eardley, “Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Will,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 56 (2003), 835–62 and Tobias Hoffmann, “Intellectualism and Voluntarism,” 420–21.

45 Aristotle, *Physics* 7.1, 242a15. On this principle, called variously the “cinesiological principle” and the “act-potency” axiom, cf. Roy Effler, *John Duns Scotus and the Principle “Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur”* (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1962).

46 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15 (Louvain, 1646; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966), 177: “[S]i enim aliquid in seipso secundum seipsum causaret actuationem, tunc illud secundum idem esset actus et potentia, quod est impossibile. Propter quod secundum hunc modum movendi vera est propositio 7 *Phisicorum*: quod *omne quod movetur etc.*”.

solution, clearly influenced once again by Aquinas, is to draw a distinction at the level of the object.

There are two types of objects: ends and means. The ultimate end is happiness (*beatitudo*), and the means are those objects that contribute to it. Now happiness as an object, when apprehended by the intellect, necessitates the will, which is to say that it causes a determinate volition in the will. The reason for this is that the ultimate good contains no negative aspect by which the will might reject it, or direct the intellect to view it from anything other than as an object that ought to be chosen. This is another way of saying that the will must of necessity desire happiness. By contrast, if the object is merely some *means* to happiness, then it does not necessitate the will. This is because their mixed character is what defines such limited goods. Accordingly, they can be viewed by the intellect under either their desirable or undesirable aspect.⁴⁷

Now when a limited good is presented to the will, what is caused in the will is not a determinate volition for the object, as is the case with the ultimate good. The reason for this is that the intellect is a power that is moved “naturally or quasi-naturally” (*naturaliter vel quasi naturaliter*).⁴⁸ It simply presents such objects to the will in a neutral fashion without evaluating them: *ex oblatione sensibilium*. As a “natural” power, that is, it cannot move itself to make specific, evaluative judgements with respect to mixed objects. Since contingent goods have a good aspect *and* a bad aspect, both, so Giles thinks, are what the intellect presents to the will. And it is this presentation that activates the will or causes what Giles calls a “volition of consideration” (*volitio considerationis*).⁴⁹

Now for Giles this volition of consideration is not a determinate volition for the contingent object per se; rather, it is a much weaker sort of volition.

47 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 177: “Nam voluntas comparatur et ad finem et ad ea quae sunt ad finem. A fine autem et ab eo quod apprehenditur sub omni ratione boni activatur et necessitatur: ab his autem quae sunt ad finem et ab his quae non apprehenduntur sub ratione omni boni, potest actuari sed non necessitari a nullo autem potest violentari.”

48 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 177–78: “Sed quaeret aliquis quid sit determinare voluntatem seipsam? Propter quod sciendum quod principium possit esse ab intellectu, ita quod nisi intellectus fieret prius in actu, nunquam voluntas fieret in actu ... intellectus enim quantum ad omnem suum primum actum movetur naturaliter vel quasi naturaliter, ita ut non sit in potestate nostra quid nobis veniat primo in mentem, sed ex oblatione sensibilium”

49 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 179: “Res ergo apprehensa prius causat in voluntate volitionem considerationis: quod si ista consideratio sit determinata ad bonum tantum necessitatur ut velit; si ad malum tantum, tunc necessitatur ut nolit; si sub ratione utriusque, tunc voluntas se potest determinare”

One might think of it as a simple awareness of the object as something that may or may not be chosen, along with a corresponding desire to merely consider whether such an object is choiceworthy in a specific sense. It therefore reduces the will to just enough actuality for it no longer to be completely in potency. Once it has thus been reduced to act, the will now has sufficient actuality, according to Giles, to be able to move or determine *itself* with respect to the object. It does this by either remaining in this dual or “forked consideration” (*consideratio bifurcata*), as Giles puts it, or by inclining to one aspect or another.⁵⁰ If it remains in the forked or pre-evaluative consideration, then no determinate volition for the object will be generated in the agent, and the will, presumably, will remain indifferent to it. If, by contrast, the will directs the intellect to focus on the good aspect, as opposed to the bad, then the intellect will now present the object to the will accordingly, and a determinate volition for the object will activate the will, and the object will be chosen. If it commands the intellect to focus on the bad aspect, on the other hand, then a nolition for the object will be generated in the will, and the object will be rejected.

Why is it that the will can move itself but the intellect cannot? Because unlike the intellect, which is moved naturally or quasi-naturally, the will is “sovereign in the kingdom of the soul” (*domina in regno animae*).⁵¹ It is accordingly able to move itself by determining, though not actuating, itself. But what does Giles mean, precisely, by the will’s ability to *determine* itself? Does he mean simply that the will moves the intellect to its activity as an efficient cause while the intellect simultaneously specifies the will’s act? If so, then what Giles is presenting here is merely a modified version of his earlier position in the *Reportatio*. Giles addresses this question directly, and in doing so rejects his

50 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 178: “Sed cum apprehenditur id quod est ad finem vel cum apprehenditur quod non habet omnem rationem boni—ut puta, cum intellectus apprehendit potionem, apprehendit eam ut bonam, quia inductiva sanitatis et ut malam ratione amaritudinis; vel dum apprehendit fornicationem, eam apprehendit ut bonam ratione delectationis et ut malam ratione inordinationis—et quia voluntas est domina sui actus, in potestate eius est sistere in hac consideratione bifurcata, vel sistere in una et desistere ab alia vel magis sistere in una quam in alia, potest enim omnino desistere velle cogitare de inordinatione et solum velle cogitare de delectatione et cum hoc facit quia non habet retrahens, allicitur ad delectationem et causatur in ea volitio fornicationis.”

51 On this topic, see Roland Teske, “The Will as King over the Powers of the Soul: Uses and Sources of an Image in the Thirteenth Century,” *Vivarium* 32 (1994), 62–71. Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 180: “Potentiae ergo animae seipsas non movent hoc modo motionis, quia non habent dominium sui actus, sed in hoc sunt subditae voluntati. Voluntas est hoc modo domina in regno animae et dicitur movere seipsam quia seipsam determinat et in potestate eius est sic vel sic se habere”

earlier position.⁵² Giles's position is now that once activated by the intellect's presentation of the object under both its good and bad aspects, the will "*first* determines itself, and *afterwards* determines the intellect [*italics mine*]."⁵³ Specifically, the will "causes a volition in itself" to either remain indifferent with respect to the object or to focus on one aspect or the other, after which there is an "execution" (*executio*) in the intellect to activate the will in accordance with this determination.⁵⁴ The will therefore, Giles suggests, is able to determine itself and specify its own act. What seems obvious, though, is that Giles has now rejected his former theory of simultaneous reciprocal causality between the will and the intellect. That is, the reciprocal causality between will and intellect seems no longer to happen at one and the same time, but in temporal succession, with the will's self-determination preceding its determination of the intellect.

The first of Giles's academic colleagues to take umbrage with his theory of self-motion was the secular master and noted critic of Aquinas, Henry of Ghent. Recall that Giles had made a distinction between actuation—the simple reduction of something from potentiality to actuality—and determination, or the will's act of specifying its volitions. Henry accuses Giles of merely trying to defend, with minor revisions, the distinction that Aquinas had drawn in *De malo* 6 and the *Prima secundae*. Specifically, Henry reduces Giles's distinction between *activare* and *determinare* to the Thomistic distinction between *specificatio* and *exercitium*, respectively.

Now Henry admits that there are superficial differences between Giles's and Thomas's accounts of self-motion. For example, the former holds that the intellect merely causes a volition of consideration in the will with respect to actuation, while the latter holds that the intellect specifies the will's act

52 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 179: "Sed dices quod voluntas non determinet seipsam, sed determinet potentias alias, ut determinat intellectum, ut consideret de hoc et non de illo vel ut magis consideret de hoc quam de illo."

53 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 179: "Ad quod respondimus quod voluntas, secundum hunc modum, prius determinet seipsam et postea determinet intellectum vel aliam potentiam quamcumque."

54 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.15, 179: "Nam primo determinet se <i.e. voluntas> ut velit considerare de hoc et nolit considerare illud vel ut magis velit considerare hoc quam illud. Et secundum quod determinatum est velle in voluntate, sic sit executio in intellectu; ... Istud ergo dominium posse sistere in uno et desistere ab alio vel posse sistere et attendere plus ad unum quam ad aliud, voluntati est attribuendum, quae dominium prius habet in operationem propriam et per eam habet dominium in operationes alias causat enim in se ipsam volitionem"

with respect to determination. Still, on Henry's account, for both thinkers the principle of motion comes, in the first instance, from the intellect, the will having no control over such a determination.⁵⁵ With respect to Giles's theory of *determinare*, Henry sees this as being effectively equivalent to Aquinas's *exercitium*. Once reduced to act by the end, the will is able to move itself toward the means. The capacity for self-motion on the part of the will Giles calls "determination" while Aquinas calls it "exercise".⁵⁶ Whatever the term, Henry sees them as equivalent.

Henry's main objection to the foregoing positions is their adherence to the claim that the object as presented by the intellect exercises real motion over the will. He objects, in short, to any view that advances the claim that the principle of motion comes from anything but the will itself. Aquinas and Giles, as we have seen, regard the presentation of the object by the intellect as necessary in order to reduce it from potency to act. Henry objects to any but the weakest sort of causation by the object over the will—that of a *sine qua non* cause—since otherwise this would jeopardize the will's freedom.

Against both Giles and Thomas, then, Henry maintains that the will is entirely free. It proceeds to its own act of willing entirely of its own accord (*per se ipsam*). That is, for Henry the principle of the will's motion, both as regards exercise and specification, and as regards absolute and mixed goods, comes from the will itself.⁵⁷ This means, for Henry, that the will proceeds to every act of its own accord through its own innate freedom to move itself without need of any real, antecedent causes.⁵⁸ Rather, the knowledge that must precede the will's act is merely, for Henry, metaphorical: what he calls a *sine qua non* cause, or mere precondition, of volition. For Henry, then, the intellect is

55 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12.26 (Opera Omnia; Leuven, 1987), 16:138–39: "Et sic, ut dicunt, res apprehensa primo causat in voluntate, et hoc ex necessitate, volitionem considerationis sive intellectionis. Et talem volitionem causari ab intellectu in voluntate appellant aliqui activare sive actuare voluntatem, quia hoc facit eam de volente in potentia volentem in actu. Alii autem respicientes ad voluntatis indeterminationem praedictam appellant hoc determinare voluntatem. Et ambo concordant in hoc, quod sic velle primo secundum actum non est a voluntate neque a libero arbitrio voluntatis, quia primi dicunt quod voluntas non est liberi arbitrii quoad actuationem, alii autem dicunt quod non est liberi arbitrii quoad actus determinationem. Et id ipsum quod illi appellant actuationem, alii appellant actus determinationem."

56 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12.26, 143.

57 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12.26, 155: "Sic ergo voluntas se ipsa per se ipsam exit in actum volendi tam finem quam ea quae sunt ad finem absque omni alia dispositione seu motione existente sive praecedente in ea."

58 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12.26, 153.

passive without qualification, while the will is active without qualification.⁵⁹ Any attempt, such as one finds in Giles and Thomas, to introduce passivity into the will is rejected by Henry on the grounds that it would jeopardize the freedom of the will and therefore moral responsibility.

Henry is undoubtedly right to detect the influence of Aquinas on Giles's theory of action. Because Giles is emphatic in defending the rationality of choice, he adopts Thomas's view that the will is initially a passive power, but that once reduced to act, it can move itself in some form or other. According to the two accounts, the intellect and the will exercise a form of reciprocal causality over one another. The trouble with Henry's assessment is that the adjustments that Giles makes to Aquinas's theory ultimately lead him away from Aquinas, so that their theories of how will and intellect interact with one another in human choice, although similar in broad outline, are quite different in their essential details.

Perhaps the cardinal difference between Giles and Thomas is that, for the latter, specification—or determination—really does mean that the intellect has evaluated the object by means of deliberation and determined it to be either good or bad. For Giles, however, although actuation is an act of the intellect, it is an operation that is *prior* to any determination of the object as either good or bad. In fact, actuation in the first instance simply generates in the will a forked volition of consideration, that is, a simple volition on the part of the will to consider whether to focus on the good or bad aspect of the object. On Giles's account, determination or specification therefore takes place at the level of the will. This is not what Aquinas means by determination, as we saw above.

Moreover, if to Aquinas's mind he is going to keep the act intelligible, then the will's freedom of exercise cannot be fully autonomous or independent of a prior determination of reason. There must have been, so Aquinas thinks, some *reason* why the will desisted from the act of choosing *x* and sent the intellect back to consider some other object to choose. As Aquinas puts it: "the will can tend towards whatever reason can apprehend as good; moreover, reason can apprehend as good, not only 'to will' and 'to act,' but 'not-to-will' and 'not-to-act'."⁶⁰ For Giles in the *Quodlibets*, by contrast, there is a strict autonomy of the

59 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 12.26, 156–57: "Verum est tamen quod intellectus existens in actu praecedat omnem actum voluntatis ut causa sine qua non. Unde quod dicunt ex parte intellectus respectu voluntatis de movendo se per aliud, non est simile, quia intellectus est potentia simpliciter passive, voluntas autem est potentia simpliciter activa."

60 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.13.6, corp., 103: "Potest enim homo velle et non velle, agere et non agere; potest etiam velle hoc aut illud, et agere hoc aut illud. Cuius ratio ex ipsa virtute rationis accipitur. Quidquid enim ratio potest apprehendere ut bonum in

will, an innate freedom to move itself and the intellect to a consideration of the object. Whatever the similarities to Aquinas's account, this is an absolutely crucial difference, and indeed separates Giles's account in the *Quodlibets* from Aquinas's in the *De malo*, so that the former should be considered a moderately voluntaristic account of human action, while the latter should properly be considered an intellectualistic one.⁶¹

Moreover, in *Quodlibet* 3, Question 15, Giles explicitly rejects the claim that the intellect can determine itself. Rather, for Giles, the intellect is moved naturally or quasi-naturally, and must await the determination of the will for purposes of evaluating mixed objects as either good or bad. The denial of the intellect's ability to move itself was a standard voluntaristic claim. For voluntarists, freedom resides in the will and not in the intellect, since the latter, as we saw a moment ago, is a passive power that is always determined by antecedent causes. For Aquinas, by contrast, the intellect, just as much as the will, can move itself in the sense that, once reduced to act by principles, it can move itself with respect to conclusions. "[I]t is clear that the intellect, insofar as it understands a principle, reduces itself from potency to act with respect to the cognition of conclusions, and in this way moves itself; and similarly the will insofar as it wills the end, moves itself to willing the means."⁶²

Finally, Giles distances himself from Aquinas in this *Quodlibet* by his implication that the will is a quasi-cognitive power, which it must be, if it is to specify its own act. Indeed, this not only represents a break from Aquinas, but also from his own earlier treatment of the issue in the *Reportatio*, where he explicitly argued, we recall, against this claim.

In case there was any ambiguity with respect to Giles's understanding of free will, he clarifies this in his next *Quodlibet*.⁶³ Here he argues that by

hoc voluntas tendere potest. Potest autem ratio apprehendere ut bonum, non solum hoc quod est velle aut agere, sed hoc etiam quod est non velle et non agere."

61 For a different interpretation of Aquinas, see Tobias Hoffmann, "Aquinas and Intellectual Determinism: The Test Case of Angelic Sin," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 89 (2007), 122–56 and David Gallagher, "Free Choice and Free Judgment in Thomas Aquinas," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 76 (1994), 247–77.

62 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.9.3, corp., 78: "Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod cognoscit principium reducit seipsum de potencia in actum, quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum, et hoc modo movet seipsum; et similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem movet seipsam ad volendum ea que sunt ad finem."

63 Namely, in *Quodlibet* 4.21 dated to 1288. The ex professo question asks "Unde sit libertas in voluntate?" On this topic, see Peter S. Eardley, "The Foundations of Freedom in Later Medieval Philosophy: Giles of Rome and his Contemporaries," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 44 (2006), 353–76.

self-determination he means nothing short of a *positive* act of the will. This is not to say that the intrinsic autonomy of the will is sufficient for it to move itself. Rather, it is only a necessary condition. In fact, according to Giles, the foundations of human freedom have three sources: the immateriality of the soul, the ability of the intellect to reflect on its own acts, and the will's innate freedom to control the intellect's presentation of the object, and thus to indirectly specify its own act. The will is free because it is located in the immaterial soul, and can therefore do one thing or its opposite. But the intellect is also immaterial, and so can reflect on the appetible object and thus present its good and bad aspects to the will.⁶⁴ But since the intellect is a power that is, as we saw, moved naturally, it cannot make a determinate presentation of the object to the will as either desirable or undesirable. It must await the will's determination to regard the object as either good, bad or indifferent if a concrete choice is to occur.⁶⁵ The intellect is therefore not *free* per se, according to Giles, but only indeterminate.⁶⁶

Again, it is worth stressing that the will's ability to indirectly specify its own act by directing the intellect to focus on the good or bad aspect of mixed goods is a positive act as opposed to a mere desisting from act. This is a feature of the will that is generated from the fact that it is formally (*formaliter*) or intrinsically free. To sum up then: the will has three sources of freedom. First, it has freedom radically (*radicaliter*) from its location in the immaterial soul. Second, it derives freedom proximately (*ex proximo*) from the intellect, which, although not "free" *per se*, nonetheless provides it with options from which it can choose to be determinately actualized. And finally it has freedom in its fullest sense formally (*formaliter*) from itself.⁶⁷

64 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.21, 257–58: "Per eandem formam intelligimus hoc et oppositum. Inclinatione ergo sequens illam formam non erit determinata ad unum sed poterit esse ad hoc et ad oppositum ... Quia intellectus est immaterialis potest seipsum convertere *supra* speciem intelligibilem quam apud se habet, *supra* quam se convertendo intelligit illud et oppositum; ideo agens per intellectum non determinatur ad alterum tantum sed potest agere hoc et oppositum."

65 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.21, 258: "Quia forma existens in intellectu est indeterminata ad hoc vel ad oppositum, et quia indeterminatum secundum quod huiusmodi non agit nec umquam procedit in opus nisi determinetur per voluntatem; voluntas est illa potentia per quam agens per intellectum seipsum determinet ad agendum vel non agendum"

66 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.21, 259: "Voluntas habet libertatem non ex libertate intellectus, sed ex indeterminatione intellectus"

67 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 4.21, 258: "Dicamus ergo hoc sit esse liberi arbitrii: formaliter posse determinare seipsum ad agendum, vel non agendum. Unde dictum est quod voluntati insit libertas ex immaterialitate naturae, in qua fundatur radicaliter et primordialiter, ex forma apprehensa tamquam ex proximo, et ex seipsa formaliter."

Now, while Henry's criticisms of Giles missed the mark to some extent, the same cannot be said for those of their contemporary and colleague at the Parisian faculty of theology, Godfrey of Fontaines. Indeed, many years afterwards, when Giles was revising his commentary on the *Sentences*, he would radically revise his earlier account of self-motion as a result of Godfrey's trenchant criticisms.⁶⁸

The essence of Godfrey's objections is that in attempting to make the will an active power and the intellect a correspondingly passive one in order to ensure freedom of choice, Giles is guilty of making several arbitrary distinctions. First, recall that, for Giles, the will is free, but the intellect is merely indetermined. On Godfrey's account, however, nothing can determine itself, because then the same thing would be in act and not in act in the same respect, and that is impossible. It is not that Godfrey denies, in that case, that there is any such thing as freedom; quite the contrary. He just does not think that freedom can be equated with self-determination. Rather, freedom is associated with a certain type of cognition, namely that associated with rational beings, who can know ends as ends, and the relation of means to ends. It belongs, that is, to beings that can reflect on their own natures and order themselves to their ends, rather than being ordered by another.⁶⁹ This is a property of beings that possess immaterial, which is to say rational souls.

For Godfrey, then, freedom is associated with immateriality. The more something is separated from matter, the freer it is; the more it is tied to and immersed in matter, the less free. If the will is free, then, this is because it is rooted in the immaterial soul. But, so Godfrey reasons, this must also be true of the intellect, which is located in the same essence.⁷⁰ For Godfrey, then, to attribute formal freedom to the will and deny it to the intellect, as Giles does, cannot be justified.

Second, recall that in order to ensure both the rationality of choice and the freedom of the will, Giles had distinguished between the acts of *actuare* and

68 These are contained in Godfrey's *Quodlibet* 8.16 in *Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, (ed.) Jean Hoffmans (Louvain, 1924). I follow John Wippel's dating of this *Quodlibet* to 1292–1293. Cf. his *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, D.C., 1981), xxviii.

69 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* 8.16, 145–47.

70 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* 8.16, 150.: "Sicut huiusmodi natura <immaterialis> est natura libera formaliter ex seipsa, ita oportet quamlibet eius potentiam esse formaliter liberam ex seipsa. Oportet ergo intellectum formaliter liberum esse seipso ut est potentia talis naturae ... Et similiter dicendum est de voluntate ... Constat enim quod natura hominis non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum intellectum, est ad seipsam conversiva."

determinare. Godfrey regards this distinction as spurious. If the will is the rational appetite, as Giles agrees that it is, then it can only be moved by its own proper object: the good. Actuation and determination are therefore one and the same act according to Godfrey, for to be actuated is simply to be reduced from potency to act by an object that the intellect has determined to be, or evaluated as, good.⁷¹ Giles had argued that since the intellect is a natural power it remains in a state of indetermination with regard to mixed objects such that the *will* must determine it. On Godfrey's account, if the intellect is in a state of indetermination, then so is the will. To argue that the two acts are discrete therefore amounts to a distinction without a difference. If an object actuates the will, then it likewise determines it. To separate the two acts such that one requires an antecedent cause while the other does not is entirely arbitrary.

Related to the foregoing distinction is the question of what precisely Giles means by the will's ability to *determine* itself. Godfrey pinpoints the problematic of this distinction very astutely. Either the will's ability to determine the intellect to focus on the good or bad aspect of the object—basically the point at which Giles located the freedom of the will—represents a positive act of the will, or else a mere desisting from act. If it is the latter, then this does not threaten the intelligibility of the action. If, on the other hand, as clearly seems to be implied by Giles's account in the *Quodlibets*, the will's directing of the intellect is a positive, self-determining act of the will, without any prior influence by the intellect, then Giles cannot claim to have preserved the rationality of choice.⁷² Godfrey effectively shows that Giles cannot have it both ways.

71 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* 8.16, 153: "Quando ergo obiectum voluntatis apprehenditur sub illa ratione sub qua natum est actuare voluntatem, tunc et ipsam simul actuat et determinat; quia nihil aliud est voluntatem determinare quam ipsam facere volentem in actu determinatum obiectum hoc vel illud. Sicut ergo obiectum voluntatis voluntatem actuat, secundum modum secundum quem apprehenditur a ratione sub illa ratione sub qua natum est movere voluntatem, ita etiam obiectum voluntatis voluntatem determinat, non ipsa se ipsam; voluntatem enim determinari nihil aliud est quam ipsam velle aliquod obiectum determinatum determinate; et indeterminatio intellectus apprehendentis obiectum indeterminate est causa indeterminationis voluntatis in volendo; et determinatio intellectus in apprehendendo sive determinata apprehensio intellectus est etiam determinatio voluntatis vel causa determinationis voluntatis indeterminate volendo."

72 Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* 8.16, 151–52: "Si ergo hoc, quod est determinare se, est esse aliquo modo in actu, in hoc quod voluntas ponitur se ipsam determinare, ponitur se ipsam actuare; si autem determinare se vel determinatum esse nihil reale est, de nihilo non oportet esse sollicitum. Et quod sit verus actus voluntatis videntur isti dicere, quia dicunt quod voluntas sic se determinat quod, facta apprehensione de fornicatione bona ratione delectationis, mala ratione inordinationis, potest voluntas desistere velle cogitare de inordinatione et solum velle insistere cogitare de delectatione. Nunc autem licet desistere

So powerful were Godfrey's criticisms of Giles's solution to the problem of free will in the *Quodlibets* that almost twenty years after Giles had defended his theory, he continued to wrestle with them. Somewhat disingenuously claiming that it had been his position all along, Giles argued that it was never his intention to present the self-determination of the will as a positive act at all—as Godfrey had accused him of problematically defending—but a mere desisting from act. As he puts it in his commentary on Book 2 of the *Sentences*, dated to 1309, “many men find fault with our theory, since this expression *to determine* seems to denote some act.”⁷³

How does Giles respond to this charge in the commentary on the *Sentences*? He continues to adhere to the claim that the ultimate good, since it has no aspect under which it can be rejected, must of necessity both actuate and determine the will. It is with respect to mixed or contingent goods, however, that a subtle change has taken place in his theory of freedom. In the revised theory, the intellect no longer presents the will with a mixed object under its “good” and “bad” aspects, as had been defended in the *Quodlibets*. Rather, it now primarily presents the will with a single object, the volition for which will generate a choice for one good, and the nolition of which will negatively generate the choice for an opposing good. This slight alteration to the theory now permits Giles to claim that the will can determine itself without the need for a positive act, since by desisting from one good, the will can now be seen to have opted for the other by default. “What is this *to determine*? It is to desist from one thing, which, in so doing, it will determine itself to the other.”⁷⁴

Consider, again, the example of fornication. When such an object is presented to the will, it can either opt for it in the pursuit of the pleasurable good, or reject it in the pursuit of the moral good.⁷⁵ In his final word on the problem of free will, Giles seems to have made, as he did in his early *Reportatio*, the rationality of choice the priority over the autonomy of the will.

cogitare de aliquo simpliciter non sit aliquis actus, licet ad aliquem actum possit consequi, tamen velle cogitare de aliquo est verus actus voluntatis; et similiter velle insistere cogitare de aliquo. Potest ergo quaeri quo agente voluntas fiat in actum secundum hos duos actus volendi; et si se ipsa, sequitur inconveniens quod volunt evitare.”

73 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.25.3.1 (Venice, 1581; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 2:298: “[D]eterminavimus in quodam nostro Quolibet, quod voluntas movet se determinando non activando se. Dicendum quod dictum nostrum multi calumnia[n]tur, quia istud determinare, videtur dicere aliquem actum.”

74 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.25.3.1, 2: 298: “Quid est ergo istud ‘determinare’? Est desistere ab uno quod faciendo determinabit se ad aliud.”

75 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.25.3.1, 2: 298.

3 Moral Wrongdoing

Perhaps more than any of Giles's other ethical theories, his views on the scope and nature of evil (*malum*) need to be examined against the institutional context in which he was situated. This is particularly true of his ideas on what philosophers today would call "moral weakness" or "weakness of will", but which Giles and his contemporaries called *incontinentia*. This is because certain of Giles's works as a young bachelor became the source of an infamous controversy over the question of whether it was possible to sin from a disordered will, or whether all wrongdoing is the result of ignorance. Without an adequate knowledge of its context, however, Giles's approach to the problem will be difficult to comprehend.

The problem of moral weakness or *incontinentia* was first identified in antiquity and discussed under the rubric of *akrasia*.⁷⁶ Concisely stated, the question concerns whether rational agents can act against their own better judgement, that is, whether they can knowingly do what is objectively bad for themselves with respect to such objects of the sense appetite as food, drinking, and sex. At first glance, the answer to this question seems obvious: of course they can. How else to explain why reasonable people put more salt on their food than is conducive to health, or commit adultery, or do any number of other harmful and illicit things?

As familiar as such actions are, however, they also appear to generate a puzzle. They make it difficult to explain why rational agents, i.e., agents who know better and desire to avoid harm, would intentionally act irrationally, that is, would knowingly fail to do what is best for themselves and, indeed, often do what is harmful. Socrates addressed the problem by famously claiming that such action was in fact impossible. What looks like deliberate wrongdoing, so Socrates thought, is actually wrongdoing that is done without adequate knowledge. He therefore concluded that rational agents could not in fact act against their own better judgement. Rather, so Socrates held, all wrongdoing ultimately stems from ignorance such that if the wrongdoer knew better, he would do better.⁷⁷

76 For an overview of the problem, see William Charlton, *Weakness of Will: A Philosophical Introduction* (Oxford, 1988); Justin Gosling, *Weakness of Will* (London, 1990); Tobias Hoffmann, (ed.), *Weakness of Will: From Plato to the Present* (Washington, D.C., 2008) and *Das Problem der Willensschwäche in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie/ The Problem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Philosophy* (Leuven, 2006). For literature on the problem in the medieval period, see Risto Saarinen, *Weakness of Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan* (Leiden, 1994).

77 See, e.g., *Protagoras* 352A–358D; *Meno* 77C–79D; and *Gorgias* 468A–469A. For some recent secondary literature, see Terence Irwin, *The Development of Ethics: From Socrates to the Reformation. Volume I* (Oxford, 2007), 13–44.

Aristotle, by contrast, held a more realistic position. When we act against our own better judgement, this is because passion has rendered inoperative the general knowledge we possess that something is bad. Accordingly, we do not see that the bad object—at the very moment that we desire it and only at that moment—actually falls under a general prohibition. Once the passion subsides, on Aristotle's account, the wrongdoer once again becomes aware of the principle prohibiting the illicit behavior, and he experiences regret for having performed the action that he knew all along, in principle at any rate, he ought not to have performed.⁷⁸

From the foregoing account one can see that there is a sense in which for Aristotle all wrongdoing that arises from passion is committed both knowingly and in ignorance. On one hand, the incontinent has *some* knowledge of the fact that the action he committed was wrong, in contrast to the vicious, intemperate person who is thoroughly ignorant of the universal principles of morality. This is obvious, and is the reason why the incontinent, as opposed to the intemperate, experiences regret once he reflects on his action, as it were, in the clear light of day.⁷⁹ Still, at the very moment at which his sense appetite is prompting him to commit the wrong action, there is a sense in which ignorance attaches to the incontinent's bad action. Why? Because passion has hindered his ability to apply his knowledge of the general, moral principle that what he wants to do is wrong. The result is that the incontinent follows the prompting of his sense appetite. This results in a clouding of his reason, which leads to his committing the bad action in ignorance. This is the only adequate explanation, so Aristotle thinks, for why people who know what is best for themselves occasionally do not act on this knowledge.

The Aristotelian notion that the incontinent is ignorant of his wrongdoing at the time that he commits his bad action would later become a source of worry to some Christian theologians who thought that it too closely resembled a defense of the Socratic Paradox. The cardinal worry was that if all wrongdoing were associated with ignorance rather than deliberate choice, this would rule out any justification for rewards and punishments; it would, in short, destroy moral responsibility. Accordingly, Étienne Tempier included on his list of proscribed errors two articles intended to discourage the arts masters and students at Paris from disseminating any views that resembled the paradox.

78 Aristotle discusses akratic behaviour in Book 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For some of the more influential secondary sources, see also, Norman O. Dahl, *Practical Reason, Aristotle and Weakness of Will* (Minneapolis, 1984); David Charles, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action* (London, 1984) and James Walsh, *Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness* (New York, 1963).

79 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.8, 1150b29–30.

Specifically, he made it illicit to teach: "That the will, while sense desire (*passio*) and particular knowledge (*scientia particulari*) are actualized, cannot act against the latter"⁸⁰ and "That if reason is correct then the will is correct."⁸¹ These were articles 129 and 130, respectively, of Tempier's syllabus.

What does the foregoing have to do with Giles of Rome? When Giles was a young bachelor he defended a proposition in his commentary on Book 1 of the *Sentences* that very closely resembled the extreme intellectualism of the Socratic Paradox.⁸² Specifically, Giles argued that "there is never any malice in the will unless there is error in the reason" (*non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error in ratione*).⁸³ Tempier interpreted Giles's defence of this position as a heterodox denial that rational agents can do wrong deliberately. He therefore initiated—on some accounts only a few weeks after he had issued his syllabus of condemned articles on March 7th—an investigation into the teachings of the young bachelor.⁸⁴ Drawing together a list of some fifty-one of Giles's theses from the commentary on the *Sentences*, Tempier demanded that Giles retract them if he wanted to be granted his *licentia docendi*. When the young bachelor refused, he was forced to leave the university. He finally returned to Paris eight years later after an intervention by Pope Honorius IV, taking up the first chair of the OESA in the theology faculty.

The matter was further complicated, however, when the masters who Tempier had gathered together to examine Giles's work conceded as *true* the

80 *Articuli condempnati a Stephano episcopo Parisiensi anno 1277*, (ed.) David Piché (Paris, 1999), 118: "(129) Quod voluntas, manente passione et scientia particulari in actu, non potest agere contra eam."

81 *Articuli condempnati a Stephano episcopo Parisiensi anno 1277*, 118: "(130) Quod si ratio recta, et voluntas recta.—Error, quia contra glossam augustini super illud psalmi: 'Concupiuit anima mea desiderare,' etc., et quia secundum hoc, ad rectitudinem voluntatis non esset necessaria gratia, set solum scientia, quod fuit error pelagii."

82 For a full discussion of this, see my "The Problem of Moral Weakness, the *Propositio Magistralis*, and the Condemnation of 1277," *Mediaeval Studies* 68 (2006), 161–203. See also, Stephen Dumont, "Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will in the Late Thirteenth Century," *Documenti e Studi* 3 (1992), 577–80. For a review of some recent relevant literature on the topic, see Bonnie Kent, "Evil in Later Medieval Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 45 (2007), 177–205.

83 This is found at Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 1.17.1 (Venice, 1521; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 89vL–vM. A modified variant of the same claim can also be found at *Ordinatio* 1.47.1, fol. 237rG: "numquam est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error vel saltem aliqua nescientia in ratione." For a discussion of this topic, see Robert Wielockx (ed.), *Apologia, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia* 3.1 (Florence, 1985), 97–120.

84 On the dating of the *propositio magistralis*, see Eardley, "The Problem of Moral Weakness," 177.

claim that there is never any malice in the will unless there is some error in the reason.⁸⁵ This action must almost certainly have caused Tempier some degree of frustration, since the essence of Giles's view on incontinence looked remarkably similar to articles 129 and 130 that the very same masters had condemned as heterodox only, on some accounts, a few weeks earlier.⁸⁶ For this reason, the claim *non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error in ratione* became known, somewhat controversially, as the "magisterial proposition" (*propositio magistralis*) or the "proposition conceded by the masters" (*propositio a magistris conceditur*).⁸⁷

Now if the magisterial proposition was an irritant to Bishop Tempier, it was scarcely less of a nuisance to Henry of Ghent, who had himself been a member of both of Tempier's commissions. Accordingly, he would later have to expend considerable effort defending himself against charges from opponents like Godfrey of Fontaines that he had contradicted himself in 1277 when he had both condemned and affirmed, within a matter of weeks, what looked like the very same proposition. How did he defend himself?

Although Henry's solution is extremely complex, in essence he argued that the *propositio magistralis* only claims that there is ignorance associated with wrongdoing, and not necessarily that it is always the cause of wrongdoing.⁸⁸ To the contrary, although the malice of the will and the ignorance of the intellect are simultaneous, as the magisterial proposition implies, it is nonetheless possible to hold that the malice of the will is the cause of the intellect's ignorance. To do this, however, one must have a proper understanding of how the instants of time can be divided. Specifically, Henry argued that although the malice of the will and the ignorance of the intellect occur in the same temporal instant,

85 See, e.g., Robert Wielockx, "Henry of Ghent and the Events of 1277," in *The Brill Companion to Henry of Ghent*, (ed.) Gordon Wilson (Leiden, 2011), 38–41.

86 John of Pouilly's *Quodlibet* 2.11 is the source for this: "Idem magistri fuerunt assessores episcopi Stephani in condendo articulos et in concedendo predictam propositionem" (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France lat. 14565, fol. 111ra, and lat. 15372, fol. 54rb; quoted in Wielockx, *Apologia*), 98, n.6.

87 Cf., Wielockx, *Apologia*, 78, n. 13.

88 For a fuller account of Henry's solution to reconciling the *propositio magistralis*, see Dumont, "Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will," 581–91 and Eardley, "The Problem of Moral Weakness," 181–86. For Henry's treatment of moral weakness, see Jörn Müller, "Willensschwäche im Voluntarismus? Das Beispiel Heinrichs von Gent," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 89 (2007), 1–29. For a recent overview of Henry's views on incontinence, see Tobias Hoffmann, "Henry of Ghent's Voluntarist Account of Weakness of Will," in *Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present*, (ed.) Tobias Hoffmann (Washington, D.C., 2008), 115–37.

the instant itself can be divided into prior and posterior “signs” according to which a malicious will can be said to cause the darkening of the intellect. Accordingly, although there is ignorance involved in incontinence, it is nonetheless, so Henry argues, a voluntary ignorance for which the agent is responsible.⁸⁹ With this argument, Henry would provide a model for how to defend the possibility of sinning from a disordered will while also maintaining the simultaneity of ignorance in wrongdoing. One of the theologians who benefited from Henry’s solution was Giles himself, who would later incorporate elements of Henry’s account, required as one suspects he must have been to explain his own prior views after being reinstated in 1285.

Now it is clear that the *propositio magistralis*, taken on its own, was open to interpretation. Some who championed the autonomy of the will denied that there was any way to take it other than as a defence of radical intellectualism, while others regarded it as perfectly consistent with the freedom of the will. What did Giles himself mean in defending the notion that there is never any malice in the will unless there is some error in the reason? Was he, in other words, embracing the voluntaristic or the intellectualistic understanding of moral weakness? The answer is that he appears to have held various views over the course of his career. The textual evidence shows that, once again, in his early *Reportatio* he adopts Aquinas’s account, almost verbatim, while in his mature *Quodlibets*, he moves to an account that is, as we mentioned a moment ago, very clearly influenced by Henry of Ghent.

Giles treats the problem of incontinence in the early *Reportatio* in the context of an enquiry into whether sinning from choice (*ex electione*) is worse than sinning from weakness (*ex infirmitate*).⁹⁰ Put otherwise, Giles is asking whether to sin from habitual vice or deliberate malice is worse than to sin from passion or incontinence. Giles argues that to sin *ex electione* is indeed worse for several reasons, including that the vicious or malicious person, because his ignorance occurs at the level of universal principles, is incapable of feeling remorse for his bad actions. Sinning *ex electione* is also worse, according to Giles, because the tendency to habitual wrongdoing associated with this type of sinful action implies a bad character, which is difficult, if not impossible to cure.⁹¹ Neither of these is true of sinning *ex infirmitate* or *ex passione*.

89 Henry’s attempts to reconcile the *propositio magistralis* and articles 129 and 130 are found in his *Quodlibet* 10, dated to 1286. See in particular questions 9, 10 and 13 of this disputation. See also, Eardley, “The Problem of Moral Weakness,” 181–86.

90 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.91.42, 384: “Utrum peccatum ex electione sit gravius peccato ex passione vel infirmitate.”

91 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.91.42, 386: “Ex hiis patet quod magis peccat qui peccat ex electione quam qui peccat ex passione propter tria: Primum est quia peccatum ex electione

How might we sum up Giles's approach to incontinence in the *Reportatio*? The answer is that it is fundamentally similar to that of Aquinas, and indeed to that of Aristotle. That is, when one sins from weakness or passion, according to Giles, this is a result of passion obstructing the appropriate use of reason such that the agent fails properly to apply the universal knowledge he possesses that the object of his desire is in fact bad. Rather, he mistakenly perceives it to be good, and acts accordingly. Because the will is by nature inclined to follow the judgement of reason (*natus est sequi iudicium rationis*), once the intellect's ability correctly to assess the situation is corrupted by passion, the corruption of the will follows.⁹² The situation is rather like that of the person who becomes, while under the influence of a disordered passion, enslaved or bound (*ligatur*) to the wrongness that he desires to do. He therefore commits an action that he otherwise would not have if his reason had been functioning properly.⁹³ The foregoing account is virtually identical to Thomas's. Indeed, Giles's presentation of it is often taken verbatim from Aquinas's *Prima secundae*.⁹⁴

Note that in the foregoing account, although the will has become disordered by passion's corrupting effect on reason, it is nonetheless involved in the action, which makes it deliberate. And this is perhaps the cardinal difference between the Thomistic and (early) Aegidian account as contrasted with that of Aristotle, namely, that Aquinas, and Giles's after him, accords a role to the will

est insanabile, id est vix sanabile, peccatum ex passione sanabile. Ideo dicitur 7 *Ethicorum* quod intemperatus impenitens est, incontinens penitens. Et huius ratio est quia, manente causa, manet effectus. Et quia, peracto actu peccati imtemperati, adhuc manet causa peccati, scilicet habitus, ideo non penitet. Sed peracto actu proveniente ex passione, cessat causa, scilicet passio, et ideo statim penitet."

92 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.91.42, 385: "Impeditur enim apprehensio et iudicium rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem virtutis ymaginative et <sequitur> iudicium virtutis estimative, sicut dispositionem lingue sequitur iudicium gustus. Videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes non facile ymaginationem avertunt ab hiis circa que afficiuntur. Et ideo consequens iudicium rationis quandoque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi, et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est sequi iudicium rationis."

93 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.91.42, 385, "Et ex hoc provenit quod aliquis habet scientiam alicuius in universali, tamen ignorat in particulari propter motum rationis, quia ratio ligatur ne exeat in actum quasi quadam immutatione corporali facta, sicut in sompno et ebrietate."

94 For Giles's obvious indebtedness to Aquinas's *Prima secundae* in this work, see Eardley, "The Problem of Moral Weakness," 189–93. For some recent work on Aquinas's theory of moral weakness, see Denis Bradley, "Thomas Aquinas on Weakness of Will," in *Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present*, 82–114 and Bonnie Kent, "Aquinas and Weakness of Will," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 75 (2007), 70–91.

in all human action, incontinence included, while Aristotle does not. Accordingly, for Aquinas, the incontinent can be said to choose his bad action, while for Aristotle the akratic does not. Rather, so Aristotle thought, he acts against his choice.⁹⁵

However, although the will is involved in incontinent action for Aquinas and for Giles in the *Reportatio* there is a sense in which ignorance would appear to be the ultimate cause of the wrong action. Indeed, what is strongly implied in the foregoing account is that had the sense appetite not obscured the incontinent's ability to apprise the situation correctly, his reason would have concluded its deliberations correctly. And since *this* is the case, the will, since it is "born to follow reason", would obviously have chosen in accordance with right reason and no wrongdoing would have occurred. Such an account seems to make ignorance the source of wrongdoing.⁹⁶ As such, it was an understandably regarded as an objectionable position to those who linked moral responsibility to the autonomy of the will and its ability to act against what the intellect determines to be best.

After Giles's rehabilitation, he addressed the question of moral weakness twice in his public disputations. Indeed, almost immediately, Giles's was called upon to explain his views on incontinence. This should come as little surprise, given that Giles's early work, as we saw, was the source of the controversial magisterial proposition that had caused such embarrassment to the bishop of Paris. Accordingly, in Giles's very first public disputation—dated to the academic year of 1285–1286—a member of his audience interrogated him on this very issue. Although the published version of this disputation—*Quodlibet* 1, Question 19—purports to address the *propositio magistralis* directly, asking *ex professo* whether there can be malice in the will without some error in the intellect, the quodlibet as a whole might be characterized by a certain evasiveness. Referring to the magisterial proposition explicitly, Giles writes: "But when it was discussed at Paris, the doctors there agreed that it was not necessary that there precede error in the intellect in order that there be malice in the will. They did concede, however, that some degree of blindness in us always

95 Bonnie Kent, "Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27 (1989), 199–223.

96 Cf. Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 2.65.25, 341: "Obiectum enim intellectus est conclusio unde abstracta. Et ideo qui scit conclusionem, unde sequitur ex principiis per se notis, de necessitate scit conclusionem. Ulterius, si comparemus obiectum voluntatis et intellectus ad ea uniformiter, simile erit. Sicut enim cum aliquis assentit principiis et percipit conclusionem sequi ex principiis, de necessitate <scit> conclusionem, ita voluntas assentiens fini, sciens quod illud quod est ad finem necessarium est, sine aliqua ignorantia de necessitate vult illud."

accompanies a malicious will.”⁹⁷ Both voluntarists, as we have seen, and intellectualists concede that there is ignorance associated with incontinence. That is not the question. The question is which caused which? For voluntarists, it is the malice of the will that causes the blindness of the intellect; for intellectualists, it is the reverse. In his first *Quodlibet*, Giles argues for neither, simply asserting that the blindness of the intellect and the malice of the will happen concomitantly.⁹⁸

That Giles was exercising some degree of caution in this, his very first quodlibetal disputation is perhaps understandable. Having only just returned to Paris after a long absence, one suspects that he was reluctant to initiate further controversy so soon after having been rehabilitated. By 1288, however, Giles was much more confident in his attempts to achieve the apparently impossible reconciliation between the *propositio magistralis*, which claims that ignorance and malice occur simultaneously, with the voluntaristic insistence that the malice of the will be what ultimately causes, and therefore precedes, the blindness of the intellect.

The main part of Giles’s *Quodlibet* 3, Question 16 is devoted to a discussion of what role ignorance plays in wrongdoing, for this is where the problematic of the magisterial proposition—that is, whether ignorance precedes malice, or vice versa—lies. He therefore follows Aristotle in drawing a distinction between sinning “because of ignorance” (*per ignorantiam*) versus sinning “in ignorance” (*ignorans*). Giles moves rather quickly over the question of what it means to sin in the first sense since this is uncontroversial. Everyone agrees that ignorance in this particular sense precedes malice, since it is precisely *because of* his ignorance that such an agent does wrong.⁹⁹ The ignorance that is associated with incontinence, on the other hand, accompanies (*concomitari*) or occurs at the same time as the malice of the will. The incontinent, in short, “sins while in a state of ignorance” (*peccans ignorans*).¹⁰⁰

97 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 1.19, 40: “Sed cum hoc Parisiis ventilaretur, placuit Doctoribus ibidem existentibus quod non oporteret praecedere errorem in intellectu ad hoc ut esset malitia in voluntate. Concedebant tamen quod semper malitiam voluntatis concomitaretur in nobis aliqua coecitas <sic> intellectus.”

98 For a more in depth discussion, see Eardley, “The Problem of Moral Weakness,” 193–95. See also Pini, “Giles of Rome,” 257–58.

99 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.16 (Louvain, 1646, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1966), 182: “...cum peccamus per ignorantiam certum est quod ignorantia in ratione praecedat malitiam in voluntate quia ratio quare peccamus est ignorantia. Sic stantibus ergo conditionibus ignorantia praecedit peccatu[m], sive malitiam.”

100 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.16, 182: “Sed cum peccamus ignorantes, ignorantia videtur concomitari malitiam. Sic enim imaginamur quod peccans ignorans non ignoret in universali

In drawing out his theory of how the malice of the will can both accompany *and* precede and cause the ignorance of the intellect, Giles resorts to his theory of self-motion defended in *Quodlibet* 3, Question 15. Recall that, according to that theory, rational agents can only ever will what they regard as good, but that the will *controls* how such goods appear to the intellect, thus indirectly specifying its own act, at least when it comes to mixed goods. This is because the intellect moves naturally or quasi-naturally, that is, presents such objects to the will in a neutral, bifurcated manner. It is the *will*, then, that must impose value on the objects if any interest in the object is to be generated in the agent. This is because the will is the commanding power in the soul. Hence, when it is confronted with the possibility of committing fornication, the intellect presents such an object to the will under the description: “fornication is an immoral pleasure” (*fornicatio est delectatio inordinata*). It is up to the will to command the intellect to focus on either the illicit aspect or the pleasurable aspect. If it is the former, then the agent will make the right choice and refrain from fornication. If the latter, he will choose the illicit action.¹⁰¹

It is not difficult to see how such an account of self-motion can be applied to the issue of incontinence. If the will ultimately controls how mixed objects appear to the intellect, after which the intellect merely provides reasons, as it were, to either will or nill the object, then any ignorance associated with the choice for a lesser good is going to be, on Giles’s account, a voluntary ignorance. “In the person who sins in ignorance, and not because of ignorance, the corruption (*infectio*) of the will *precedes* the deception (*deceptio*) of reason; but the deception of reason precedes the carrying out of the deed.”¹⁰² That is, once the will of its own accord succumbs to the attraction of the pleasurable aspect

et quod ratio secundum se sit recta; obliquitatem autem, si quam habeat, habeat ex connexionem ad appetitum.”

101 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.16, 182: “Cum ergo ratio totam istam propositionem apprehendit et cum voluntas fertur in hoc totum, ut patet ex quaestione praecedenti, potest se determinare ut velit considerare alterum tantum. Cum enim intelligimus totam hanc propositionem ‘fornicatio est delectatio inordinata’ consideramus fornicationem sub duplici ratione. Sed voluntas potest se determinare ut velit considerare fornicationem sub altera ratione tantum: potest enim desistere velle considerare fornicationem quia inordinata, et insistere velle considerare ipsam quia delectabilis. Et cum hoc facit facile allicitur. Si autem e contrario facit, abhominatur. In potestate autem eius est facere hoc vel illud, potest enim esse magis facile vel magis difficile secundum quod magis vel minus consuevimus ad opera contraria.”

102 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.16, 182: “In eo ergo qui peccat ignorans, et non per ignorantiam, infectio voluntatis praecedat deceptionem rationis, sed deceptio rationis praecedat perpetrationem operis.”

of fornication, then it becomes corrupted. And once it has been corrupted it proceeds to blind the reason to view this object as good or choiceworthy. It is the will, then, that causes the ignorance that makes moral weakness possible.

Note that, on Giles's account, the perverse will only becomes disordered after it has spontaneously opted to direct the intellect's attention to the desirable aspect of the illicit object.¹⁰³ Prior to that the will, through its own innate freedom, could have commanded the intellect to focus on the fact that fornication ought not to be willed. The presupposition here is that when the incontinent chooses to direct the intellect to find a way to present objects like fornication as good, his act is one of pure freedom, that is, an act without *any* antecedent causes.

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Giles has adopted a different account of incontinence from his earlier one. In the *Reportatio*, we recall, he embraced the Thomistic account according to which passion or concupiscence blinds the intellect, thus causing the ignorance on which the illicit choice was made. In the *Quodlibetal Questions*, by contrast, it is the autonomous will, prior to any disorder, that causes the ignorance of the intellect that precedes the execution of the illicit act. Hence, the difference between the early and later accounts may be schematized as follows:

- *Aquinas/early-Giles*: passion → blindness of intellect → malice of will → illicit choice → bad act
- *Mature-Giles*: malice of will → blindness of intellect → determination of the will → illicit choice → bad act

As is obvious from the foregoing diagram, it is the malice of the will, according to Giles's mature position, that is the ultimate cause of the incontinent's

¹⁰³ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.16, 182: "Et si in potestate eius est ut attendat circa fornicationem, vel quia delectabilis vel quia inordinata, in potestate eius est ut alliciatur ad fornicationem vel abhominetur eam. Et si allicitur, ipsa iam allecta et quasi infecta, inficit rationem, ut male iudicet circa fornicationem apprehensam ut scilicet iudicet fornicationem faciendam esse quae non est facienda. Infectio enim voluntatis pervertit iudicium rationis circa agibilia sicut infectio linguae pervertit iudicium eius iuxta gustabilia. Ergo in eo qui sic peccat, nisi praecederet allectio et infectio in voluntate, non communicaretur deceptio rationis. Erit ergo in sic peccantibus hic ordo: ut prius ratio apprehendat aliquid sub duplici ratione, et hoc sine peccato non tamen sine periculo. Secundo voluntas determinet se ut velit desistere considerare de fornicatione sub hac ratione et insistere sub alia. Et prout voluntas se determinat, ratio sic exequitur ut voluntas vult, et sic considerat. Quo facto, voluntas allicitur vel abhominatur; et sic si alliciatur, allecta iudicium rationis pervertit. Quo perverso, progredimur in placitum opus."

wrongdoing. But if the malice of the will is the ultimate cause of incontinence, then it is also the cause of the blindness or darkening of the intellect that makes incontinence possible. And if this is the case, then clearly the malice of the will precedes the ignorance associated with wrongdoing. How can this be reconciled with the claim that the malice of the will and the ignorance of the intellect are simultaneous?

To resolve this difficulty, Giles resorts to the theory of the divided instant that Henry of Ghent had defended. For Giles, although both the malice of the will and the darkening of the intellect occur in the same temporal instant, that is, simultaneously, the instant itself can be divided into prior and posterior signs. When incontinence occurs, the malice of the will emerges in the prior sign along with a correct intellect. In the posterior sign, however, the intellect falls from rectitude due to the malice of will that occurred in the prior sign.¹⁰⁴ As we saw above, this was Henry of Ghent's more or less identical solution.

4 The Purpose of Human Life

Ancient and medieval theories of ethics, in contrast to their modern counterparts, tended on the whole to focus on defining the highest good, or *summum bonum*, of human beings. In this sense, they tried to address the question of what makes a person good as opposed to what makes an action right.¹⁰⁵ Arguably, the paradigm example of an ancient account of ethics is Aristotle's. His was by no means the first treatment of this branch of philosophy—Plato also had much to say about the nature of the Good and about what conditions make for well-lived life. Still, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* must certainly qualify as the first *systematic* investigation into the subject matter of ethics.¹⁰⁶ And in any case, Aristotle's account was more relevant to the authors we are addressing than was Plato's.

For Aristotle, the good life consists in the acquisition of happiness or *eudaimonia*. This in turn consists, as it were, in the possession of what we might call both internal and external goods. The former goods refer to the moral and

104 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 3.16, 183. See also, Eardley, "The Problem of Moral Weakness," 201–02.

105 Vernon Bourke, *History of Ethics*, 2 vols. (New York, 1970), 1:10.

106 For the most authoritative text and commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* see René-Antoine Gauthier and Jean Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, 4 vols. (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2002). See also John L. Akrill, "Aristotle on *eudaimonia*" in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, (ed.) Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley, 1980), 15–34; Sarah Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle* (New York, 1991) and Michael Pakaluk, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction* (Cambridge, 2005).

intellectual virtues, that is, to good qualities of the soul or inner man achieved through proper habituation. The latter, by contrast, refer to such goods as health, wealth and friendship; goods, in other words, that are external to the soul. Both types of goods are subject to fortune, but the former, once possessed, are somewhat more immune to the vicissitudes of life.¹⁰⁷ That is, whether we develop the moral and intellectual virtues or not, so Aristotle thinks, will depend on the sort of family and, indeed, the sort of polity we are born into, and these are factors that are ultimately beyond our control. Still, should we be lucky enough to be born into circumstances that allow for the cultivation of moral virtue, such qualities of the soul are difficult to lose. The same cannot be said of such goods as wealth, friends, health and any number of desirable objects that are external to the soul. The morally virtuous life, depending as it does on everyday practical flourishing, therefore has an element of luck built into it in a way that the pursuit of the intellectual virtue of wisdom does not.

Thirteenth-century scholastics such as Giles of Rome and his contemporaries agreed with Aristotle that there was an objective point, or *summum bonum* to human life. Like Aristotle, they also agreed that the present life was very vulnerable to forces and events that were ultimately outside of one's control. From this they concluded, in contrast to Aristotle, that the highest good for human beings—if it really *was* the most self-sufficient of goods, as Aristotle himself suggested—must consist in an object and an activity that transcends the present life with all of its contingencies. From the advent of Christianity, then, theologians agreed that the ultimate goal or purpose of human life must lie in some sort of union with the source of all creation, which they understood to be God. Just how this union was achieved, however, was the cause of disagreement between Giles and his contemporaries.¹⁰⁸

Generally speaking, most scholastics agreed with Aristotle that happiness (*beatitudo*)—to the extent that it consists in an activity of the soul—had to be associated with that which was highest in man.¹⁰⁹ They disagreed, however, on which faculty held primacy within the soul. To those who thought that the will was the highest faculty in man, happiness was thought fundamentally and necessarily to consist in the act of loving God. Others insisted that the highest faculty in man was the intellect, and that the purpose of human life consisted

107 Cf. Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1986), 318–77.

108 See Peter S. Eardley, "Happiness", in *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, (eds.) Karla Pollmann and Willemien Otten, 3 vols. (Oxford, 2013), 2:605–09.

109 See, e.g., Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.3.5, corp., 31: "[S]i beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis."

in coming to know the essence of God through the beatific vision. Thirteenth-century Franciscan theologians such as John Peckham (*ca.* 1225–1292), for example, tended to defend the former view, while Aquinas famously defended the latter.¹¹⁰ As for Giles of Rome, the textual evidence suggests that, although he always defended the primacy of the will with regard to this facet of his ethics, he refined his account on this subject over the course of his career.¹¹¹

Unlike his approach to the freedom of the will and incontinence, which owe much to Aquinas, Giles's treatment of the final end for man in the *Reportatio* represents a significant departure from that of his former teacher. For Aquinas, although the will cooperates with the intellect in the achievement of the final end, none of its acts can be what the perfection of the agent consists in *per se*. This is because the will is a type of appetite. Specifically, it is a movement towards the good when absent, and an enjoyment of it once achieved.¹¹² Accordingly, it cannot be what perfection consists in. And in any case, for Aquinas, the intellect is the highest power in the soul. Created happiness therefore consists, so Thomas thinks, in the beatific vision. Only then will our desire to know the *causa causarum* or *prima causa*, which is God, come to rest, and our intellects be fully perfected.¹¹³ In short, for Aquinas, happiness chiefly consists in an act of the intellect: the knowledge of God.

110 John Peckham, *Quodlibet* 1.5 (Grottaferrata, 1989), 16: "Dico quod beatitudo consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis ..."; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.3.4, corp., 29: "Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit..."; and *ibid.*, 3.8, corp., 35: "Respondeo dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae."

111 For a more in depth treatment of this topic, see Peter S. Eardley, "Conceptions of Happiness and Human Destiny in the Late Thirteenth Century," *Vivarium* 44 (2006), 276–304. See also Anthony Celano, "Act of the Intellect or Act of the Will: The Critical Reception of Aristotle's Ideal of Human Perfection in the 13th and Early 14th Centuries," *AHDLM* 57 (1990), 93–119; Lenn Goodman, "Happiness," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, 1:457–71 and Georg Wieland, "Happiness: The Perfection of Man," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 673–86.

112 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.3.4, corp., 29: "Dico ergo quod quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis. Manifestum est enim ex praemissis quod beatitudo est consecutio finis ultimi. Consecutio autem finis non consistit in ipso actu voluntatis. Voluntas autem fertur in finem et absentem, cum ipsum desiderat; et praesentem, cum in ipso requiescens delectatur."

113 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.3.8, corp., 36: "Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit"

Still, although Giles, in contrast to Aquinas, argues that the final end for human beings is achieved through an act of the will, he seems to defend this view with an eye to Aquinas's own teachings. In the *Reportatio*, for instance, he asserts that beatitude is twofold. First, it consists of an object, which is God, and second in a psychological act of the agent which unites him to God.¹¹⁴ Aquinas held an identical position, which he called "created" and "uncreated" beatitude, respectively.¹¹⁵ But while Aquinas agreed that beatitude understood as an object is God, he also argued that, when understood as a subject, it consisted, as we saw, in an act of the intellect. Giles argues, on the contrary, that what Aquinas calls "created" happiness accrues to the will. As if to justify why Thomas might have erred in attributing happiness to a perfection of the intellect, however, Giles attempts to explain how the ancient philosophers (*philosophi*) got it wrong. Because they relied on natural reason alone, they could not see anything of the divine essence. At best, they could only witness God's effects in the world. Of these effects, the noblest they could discern was human understanding. They therefore posited happiness in this activity.¹¹⁶ The suggestion here is that Thomas, without naming him, is following the *philosophi* in this error.

How then do we know that happiness consists in an act of the will rather than the intellect? For Giles, we have this both on authority and on reason. On authority, because the *beati* are certain that there exists something better than the material world. They know that our final end is God, and that the activity of the soul that brings us closest to God must comprise human happiness.¹¹⁷ On Giles's account, the activity that achieves this belongs to the will rather than the intellect, a fact that can be established philosophically. How so? Because first and foremost, understanding (*intelligere*) is merely a motion of the object

114 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.24.49, 483: "Duplex est beatitudo: quedam est extra, et hoc est finale obiectum, quod est summum bonum, scilicet Deus. Alia est beatitudo que consistit in actu beati, quo unitur illi summo bono."

115 See Eardley, "Conceptions of Happiness and Human Destiny," 288–89.

116 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.24.49, 483: "Et quia philosophi non viderunt illud summum bonum per essentiam, ideo non posuerunt beatitudinem in eo, sed solum in aliquo actu intelligendi, quia intelligere naturale hominis non se extendit ad essentiam divinam, sed ad effectus divinos. Et quia nullum intelligibile naturaliter a nobis est ita perfectum sicut actus intelligendi illius, propter hoc non posuerunt beatitudinem in aliqua re extra, sed solum in intelligere intellectus"

117 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.24.49, 483: "Sed beati, qui certi sunt de aliqua meliori re, scilicet divina essentia, cui coniunguntur, quam sciunt habere omnem modum beatitudinis et cui possibile est hominem uniri, ponunt principaliter beatitudinem suam per comparisonem ad divinam essentiam, ita quod Deus est beatitudo hominis."

known into the soul, while willing (*velle*) is a motion of the soul towards the thing desired or loved. Knowing God merely makes him present to us in human terms with all its limitations. The act of *loving* God, by contrast, “joins the blessed soul to God in a divine mode (*modus divinus*).”¹¹⁸ Another way of putting this is to say that, in the act of knowing God there can only be generated in the blessed soul a human representation of God, since everything that is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. The will’s act of loving God, by contrast, “transforms (*transformat*) the lover into the beloved and places the lover into the beloved object.”¹¹⁹ In short, in loving God, so Giles claims, “the blessed soul is in God.”¹²⁰

In the mature *Quodlibetal* Questions, Giles will further refine this account. Still, he would maintain his basic view that love acts as a transformational force. This is because love, which is an act of the will, seeks to unite itself with the object of its love, a claim that Giles would derive from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. “[T]he lover, such as he is, does not will the presence of the beloved only on account of love itself, but indeed for the sake of the beloved thing itself, to which, as far as he is able, he wills to join himself.”¹²¹ The highest sort of love is that, naturally, whose object is the highest of all beings: God. When rational agents love God *in patria* they experience a certain extasy (*extasim*), which, according to Giles, “places lovers beyond themselves.”¹²² For Giles,

118 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.24.49, 483: “[I]ntelligere est motus rei ad animam, ita quod intelligere est per receptionem intelligibilis in anima. Et quia omne quod recipitur, recipitur per modum recipientis, ideo intelligere divinam essentiam <fit> secundum modum recipientis anime. Sed velle est motus anime ad rem, qui transformat amantem in amatum et ponit amantem in amato. Et sic patet quod coniungit animam beatam Deo secundum modum divinum”

119 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.24.49, 483: “Sed velle est motus anime ad rem, qui transformat amantem in amatum et ponit amantem in amato.”

120 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio* 4.24.49, 483: “[In] intelligendo Deus est in anima beata, in volendo anima beata est in Deo.”

121 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 277 “sed amans, secundum quod huiusmodi, non vult praesentiam amati solum propter ipsum amorem, enim vero propter ipsam rem amatam cui, quantum potest, vult se coniungere; imo secundum quod huiusmodi quantum posset vellet seipsam in ipsam transformare. Ideoque est quod unire et transformare amori appropriantur, ut patet per Dionysium, 4. Cap. *De divinis nominibus*, recitante verba Hierarchea ‘quod omnis amor est quaedam virtus unitiva’”

122 Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 5.5, 277: “Divinus ergo amor, id est amor quo diligimus Deum, est faciens extasim, id est ponens amantes extra seipsos, non permittens eos amare sive ipsos amantes esse sui ipsorum ... Amor enim non permittit quod amans fit sui ipsius sed cogit amantem esse rei amatae quare si transformare nos in Deum et quantum in se est, quid idem facere cum eo sit multo maior quam quaecumque alia unio nostri ad Deum.”

then, the final end in the *Quodlibets*, as it was in the early *Reportatio*, consists not so much in a *perfection* of self, as in the *transcendence* of the self. This view would ultimately be inspired by and derive from the mystical tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius, and was a view that he would share with Henry of Ghent.¹²³

5 Conclusion

In his views on ethics and moral psychology, Giles of Rome was nothing if not a dynamic thinker who did not hesitate to change his mind, sometimes quite radically, when the situation warranted. This should come as no surprise—it would be strange indeed if a thinker never altered his opinions on anything as he grows in intellectual maturity. That Giles sometimes revised his views often came in reaction to criticism from such formidable contemporaries as Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, as we saw on the questions of the freedom of the will and of moral weakness. Such criticisms forced Giles to revisit his own positions and therefore clarify them, sometimes several times over the course of his long academic and ecclesiastical career. Often, such revisions would show the influence of Aquinas, although Giles would almost always take them in original directions. Finally, it is necessary to appreciate, as a significant factor shaping the growth of his thought, what must surely have been the enormous pressure that came to bear on Giles when he was, at a comparatively young age, made the official spokesman of the OESA. After this point, he was not just speaking for himself in his published writings, but for his entire order and, therefore, posterity.

¹²³ Cf. Eardley, "Conceptions of Happiness and Human Destiny," 276–304.

Logic, Rhetoric, and Language

Costantino Marmo

1 Introduction

In this chapter Giles of Rome's commentaries on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and on some of his logical works, such as the *Sophistici elenchi* and the *Posterior Analytics*, together with some short treatises, will be presented in their broad outlines and discussed.¹ These works comprise Giles's contribution to the philosophy of language and, taken together, demonstrate both continuity with, as well as departures from the older tradition. For instance, while Aristotle's logical works had a longer or shorter tradition of commentaries in the 12th- and 13th-century universities, his treatise on rhetoric was an almost unknown work when Giles decided to write a commentary on it. Therefore, while Giles could count, in the case of the *Sophistici elenchi* and the *Posterior Analytics*, on some previous models and on a standard set of questions discussed with reference to those texts, he had almost no tools for confronting the difficult task of explaining and discussing Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Furthermore, when he started his undertaking as a commentator on Aristotle's works, Giles was probably very young: his commentary on the *Rhetoric* is dated to around 1272–73 and represents probably his very first attempt at the genre of scholastic writing.

His method of commenting, in all three of the works that I shall deal with, conforms to the genre of the *Sententia*-commentary, regularly adopted by Giles in his Aristotelian commentaries.² That is, he first proposes a *divisio textus* that shows the logical articulation of the text in general and of every commented portion (single sentences or even single words).³ He then moves to

1 Because the critical editions have yet to appear, all references to these commentaries will be taken from their 15th- and 16th-century editions: Giles of Rome, *Super libros Rhetoricorum*, (Venice 1515; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968); Giles of Rome, *Super libros Elenchorum* (Venice, 1496; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Giles of Rome, *Super libros Posteriorum Analyticorum* (Venice 1496; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967).

2 Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici (Parte II)," *Documenti e studi* 2 (1991), 1–74, 5–11.

3 As Marmo and Bertagna show, the *divisio textus* plays a very important role in Giles's interpretation of Aristotle's works: it tries to make explicit the intrinsic logical consistency of these texts, even when (as the contemporary debates among interpreters make clear) there is none or when the texts are the ambiguous result of successive reworkings. See Costantino

the *expositio litterae*, or the literal explanation of the text, which he often rephrases, sometimes adding references to other commentaries or translations. These are frequently used to assist in interpreting difficult passages. Finally, he commonly adds some discussions of specific problems under the headings of *notabilia* or *notanda* (short annotations) and *declarationes* or *dubitationes* (shorter or longer digressions or discussions).⁴

Besides having authored the aforementioned commentaries, in the first part of his career Giles also wrote some short treatises on different subjects, such as *De partibus philosophiae essentialibus* (*On the Essential Parts of Philosophy*) and the *De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae* (*On the Difference between Rhetoric, Ethics, and Politics*).⁵ The latter will be relevant later on, while discussing the relationships between rhetoric, dialectic, and ethics. The former work, on the other hand, gives us a glimpse into Giles's conception of the place of the disciplines of language in his classification of the sciences.

The *De partibus philosophiae essentialibus* was probably written soon after Giles's commentaries on the *Physics* and the *Sophistici elenchi*, but before his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, i.e. between 1275 and 1285.⁶ While in his previous commentaries Giles had only developed certain branches of his general classification of the sciences, here he offers a broader and fuller account of his taxonomy. The basic principle upon which Giles roots his general picture remains the same throughout his various works, though: the distinction between the different scientific domains derives from their respective objects,

Marmo, "L'utilizzazione delle traduzioni latine della *Rhetorica* nel commento di Egidio Romano (1272–1273)," in *La Rhétorique d'Aristote: traditions et commentaires de l'Antiquité au XVII^e siècle*, (eds.) Gilbert Dahan and Irène Rosier-Catach (Paris, 1998), 111–34; and Mario Bertagna, "La *divisio textus* nel commento di Egidio Romano agli *Analitici Posteriori*. Parte I," *Documenti e studi* 13 (2002), 285–371; Mario Bertagna, "La *divisio textus* nel commento di Egidio Romano agli *Analitici Posteriori*. Parte II," *Documenti e studi* 14 (2003), 263–326; Mario Bertagna, "La *divisio textus* nel commento di Egidio Romano agli *Analitici Posteriori*. Parte III," *Documenti e studi* 15 (2004), 439–86.

4 See Francesco Del Punta, "The Genre of Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought," in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der S.I.E.P.M., 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt*, (eds.) Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 1998), 138–51, for a survey on the genre of commentaries in the 13th century, their structure and evolution.

5 An edition of the *De partibus*, which is a transcription from the *incunabulum* edition of Leipzig 1490, can be found in Mikolaj Olszewski, "Philosophy according to Giles of Rome: *De partibus philosophiae essentialibus*," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 7 (1998), 195–220, 214–20; Giles of Rome, *De differentiae rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae*, (ed.) Gerardo Bruni, *The New Scholasticism* 6 (1932), 1–18.

6 Olszewski, "Philosophy according to Giles of Rome," 195.

which allows Giles to single out four major areas. The fundamental distinction is that between two basic types of beings (*entia*), that is, between real beings, or those that exist outside of the human mind, and intentional beings, or those whose existence is dependent on the human mind. Real beings can be further subdivided into (1) beings that cause human cognitions, (2) beings that derive from human actions as an independent product (*factum*), and (3) beings that originate from human actions without producing anything independent, yet nonetheless contribute to the perfection of human life, whether this be felicity or virtue.⁷ From these types of beings a first distinction between the sciences—or arts—emerges: respectively that between the rational sciences, the speculative sciences, the mechanical arts, and the moral sciences.⁸

Giles had already made clear in his commentary on the *Sophistici Elenchi* that the objects of the rational sciences are not the acts of the human intellect, as Thomas Aquinas had suggested in his commentaries on the *De interpretatione* and the *Posterior Analytics*. Rather, they are the intentional beings produced by intellectual activity, i.e. mental terms, or simple concepts, and definitions, propositions, and modes of argumentation.⁹ Although Giles's classification of Aristotle's logical works is not very different from the one that had been worked out by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, he did depart from them over the question of whether rhetoric was a part of logic. That is, both Albert and Thomas had adopted the Neoplatonic framework of an enlarged conception of logic, influenced by Arabic sources, according to which both rhetoric and poetics were included in the *Organon*.¹⁰

7 Giles of Rome, *De partibus*, 215: "Prima ergo divisione sic dividi possunt entia: quaedam sunt causae scientiae nostrae, quaedam vero sunt causata a nobis et ab intellectu nostro. Ea vero, quae ab intellectu nostro causantur, in triplici genere esse videntur, quia quaedam sunt intentionalia, ut intentiones, quae sumunt originem ex actionibus rationis, quaedam vero dicuntur esse realia; et haec distinguuntur, quia quaedam sunt factibilia, quaedam agibilia. Factibilia autem dicuntur, ex quibus resultat aliquod factum vel aliquid in effectum, cuiusmodi sunt opera artium mechanicarum ... Agibilia vero sunt opera deservientia nobis ad vitam perfectam sive ad vitam virtuosam et felicem, ex quibus non resultat aliquod factum"

8 Giles of Rome, *De partibus*, 216: "Nam scientiarum sive artium quaedam sunt speculativae reales, quaedam rationales, quaedam morales, quaedam mechanicae. De entibus igitur realibus causantibus scientiam nostram sunt scientiae speculativae. De intentionalibus vero sunt scientiae rationales. De agilibus vero sunt morales. De factilibus sunt artes mechanicae."

9 See Costantino Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word to the Significance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Thirteenth Century Scholasticism," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin* 60 (1990), 145–198 and Olszewski, "Philosophy According to Giles of Rome."

10 For the Arabic tradition on this see Deborah L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden, 1990).

Giles's approach to this taxonomy was different, as we shall see, probably because in writing a commentary proper on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* he had the opportunity to explore the topic in depth. His predecessors, by contrast, simply embraced the conception of a "great logic" without considering all of its theoretical implications. To be sure, in his *De partibus* Giles does not go very far either, but simply says that rhetoric, like logic, is a rational science, albeit one that does not form an essential part of philosophy.¹¹ The important point, however, is that in this work rhetoric comprises no part of logic for Giles, but is merely recognized as *akin* to it. Moreover, he neglects to treat its relationship to the moral sciences, which is the topic of the other short treatise mentioned above and of some *declarationes* in his commentary on the *Rhetoric*.

The distinction between the types of intentional beings—namely terms, propositions, and the various modes of argumentation—along with their articulations, marks the various divisions of the Aristotelian logical works. Terms are dealt with in the *Categories*, propositions in the *De interpretatione*, and syllogistic and topical argumentation—be this necessary or defective—is discussed in the books of the so-called *ars* or *logica nova*, which included the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and the *Sophistici elenchi*. Giles casts aside any attempt to elaborate further a subdivision of rhetoric.

While there is no mention of poetics in Giles's classification, he assigns a peculiar position to grammar, and this is worth mentioning because it appears to be in complete disagreement with the contemporary mainstream conception of grammar as a science.¹² Concisely put, the proposal of a speculative grammar, advanced in the late 1260s by Martin of Dacia and Boethius of Dacia in their treatises and commentaries on Priscian, implied the idea that grammar does not deal with phonic expressions (*voces*). Rather, it has to do with certain general features of language, such as the *modi significandi*, or features that can be found in all historical languages, and the *modi essendi*, or features

11 According to Giles, only speculative sciences fall into this class, see Giles of Rome, *De partibus*, 216: "Harum autem artium solae speculativae essentialis partes philosophiae dicuntur ... Artes autem rationales etiam essentialis pars philosophiae esse non possunt."

12 Giles refers to poetics only in his commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, saying that it is based on gestures and representations. See *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 1ra: "[I]nnititur in aliis gestibus et representationibus." I do not think that here *gestibus* should be interpreted as history, *res gesta*, as B.S. Robert, "Rhetoric and Dialectic: According to the First Latin Commentary on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle," *The New Scholasticism* 31 (1957), 484–98, 489, suggests; cf. Costantino Marmo, "Carattere dell'oratore e recitazione nel commento di Giovanni di Jandun al terzo libro della *Rhetorica*," in *Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento: Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi*, (ed.) Luca Bianchi (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), 17–31, 24, n. 17, with reference to Giles's commentary on the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

that are derived from the properties of real beings.¹³ These two tenets of the so-called modistic approach to grammar allowed the grammarians—in Martin's and Boethius's view—to hold that their discipline is not only an *ars* that rules the way men produce linguistic items, but a speculative science in the strong Aristotelian sense. That is to say, grammar has as its object a real being, or at least something that is grounded in the objective properties of real beings, and a universal one, that is, something common to all languages, and that cannot be identified with their phonic expression.

It is surprising to find that Giles does not agree with any of these tenets. As he says in his commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi*, grammar must be conceived as a *sermocinalis scientia*, a linguistic science, instead of one that is *rationalis*—like logic or rhetoric—because its main goal is the regulation of language so that the speaker does not make mistakes while speaking. In his *De partibus*, he adds that grammar should be considered outside the domain of philosophy altogether, since in many ways it contains an element of arbitrariness.¹⁴ These few comments on grammar make clear that Giles holds a relatively traditional view of the object of grammar and of its epistemological status. First and foremost is the fact that it deals with phonic expressions (*voces*), a feature that makes each language different from any other, and is traditionally taken as a proof of the arbitrariness of (spoken) language.¹⁵ Given its object, grammar cannot be listed among either the rational or the real, that is, speculative sciences. Since Giles's annotations are so sketchy, however, it is difficult to say whether they depend on a superficial knowledge of the new trends in linguistic thought—which is quite probable, considering his very young age—or whether they express a conscious and deliberate statement against the Modist view of grammar.¹⁶

13 Cf. Costantino Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica: Parigi, Bologna, Erfurt 1270–1330. La semiotica dei Modisti* (Rome, 1994), 137–264.

14 Giles of Rome, *De partibus*, 216: “grammatica ... in multis ad placitum esse videtur”; Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 1ra.

15 Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 16a3–6.

16 Giles shows some acquaintance with Modistic debates when he refers to the speculations about the *adinventor grammatice*, who should have been a metaphysician because of his knowledge of both *modi significandi* and *intelligendi*: it is interesting that he omits the *modi essendi*, which are the main reason for claiming such a philosophical competence in the creator of grammar. See Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 5ra; but cf. *In Physicam* 3.4 (Venice 1502; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), fol. 56rb, quoted in Costantino Marmo, “Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari ... Egidio Romano e Tommaso d'Aquino sulle passioni dell'anima,” *Documenti e studi* 2 (1991), 281–315, 286–287, n. 28, where all the three types of *modi* are taken into account.

2 Giles's Commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

The commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is very probably the first work by Giles of Rome, having been written in the years 1272–73.¹⁷ This was only a few years after William of Moerbeke finished his new translation from the Greek around 1269.¹⁸ It should be noted that Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was not the first to be produced during the 13th century. An anonymous *Translatio vetus* from the Greek was done in the first half of the same century and a translation from the Arabic, together with some excerpts from Averroes's commentary and from Avicenna's *Shifa'*, was done in the years 1246/47–1256 by Hermannus Alemannus.¹⁹ Giles's commentary is therefore not only his first scholastic work, but it is also the first extant commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It is well known that Albert the Great and Boethius of Dacia commented upon it, too; their commentaries, however, do not survive, and Giles does not appear to have had any knowledge of them.

At the very beginning of his work, Giles affirms that the task of commenting upon the *Rhetoric* seems to be very difficult because of both the intricacies of the text—made even worse by Aristotle's extreme conciseness—and the lack of helping texts (*paucitas auxiliorum*).²⁰ As an absolute beginner, Giles faced a very complex text with almost no assistance other than his own background knowledge. And although he knew Aristotle's *Organon* and other philosophical works, he probably had little or no acquaintance with classical Ciceronian rhetoric.²¹ The only tools he had at his disposal were the two

17 Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici (Parte I)," *Documenti e studi* 1 (1990), 1–111, 20–24.

18 Cf. Bernd Schneider, "Praefatio", in *Rhetorica: Translatio Anonyma sive Vetus et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka* (Aristoteles Latinus; Leiden, 1978), 31.1–2: vi–lv, xxviii.

19 See William F. Boggess "Hermannus Alemannus's Rhetorical Translations," *Viator* 2 (1971), 227–50, 247–49; Gilbert Dahan, "L'entrée de la Rhétorique d'Aristote dans le monde latin entre 1240 et 1270," in *La Rhétorique d'Aristote: traditions et commentaires de l'Antiquité au XVII^e siècle*, (eds.) Gilbert Dahan et Irène Rosier-Catach (Paris, 1998), 65–86.

20 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 1ra: "Quam petitionem licet mihi gravem non modicum: etiam praeter difficultatem quae in dicto consurgit opere, non solum ex graeca editione, ex philosophi brevi elocutione, sed ex multiplicitate exemplorum, et paucitate auxiliorum reddat occupationum pluralitas"

21 Giles starts referring to Cicero (in general, and not to any specific work) only in his *De Differentia*. See Gerardo Bruni, "The *De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae* of Aegidius Romanus," *The New Scholasticism* 6 (1932), 1–18, 5; cf. James J. Murphy, "The Scholastic Condemnation of Rhetoric in the Commentary of Giles of Rome on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle," in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age, Actes du quatrième congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Montréal, 27 août—2 sept. 1967* (Montreal, 1969), 833–41, 836, and

previous translations of the *Rhetoric*, together with al-Fārābī's *Didascalía in Rhetoricam*, translated from the Arabic by Hermannus Alemannus during the 1250s. Because of its fullness and its quality, Giles's work was recognized by subsequent commentators, such as John of Jandun and John Buridan, as the *expositio par excellence* of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.²²

3 Rhetoric's Place in Thirteenth-Century Teaching

Studies of the presence of rhetoric in 13th-century university teaching have basically confirmed the conclusions of the pioneering work of James J. Murphy, who identified Giles's commentary as the principal factor responsible for the lack of interest shown in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the elaboration of "the medieval theory of discourse".²³ Instead, the medieval scholastic—and, according

in his commentary on the *Posterior analytics*. See Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. A4va.

22 This commentary probably had a twofold redaction. The edition and some manuscripts present some additions that are absent from other manuscripts. One of them is in the prologue, and represents a quite traditional humility statement: "quia honus expositoris assumpsi (assensi, S), nolo mihi ascribi que (quia, *ed.*) proferam, sed talem promulgabo sententiam qualem credam Aristotelem intendisse" ("since I assumed the commentator's burden, I do not want to be considered the author of what I will write, but I will rather express the sense that I believe was intended by Aristotle." Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 1ra; S = Paris, Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne, 120, fol. 1ra, in Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word," 188, n.161). Other manuscripts omit this portion of text, while they present an addition with a probable reference to Thomas Aquinas, which both the edition and S omit (cf. Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word," 188; Ubaldo Staico, "Retorica e politica in Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi* 3 (1992), 1–75, 2, 32, adds that also the ms. Vat. lat. 833, fol. 1rb presents the same variant). This hypothesis, however, will remain just an incidental annotation until a critical edition of Giles's commentary sees the light.

23 Murphy, "The Scholastic Condemnation," 840. See, for instance, P. Osmund Lewry, "Rhetoric at Paris and Oxford in the Mid-Thirteenth Century," *Rhetorica* 1 (1983), 45–63; Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word"; Staico "Retorica e politica"; Gordon Leff, "The *Trivium* and the three Philosophies," in *Universities in the Middle Ages*, (ed.) Hilde de Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge, 1992), 307–16; Karin M. Fredborg, "The Scholastic Teaching of Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin* 55 (1987), 85–105; Karin M. Fredborg, "Ciceronian Rhetoric and the Schools," in *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval Universities*, (ed.) John van Engen (Notre Dame, 2000), 21–41; Martin Camargo, *Medieval Rhetorics of Prose Composition: Five English Artes Dictandi and Their Tradition* (Binghamton, NY, 1995); Martin, Camargo, "Tria sunt: The Long and the Short of Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Documentum de modo et arte dicendi et versificandi*," *Speculum* 74 (1999), 935–55; John O. Ward, "Rhetoric in the Faculty of Arts at the Universities of

to Murphy, post-Aegidian—fate of the *Rhetoric* was an association with the practical sciences. That is, the work is almost always accompanied in manuscripts by either Aristotle's *Ethics* or his *Politics*, or both.²⁴ The manuscript evidence for the *Rhetoric* having been studied in connection with moral philosophy seems to be supported by a passage in Roger Bacon's *Opus maius*, written a few years before Giles's commentary, which mentions the importance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* for persuading people to act rightly.²⁵ Giles's commentary, however, suggested a different and more complex framework, where rhetoric is linked both to logic (or dialectic) and to moral philosophy, without embracing either the Neoplatonic standpoint of a subordination of rhetoric to logic, or the Ciceronian view of the inclusion of rhetoric into civil science.

4 Rhetoric and Dialectic

The transmission to the Latin world of the Neoplatonic view of a "great logic", encompassing the traditional *Organon* and the books of *Rhetoric* and of *Poetics*, through the mediation of the Arabic philosophers, such as al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī, has been thoroughly studied by Deborah L. Black.²⁶ In the Latin universities this model saw some success thanks to the contributions of Albert the Great, Roger Bacon and, in particular, Thomas Aquinas, whose commentaries on the *De interpretatione* and the *Posterior Analytics* had a profound influence on the Parisian (and Bolognese) Masters of Arts.

Thomas's articulation of the domain of logic was based, first and foremost, on a threefold distinction of the acts of the human soul—simple apprehension,

Paris and Oxford in the Middle Ages: a Summary of the Evidence," *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 54 (1996), 159–231; Charles F. Briggs, "Aristotle's *Rhetorica* in the Later Medieval Universities: A Reassessment," *Rhetorica* 25 (2007), 243–68; Costantino Marmo, "Les actes de langage entre logique, rhétorique et théologie au Moyen Âge," in *La genèse des actes de parole, Actes du colloque internationale, Paris, 5–6 octobre 2007*, (ed.) Barbara Cassin (Turnhout, 2010), 259–80.

24 Murphy, "The Scholastic Condemnation," 840; Briggs, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," 253–58.

25 Irène Rosier-Catach, "Roger Bacon, al-Fārābī et Augustin: rhétorique, logique et philosophie morale," in *La Rhétorique d'Aristote: traditions et commentaires de l'Antiquité au XVII^e siècle*, (eds.) Gilbert Dahan and Irène Rosier-Catach (Paris, 1998), 87–110; Costantino Marmo, "Logique élargie et sémiotique: Albert le Grand, Roger Bacon et Gilles de Rome," in *Ad notitiam ignoti. L'Organon dans la translatio studiorum à l'époque d'Albert le Grand* (Turnhout, 2013), 447–65.

26 See Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics*.

affirmation and negation, and inferential reasoning—that allowed him to distinguish between the *Categories*, the *De interpretatione*, and the *Logica nova*.²⁷ The last one was then further divided into a part devoted to judgement, which was associated with the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, while another part focused on invention, and was associated with the *Topics*, the *Rhetoric*, and the *Poetics*.²⁸ Finally, a third part was aimed at detecting and refuting fallacious forms of reasoning, and was associated with Aristotle's *Sophistici elenchi*.²⁹ The books included in the second branch of the *Logica nova* were distinguished according to the cognitive habits of the modes of argumentation used in each science, which was the same criterion used by the Arabic philosophers. If dialectic, with its probable modes of argumentation, could engender faith or opinion (*fides vel opinio*), rhetoric could achieve only a lower degree of certainty, called by Thomas “suspicion” (*suspicio*), and poetics an even lesser one, called “estimation” (*aestimatio*).³⁰

Many Masters of Arts adopted Thomas's division of logic, with its inclusion of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, but did not otherwise pay much attention to these two works.³¹ Their adhesion to the paradigm of a great logic, just like

27 Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum* 1.1 (Opera Omnia; Rome, 1989), 1.2:4–5: “Sunt autem rationis tres actus. Quorum primi duo sunt rationis secundum quod est intellectus quidam: una enim actio intellectus est intellegencia indivisibilium, siue incomplexorum, secundum quam concipit quid est res, et haec operatio a quibusdam dicitur informatio intellectus siue ymaginatio per intellectum; et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina quam tradit Aristotiles in libro Predicamentorum; secunda uero operatio intellectus est compositio uel diuisio intellectuum, in qua est iam uerum et falsum; et huic rationis actui deseruit doctrina quam tradit Aristotiles in libro Peryermenias. Tercius uero actus rationis est secundum id quod est proprium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deueniat in cognitionem ignoti; et huic actui deseruiunt reliqui libri logice.”

28 Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum* 1.1, 5–7.

29 Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum* 1.1, 7.

30 Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum* 1.1, 6–7: “Per huiusmodi enim processum quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat sciencia, fit tamen fides uel opinio, propter probabilitatem propositionum ex quibus proceditur ... et ad hoc ordinatur topica siue dyaletica ... Quandoque uero non fit complete fides uel opinio, set suspicio quedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinetur in hanc quam in illam; et ad hoc ordinatur rethorica.”

31 Marmo, “*Suspicio*. A Key Word;” Deborah L. Black, “Traditions and Transformations in the Medieval Approach to Rhetoric and Related Linguistic Arts,” in *L'Enseignement de la philosophie au XIII^e siècle. Autour de la “Guide de l'étudiant” du ms. Ripoll 109*, (ed.) Claude Lafleur (Turnhout, 1997), 233–54.

that of Thomas Aquinas, was very superficial and had no implications for the actual functions of the “new” parts of logic.³² Only two philosophers advanced a different and personal position on the relationship of rhetoric and logic (or dialectic): Radulphus Brito and Giles of Rome. The first, commenting on the fourth book of Boethius’ *De topicis differentiis* in the 1290s, excludes rhetoric (and poetics) from the domain of logic, whose parts parallel the various kinds of second intentions of syllogisms.³³

In a question devoted to the relationship between rhetoric and logic, Radulphus Brito asserts that rhetoric can be considered in two ways. In one way, it might be thought of as *docens*, in which case it is a science like all the others producing *per causas* knowledge of its objects. In another way, it might be thought of as *utens*—i.e. as applicable to other fields—in which case it produces a weak cognitive habit called *credulitas* or *suspicio*.³⁴ Implicitly, Brito indicates the theoretical weakness of Thomas’s division of logic, which ends up classifying rhetoric—and, indeed, poetics—not as a science in the proper sense (i.e. as *docens*), but rather as a method of inquiry applied to other fields (i.e. as *utens*). As far as the differences between logic and rhetoric are concerned, Brito holds that they should be kept distinct for three reasons. First, they have different subjects (*syllogismus dialecticus* vs. *oratio persuasiva*). Second, they make use of different instruments (*syllogismus*—*inductio* vs. *enthymema*—*exemplum*). Finally, they have opposite aims and addressees

32 While Averroes’s *Expositio in Poetiam* was translated from the Arabic by Hermannus Alemannus in 1256, Aristotle’s *Poetics* was to be translated from the Greek only in 1278 by William of Moerbeke. See Boggess, “Hermannus Alemannus’s Rhetorical Translations”; Gilbert Dahan, “Notes et textes sur la *Poétique* au Moyen Âge,” *AHDLMA* 47 (1980), 171–239. This section will follow Marmo, “*Suspicio*. A Key Word,” 187–91.

33 It was used as a textbook of rhetoric in the first half of 13th century. See Lewry, “Rhetoric at Paris and Oxford.”

34 Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones in De differentiis topicis Boethii* 4.1, (ed.) Niels-Jørgen Green-Pedersen, *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 26 (1978), 85: “Dico quod simile iudicium est de rhetorica et de dialectica, quia Philosophus dicit in principio Rhetoricae suae quod rhetorica assecutiva est dialecticae. Modo dialectica potest sumi dupliciter: uno modo pro habitu acquisito per syllogismum dialecticum de aliqua conclusione, et talis est utens, id est dialectica qua utimur applicando syllogismum dialecticum ad quamlibet materiam. Alia autem est dialectica docens, et est ista habitus aggeneratus in nobis de syllogismo dialectico per eius principia et causas; et talis habitus est scientia. Eodem modo poterimus distinguere de rhetorica, scilicet quod rhetorica potest accipi pro habitu aggenerato in nobis de oratione persuasiva per eius causas et propria principia. ... Minor patet, quia rhetorica isto modo est quaedam credulitas generata per quasdam persuasiones, quia argumenta rhetorica solam generant suspicionem.” Cf. Marmo, “*Suspicio*. A Key Word,” 185–86.

(*ad movendum virtutem apprehensivam* vs. *ad movendum virtutem irascibilem et concupiscibilem*).³⁵

In his commentary on the *Rhetoric*, some twenty years prior to Brito, Giles of Rome went deeper into the examination of this topic than any of his colleagues and, like Brito, ended up disagreeing with Thomas. According to Giles, even if rhetoric is very akin to dialectic, it is in no sense subordinated to it. Differently from Brito, however, he remains within Thomas's theoretical model, although, as will also be the case with the emotions, Giles nonetheless tries to distinguish certain details of his position from those of Thomas. He argues that the differences between logic (or dialectic) and rhetoric depend on the cognitive habits they generate in the human mind: while dialectic produces opinion, rhetoric brings about *fides* or *credulitas* instead of *suspicio*, as Thomas had suggested.³⁶ To some extent, Giles's choice of terminology is a result of the translation from which he was working. While *fides* is the word used by the anonymous translator of the *Vetus* to render the Greek *pistis*, the Latin term *credulitas* was the translation for the Arabic equivalent of the same Greek term in Hermannus's translation of al-Fārābī's *Didascalía in rhetoricam*.³⁷ Giles also makes a reference to Thomas's terminology, when he adds:

35 Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones in De differentiis topicis Boethii* 4.2, 88–89: "Dico quod rhetorica et dialectica sunt distinctae scientiae, quia illae scientiae sunt distinctae quae sunt de distinctis subiectis vel de eodem diversimode considerato, quia utrumque istorum facit distinctionem in scientiis. ... dialectica est de syllogismo dialectico ut ordinatur ad generandum opinionem, rhetorica autem est de oratione persuasiva vel de modo persuadendi iudici ... Etiam differunt in instrumento, quia rhetoricus utitur enthymemate et exemplo, non enim utitur syllogismo, quia impossibile vel saltem difficile est invenire propositionem universalem in materia rhetorica sine instantia. ... Nec utitur inductione, scilicet inducendo in omnibus singularibus, sed utitur exemplo ... Sed dialecticus utitur syllogismo et inductione. Item differunt in modo considerandi, quia dialecticus determinat de oratione dialectica ut ordinatur ad movendum virtutem apprehensionis, sicut intellectum speculativum. Sed oratio persuasiva, de qua est rhetorica, non ordinatur ad hoc ut speculetur, sed ordinatur ad movendum appetitum iudicis, scilicet ad movendum virtutem irascibilem et concupiscibilem" Cf. Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word," 186.

36 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 1ra–b: "[D]icere possumus rhetoricam differre a ceteris scientiis ratiocinativis, eo quod non eodem modo procedat per rationes ut ille. Sunt autem ... tria genera rationum: quia quaedam sunt rationes probabiles, quaedam persuasivae, quaedam demonstrativae. Rationes probabiles sunt dialecticae, persuasivae sunt rhetoricae, demonstrativae vero sunt aliarum scientiarum. Possumus autem assignare differentiam inter ista genera rationum secundum differentiam eorum quae generantur ex illis. Nam per rationes probabiles generatur opinio, per persuasivas fides aggeneratur sive credulitas. Per demonstrativas vero efficitur scientia."

37 Al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rhetoricam* 2–3, (eds.) Mario Grignaschi and Jacques Langhade (Beirut, 1972), 155–56.

Some great masters said—not while commenting on this book, for they did not write anything about it, but in other writings—that belief (*credulitas*) or faith (*fides*) is different from opinion (*opinio*) according to one's level of confidence (*certitudo*). This is because we adhere more confidently to what we have an opinion on than to what we believe in. Consequently, this kind of belief, and in particular the one yielded by rhetoric, should be called a kind of suspicion (*suspicio*).³⁸

As Gauthier has shown in the introduction to his revised edition of Thomas's logical commentaries, the aforementioned works did not circulate before 1274. Thus the passage just quoted appears to be a very early reference to Thomas's position, and one that Giles probably wrote without having Thomas's text at his elbow, but rather from his own personal recollection of the Dominican master's teaching. Such a state of affairs might also explain why Giles's reference is so brief as well as somewhat incorrect, given that Thomas did not in fact dwell very much on the difference between opinion and suspicion in his logical commentaries. It could also well be the case, however, that Giles penned the above addition after Thomas's death in 1274, and thus after his logical works had started circulating among the Parisian Masters of Arts.³⁹

Before introducing his own theory, Giles also criticizes al-Fārābī, according to whom rhetoric concerns particulars, whereas logic or dialectic deals with universals. Both Thomas's and al-Fārābī's positions regarding the difference between rhetoric and logic/dialectic are either false or far from the truth, he glosses. This is because in order to account properly for the difference between them, one has to bear in mind that our intellect sometimes gives its assent to a proposition based only on an evaluation of its contents, and sometimes because it is moved by the will. While dialectical reasoning causes an assent of the first type, rhetorical arguments deal with subjects wherein the intellect can be moved by the will. Keeping this premise in mind, Giles lists six differences between the two rational sciences of language, a list that also includes Thomas's and al-Fārābī's positions:

38 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 1rb (S fol. 1rb): "[D]ixerunt aliqui magni non super hoc libro, super quo nihil fecerunt, sed in aliis suis scriptis (magni ... scriptis, om. ed. S), credulitatem siue fidem differre ab opinione secundum certitudinem, quod (quia, ed.) certius adheremus hiis que opinamur, quam hiis que credimus; nam huiusmodi credulitas et potissime que generatur per rethoricam quedam suspicatio (suspicio est vel, S) debet dici" (quoted in Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word," 188). It should be noted that this is only witnessed in certain manuscripts.

39 Cf. Marmo, "Suspicio. A Key Word," 188, n. 161. Other meaningful variants are referred to in Costantino Marmo, "Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari," 287, n. 30.

- (1) Rhetoric is more interested in moral subjects, dialectic in speculative ones.
- (2) Rhetoric deals with emotions, while dialectic does not.
- (3) The audience of rhetorical arguments is rough and simple, while that of dialectical reasoning is more subtle and ingenious.
- (4) Rhetoric's instruments are enthymemes and examples, while dialectic's are syllogisms and modes of induction.
- (5) Rhetoric usually refers to singular events, while dialectic is more universal.
- (6) Rhetoric makes use of different kinds of *loci* than those employed by dialectic.⁴⁰

With this six-fold difference between rhetoric and dialectic Giles is able to explain the opening statement of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*—translated by Moerbeke as “*Rhetorica assecutiva dialectice est*”—without implying, as did various of Thomas's followers, any kind of subalternation between the two. He discusses the problem explicitly in a *declaratio* that follows the fourth *lectio* on the first book. Here he distinguishes a significant sense in which all of the sciences are subordinated to metaphysics, from a strict one in which only some sciences are subordinated to others, as, for example, *perspectiva* is subordinate to *geometria*. In the strict sense, then, rhetoric is not subordinated to dialectic because it lacks some basic requirements that would make it so. First, rhetoric is not directed by nor does it derive its goals from those proper to dialectic. Second, rhetoric and dialectic have different ways of reasoning (*modi procedendi*), so that they also produce different cognitive habits, such as *fides* and *opinio*.⁴¹ The first phrase of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* must therefore be interpreted

40 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 1va: “Prima est quia rhetor magis descendit in materiam moralem, et dialecticus magis in speculativam. Secunda quia spectat ad rhetorem determinare de passionibus: non autem ad dialecticum. Tertia est quia iudex locutionis rhetoricae et eius auditor est simplex et grossus. Auditor vero locutionis dialecticae debet esse ingeniosius et subtilis. Quarta est quia instrumenta rhetoricae sunt enthymema et exemplum, dialecticae vero syllogismus et inductio. Quinta est ... quia persuasio rhetoricae magis est circa singularia, dialectica vero probatio magis est circa universalia. Posset etiam sexta assignari: quia licet tam dialectica quam rhetorica utatur locis, loci tamen hic et ibi non sumuntur eodem modo.” Cf. Robert, “Rhetoric and Dialectic”; James R. O'Donnell, “The Commentary of Giles of Rome on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle,” in *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson*, (eds.) Thayron A. Sandquist and Michael R. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), 139–56, 145; Marmo, “*Suspicio*. A Key Word,” 189, and n. 163, where Simon of Faversham is shown to have borrowed this list for his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*.

41 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 7va–b.

not in terms of rhetoric's subordination to dialectic, but rather as a kind of similitude. In some respects, rhetoric is very close to dialectic: both deal with the acts of human intellect, both are rational sciences, both are general, etc. In other respects, however, it is very dissimilar. For example, the cognitive habits produced by both rhetoric and dialectic have different degrees of certainty, they make use of very different instruments, and they make appeal to different faculties of the soul, namely, to the intellect alone in the case of dialectic, and to the intellect *and* the will in the case of rhetoric.⁴²

5 Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy

The third *declaratio* that follows the fourth *lectio* on the first book makes clear that rhetoric is not subordinated to civil science or politics.⁴³ As we saw above, rhetoric is different from dialectic because it applies its ways of arguing (*rationes persuasivae*) to ethical and political matters, which are singular or linked to singular events, rather than universal, and in these matters our emotional attitudes can radically influence our judgements. In his commentary, Giles emphasizes the epistemological status of rhetoric as a *scientia docens*, which shares with dialectic its general objects (*actus rationis*). That is why Giles defines rhetoric as a special dialectic, applied to moral or political issues. Its subject matter is universal in the sense that persuasive arguments as such are universally applicable.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the fact remains that arguments of this kind are actually more applicable to political and moral subjects, which are singular or individual events, than to others. As far as dialectic and rhetoric share the character of sciences of the acts of the intellect, they are general

42 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 2ra. Cf. Marmo, "L'utilizzazione delle traduzioni latine della *Rhetorica*," 126. In a following passage, after having presented the various ways in which an enthymeme differs from a syllogism, Giles discusses again the problem of subalternation, adding that the subject-matter of rhetoric does not keep the *ratio* of the subject-matter of dialectic, as for instance in the subject of *perspectiva* as compared to its subalternating science (*geometria*): a *linea visualis* is always a *linea*; while an enthymeme is just an anomalous syllogism, and it is applied to singular facts rather than to universal things. (See Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 15ra–b).

43 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 7vb–8ra: "[Q]uia he rationes rhetoricae sint applicabiles ad negocium politicum: quasi ad propriam materiam. Magis tamen debet rhetorica dici quaedam dialectica quam quaedam politica."

44 Indeed, Giles does not deny that they can also be applied to natural sciences. Cf. Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 16rb.

sciences and in principle their instruments can be applied to every kind of subject.⁴⁵

Dialectic, however, given the intrinsic character of its instruments, is more applicable to subjects proper to the speculative sciences, rhetoric rather to subjects proper to the political and moral sciences. Giles justifies the inclinations of the two rational sciences by making appeal to the two basic types of happiness possible in this life.⁴⁶ The first is political happiness, attainable in civil life and proper to man *qua* man, discussed by Aristotle in the first book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*. The second is speculative happiness, possible to man in so far as he shares something with the separate substances. This is the type of happiness Aristotle discussed in the tenth book of the *Ethics*. In order to make access to these two kinds of happiness possible, two realms of sciences have been organized, these being moral and doctrinal sciences, together with their respective methods of inquiry (*modi sciendi*), i.e. rhetoric and dialectic.⁴⁷

45 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 7va: "[D]eclarare possumus dialecticam et rhetoricam non esse circa determinatum genus. Nam si volebamus accipere materiam harum actus rationis circa quos immediate versantur non sunt talia determinati generis, eo quod ratio male sit terminabilis termino proprio, semper enim ratio secundum quod huiusmodi tendit in aliquid ut in illud de quo est. Si vero materiam diversarum partium accipere volumus res ad quas sunt applicabiles rationes adhuc verum est eas non esse determinati generis. Nam et si rhetorica magis est applicabilis ad facta singularia sive ad opera politica vel ad ea ex quibus passiones consurgere possunt, dialectica vero magis ad aliam, propter hoc <non> debere dicere rhetorem versari circa determinatum genus. Non enim solum persuadere habet circa ea quae consurgunt ex ubi quod non possint persuadere circa ea, quae consurgunt ex quali, vel circa actionem et passionem sive circa alia predicamenta ... Possemus tamen dicere si vellemus quod licet rationum rhetoricarum videatur esse proprius usus circa materiam politicam, potest tamen usus earum adaptari ad materiam aliarum scientiarum."

46 On the theory of the twofold happiness, see Roberto Lambertini, "Il filosofo, il principe e la virtù. Note sulla ricezione e l'uso dell'*Etica Nicomachea* nel *De regimine principum* di Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi* 2 (1991), 239–79, 269–70.

47 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 4va: "Est ergo duplex felicitas quam acquirere possumus ex puris naturalibus et de qua terminaverunt philosophi: videlicet politica quae sumitur secundum vitam civilem de qua determinatur in primo Ethicorum et quae competit homini ut homo est. Alia est felicitas speculativa quae respicit contemplativam vitam, de qua determinatur in decimo Ethicorum quae non est hominis secundum quod huiusmodi sed magis prout in eo est aliquid divinum vel quod participat aliquid de substantiis separatis, ut ex eodem decimo haberi potest. Secundum has duas felicitates inventa sunt duo genera scientiarum, videlicet moralium et doctrinalium. Morales quidem ut de se serviant vitae civili secundum quam sumitur felicitas politica. Doctrinales vero ut deserviant vitae speculativae: secundum quam sumitur contemplativa felicitas."

In his *De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae* (written before 1282, maybe even before 1279), Giles goes back to this topic, underlining again the general character of rhetoric as a special kind of discourse.⁴⁸ This means that rhetoric, even if it applies in particular to moral and political matters, does not yield any special knowledge in those fields, because it does not move from the principles proper to them, but rather from general propositions, specifically, enthymemes and *loci communes*.⁴⁹ When the rhetorician talks about moral or political subjects he is like a dialectician—Giles talks about a *temptator*, who is a kind of dialectician—who tries to say something about geometry. Since the latter can be called a *sophisticus geometricus*, the former can be labelled a *sophisticus politicus* “since he does not argue from the proper principles of politics.”⁵⁰

6 The Three Means of Persuasion and the Emotions

Following Aristotle, Giles makes clear that there are three means for persuading someone—or of engendering faith or belief—which can be studied by a science such as rhetoric (*docens*): (1) that taken from the listener’s side (*ex parte audientis*, i.e. *pathos*); (2) that taken from the speaker’s side (*ex parte dicentis*, i.e. *ethos*); and (3) that drawn from the content itself (*ex parte rei*, i.e. *pragma*).⁵¹ The last topic occupies a part of the first book of the *Rhetoric*

Sic etiam inventi sunt duo modi sciendi: dialecticus et rhetoricus; dialecticus propter scientias doctrinales, rhetoricus vero propter morales.”

48 Bruni, “The *De differentia*,” 4. Murphy seems to have misunderstood Bruni’s dating proposal, since he did not see the apparent print errors that made Bruni’s text incongruous—“later” instead of “previous” and “precedes” instead of “follows”. Bruni’s intention is altogether clear, though. See Murphy, “The Scholastic Condemnation,” 836.

49 Cf. Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 15va: “Secunda differentia est quia idem enthymema ex propositionibus specialibus constitutum quod facerent rhetor et politicus, reduceretur in sua principia a rhetore et politico aliter et aliter: nam rhetor reduceret ipsum in locos et in principia communia, politicus vero in propria principia ... Nam si volumus accipere enthymemata quae sunt formata ex omnibus propositionibus sic sunt propria rhetori, non quod rhetor non possit considerare de enthymematibus formatis ex specialibus propositionibus sed quia ipse et non artifices speciales considerat de his quae formantur ex communibus.”

50 Giles of Rome, *De Differentia* 8; cf. Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, prol., fol. A4va.

51 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1355b35, Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 2va: “Fides autem quam assignare intendit rhetor tripliciter habet fieri: videlicet ex parte auditoris et ex parte dicentis et rei.”

constituting the “core business” of rhetoric.⁵² The other two are dealt with in a preliminary part of book one and at the beginning of book two.

From the beginning Giles remarks that the means of persuasion taken from the sides of the listener and speaker are secondary to that taken from the content itself. This is his way of interpreting what Aristotle says about enthymemes, which are the “body of persuasion”, or, according to the *Vetus translatio*, the “body of faith”. The other means produce either emotions in the listener’s mind or confidence in what the speaker says. Faith or belief, which the rhetorician aims at, is mainly produced by reasoning devices such as enthymemes and examples, rather than by any appeal to emotions or confidence-creating devices.⁵³ In particular, Giles—in a couple of *declarationes* devoted to the explanation of this point—maintains that *sermones passionales* (emotional discourses) do not constitute the primary concern of rhetoric. When, for instance, an attorney defends a man charged with theft and tries to influence the judge by talking about, say, the good actions the accused has done, he does something wrong because he tries to distort the judge’s faculty of judgement, making him incline towards the accused man and against the other party, so that the judge loses his impartiality. Giles adds that, in various towns, these kinds of *extra rem* discourses, which make appeal to the judge’s emotions, are rightly forbidden.⁵⁴ The problem with rhetoric is that the discourses it aims at

52 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 2va under the heading of *persuasiones artificiales*.

53 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 2va–b: “Ad cuius evidentiam notandum quod ut habitum est sicut per rationes logicas aggeneratur opinio sic per rhetoricas inducitur fides et credulitas. Fides autem quam assignare intendit rhetor tripliciter habet fieri, videlicet ex parte auditoris et ex parte dicentis et rei. Via autem ad generandum fidem ex parte auditoris esse habet per sermones passionales. ... Secunda via ad inducendam credulitatem sumitur ex parte dicentis: ut si quis se talem postest ostendere cui merito fides debeat adhiberi: quae ab eo dicuntur de facili acceptantur ... Tertia via ad generandum fidem sumitur ex parte rei ut si quis enthymemata et persuasiones facit per quae ei fides adhibeatur. Advertendum est: quod licet istis omnibus modis fides fieri habeat principaliter rhetorica est de persuasionibus ... Erraverunt ergo illi qui credentes se tradere sufficienter rhetoricam artem de persuasionibus nihil dixerunt sed solum dederunt artem de sermonibus passionibus.”

54 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 4ra: “Notandum igitur quod iudex inter litigantes debet esse de medio et quia de se non est inclinatus ad aliam partem valent passionibus ad removendum iudicem ab una parte et inclinandum ad aliam ... In iudicialibus vero quia iudex non est inclinatus ad alteram partem non est sufficiens ostendere solum sic rem se habere sed prae opere et necessarium est captare auditorem id est reddere iudicem benivolum sibi per singula. Nam iudex in talibus iudicat de alienis ad quae de se sufficienter non inclinatur propter quod si audientes sive si iudices inclinentur per

producing deal mainly with particular cases, where emotions and the will can play an effective role in yielding the assent of a jury or of a judge.⁵⁵ In conclusion, even if persuasion, i.e. the assent to a given proposition, is not always achieved in virtue of emotions or an act of the will, the appeal to the emotions falls outside the scope of rhetoric, or at least must be considered as a secondary subject matter in comparison to enthymematic reasoning.⁵⁶

At the beginning of his commentary on the second book, Giles remarks upon the means of persuasion based on the speaker's character (*ethos*), and develops a complex discussion about emotions, moving from the means of persuasion on the listener's side to an analysis of the emotions as such (*pathê*). As for the character of the speaker *per se* Giles says that this is very important in the practice of counselling, because listeners more readily accept directions from someone who presents him- or herself as a friend or as a wise person, and so on. Giles suggests, to anyone who wants to act as adviser, not only to give the

passiones erunt intendentes ad negotium litigantium et ad id ad quod est bonum ipsorum propter quod sic affecti condolent vel condonant litigantibus remittendo eis penam et non iudicant recte quia declinantes ad alteram partem non sunt in medio sicut iudices esse debent. Et quia passiones sic pervertunt iudicium utile est multis locis lege prohibere sermones passionales vel dicere extra rem."

55 Following Aristotle, Giles also distinguishes the judicial sphere, where this kind of discourse might be important, from the deliberative and the epideictic ones, where they play almost no role. Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 4r: "Sermones passionales potissime sunt utiles in iudicio, in concione autem vel in deliberativo nihil aut modicum valent."

56 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 4rb–vb: "Secundo declarandum restat sermones passionales non esse id circa quod essentialiter versatur rhetorica quod duplici via ostendi potest. Prima via sumitur ex eo quod dictum est: habitum est enim persuasionem rhetoricam esse non ex eo quod intellectus actu assentit per imperium voluntatis sed quia quaedam sunt quibus de se competit causare passiones in appetitu et pervertere intellectum. Utrum autem talis persuasio fiat vel non fiat nihil ad propositum, sed sufficit ad hoc quod sint sermones rhetorici quod de talibus oriantur ... Sic rhetorica quae scientia rationalis est essentialiter respicit actus rationis: dato quod huiusmodi actus sine passionibus esse non possint non tamen propter hoc circa sermones passionales dicitur naturaliter esse rhetorica ... Teneamus ergo circa actus rationis et circa modos arguendi essentialiter versari rhetoricam. Advertendum tamen quod licet tam syllogicare quam persuadere actus rationis sint tamen quia syllogismus magis respicit verum, persuasio vero vel enthymema magis respicit verisimile quia dialecticus descendit in scientias doctrinales quia considerat verum, rhetorica vero in morales quia incedunt verisimiliter, dialecticus essentialiter negociabitur circa syllogismos, rhetor vero circa enthymemata. Bene ergo dictum est quod dicebatur in principio lectionis, enthymemata esse totum corpus persuasionis, sive totum corpus fidei vel esse id solum quod essentialiter respicit rhetorica quod declarare volebamus."

auditor a positive impression as a person, but also to offer him or her the image of a person seriously involved in the problems the listener is facing.⁵⁷ This is because, for every person, a friend is a kind of *alter ego*.⁵⁸ This implies that the adviser's involvement in the problem he or she asked to be counseled about, in order to reach any positive result, should incline towards a virtual identification of the two sides of the communication relationship.⁵⁹

As for the emotions, Giles embarks on a thorough discussion of their definition and their number, devoting to them the only four *declarationes* in his commentary on the second book. As is well known, Giles's theoretical framework (in this discussion as well as in others) is deeply indebted to Thomas Aquinas's theory, his own contribution being limited to small corrections or side improvements to that theory.⁶⁰ Thomas developed his theory over the entire course of his career, from his early commentary on the *Sentences* and his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, to his *Summa theologiae*.⁶¹ Giles, however, knows—or makes use of—only the last version of this theory, i.e. that of the *Summa*. Furthermore, he takes for granted some of Thomas's main achievements in this field, like the definition of the emotions as *motus sensitivi appetitus* or his distinction between the emotions of the *concupiscibilis* and the *irascibilis* parts of the sensitive soul.

Thomas built a systematic account of the emotions, departing significantly from the traditional fourfold system (*gaudium* vs. *dolor*; *spes* vs. *metus*). His fundamental innovation was to displace both hope (*spes*) and fear (*metus* or *timor*), locating them in the irascible part of the sensitive soul. His other move

57 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 2, fol. 48va–b: “Ostendit quod ex eo quod auditor efficitur qualis et dicens ostendit se qualem variatur iudicium auditoris et fit in auditore alia et alia fides propter quod talia pertinent ad rhetorem cuius est persuadere ... Dicit ergo quod apparere dicentem quale quendam ut quod ostendat se amicum vel prudentem vel bonum multum differt ad fidem et maxime in consiliis. Deinde in litigiis quia plus credimus propter qualitatem dicentis in consiliis quam disceptatione ideo addit quod auditores et eos quibus datur consilium existimare dicentem se habere ad ipsos qualiter ipsum id est sicut se habet ad ipsum potissime variat fidem. Nam tunc potissime creditur nobis: cum damus consilium quando conformamus nos eis quibus consulimus et ostendimus nos esse tales quales ipsi.”

58 Giles actually uses the expression “amicus est alter ipse”: Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 1, fol. 21va.

59 On this subject and on how John of Jandun, in his commentary on the *Rhetoric*, worked it out, see Marmo, “Carattere dell'oratore.”

60 Here I will mainly follow what I wrote in Marmo, “Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari.”

61 Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* 3.26.1.3, (ed.) Pierre Mandonet, 2 vols., (Paris, 1929); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.23.4 (Opera Omnia; Rome, 1891), 6 and Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* 26.4, corp. (Turin and Rome, 1949).

consisted in taking as a model the action of natural agents in order to explain the movements of the desiring soul. Another tenet of Thomas's system—albeit one that was not exclusively his own—is that every natural or free inclination towards an object presupposes the object being known somehow by the subject. As with every natural agent, an object that is considered to be “good” affects the appetitive soul either with an inclination towards itself, or causes it to move towards itself, or makes it stop when it reaches itself. This inclination corresponds to love (*amor*), the actual movement to desire (*desiderium* or *concupiscentia*), and the resting to joy (*gaudium*). The opposite inclinations to those of movement and rest are caused by an object that is seen as “evil” for the subject. Accordingly, the emotions are the following: hate (*odium*), escape (*fuga* or *abominatio*), and sadness (*tristitia*) or pain (*dolor*) (with a difference in the respective embodiment of the emotion).⁶²

Giles of Rome comments upon the foregoing system of Aquinas by arguing that “even if this explanation can be accepted (*tollerari*), it is based on some accidental features.”⁶³ He therefore tries to root Thomas's system in a more solid and consistent ground, taking advantage of the semantic potentiality of the emotions' definition as *motus sensitivi appetitus*: the number and types of emotions should be logically deduced from the various types of *motus*. Giles's way of interpreting *motus*, however, appears to abandon the idea that emotions are embodied (the movement being, for Thomas, an inner modification of body and soul together) along with Thomas's overly literal parallel with natural agency, which transforms every *motus* into a local movement. Furthermore, he rejects the notion that emotions like joy and sadness are defined as kinds of *rest*, thereby contradicting the general definition of emotion. In order to avoid this kind of problem, Giles proposes to distinguish between a physical movement (*motus*) taken (1) in its beginning (love and hate); (2) in its performance (desire and escape); or (3) in its final stage, which he calls *mutatum esse* (literally, “having been moved”).⁶⁴ The last of these corresponds to the enjoyment of the attained good or to the sadness of being affected by the presence of something evil. The basic oppositions that organize the system are, then, those between good and evil (*bonum* vs. *malum*) and between movement and its final stage (*motus* vs. *mutatum esse*).⁶⁵

62 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 1–2.23.4, 176b. (Cf. Marmo, “*Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari*,” 293–295).

63 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 2, fol. 49vb: “*Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari, respicit tamen id quod est per accidens.*”

64 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 2, fol. 49vb–50ra.

65 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 2, fol. 49vb; Marmo, “*Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari*,” 296–301.

If Giles merely rearranges Thomas's emotions of the desiring soul, giving them a putatively better organization, things change radically with the emotions of the irascible part of the soul. Here Thomas left something of a black hole, as it were, leaving one emotion, that of anger or *ira*, alone in the system, with no opposite emotion to confront it—at least in the same part of the soul. Giles appears to be a rigorous “structuralist” in his attitude towards this problem, and ends up finding an appropriate opposite emotion to anger, which he does by following Aristotle in the second book of *Rhetoric*. Emotions located in the irascible part of the soul are marked by a specific, presupposed kind of apprehension or evaluation. That is, their objects are not what are simply good or evil. Rather, they are goods that are difficult to attain or evils that are difficult to avoid.⁶⁶ In short, both are marked by the semantic trait of difficulty (*arduum*). This kind of apprehension of the object presupposes an evaluation of the capability of the subject to prevail or not to prevail over these difficulties.

Thomas's attempts to give an account of the five emotions of the irascible part of the soul are not always satisfying from the point of view of consistency. From his first attempt in the commentary on the *Sentences*, he wavers between an account that includes anger as an emotion directed towards something bad that is present and that the agent believes he can overcome,⁶⁷ and a taxonomy of the emotions that simply does not encompass rage at all.⁶⁸ Giles gives a solution to this structural conundrum, introducing a twelfth emotion within the irascible soul opposed to rage. This is called *mansuetudo* or *mitiditas*, and we might translate it as “resignation” or “fatalistic acceptance”.⁶⁹ If in the case of anger, the subject evaluates positively his or her ability to exact revenge for a previous offense, in the case of resignation the subject's evaluation is negative in the sense that he or she gives up any attempt to take revenge. Aristotle

66 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 2, fol. 50ra: “His visis passiones irascibilis de levi possumus accipere quia huiusmodi passiones vel sumuntur respectu boni vel respectu mali, hic erit solum respectu futuri. Nam bonum praesens et maxime bonum nostris proportionatum naturalibus cum iam est habitum et adeptum, ut communiter dicitur, non reputamus ipsum arduum. Ideo respectu talis boni non sumuntur passiones irascibilis secundum quas ferimur in difficile et arduum.”

67 Anger, in this organization of the emotions, is opposed to sadness, i.e. the emotion directed towards something bad that is present: an emotion of the desiring soul.

68 See Marmo, “*Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari*,” 301–05, for a full exposition of Thomas's solutions.

69 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* 2, fol. 50ra–b: “Si vero quiescimus a tali motu: sic est mitiditas vel mansuetudo. Unde mitiditas non habet omnem rationem passionis cum magis dicat quietem a motu quam motum. Potest tamen passio appellari secundum quod negationes sunt in eodem genere cum affirmationibus.”

had suggested that *quiescere ab ira* ("refraining from anger" in Hermann's translation) or *mitem esse* ("being nonaggressive" in the *Vetus* translation) is the emotion contrary to anger. The reason why Thomas did not accept this view lies probably in the fact that *mansuetudo* is also the name of a virtue, discussed in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* where the Philosopher says that it is opposite to both anger and its contrary emotion that has no name.⁷⁰ In the first book of his *De regimine principum*, where he deals with the emotions, Giles explicitly admits that *mansuetudo*, because of the lack of names (*vocabulorum penuria*), refers both to the virtue and to the emotion of the irascible part of the soul.⁷¹

The taxonomy of the emotions of the irascible part of the soul, according to Giles, is therefore composed of six elements. Four of them relate to a future good or evil, and vary depending on the subject's evaluation of the probability of facing or avoiding that eventuality. In the first, positive instance, the subject's emotion is either hope (*spes*) or temerity (*audacia*); in the second, negative instance, the subject's emotion is either despair (*desperatio*) or fear (*timor*). In each of these two instances the difference between the resulting emotions lies in the inchoate stage of the former as opposed to the performative character of the latter. The two remaining emotions are directed toward a present good or evil and are marked by the agent's attitude, which either, in the case of anger, seeks revenge, or, in the case of resignation, refrains from it.⁷²

As well as for other points of doctrine, Giles's taxonomy of the emotions would be borrowed by all subsequent commentators on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the 14th century. Indeed, the authority of Giles's commentary was aptly expressed by John of Jandun, who in his own commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, simply called Giles "The Expositor".

7 Giles's Commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi*

Giles's commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi* was written around 1274. Like his commentary on the *Rhetoric*, it represents a stable point of reference for all

70 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.5, 1125b26–29.

71 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 1.3.1 (Rome 1607; repr. Aalen, 1967), 153–54: "Computabatur enim *supra* mansuetudo inter virtutes sed hoc est propter vocabulorum penuriam, ut ait Philosophus 4 Ethicorum. Mansuetudo enim proprie nominare videtur passionem oppositam irae. Sed cum sit quaedam virtus inter iram et mansuetudinem, quia virtutem illam proprio nomine nominare nescimus, nominamus eam nomine mansuetudinis, eo quod illa virtus plus communicat cum mansuetudine quam cum ira. Erit mansuetudo aequivocum ad virtutem et ad passionem oppositam irae."

72 Marmo, "Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari," 305–11.

the subsequent commentators of the 14th century, as Giles is again referred to as the expositor *par excellence* in these later commentaries on the *Sophistici elenchi*.⁷³ His way of commenting on this work is similar to that of his other commentaries, that is, he employs a literal explanation introduced by a thorough *divisio textus*, punctuated by frequent *notanda*, and often completed by *dubitationes*. Unlike in the case of his commentary on the *Rhetoric*, however, for this commentary Giles could take advantage of a long tradition of Latin commentaries going back to at least the 12th century.⁷⁴ In this work Giles intervenes in contemporary debates with his own personal positions. Moreover, Giles bases his commentary on the Boethian version of Aristotle's work, but he also makes use, probably for the first time, of William of Moerbeke's revision of that translation.⁷⁵

8 Outlines of a Theory of Signification

In the first part of his commentary, Giles offers some hints of the semantic positions he will take, ones that were traditionally expressed in commentaries on the *De interpretatione*. First, when he corrects his earlier position in the *Rhetoric* commentary about the subject matter of logic and rhetoric, he refers to his theory of the meaning of terms. If in his commentary on the *Rhetoric* he had maintained that logic and rhetoric deal with the acts of the intellect (following the threefold distinction used by Thomas Aquinas to distinguish the different parts of logic: apprehending, affirming and negating, and inferring), here Giles holds that, properly speaking, logic and rhetoric do not deal with those acts but rather with their products, i.e. simple concepts, enunciations, and the various kinds of inference.⁷⁶ In order to support this view, he says that the term

73 See Andrea Tabarroni, "Figura dictionis e predicazione nel commento ai *Sophistici Elenchi* di Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi* 2 (1991), 183–215, 198.

74 For an overview, see Sten Ebbesen, "The Way Fallacies were Treated in Scholastic Logic," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 55 (1987), 107–34. For the Greek tradition, see Sten Ebbesen, *Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post-Aristotelian and Medieval Writings on Fallacies*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1981), vol. 1.

75 Tabarroni, "Figura dictionis e predicazione," 199.

76 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* (Venice 1496; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1967), fol. 2va: "Ad quid dici potest quod etsi aliquo modo de actibus rationis sit logica, proprie tamen non est de actibus sed est de intentionibus et conceptibus qui formantur per huiusmodi actus. ... substantia non significat actum illum intelligendi per quem intellego substantiam, sed significat conceptum quendam et rationem quendam quam formo in intelligendo substantiam."

“substance” does not mean the act of apprehending the substance, but rather the concept that is formed by the intellect when it understands any substance (the acts of the intellect are studied in the *De anima*).

The foregoing position was the one that was most commonly held at this time in university debates; only a few thinkers, most notably Roger Bacon, thought that simple terms (such as nouns and verbs) directly signify things (apprehended through concepts).⁷⁷ Furthermore, Giles adds the support of a quotation from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, where the Stagirite—in the Latin version—affirms that the meaning of a name is its definition (*definitio*).⁷⁸ This is because, when we understand a simple thing, we always form in our intellect a simple concept that can be called, in a very general sense, a “definition”. As Giles adds in a later passage, while names—and indeed other simple terms—are signs of concepts, these concepts are signs of things, so that names also signify things through the mediation of concepts.⁷⁹ Furthermore, he remarks that while simple terms have a meaning (*significatum*), or a plurality of meanings, a sequence of terms (correctly linked according to syntactical rules) forming a proposition contains in itself a sentence (*sententia*).⁸⁰ As we shall see below, his quite traditional position with respect to the meaning of terms helps Giles to work out his personal point of view in contemporary debates about the possibility of a single term signifying a plurality of things. This will in turn allow Giles to take a stance against the modistic conception of signification as the essential or substantial form of the linguistic sign (*dictio*).

77 See Thomas S. Maloney, “Roger Bacon on the *Significatum* of Words,” in *Archéologie du signe*, (eds.) Lucie Brind’Amour, Eugène Vance (Toronto, 1983), 187–211. Costantino Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 69–70 and 318–20. On the whole debate about signification, cf. Giorgio Pini, “Species, Concept and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century,” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 8 (1999), 21–52.

78 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* prol., fol. 2va: “ratio quam significat nomen est diffinitio”; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 4.7, 1012a 23–24.

79 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 10vb: “[V]oces sunt signa eorum conceptuum qui sunt in anima, nam ratio quam significat nomen est diffinitio ... nomina ergo sunt signa conceptuum, conceptus vero sunt signa rerum. Nomen ergo est signum rei mediante conceptu.”

80 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 12va: “Secundo quia oratio dicitur continere in se sententiam aliquam, dictio vero non continet sententiam aliquam, sed significationem. Ideo equivocatio differt ab amphibologia ... cum dictio equivoca per intellectum refertur in sua significata nec secundum se nec secundum intellectum intelligitur esse transposita vel variata, amphibologia autem non sic.”

In the context of the latter debate, Giles proposes a view that will be criticized by later commentators, albeit without their really understanding it. Giles holds that a phonic expression (*vox*) signifies in a double way. Firstly, it points to the mental model or image of itself, and secondly it signifies the concept of a real thing (and this thing *via* its concept or definition).⁸¹ The first kind of signification is natural, and essential, to the phonic expression, because—according to the theory of linguistic articulation worked out by Augustine and John Damascene—the act of uttering a word presupposes that our mind has in itself the image of the uttered word.⁸² This kind of meaning is neither conventional nor derived from an act of imposition. Rather, it simply reflects the natural way in which human beings produce linguistic items or phonic expressions. The second kind of meaning, by contrast, depends on a previous act of imposition and is neither natural nor essential to the phonic expression.⁸³

Various commentators in the modistic milieu reported Giles's views about the natural signification of the mental image of a phonic expression. They interpreted it, however, in terms of self-reference. For instance, the anonymous

81 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 10vb: "Sciendum ergo quod vox prolata dupliciter significat. Uno modo representat conceptionem sui ipsius, alio modo respresentat conceptiones et rationes rerum."

82 Augustine, *De Trinitate* 15.19, and John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.13 (in the Latin version of Burgundio of Pisa). See Claude Panaccio, *Le discours intérieur de Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris, 1999), 78–90 and 108–17. The same theory is presented by Roger Bacon in his *De signis* 2.1.18 and 5.166 (in Karin M. Fredborg, Olaf L. Nielsen, and Jan Pinborg, "An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's 'Opus maius': 'De signis,'" *Traditio* 34 (1978), 75–136, 87 and 134) and by pseudo-Kilwardby in his commentary on Priscian (in Karin M. Fredborg, Niels-Jørgen Green-Pedersen, Olaf L. Nielsen, and Jan Pinborg, "The Commentary on 'Priscianus Maior' Ascribed to Robert Kilwardby," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 15 (1975), 1–143, 59).

83 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 10vb–11ra: "Cum ergo queritur utrum significatio conveniat essentialiter dictioni: si loquimur de significatione prout [est] vox significat seipsam in imagine conceptam, sic quodammodo essentielle est voci significare et immo si significativa non esset, non esset vox ... De ratione enim vocis est quod primo concipiatur in imaginatione quam proferatur. Si enim ex ore alicuius animalis absque imaginatione precedente per tussim vel per aliquem alium modum sonus emitteretur, ille sonus vox non esset. Huiusmodi ergo significatio quodammodo essentialis est voci et non est ad placitum ... Sic imaginatio et preconceptio unius vocis non potest alteri adaptari. Patet ergo quod si vox prolata referatur ad significationem prout significat seipsam aut imaginationem conceptam: quodammodo est essentielle ei significare, sed si referatur ad significationem prout significat rationes rerum in intellectu conceptas, sic non est essentielle ei significare. Immo talia sunt ad placitum et possunt uni rei plura significata competere." Cf. Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 121–22.

author of a commentary preserved in a Prague manuscript, writing a decade after Giles, holds that phonic expressions naturally signify themselves, without any human act of imposition.⁸⁴ At the end of the century, Radulphus Brito in his commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi*, while discussing the question of whether signification is the essential form of the linguistic expression (*dictio*), mentions this position as Giles's own, only to reject it.⁸⁵

9 The Fallacy of Equivocation and Contemporary Debates on Meaning

The discussion of signification as the essential form of every linguistic expression (*dictio*) has its origin in the idea, probably proposed by Robert Kilwardby in his very influential commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi* (ca. 1245), that pronunciation is the form of the *dictio* considered as a phonic expression (i.e. without meaning).⁸⁶ The Modists adopted this view, substituting for *dictio* the term *vox* and interpreting the former term as a linguistic item endowed with meaning. The result was that a sequence of linguistic items could be formed from the pure phonic expression (*vox*) to the word-class (*pars orationis*), each one characterized by a different essential or substantial form: *prolatio*, *significatio*, and *modus significandi*.⁸⁷ This tenet appears to be central to the modistic theory of signification and, in the second half of 13th century it meets only a few opponents, among them Giles of Rome.

Giles discusses this topic in one of the many *dubitationes* he raises in the section where he comments on equivocation, which is the first type of fallacy that originates within and by human discourse (*in dictione*). The other group of fallacies are those that are caused by extra-discursive factors (*extra dictionem*). The commented text amounts to no more than a few examples, but they influenced for a couple of centuries various arrangements of the types

84 Anonymous of Prague, *Quaestiones super Aristotilis Sophisticos Elenchos* 9, (ed.) in Dafne Muré, "Anonymus Pragensis on Equivocation," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 68 (1998), 63–97, 70 (quoted in Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 123, n. 36).

85 Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos* 13, (ed.) Sten Ebbesen, "Texts on Equivocation. Part II. ca. 1250–1310," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 68 (1998), 99–307, 198 (quoted in Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 125, n. 40).

86 Cf. Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 94–95.

87 This sequence can be found in grammatical as well as in logical works, such as commentaries on the *Categories* or the *Sophistici elenchi* (see Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 109–36).

of equivocation.⁸⁸ Giles adopts what was in his time the standard threefold classification of equivocal terms. First, there are pure equivocal terms, such as *canis*, that signify either the barking four-legged animal, or a kind of fish (or a sea mammal—it is not clear), or a constellation. Second, there are analogical terms such as *sanum*. In its primary sense, this term indicates the quality of health (*sanitas*) possessed by a body. However, in its secondary meaning, it indicates the preservation of health through diet, or its signification by urine, or its restoration by medicine.⁸⁹ Finally, there are weak equivocal terms, such as the Latin participle *laborans*, which, depending on the context, can signify someone suffering either in the present or in the past.⁹⁰

Giles does not accept that signification can be considered a substantial form—not even in a metaphorical sense—because for him it is an accidental form that the intellect adds to the phonic expression. If in this debate he sides with the “English” approach, at other times he takes the “Continental” approach of the *Modistae*, or else he tries to forge his own way.⁹¹ For instance, he agrees with the *Modistae* when he holds that the very same equivocal term (of the first type) cannot be used as such by one single person in a single given moment (*termino semel sumpto non contingit uti equivoce*).⁹² The reason why its equivocal usage is not possible lies in the natural limitations of the human

88 For the 12th century, see Irène Rosier, “Evolution des notions d’‘equivocatio’ et ‘univocatio’ au XIIe siècle,” in *L’ambiguïté. Cinq études historiques*, (ed.) Irène Rosier (Lille, 1988), 103–62; Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 271–77, for the first half of 13th century. For the second half of the 13th century, see the texts edited in Sten Ebbesen, “Texts on Equivocation. Part I. ca. 1130–ca. 1270,” *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 67 (1997), 127–99, and Ebbesen, “Texts on Equivocation. Part II”.

89 Analogy takes the place of metaphor in the classification worked out in the first half of the century.

90 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 10vb: “Postquam ostendit in dictis paralogismis esse equivocationem ex modo significandi quia laborans potest supponere pro laborante prius vel pro laborante nunc.”

91 On this opposition in the second half of 13th-century debates, see Sten Ebbesen and Irène Rosier-Catach, “Robertus Anglicus on Peter of Spain,” in *Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, held at the University of Navarre (Pamplona, 26–30 May 1997)*, (eds.) Ignacio Angelelli and Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (Hildesheim, 2000), 61–95 and Costantino Marmo, “La funzione del contesto: teorie ‘continentali’ e ‘inglesi’ a confronto sull’eliminazione dell’equivocità tra fine XIII e inizio XIV secolo,” in *“Ad ingenii acuitionem”: Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù*, (eds.) Stefano Caroti et al. (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2006), 249–80.

92 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 11ra: “Termino semel sumpto non contingit uti equivoce quia simul et semel non possumus terminum equivocum per intellectum nostrum referre in omnia sui significata.”

intellect, which cannot process more than one simple concept at a time. If a term is linked to different things through a multiplicity of acts of imposition (as in the first type), this term is able to recall different simple concepts in the mind of the speaker or that of the hearer. However, he or she might actually understand only one simple concept at a time, so that a single speaker or hearer might only be able to make use of one sense at a time. Different hearers, by contrast, might simultaneously understand disparate concepts signified by the same term.⁹³ This brief account, given by Giles in a single *dubitatio*, corresponds exactly to a position worked out in the articulated discussions one can read in various anonymous commentaries on the *Sophistici elenchi* that can be linked to the *Modistae*.⁹⁴

In other cases, Giles tries to find his own way to solve a *dubitatio*, as in his discussion of how multiple meanings can be contained in an equivocal term. After the appearance of Robert Kilwardby's commentary, two options were available: either the variety of meanings of an equivocal term (in the first sense) are contained in it as in a conjunction (*sub copulatione*) or as in a disjunction (*sub disiunctione*).⁹⁵ Kilwardby had proposed the conjunction as a model, so that a proposition containing an equivocal term such as *animal currit* is equivalent to a conjunction of simple propositions where the various meanings of the equivocal term are made explicit: *latrabile currit et marinum currit et sidus caeleste currit*. This implies that the first proposition is true if and only if the conjunction, i.e. each member of the conjunctive proposition, is true.

If Albert the Great follows Kilwardby in this, the first generation of the *Modistae*, such as Martin of Dacia, the Anonymous-C and the Anonymous-SF,

93 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 11ra: "Nam et si eadem vox semel prolata apud diversos auditores diversa repraesentat, illa vox non proprie semel sumitur cum a diversis diversimode sumatur et secundum diversas acceptiones diversas conceptiones format."

94 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 11ra; cf. Anonymous-C, *Quaestiones super libros Sophisticorum elenchorum*, q. 814, in *Incertorum auctorum Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, (ed.) Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen, 1977), 287–88; Anonymous-SF, *Quaestiones super libros Sophisticorum elenchorum* q. 39, in *Incertorum auctorum Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, 82; Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones veteres super libro Elenchorum*, q. 14, in Simon de Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro elenchorum*, (ed.) Sten Ebbesen (Toronto, 1984), 64–65; Anonymous of Prague, *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, q. 10, in Daphne Murè, "Anonymous Pragensis on Equivocation," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin* 68 (1998), 63–97, 71–73, who introduces some interesting variations (cf. Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 358–64).

95 Robert Kilwardby, *Expositio in libros Elenchorum*, ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 16619, fol. 8rb (quoted in Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 279). For the following discussion, see Marmo, *Semiotica e linguaggio nella Scolastica*, 279–95.

emphatically reject Kilwardby's solution. They held that it is impossible that an equivocal term include in its meaning a conjunction (or a disjunction), because the imposition of categorematic terms (nouns and verbs) precedes the imposition of syncategorematic terms, such as conjunctions and disjunctions.⁹⁶ They rather prefer the model of definition according to which the meanings of an equivocal term should be made explicit simply through a list. On this view, the various components of a definition follow one another without connecting particles, so that *canis* is equivalent to *animal latrabile, marina belua, sidus caeleste* (*hoc hoc hoc*) rather than to a conjunction or a disjunction of elements (*hoc et hoc et hoc; hoc vel hoc vel hoc*).⁹⁷

Giles of Rome makes clear that the hostile interpretation the *Modistae* give of Kilwardby's position is simply untenable. This is because, according to Giles, an equivocal term signifies its meanings *sub copulatione* or *sub disiunctione*, which cannot possibly mean that an equivocal term includes in its meaning either a copulative or a disjunctive syncategoreme.⁹⁸ Kilwardby's position must therefore be interpreted as indicating a similitude between how an equivocal term includes its meanings and how a conjunction includes its constituents, so that the problem should be rephrased in another way. That is, can an equivocal term have its meanings in the same way copulative expressions or disjunctive expressions have their constituents (*per modum copulationis vel disiunctionis*)? This way of rephrasing the question—more so than Giles's solution of the issue—will be followed by many subsequent commentators such as Radulphus Brito.⁹⁹ Giles's solution tries to preserve the best of two worlds: from the point of view of its imposition, an equivocal term signifies its meanings *per modum copulativum*. From the point of view of its usage, however, it signifies them *per modum disiunctivum*, since our intellect cannot apprehend but one meaning at a time.¹⁰⁰

96 Martin of Dacia, *Quaestiones super Praedicamentorum* 7, 165; Anonymous-C, *Quaestiones super libros Sophisticorum elenchorum* 815, in Ebbesen, "Texts on Equivocation. Part II," 291.

97 Anonymous-SF, *Quaestiones super libros Sophisticorum elenchorum* 45, 94–95; John of Dacia, *Summa grammatica*, 368–69.

98 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 11ra: "Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum nomen equivocum sua significat habeat sub copulatione vel sub disiunctione. ... Sciendum ergo quod nomen equivocum in sui significatione nec disiunctionem nec copulationem includit."

99 Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos* 14, in Ebbesen, "Texts on Equivocation. Part II," 201. Cf. Sten Ebbesen, "Can Equivocation Be Eliminated?" *Studia Mediaevistica* 16 (1975), 103–24, 106.

100 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 11ra: "Si queratur ulterius utrum habeat sua significata per modum copulativum vel disiunctivum dici debet quod nomen equivocum

10 Other Fallacies

The fallacy of figure of speech, as scholars usually refer to it, is the last of the fallacies that originates directly from language.¹⁰¹ As with the other fallacies he enumerates in the *Sophistici Elenchi*, however, Aristotle deals with it in passages scattered throughout the work, which makes it difficult to get a clear idea of exactly what it is. In Chapter 4, for example, Aristotle defines it as the fallacy that arises from a semantic mistake, “when one refers in the same way to a thing and to something else which is however different”.¹⁰² The list of examples Aristotle gives after this definition does not particularly clarify the issue. For example, one can assume a term as masculine while it is feminine, because it ends up with a usually feminine termination; or one can take a qualitative expression as if it were quantitative, or vice versa. Finally, one can take an active verb as passive, or vice versa.

As Andrea Tabarroni has shown, Giles’s discussion of the *fallacia figura dictionis* has a particular interest for the distinction between the two basic types of fallacies. As a matter of fact, Giles underscores the way in which this fallacy is close to the fallacy of accident, that is, to a fallacy that has its *causa apparentiae* outside of language.¹⁰³ This annotation is not new, as Giles admits, having earlier been proposed by Peter of Spain and then taken up by Albert the Great. Giles devotes, however, four *declarationes* to the discussion of this fallacy. In the first, he proposes a new and original classification with respect to it. The traditional classification indicated three types of fallacies of figure of speech, which depended either (1) on a mistake about grammatical gender

ut patet dupliciter ad sua significata comparari potest. Primo ut per impositionem illa importat, secundo ut per intellectum ad illa refertur. Si ergo loquimur de nomine equivoce ut per impositionem sua significata importat, sic dicitur ea habere sub copulatione ... sed si nomen equivocum referatur ad sua significata prout per intellectum refertur in illa, sic habet ea quasi sub disiunctione quia non habet ea simul.”

101 This section mainly follows Tabarroni, “*Figura dictionis e predicazione*.”

102 Aristotle, *Sophistici elenchi* 166b10–11.

103 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fols. 14vb: “Dicit ergo quod redargutiones secundum figuram dictionis accidunt quando quod non est idem et quod non est similiter, interpretatur similiter id est accipitur ac si esset similiter et idem, causa ergo apparentiae huius fallacie est similitudo interpretationis, causa autem non existentie est diversitas interpretatorum. ... Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod inter ceteras fallacias ista quodammodo magis appropinquatur ad fallacias reales, sive ad fallacias extra dictionem propter quod multi paralogismi peccantes secundum hanc fallaciam, peccant per fallacias accidentis et per fallacias extra dictionem. Immo secundum quosdam nullus fit paralogismus in hac fallacia qui non peccet per fallaciam accidentis que est fallaciam extra dictionem.”

(*commutatio generum*); (2) on a mistake about categories (*commutatio praedicamentorum*); or (3) on the confusion of general names with singular ones (*commutare quale quid in hoc aliquid*).¹⁰⁴ If the first case does not seem very interesting, the second and the third, by contrast, have significant philosophical import since they concern the false implications that can be drawn from mixing up either different categories, or the predicative and referential functions of the terms.

Giles also lists three types of this fallacy, but otherwise his classification differs significantly from the traditional one. As a general premise, he says that these types can be gathered from the three basic features of language, i.e. meaning (*res significata*), way of signifying (*modus significandi*), or pronunciation (*modus proferendi*).¹⁰⁵ In the first group, derived from the *res significata*, Giles places the examples of both the first and third traditional types. This fallacy happens when, because of the unity of the things signified, one also infers the identity of the ways of signifying. Thus this fallacy includes both the argumentations based on the confusion of genders (*quicquid est animal coloratum albedine est album; Plato est animal coloratum albedine; ergo Plato est album*)¹⁰⁶ and those wherein the signification of a species is ascribed to an individual name, so that two types of supposition, e.g. simple and personal, are also mixed up (*homo est species; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est species*).¹⁰⁷ The second type of fallacy is determined by the reverse confusion, namely when from the unity of the ways of signifying one is pushed to infer a unity of meaning or of one item belonging to the same category as another item.¹⁰⁸

104 Lambert of Auxerre (Lambert of Lagny), *Logica (Summa Lamberti)*, (ed.) Franco Alessio (Florence, 1971), 168–73; Roger Bacon, *Summulae dialectices*, in Alain de Libera, “Les *Summulae dialectices* de Roger Bacon. III. *De argumentatione*,” *AHDLM* 54 (1987), 139–289, 254–60; Peter of Spain, *Tractatus* 7.83–100, (ed.) Lambertus Maria de Rijk (Assen, 1972), 131–45.

105 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 14vb: “In dictione enim tria sunt considerare: rem significatam, modum significandi, et modum proferendi.”

106 This syllogism is not translatable since its conclusion implicitly ascribes to *Plato* the neuter gender. Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 14vb: “Ut sicut animal significat neutraliter sic credimus quod et Plato neutraliter significet.”

107 Interestingly enough, Giles shows here his acquaintance with both supposition theory and speculative grammar. Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 14vb–15ra.

108 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 15ra: “Sed si e converso sit quod propter unitatem modi significandi interpretamur unitatem rei significate erit secundus modus.” The way of signifying involved in all these cases is the *modus significandi concretive* (or *concretio*) as opposed to *modus significandi abstractive* (or *abstractio*) characteristic of names (including both nouns and adjectives): see Tabarroni, “*Figura dictionis e predicazione*,” 208–09.

The third and last type arises from a unity in the way we pronounce terms and it is applied in particular to verbs, so that the similarity in morphological ending might induce someone to ascribe to one linguistic item certain properties of another one. For instance, if one notices that the verb *videre* (to see) has an ending similar to the verb *secare* (to cut), one might infer that *videre*, like *secare*, refers to an action, when, on the contrary, it refers to a passion. In this case, as Giles explains, we again have a variation in category (action versus passion); its origin, however, is not in the (supposed) unity of the ways of signifying of the terms in question, but rather in the way of pronouncing them.¹⁰⁹

At the end of his exposition, Giles admits that this way of deducing the types of fallacies of figure of speech makes frequent appeal to reality—at least in the first and second modes—so that a great uncertainty remains about whether they are actually *fallaciae in dictione* at all. Even if he does not see anything wrong in assigning to both linguistic and extra-linguistic fallacies the same (incorrect) syllogism, he devotes the second *declaratio* to solving this *dubium*. First of all, Giles affirms that the way of pronouncing words (*modus proferendi*) is relevant for all the types of fallacy of figure of speech. One should distinguish, however, two kinds of *modi proferendi* with respect to words: (1) according to their endings (morphological *modus proferendi*); or (2) according to whether they are concrete or abstract. Pronunciation in the first sense, as seen above, is relevant for the third type of figure of speech; pronunciation in the second sense is relevant for the first and the second types. In both cases, the relevant fact is that the predicate is a concrete term which somehow signifies its subject or *substratum* (in the case of a concrete accidental term) or its individuals (in the case of a substantive universal term), or which implies the other categories, since a substance implies its accidents, and the accidental properties imply substance as their *substratum*.¹¹⁰ By proceeding in this way Giles has solved some theoretical problems emerging from Aristotle's puzzling text.

109 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum*, fol. 15ra: "Si propter convenientiam modi proferendi interpretatur unitatem modi significandi vel rei significate esset tertius modus quem philosophus appellat faciens interpretari patiens vel e converso patiens et dispositum interpretari esse faciens et agens. Ut si quia videre est similis terminationis et similis prolationis ad secare crederemus quod sicut secare importat actionem sic et videre. Ex quo apparet quod sicut cum quale interpretatur quantum sic et cum patiens interpretatur facere fit variatio praedicamenti non tamen hoc est eodem modo sed in secundo modo est variatio predicati propter convenientiam modi significandi, hic autem in tertio modo est variatio predicati propter similem terminationem et propter convenientiam modi proferendi."

110 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum* 1, fol. 15rab.

The fallacy of *plures interrogationes ut unam*—i.e. that of many questions posed as a single one—generates the opposite problem. That is, its *causa apparentiae*, in the first half of the century, was traditionally individuated in the apparent unity of posing the question (*unitas ex parte modi interrogandi*), which appears to be odd for an *extra dictionem* fallacy.¹¹¹ The Anonymous-SF and Giles of Rome adopt a different way of describing its *causa apparentiae* as deriving instead from the partial identity of the things about which the question is posed.¹¹² This move allows them to include the fallacy of many questions as one clearly among the fallacies *extra dictionem*.

11 Giles's Commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*

Giles wrote his massive *Sententia*-style commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* around 1285.¹¹³ In it, as in his commentary on the *Sophistici elenchi*, Giles takes advantage of a series of great commentators, including Robert Grosseteste, Robert Kilwardby, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, together with some commentaries by the Arabic philosophers al-Fārābī and Averroes. This commentary, though, unlike that on the *Elenchi*, has not attracted much attention in the literature. Only recently have some aspects of its text or some points of its doctrine been carefully studied.¹¹⁴ What follows is a discussion of some of

111 This discussion follows that of Andrea Tabarroni, "Plures interrogationes: A Fallacy in Question?" in *Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language*. Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, June 11–15, 2002 (Florence, 2004), 289–306.

112 Cf. Incerti Auctores, *Quaestiones super Sophisticos elenchos* 103–104, (ed.) Sten Ebbesen, (Hauniae, 1977), 238 and 240–41; Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Elenchorum*, fol. 22va (quoted in Tabarroni, "Plures interrogationes: A Fallacy in Question?" 301, n. 31). They are followed by Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super libros Elenchorum* 41 (quaest. novae), (eds.) Sten. Ebbesen et al. (Toronto, 1984), 213.

113 Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici (Parte II)," *Documenti e studi* 2 (1990), 1–74, 71.

114 See Jan Pinborg, "Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie an der Artistenfakultät," in *Die Auseinandersetzungen an der Pariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert*, (ed.) Albert Zimmermann (Berlin, 1976), 240–68, who edited Giles's treatise *De medio in demonstratione*. See also John Longeway "Aegidius Romanus and Albertus Magnus vs. Thomas Aquinas on the Highest Sort of Demonstration (*demonstratio potissima*)," *Documenti e studi* 13 (2002), 373–434; Bertagna, "La *divisio textus* nel commento di Egidio Romano agli *Analitici Posteriori*. Parte I," 285–371; Bertagna, "La *divisio textus* nel commento di Egidio Romano agli *Analitici Posteriori*. Parte II," 263–326; Bertagna, "La *divisio textus* nel commento di Egidio Romano agli *Analitici Posteriori*. Parte III," 439–86; A. Corbini, *La teoria della scienza nel XIII secolo* (Florence, 2006).

the theories developed by Giles in this commentary that went on to influence subsequent debates. These include his treatment of the various types of demonstration and of the relationship between definitions and demonstration, and, finally, his theory of the highest type of demonstration.

12 The Types of Demonstration

After a long prologue and a first lesson devoted to the discussion of general problems Giles presents Aristotle's theory of demonstration in general.¹¹⁵ He then proceeds to deal with various types of demonstrations and various types of knowledge in a comparative way so as to find the more powerful demonstration (*potissima demonstratio*).¹¹⁶

A demonstration, in general, is a syllogism proceeding from premises that are universal, true, immediate, and known prior to and better than its conclusion. Discussing Chapters 13 and 24, Giles appears to consider two basic oppositional pairs of demonstration: demonstrations *quia*, or those that demonstrate the existence of a fact, that is, of the inherence of a predicate in a subject, versus demonstrations *propter quid*, which are demonstrations through its causes. Finally, he considers universal versus particular demonstrations.¹¹⁷ In the case of the first pair, if a *propter quid* demonstration is one in which the middle term is both the cause of the inherence of a predicate in the subject and its immediate cause, then a *demonstratio quia* is missing one of these conditions or both.¹¹⁸ The last type of *quia* demonstration—namely that

¹¹⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum* 1.2–12.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte I," 301, and the text quoted in 303, n. 35 (Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum* 1.13–34).

¹¹⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+1ra: "[D]emonstratio non solum dividitur in demonstrationem quia et propter quid, sed etiam in demonstrationem universalem et particularem ..." On the problem of defining general versus particular demonstrations in contemporary interpretations and medieval commentaries, see Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte II," 288–317.

¹¹⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+1rb-va: "Ad demonstrationem propter quid duo requiruntur et oportet ambo illa concurrere, videlicet quod talis demonstratio sit per causam et quod sit per causam immediatam, id est propriam et convertibilem. Igitur erit demonstratio quia vel si non est per causam, sed per effectum, vel si est per causam, non tamen per causam immediatam et convertibilem. Posset etiam esse tertius modus quia, ut si deficeret in utrisque, quod nec sit per causam sed per effectum nec sit per effectum proprium et convertibilem. Omnis ergo demonstratio vel est per causam vel est per effectum, per causam dupliciter, vel per mediatam vel per immediatam, et per effectum dupliciter, vel per effectum proprium et convertibilem vel per effectum non proprium et non convertibilem. Cum ergo quattuor modis possit

which derives from a simple effect—appears to be something originally added by Giles.¹¹⁹ It takes into account the fact that an effect might be caused by various things. For instance, *desiccare* (to dry) might be the effect of the sun and of fire. It is therefore impossible to argue from the fact that something dehydrates that it is the sun or fire, but only negatively from the fact that something does not dehydrate that it is neither of these.¹²⁰

Quia and *propter quid* demonstrations display their role in the theory of the subordination of the sciences. Giles examines three cases: where there is (a) a total subordination of one science to another; (b) a partial subordination of one to another; and (c) when a particular proposition is demonstrated *quia* in one science and *propter quid* in another.¹²¹ As has been underlined, the inclusion of intermediate cases of partial subordination of one science to another is Giles's original contribution to the discussion. In a passage where Aristotle says that the same relation that holds between optics and geometry also holds between the study of the rainbow and of optics Giles interprets Aristotle as here referring to partial subordination. That is, in such a case, Giles sees

esse demonstratio, uno modo est demonstratio propter quid, cum est demonstratio per causam immediatam, tribus aliis modis erit demonstratio quia." Cf. Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte II," 274–75.

119 At least no other contemporary reader of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* acknowledges it.

120 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+2rb: "Dicendum quod unus effectus potest sequi ex multis causis, utputa desiccare potest esse effectus solis et ignis. Talis ergo effectus qui efficitur ex multis causis excedit quamlibet illarum causarum et si sit talis effectus notior sua causa ut si notius est mihi quod aliquid sit desiccativum quam quod sit ignis poterimus arguere a tali effectui ad suam causam non affirmative ... sed negative. Dicemus enim quicquid non desiccat non est ignis." See discussion on this topic in Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte II," 276 and 286–87.

121 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+2vb–F4+3ra: "Primo si una scientia subalternatur simpliciter alii scientie sicut musica simpliciter subalternatur arismetice ... Secundo potest hoc contingere si scientia simpliciter non subalternetur scientie sed subalternetur ei quantum ad aliquam partem sicut naturalis philosophia subalternatur perspective non simpliciter sed quantum ad illam partem quod est de iride ... Tertio hoc potest contingere si scientia non subalternetur scientie nec simpliciter nec quantum ad aliquam partem, sed solum hoc est quia utitur aliqua propositione de qua dicit quia circa quam alia scientia dicit propter quid ut patet in medicina cirurgica et geometria. Medicina enim cirurgica nec simpliciter nec secundum aliquam sui partem subalternatur geometrie. Medicus tamen cirurgicus dicit de aliquo quia de quo spectat ad geometram dicere propter quid. Dicit enim cirurgicus quia vulnera circularia tardius sanantur. De hoc autem diceret geometra propter quid, videlicet quia in circulo non vulneris circularis propter earum distantia tardius coniunguntur et per consequens talia vulnera tardius sanantur." Cf. Corbini, *La teoria*, 187–89.

Aristotle as introducing a subordination of only a *part* of natural philosophy, i.e. that which deals with rainbows, to the science of optics, without implying a total subordination of the former to the latter. For Aristotle, however, the study of rainbows appears to be a science in itself, totally subordinated to optics.¹²² According to Giles, since the natural philosopher (*physicus*), in order to explain or describe the rainbow, has to make use of the notion of a visual line, which is a notion studied by the optician (*perspectivus*), the part of natural philosophy that deals with rainbows is subordinated to optics.¹²³

In cases where there is total subordination of one science to another, the distinction between *quia* demonstrations and those that are *propter quid* provides a clue for telling the differences between a superior science and an inferior one. That is, the first kind of science knows through the cause, while the second one does not.¹²⁴ Moreover, the superior one does not have any knowledge of the particular facts, which are, on the contrary, known by the inferior one.¹²⁵ Finally, the first kind of science applies to a general subject matter—or a form as such—while the second deals with a particular one. Although they

¹²² Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte II," 278.

¹²³ Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+4ra: "Notandum autem quod naturalis philosophia sive physica non subalternatur perspective simpliciter sed quantum ad aliquam partem utputa quantum ad id quid est de yride igitur quando propter quid et quia comparantur ad tales scientias diversas cuiusmodi sunt perspectiva et physica talis comparatio non est secundum quod una scientia subalternatur alteri simpliciter sed secundum quod subalternatur ei quantum ad aliquam partem... Dicendum quod oportet ex his quae dicuntur de linea visuale circa quam lineam negociatur perspectiva dicere propter quid eorum quae apparent in iride. Ea autem quae dicuntur de linea visuali vel competunt ipsi lineae secundum se et illa accipit perspectivus a geometra. Nam ad geometram pertinet determinare de linea et de his quae lineae insunt per se. Si vero ea quae dicuntur de linea visuali non competant lineae secundum quod linea sed secundum quod visualis talia dicuntur esse perspectiva simpliciter ... De yride ergo quia dicit naturalis sed propter quid dicit perspectivus aut simpliciter aut secundum doctrinam suam superiorem id est secundum quod accipit a geometra." Cf. Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte II," 279, n. 33.

¹²⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+3va: "Dicit ergo quod (hoc enim ipsum quia scire est sensibilibus) id est scientiarum subalternatarum (sed propter quid scire est mathematicorum), id est scientiarum subalternantium (hi enim) id est mathematici sive scientie subalternantes (habent demonstrationes causarum) id est per causas quasi dicat quod differt scientia subalternans a subalternata in modo sciendi quia unius est scire quia, alterius propter quid."

¹²⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+3va: "Scientie ergo subalternantes propter sui altitudinem considerantes universales causas licet sciant propter quid ignorant tamen multos effectus et multa quia quae non ignorant scientie sensibiles et subalternate."

have the same subject matter, that is, a universal form, the inferior one regards it as brought about by a particular matter.¹²⁶ According to Mario Bertagna, even though Giles tries to provide a positive assessment of the *demonstratio quia*, it nonetheless remains a defective demonstration. This is especially true of the last type, i.e. the one deriving from a simple effect, which, as was seen above, can offer only negative conclusions from negative premises.¹²⁷

13 Definitions and Demonstration

As mentioned, the principal goal of the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*, according to Giles, is to explain the notion of definition and to show the relationships between the various types of definitions and scientific demonstration.¹²⁸ The basic distinction indicated by Giles is that between the essential definition of a thing (*diffinitio dicens quid*) and its causal definition (*diffinitio dicens propter quid*).¹²⁹ But there are other types of definition, all organized in a chain of distinctions that Giles expands on more fully in his commentary on book 2, chapter 10. First, there is the distinction between nominal and real definitions, with real definitions being able to be derived either from accidental properties or from essential properties. Second, there is the distinction between essential and causal definitions.¹³⁰

As Giles explains in a *dubitatio* devoted to the first type of definition, the distinction between nominal and real definitions is not mutually exclusive. That is, every real definition is also a nominal definition—in the sense that it explains the meaning of the *definiendum*, or of its name—while a nominal definition can also be a real definition when its *definiendum* is really existent.¹³¹ Giles goes

126 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. F4+3vb: “Deinde cum dicit (Mathematice enim) dat quartem differentiam sumptam ex parte scientie subalternantis, nam tales scientie differunt a subalternatis quia sunt circa species et sunt formaliores illis. Ideo ait quod (mathematice enim) id est scientie subalterantes (sunt circa species) et circa formam (non enim sunt de aliquo subiecto) id est de aliquam materiam speciali.” Cf. Bertagna, “La *divisio textus*. Parte II,” 281–84.

127 Bertagna, “La *divisio textus*. Parte II,” 286.

128 This discussion follows Bertagna, “La *divisio textus*. Parte III.”

129 Bertagna, “La *divisio textus*. Parte III,” 447–48.

130 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4vb; cf. Bertagna, “La *divisio textus*. Parte III,” 470.

131 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4vb: “Dicendum quod non omne quid nominis est quid rei, sed omne quid rei est quid nominis, nam ratio quam significat nomen est diffinitio. Si ergo illa ratio sit figmenti erit quid nominis tantum si autem sit vera diffinitio rei, erit quid nominis et quid rei aliter tamen et aliter quia

on to add some interesting annotations in this context to what he had already said in his previous commentaries. For example in saying that “*ratio quam significat nomen est diffinitio*” (*Met.* IV.10), he exactly refers to this broad notion of nominal definition, which includes both the definition of *figmenta* (fictitious entities, such as a *chimaera*) and the definition of really existing entities.¹³² Another way to make explicit the meaning of a word is to use a periphrasis (*ratio ponens altera nomina*), which, unlike the nominal definition, does not refer exactly to what the word means (*non exponit quid importatur per nomen*). Rather, it just puts other names in place of the *definiendum*. Because these names might be unknown or less known than the *definiendum*, the periphrasis might actually end up being of no help in understanding a word.¹³³ The problem with a nominal definition is that, in itself, it does not say whether the *definiendum* is anything really existing or not. Knowing the nominal definition, though, is the first step towards scientific knowledge. The second step is obtaining knowledge of the existence of the *definiendum*, so that we realize that our first definition is not only a nominal, but a real definition. The third step is to be aware that the characteristics indicated in the definition are essential properties of the *definiendum*. The final stage (before demonstration, of course) is when we get to know that the *definiens* is convertible, i.e. co-extensive, with the *definiendum*: this means that it is a proper definition of the *definiendum*.¹³⁴

quantum est de se et primo aspectu est quid nominis, postea est quid rei entis et tunc est quid rei entis secundum veritatem et per substantialia.” Cf. Corbini, *La teoria*, 222, 228–32.

132 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4vb. Cf. Bertagna, “La divisio textus. Parte III,” 473, n. 83.

133 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4vb: “Possumus autem dicere quod differt diffinitio dicens quid nominis a ratione ponente altera nomina. Nam diffinitio dicens quid nominis est quando notificatur quid importatur per nomen incomplexum ut si notificaretur quid importatur nomine trianguli. Diffinitio autem altera nomina ponens potest dici cum notificatur quid importatur per plura nomina ut si diceretur quod tunica nigra est colobium atrum vel possumus adhuc aliter distinguere et melius ut dicatur ratio ipsius quid significet nomen quando exponitur quid importatur per nomen sive illud sit complexum sive incomplexum, ratio autem ponens altera nomina est quando non exponitur quid importatur per nomen sed loco unius nominis assignatur unum alterum nomen et loco ipsorum plurium nominum assignantur altera plura nomina eque ignota vel magis quam nomina prius assignata.” Cf. Bertagna, “La divisio textus. Parte III,” 472, n. 81.

134 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4vb–O1ra: “[Q]uantum est de se et primo aspectu est quid nominis, postea est quid rei entis et tunc est quid rei entis secundum veritatem et per substantialia. ... Diffinitio ergo quia habet plures partes primo aspectu se offert ut consideretur quid quelibet pars significet, postea se offert ut

As Bertagna once again has shown, Giles grounds his observations about the opposition between essential and causal definitions on a faulty text and on some misunderstandings that grew out of his attempts to impose consistency on the commented text.¹³⁵ As a consequence, while Aristotle was distinguishing between nominal and real definitions in order to show that only the second type can enter a demonstration in the highest sense, Giles ends up maintaining that only causal definitions, being indemonstrable, can play the role of the middle term in such demonstrations. Essential definitions, being demonstrable of their *definiendum* or subject, can play the role of demonstrative conclusions instead.¹³⁶

14 The Middle Term in the Highest Type of Demonstration

If usually Giles's positions are not far from those worked out by Thomas Aquinas, in the case of the individuation of the middle term in the highest sort of demonstration they are simply opposite. Here Giles sides rather with Albert the Great.¹³⁷ Albert holds that there are three types of demonstration. The first—a kind of concession to Grosseteste—is the lowest type of demonstration and employs the formal definition as the medium in a syllogism that demonstrates the material definition of the subject.¹³⁸ The second demonstrates of the subject the definition of its passion (a typical property) using as middle term the causal definition of the passion. The third type is simply the second kind of demonstration, but as this occurs in mathematics.¹³⁹ The second type

consideremus utrum illa omnia sint in aliquo ente, tertio se offert utrum omnia illa sint essentialia illi enti." Cf. Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte III," 474, n. 84.

135 Bertagna, "La *divisio textus*. Parte III," 475–76.

136 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4ra: "Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis dato quod diffinitio subiecti non sit medium in demonstratione utrum debeat ingredi demonstrationem"

137 What follows is based on Longeway, "On the Highest Sort of Demonstration," and Pinborg, "Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie." Cf. Corbini, *La teoria*, 201–15.

138 A formal definition is a definition given through the formal cause of a thing (*ira* as *appetitus contrarii doloris*, i.e. anger as the appetite for pain in what is opposed to the subject), and corresponds to the causal definition. A material definition, by contrast, is the one that refers to the material cause (*ira* as *accensio sanguinis circa cor ex evaporatione fellis*, i.e. anger inasmuch it is embodied or as an accension of the blood to the heart from the evaporation of the gall). See Albert the Great, *Liber Posteriorum* (Opera Omnia; Paris, 1890), 2:190a, in Longeway, "On the Highest Sort of Demonstration," 377, n. 8.

139 See Longeway, "On the Highest Sort of Demonstration," 376–77.

is therefore the highest kind of demonstration according to Albert. Thomas and his school, on the contrary, holds that the highest sort of demonstration is the one in which the passion of the subject is demonstrated, using as middle term the definition of the same subject.¹⁴⁰

Giles, already in a separate question devoted to this problem, written probably before his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, had sided with Albert against Thomas.¹⁴¹ In this question, Giles underlines the difficulties of assuming the subject's definition as a middle term: in particular, as he holds, if one takes this kind of *medium*, the result is that the demonstration will not derive from immediate and prior principles, and that the whole order of demonstrative proofs will be destroyed.¹⁴² Previously, in the same question, Giles showed how the properties of subjects are organized in an ontological order, which is reflected in the demonstrative order (*ordo demonstrationis*). In individual things there is a double nature: one is the form, from which *per se* accidents flow, and the other is matter, from which another type of accident derives, namely, the so-called *accidentia per accidens*.¹⁴³ Only the first type of accidents (or *passiones*) can be demonstrated of a subject.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, while *accidentia per se* are directly caused by the essence of the thing (*esse essentiae*), the other sort is something added to the essence and concerns the actual existence (*esse actuale*) of a thing rather than its essence.¹⁴⁵ Since properties that flow

140 Longeway, "On the Highest Sort of Demonstration," 387–407.

141 See Pinborg, "Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie," 245, n. 17 (a critical edition of the *quaestio* can be read in the appendix to Pinborg, "Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie," 254–68). Cf. Corbini, *La teoria*, 208.

142 Giles of Rome, *Quaestio quid sit medium in demonstratione* 2.1 (in Pinborg, "Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie," 251–68, 264–66).

143 Giles of Rome, *Quaestio quid sit medium* 1.1, 255–56: "Et sicut in huiusmodi substantiis duplicem naturam aspicimus scilicet formam et materiam, ita in eis conspiciamus duo genera accidentium, unum genus quod consequitur formam et aliud genus quod consequitur materiam. Accidentia autem quae consequuntur formam sunt accidentia per se ... Alia autem accidentia quae sequuntur materiam dicuntur accidentia per accidens"

144 Giles of Rome, *Quaestio quid sit medium* 1.1, 255–56.

145 In his commentary on the *Posterior analytics* Giles adds a third kind of *esse*, intermediate between *esse essentiae* and *esse actuale*, that he calls *esse rem praedicamenti*, the kind of real existence that is assigned to things as far as they belong to a category: differently from what he held in his *quaestio*, here Giles maintains that this kind of *esse* can be scientifically known (and demonstrated), while the *esse actuale* cannot. See Giles of Rome, *Super Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. Nrb–va: "Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo demonstratio se habet ad esse. Dicendum quod possumus distinguere triplex esse ad quorum duo demonstratio se habet per se, ad tertium autem per accidens. ... Est autem primum esse rei per quod res est in predicamento. ... Hoc est ergo esse rem praedicamenti quod

from matter are useless in demonstration, Giles concentrates on those properties that follow the essence of things or their form.

The foregoing taxonomy derives from the different degrees of abstraction through which one can gather—and name—they in the unity of substantial forms. For example, a human being is such in virtue of one and the same form, but from it one can abstract the properties of being (*esse*), of living (*vivere*), of being a substance (*substantia*), or of being an animal (*animal*).¹⁴⁶ These names refer to the same form, but taken at different degrees of abstraction and as they are ordered from the more to the less abstract. From each of these properties other properties follow, so that they can be ordered, again, according to their different degree of abstraction. Among the properties derived from one degree of abstraction, one is the immediate consequence of the form taken at a certain level of abstraction. The others follow according to an order of causality, in particular, a property of a higher degree of abstraction is the cause of a property placed at a lower degree.¹⁴⁷ Demonstration takes advantage of this order of causality between properties, so that the passion, or property, predicated of the subject in its conclusion is demonstrated through the definition of the property belonging to the immediately higher degree, which is its cause.¹⁴⁸

In his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, Giles rejects Thomas's solution because he thinks that, since *definiens* and *definiendum* are the same, using the definition of the subject to demonstrate its passion would just beg the

de ea possit esse scientia vel quod habeat habitudinem ad debita principia et ad debitas proprietates ... Est autem secundum esse rei quod dicit veritatem propositionis et tale esse presupponit primum esse ... Tertium autem esse est esse actuale rei. Hoc autem per accidens se habet ad demonstrationem." Cf. Pinborg, "Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie," 247, n. 20.

146 Giles of Rome, *Quaestio quid sit medium* 1.3, p. 259: "[I]ta eadem forma est per quam homo est ens, substantia et animal, et non differt nisi secundum esse magis abstractum et minus."

147 Giles of Rome, *Quaestio quid sit medium* 1.4, 261: "[Q]uod ab una natura ut a una forma secundum unum genus abstractionis immediate non procedit nisi una proprietas sive una passio ... et mediante illa proprietate fluit alia. Et ideo dicere possumus quod in qualibet abstractione invenitur unum immediatum proprium ... Apparet igitur quod inter huiusmodi proprietates se secundum ordinem causalitatis consequentes aliquae sunt primae, aliquae mediae, aliquae postremae."

148 Giles of Rome, *Quaestio quid sit medium* 1.4, 261–62: "Et ita apparet, quod demonstratio vel est ex primis et veris ... vel ex hiis quae ex primis et veris sumpserunt originem, quando postremae demonstrantur per secundas et medias. Semper tamen demonstratio est ex immediatis accipiendo immediatum respectu passionis conclusi."

question without demonstrating anything.¹⁴⁹ At the same time he explains why this objection does not hold against his position which is against the demonstration that uses the definition of the passion as middle term. Specifically, according to Giles, the definition of the passion is not an essential definition “which is the same as the passion” (*diffinitio...non est dicens quid passionis quae est idem cum passione*). Rather, it is a causal one “which is not the same as the passion itself” (*sed est dicens propter quid eius quod non est idem cum ipsa*).¹⁵⁰ Applications of his theory and of his refusal to take the definition of the subject as a middle term in the *demonstratione potissima* can be found both in natural philosophy and in geometry.

An example used by Aristotle to illustrate his theory of demonstration is that of the lunar eclipse. In order to demonstrate the obscuration of the Moon in an eclipse there must be taken as the middle term the property of interposition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon, and this is no definition of the subject, i.e. the Moon.¹⁵¹ The same holds in geometry when one demonstrates that a triangle has three angles whose sum is equal to two right angles (call them “2R”). He follows this line of argumentation, saying that a triangle has an extrinsic angle equal to the sum of its opposite interior angles and derives from this property the passion to be proved of the subject, that is, the property of 2R.

149 Giles of Rome, *Super Posterium Analyticorum*, fol. N4+3rb-va: “Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum diffinitio subiecti sit medium in demonstratione ... Si autem vellemus conclusiones demonstrationum notas facere per rationes nominum et per rationes terminorum hoc esset velle quod huiusmodi conclusiones essent per se note et hoc esset tollere totum ordinem scientificum.”

150 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4va: “Quando vero ulterius additur quod si esset medium diffinitio passionis demonstrate tunc probaretur idem per idem quia diffinitio passionis est cum passione. Dici debet quod hoc idem sequeretur et magis si esset medium diffinitio subiecti nam diffinitio subiecti per se loquendo magis est idem cum subiecto quam diffinitio passionis cum ea. Sed sicut est inconveniens quod aliquid probetur per seipsum ita est inconveniens quod de subiecto probetur aliquid per seipsum sive per ipsum subiectum hec ergo ratio non concludit intentum sed petit sibi quandam difficultatem solvi. Propter quod sciendum quod diffinitio quae est medium in demonstratione non est dicens quid passionis quae est idem cum passione sed est dicens propter quid eius quae non est idem cum ipsa.” Trans. Longeway, “On the Highest Sort of Demonstration,” 409.

151 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+1vb: “Quod patet in exemplo suo posito. Medium enim ad demonstrandum defectum de luna est interpositio. Constat autem quod interpositio nullo modo est diffinitio subiecti quia nullo modo est diffinitio lune ... Est enim diffinitio dicens causam et propter quid. Si quereretur enim quid est defectus, diceremus quod causaliter est ipsa interpositio terre.”

The property of having such an extrinsic angle as the one described is a passion that is prior to (or more general than) the passion to be demonstrated of the subject. It is, in turn, to be demonstrated through another property of the triangle, that of having a line passing through that angle and parallel to its opposite side. The three properties taken into account, as Giles explains, are placed at increasing degrees of abstraction. The more general is cause of the less general and each of them is linked to different facets of the form "triangle" (its being composed of rectilinear lines or its being a continuous figure).¹⁵² In the same way, being, substance, and animal are contained in the form of humanity.¹⁵³ It is not possible, however, to ascend beyond a certain indemonstrable property, such as the v-postulate of Euclidean geometry, i.e. that parallel lines do not meet at any point (*parallelas autem non concurrere non probatur, sed accipitur tamquam principium*).¹⁵⁴

In none of the passages of the foregoing demonstration, Giles concludes, does the definition of the subject, i.e. of the triangle as a three-sided plane figure, play any role but as a basic and primitive presupposition. Otherwise one could not even understand what drawing a line through the angle opposite to one side means.¹⁵⁵ In conclusion, "sometimes passions are demonstrable through prior passions, and sometimes they inhere in their subjects in a primitive and indemonstrable way, but they are never demonstrable of the subject through the subject's definition."¹⁵⁶

152 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+2ra: "Demonstrantur ergo semper posteriora per priora nec tamen oportet deuenire ad diffinitionem subiecti quod sit medium in demonstratione ut patuit in exemplo preallegato. Fierent enim ibi tres demonstrationes, nam prima demonstratio erit quod triangulus habet tres, per hoc quod habet angulum extrinsecum equivalentem. Secunda erit quod habet angulum sic equivalentem quia per lineam eque distantem tertio lateri habet angulum extrinsecum divisibilem in duos angulos equales intrinsecis. Tertia erit quod habet angulum sic divisibilem quia parallele non concurrunt."

153 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+1vb–2vb.

154 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+2ra.

155 See Giles of Rome, *Quaestio quid sit medium* 2.3, 267; Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum*, fol. N4+4ra–b.

156 Longeway, "On the Highest Sort of Demonstration," 415.

Political Thought

Roberto Lambertini

1 Introduction

Histories of medieval political thought rarely fail to devote at least some attention to Giles of Rome.¹ This comes as no surprise, since the Augustinian master produced works in both of those genres that, between the 13th and the 14th century were among the main forms of political discourse, these being the *specula principis*² and the *tractatus de potestate papae*.³ Moreover, Giles touches upon issues that are relevant for political thought in some of his other works as well. Another matter remarked upon by several scholars is the degree of consistency of the political ideas expressed by Giles in his various works.⁴ This too is not surprising in a body of work that spans at least a quarter of a century if we consider his political works alone, and some thirty-five years if those non-political works with political content—the *Ordinatio* of the commentary on book 2 of the *Sentences* and the *Contra exemptos*—are included. Rather than attempting any sort of reassessment, this chapter limits itself to discussing those aspects of Giles's work that pertain to the history of political thought, and to surveying the substantial progress made by recent scholarship to our understanding of Giles's contributions to medieval learned discussions concerning political matters.

1 James H. Burns, (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350–c.1450* (Cambridge, 1989), esp. 481–83; Jürgen Miethke, “Politische Theorien im Mittelalter,” in *Politischen Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, (ed.) Hans-Joachim Lieber (Bonn, 1991), esp. 89–94 and 99–102; Antony Black, *Political Thought in Europe 1250–1450* (Cambridge, 1992), 49–54 and 153–54; Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought: 300–1450* (London, 1996); Janet Coleman, *A History of Political Thought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance* (Oxford, 2000), 63–71.

2 For a recent survey see Roberto Lambertini, “Mirrors for Princes,” in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, (ed.) Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht, 2011), 791–97; See also István Bejczy and Cary J. Nederman, (eds.), *Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages 1200–1500* (Turnhout, 2007).

3 Jürgen Miethke, *De potestate papae, Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham* (Tübingen, 2000).

4 An effort, perhaps somewhat forced, to reduce Giles's political thought to a unity can be found in Wilhelm Kölmel, *Regimen Christianum, Wege und Ergebnisse des Gewaltenverhältnisses und des Gewaltenverständnisses (8. bis 14. Jahrhundert)* (Berlin, 1970), 291–360.

2 The Context of Giles's Political Works

According to the most recent and reliable assessments of the absolute and relative chronology of Giles's work,⁵ the first evidence of his acquaintance with some key concepts of medieval political thought dates back to his commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1271–74).⁶ At this early point in his scholarly career, Giles seems to have had no more than a vague knowledge of the *Politics*, since when he explains such terms such as “democratia” or “oligarchia”, he has recourse to book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, rather than to the *Politics*. Also, when in a long *notandum* he argues in favor of monarchy as the best constitution, he resorts not to the *Politics* but rather to a well-known statement from the *Metaphysics*.⁷

This impression of an initially limited acquaintance with Aristotle's *Politics* is further supported by the short treatise that bears the title *De differentia Ethicae, Politicae et Rethoricae*.⁸ The *De differentia* cannot be dated with certainty; we only know that it was written after Giles's commentary on the *Rhetoric*, but before the *De regimine*. Since the date of this latter work can oscillate between 1276 and 1281 (although it was most probably written in the late 1270s), we are left with a rather wide range of possible dates. It can be considered certain, however, that Giles had already achieved considerable notoriety, because the short treatise originates from the request of a Dominican *lector* active at his Order's *studium* in Angers. Explaining his views on the difference between the three disciplines, Giles makes three points of special interest for our purposes. First, he adopts the traditional peripatetic threefold division of practical philosophy into ethics, *oeconomica*, and politics, where the last is said to deal with

5 Silvia Donati, “Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano, I: Le opere prima del 1285—I commenti aristotelici,” *Documenti e studi* 1 (1990), 1–111, 32–35.

6 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum*, (Venice, 1515; Frankfurt am Main 1968), fol. 18b-d; see Costantino Marmo, “Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari: Egidio Romano e Tommaso d'Aquino sulle passioni dell'anima,” *Documenti e studi* 2 (1991), 281–315; Ubaldo Staico, “Retorica e politica in Egidio Romano,” *Documenti e studi* 3 (1992), 1–75; Costantino Marmo, “L'utilizzazione delle traduzioni latine della Retorica nel commento di Egidio Romano (1272–1273),” in *La Rhétorique d'Aristote. Tradition et commentaires de l'antiquité au XVII^e siècle*, (eds.), Gilbert Dahan and Irène Rosier-Catach (Paris, 1998), 111–13; Janet Coleman, *A History of Political Thought*, 64–69.

7 Giles of Rome, *Super Libros Rhetoricorum* fol. 18c: “ut sicut in universo est unus principatus et unus princeps ut concluditur in decimo metaphysice, ita sit unus dominus unius civitatis.” Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12, 1076a39–40.

8 Gerardo Bruni, “The ‘*De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae*’ of Aegidius Romanus,” *The New Scholasticism* 6 (1932), 1–18.

the *regimen civitatis*. Second, he says politics is necessary because some persons must be compelled to act according to justice. As Giles himself puts it:

Some are so wicked that neither love for honesty nor paternal *admonitio* can move them to good; therefore, in addition to *oeconomica* and ethics, politics was necessary, in order that its laws, by means of the fear of punishment, can induce to good those who have a wicked soul.⁹

Third, Giles bears witness to the fact that the reception of Aristotle's *Politics* was progressing rather slowly at the beginning of the 1270s. Giles states in fact that if we (meaning the Latin West) had the complete text of the *Politics*, then we would find in it laws that would regulate even specific contracts.¹⁰ It is not easy to understand what Giles exactly meant when he wrote, "si totam haberemus politicam" ("if we had the whole book of the *Politics*"). He could be referring to the *translatio imperfecta* that covered only book 1 and part of book 2,¹¹ but this cannot be certain, since also the colophon of Moerbeke's second translation, in many manuscripts, pointed to the incompleteness of the available text.¹² At any rate, the emphasis on the law betrays a merely indirect knowledge of Aristotle's *Politics*, suggesting that Giles's account of the *Politics* was not yet based on a direct knowledge of the work but rather on the hints one could gather from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. His emphasis on the law as the proper object of politics, however, is also part of a critique of the jurists, who are said to deal with laws in a narrative way, as opposed to the scientific approach that is characteristic of politics. This is the context of the famous definition of the jurists as "idiotae politici", where "idiotae" does not mean "idiot", but rather "layman". Nevertheless, Giles's claim is clearly part of a controversy that opposed the arts faculty to the jurists, as some scholars have already pointed out.¹³

9 I base my rendering in English on the text established by Bruni, "The 'De differentia'," 9: "Et aliqui sunt ita perversi quos nec amor honesti, nec paterna monitio, ad bonum trahit, ideo praeter yconomicam et ethicam oportuit dare politicam, per cuius leges, timore pene, inducerentur ad bonum illi qui sunt habentes perversam animam."

10 Bruni, "The 'De differentia,'" 10.

11 Aristotle, *Politica* (libri 1–11.11). *Translatio prior imperfecta interprete Guillelmo de Moerbeke* (?), (ed.) Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Bruges and Paris, 1961).

12 Aristotle, *Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Guilelmi de Moerbeka*, (ed.) Franz Susemihl (Leipzig, 1872), 372.

13 Staico, "Retorica e politica," 71–75; Gianfranco Fioravanti, "Filosofi contro legistae: un momento dell'autoaffermazione della filosofia nel Medioevo," in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (eds.) Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York, 1998), 421–27.

3 The *De regimine principum*

Aquinas's *speculum principis* remains but a fragment, so it is difficult to ascertain to what extent Giles's innovation in the tradition of the mirrors for princes genre was influenced by the great Dominican thinker. Giles knew and used Aquinas's *De regno*, but went much further in the incorporation of Aristotelian material in his own *speculum principis*. The structure itself of the *De regimine principum*, divided into three main books, does not depend on *De regno*, but reflects the traditional peripatetic threefold division of practical philosophy into ethics, *oeconomica*, and politics. The three treatises on *oeconomica* attributed to Aristotle had not yet been translated when Giles wrote his most successful work.¹⁴ Still, he was very well acquainted, as is witnessed by his *De differentia*, with a well established tradition at the arts faculty, influenced by different kinds of sources, that distinguished three realms of morally relevant human action: individual life, life in the family (understood in the broader sense of the household), and life in the city. As a matter of fact, Giles set out to put together an "Aristotelian" *oeconomica* without having a corresponding book by Aristotle at his disposal. As previous research has already shown, he relied mainly on book 1 of Aristotle's *Politics* (which some of his contemporaries, but also later authors, thought contained the Stagirite's doctrine of the household),¹⁵ and on books 7 and 8 of the same work, which contain an unfinished description of the ideal polis. But Giles also drew heavily on the *Ethics*, in particular on the books where Aristotle discusses friendship. The example of *De regimine*, book 2 shows how important it was for Giles to compose a book with a distinctly Aristotelian flavor. Not surprisingly therefore, book 1 of the *De regimine* is interspersed with a very large number of quotations from Grosseteste's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, while book 3, at least as far as political life in peacetime is concerned, quotes very frequently from Moerbeke's rendering of the *Politics*.¹⁶

Despite such evidence of borrowing, however, one should not assume that Giles's text is but a summary of Aristotle's works, even if Giles himself may

14 Christoph Flüeler, "La dottrina medievale sul governo della casa. Il contributo degli Ordini mendicanti," in *Etica e politica: le teorie dei frati mendicanti nel Due e Trecento* (Spoleto, 1999), 173–202.

15 Roberto Lambertini, "A proposito della costruzione dell'Oeconomica in Egidio Romano," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 315–70.

16 Roberto Lambertini, "*Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes*. Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della Politica nel terzo libro del *De regimine Principum*," *Documenti e studi* 1 (1990), 277–325.

have tried to convey this impression to the reader. Whatever Giles's own intentions, he certainly managed to mislead some specialists of the last century, such as Alois Dempf, who wrote, "[t]oday it is almost impossible to understand how this Mirror for Princes, a pure paraphrase of the Aristotelian *Politics*, could become one of the most successful books of the Later Middle Ages."¹⁷ The expression "paraphrase" is misleading from many points of view. For the present purposes, I will emphasize only three of them. First, as has already been remarked, for the construction of his mirror, Giles draws on material not only from the *Politics*, but also from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*. Second, he reads Aristotle's text through the lens of a reception that had already passed through several stages. Not only had the *Politics* been translated into Latin by Moerbeke (a process that already implies a certain amount of interpretation), but it had also been commented upon by Albert the Great and Aquinas, and maybe, already, by Peter of Auvergne as well.¹⁸ It is possible to show that Giles intensively used Aquinas's *Sententia libri Politicorum* and, more selectively, also Albert the Great. Moreover, other works by Aquinas, such as his *De regno* and *Summa theologiae*, were exploited by Giles in drafting his own mirror.¹⁹ Third, and even more importantly, Giles does not refrain from using Aristotle's text to support opinions that clearly were not those of the Stagirite. This does not imply, however, that we should not consider the framework of his political thought in *De regimine* "Aristotelian" as opposed to "Augustinian", for some years ago Lidia Lanza rightly pointed out that, many disagreements notwithstanding, the *De regimine*'s main source of philosophical inspiration is Aristotle's *Politics*.²⁰

Still, one should be aware that Giles does not slavishly follow the Stagirite, since when the issue at stake is particularly relevant, he is able to knowingly interpret Aristotle against his own intentions. A telling example of Giles's approach is his discussion of monarchy as the best constitution. In this context he seems to play-off—so to speak—the *De regno* against Aristotle in order to support his own monarchist conviction. In the second part of *De regimine*, book 3, Giles pursues his goal by opening a sort of question, listing pros and cons

17 Alois Dempf, *Sacrum Imperium. Geschichts—und Staatsphilosophie des Mittelalters und der politischen Renaissance* (Munich, 1973), 449.

18 See also Roberto Lambertini, "Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome and Aristotle's *Politica*," in *Peter of Auvergne: University Master of the 13th Century*, (eds.) Christoph Flüeler, Lidia Lanza, and Marco Toste (Berlin, 2015), 51–70.

19 Lambertini, "Philosophus videtur," 287–304.

20 Lidia Lanza, "La *Politica* di Aristotele e il *De regimine principum* di Egidio Romano," *Medioevo e Rinascimento* 15 (2001), 19–75; see also, Lidia Lanza, "Aspetti della ricezione della *Politica* aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d'Alvernia," *Studi Medievali* 35 (1994), 643–69.

according to the typical structure of a medieval *dubitatio*. The first *rationes* in favor of monarchy are taken, with some minor modifications, from Aquinas's *De regno*. Then Giles takes some arguments against monarchy from Aristotle's *Politics*, presenting them, however, as *rationes in contrarium* that Aristotle had formulated only in order to refute them. In his own solution, Giles then states squarely that the Philosopher supports monarchy as the absolutely best form of government and corroborates his assertion by referring to an argument which, in the *Politics*, goes exactly in the opposite direction. Giles writes that "the prince, or the king (according to the Philosopher in book 3 of the *Politics*) should gather around himself many men of learning, so that he can have many eyes, and many good and virtuous men, so that he can have many feet and many hands, becoming a man with many eyes, hands, and feet."²¹ As a matter of fact, in Aristotle's *Politics*, book 3, Aristotle argues that absolute rulers often rely on counsellors, but uses this state of affairs for the opposite goal, to argue, namely, that many can be better than one:

Nor does any one deny that the decision of such matters must necessarily be left to man, but it is argued that there should be many judges, and not one only. For every ruler who has been trained by the law judges well; and it would surely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, or act better with two hands or feet, than many with many; indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make for themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet. For they make colleagues of those who are the friends of themselves and their governments. They must be friends of the monarch and of his government; if not his friends, they will not do what he wants; but friendship implies likeness and equality; and, therefore, if he thinks that his friends ought to rule, he must think that those who are equal to himself and like himself ought to rule equally with himself.²²

21 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.4 (Rome, 1607; repr. Aalen, 1967), 460: "ille princeps vel ille rex (secundum Philosophum 3 *Politicorum*) debet sibi associare multos sapientes, ut habeat multos oculos, et multos bonos et virtuosos, ut habeat multos pedes et multas manus et sic fiet unus homo multorum oculorum, multarum manuum et multarum pedum."

22 Aristotle, *Politics* 3.16, 1287b23–35 (Susemihl (ed.), 232–33): "non igitur hoc contradicunt, tamquam non necessarium hominem esse iudicantem de talibus, sed quod non unum solum, sed multos. Iudicat enim unusquisque princeps eruditus a lege bene, inconveniensque forte utique esse videbitur, si melius percipiat quis duobus oculis et duabus auribus iudicans et agens duobus pedibus et manibus quam multi multis, quoniam et nunc oculos multos monarchae faciunt sibi et aures et manus et pedes, eos enim, qui principatui et ipsius sunt amici, faciunt conprincipes Non amici quidem igitur existentes non faciunt

A similar example occurs in the following chapter, where Giles argues in favor of hereditary monarchy. In this case, he isolates from its context a quotation from the *Politics*, book 3, chapter 15—"That, in fact, is hardly to be expected, and is too much to ask of human nature"—and then reinterprets the passage as if it did not contain any objections against hereditary monarchy.²³ With these words, Aristotle refers to the difficulties of hereditary succession, which arise from human nature and cannot, therefore, be overcome. Giles, however, confines the meaning of this statement to Aristotle's own times, weakening thereby its force as an objection. Moreover, Aristotle wanted to hint at the fact that human nature is not strong enough to decide to hand power over to other, more suitable persons, if the king realizes that his natural heirs are not apt to rule. Giles, on the contrary, thinks that, in principle, succession by election might seem better, but on the basis of historical experience (*experimentaliter*), the opposite is true, since pious kings always succeed in securing succession to their heirs.²⁴

After showing that in his *De regimine* Giles does not simply repeat Aristotle, but rather uses the Philosopher's texts to support his own positions, it becomes easier to outline some basic tenets of Giles's political thought embedded in his mirror for princes. The peculiarities of the literary genre of the mirrors make it obvious that the role of the ruler in the political community is especially emphasized: it is not surprising that Giles underlines time and again that the well-being of the kingdom depends on the moral qualities of the prince, and that his attitude towards his family, his court, his counsellors, and his subjects in general is decisive for the destiny of his *regnum*. Still, Giles now presents a more comprehensive approach to political theory, inspired also by a much greater familiarity with Aristotle's *Politics* than he had had at the time he wrote his commentary on the *Rhetoric* and the *De differentia*.

A major theme of the *De regimine* is the naturalness of power relations among human beings. To this purpose, at the beginning of book 2 (devoted to *oeconomica*) Giles puts forward arguments to prove that humans are naturally social. Drawing inspiration mainly from Aquinas's *De regno*, he argues at length that nature has provided mankind with characteristics that make a life lived in isolation almost impossible. Moreover, being deprived of the instincts

secundum monarchiae voluntatem; si autem amici et illius et principatus, quodque amicos forte et similis, quare si hos existimat oportere principari, aequales et similes principari existimat oportere similiter."

23 Aristotle, *Politics* 3.15, 1286b26–27 (Susemihl (ed.), 225): "difficile enim et maioris virtutis quam secundum humanam naturam."

24 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.5, 462.

governing the life of other animals, human beings need to learn from their fellow creatures. The origin of the political community is coherently described according to the pattern of generation and growth: human sociability has its first manifestation in the family, many families make up a *vicus* or *vicinia*, and several of these, in turn, together constitute the city. To this model, clearly taken from the *Politics*, Giles adds the *regnum* as the fulfilment of the whole development. The potential contrast with Aristotle, who claims that perfect life is possible at the level of the city, is partly avoided by Giles with the argument that a *regnum* is necessary for defending the political community from external enemies.²⁵

Although this “genetic pattern” is the most natural way of constituting a community, Giles is aware of other possibilities. Near the beginning of book 3 he mentions another natural way, this being the consent (*concordia*) of individuals who agree to found a city, and an unnatural one, that is characterized by violent oppression on the part of a tyrant, who compels people to live together under his power. According to Giles, *concordia* is less natural than the “genetic pattern”, but can nevertheless still be considered “natural” because human beings are naturally equipped with a drive towards the attainment of the quality of life that only a political community such as the city can guarantee.²⁶

Although the proof of the claim that humans are naturally political animals can be considered implicit in what has just been said above about their natural sociability, Giles, in book 3, part 1, chapter 4 feels the need to argue in favor of this claim. Here he shows that the city is not only the fulfilment of the family and the *vicus*, but also that it constitutes their proper end. Only in the city, for example, does human language attain its proper end, since by nature rational agents are only able to express concepts such as “just” and “unjust”, as Aristotle argued, in such a context.²⁷ Giles is aware that this kind of teleological reasoning is open to an objection grounded in the fact that not *all* human beings live in a political community. To this Giles responds that the naturalness of political life should not be wrongly assimilated to physical necessity. Some human beings cannot live politically because they are so morally corrupt that their way of life can be likened to that of beasts; others renounce political life for a higher religious end. Finally, some cannot live politically because they are too poor or too unfortunate and are thus compelled to live outside the city, and there earn their living working on the land.²⁸ As Ulrich Maier pointed out some years ago, Giles shares with many other theologians and Aristotle commentators the idea

25 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 2.1.1–2, 214–16; see also 3.1.5, 411–12.

26 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.1.6, 413–15.

27 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.1.4, 409–10.

28 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.1.3, 407.

that political life is possible only in the city, understood not so much as a synonym for "state" or "community", but rather as urban reality: outside the city walls, one could say, there is no political community proper.²⁹

After these introductory chapters, Giles devotes the remainder of book 3, part 1 to providing what amounts to a summary of the *Politics*, book 2, in which Aristotle criticizes several other real and hypothetical constitutions. Here Giles follows closely his source, as well as Aquinas's commentary thereon. The only exception concerns the theoretical constitution advocated by Socrates and Plato. After a long point-by-point refutation that cleaves closely to Aristotle's critique, Giles chooses to add what might be called a "charitable" interpretation of an aspect of their doctrine. Returning to their advocacy of the communality of women and children, Giles reiterates that such a position is obviously absurd, if taken in its literal meaning, yet can be accepted if interpreted metaphorically as signifying that every citizen should love the wives and children of his fellow citizens *as if they were his own*. The same holds for the communality of material goods: in this case, however, the good citizen should be ready to share his property with others in need. Interestingly enough, in this attempt to find at least one metaphorical sense in which Socrates and Plato were right, Giles is in agreement with one of his fiercest theological adversaries, Henry of Ghent.³⁰

Giles's account of Aristotle's famous scheme of good and corrupt constitutions bears a particular interest insofar as he claims that the way Italian cities are ruled stands as an example of the good government of the many. He writes:

Usually, in Italian cities the many, (that is the whole *populus*), have the power. There, in fact, the consent of the whole *populus* is required for approving the statutes, for electing the *podestà*, and also for correcting them. Although, in fact, in those cities, a *podestà*, or some other authority that rules the city, is always nominated, the whole *populus* nevertheless has more power than the nominated authority, since the whole *populus* can elect and correct him, if he acts unjustly; furthermore the whole *populus* has the power to approve the statutes that the authority is not allowed to infringe...We might call this kind of constitution "*gubernatio populi*".³¹

29 Ulrich Meier, *Stadt und Bürger. Die Stadt im Denken spätmittelalterlicher Theologen, Philosophen und Juristen* (Munich, 1994), 69–75.

30 See Lambertini, "Philosophus videtur," 313–16.

31 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.2, 455: "communiter ... in civitatibus Italiae dominantur multi, ut totus populus: ibi enim requiritur consensus totius populi in statutis condendis, in potestatibus eligendis, et etiam in potestatibus corrigendis, licet enim semper ibi

Provided that the many rule in the interest of the whole community, the *gubernatio populi* is a good constitution. However, as has already been mentioned, Giles prefers monarchy both because it reproduces the pattern of government existing in nature and in the universe, and because history shows that monarchical constitutions enjoy more stability. Concerning this second point, Giles is persuaded that hereditary monarchy in particular is best: first, because it avoids the dangers of instability connected with the election of the monarch; second, because it is better that the king in charge knows that the results of his efforts will be transmitted to his son; and, third, because it is better for the subjects, since they get used to obeying the legitimate heir even before he becomes king.³²

In the third book of *De regimine* Giles also confronts the issue of the relationship between the prince and the law, not restricting himself to general, albeit revealing expressions, such as those which identify the prince with the *lex animata*. In chapter 29 of book 3, part 2 he formulates a veritable *quaestio* that resonates in many particulars with what was also being discussed in some contemporary commentaries on the *Politics* and on the *Ethics*: “Whether a kingdom or city is better ruled by the best king or the best law” (*Utrum regnum aut civitas sit melius regi optimo rege, aut optima lege*).³³ Giles’s response avoids deciding between these options, at least apparently, thanks to a distinction made between natural and positive law. He makes his prince subject to natural law but superior to positive law, which he not only promulgates but can even choose not to follow, when right reason makes known to him the principles that natural law imposes on him.³⁴ Such a solution guarantees the *princeps* a virtually unlimited range of action, since he is freed from all restraints other than those of practical reason. Indeed even when, in a previous chapter, he

adnotetur potestas, vel dominus aliquis, qui civitatem regat; magis tamen dominatur totus populus, quam dominus adnotatus eo quod totius populi est eum eligere et corrigere, si male agat. Etiam eius totius est statuta condere, quae non licet dominum transgredi ... Nos autem talem principatum appellare possumus gubernationem populi.”

32 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.5, 461–63.

33 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.29, 531–34. For commentaries on the *Ethics*, see, for example, Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super librum Ethicorum* v, in *Le ‘questiones’ di Radulfo Brito sull’ Ethica Nicomachea. Introduzione e testo critico*, (ed.) Iacopo Costa (Turnhout, 2008), 455–57. For commentaries on the *Politics* see the lists of questions in Christoph Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter*, pt. 2 (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1992), 101–83.

34 Giles of Rome; *De regimine* 3.2.29, 532: “sciendum est regem et quemlibet principantem esse medium inter legem naturalem et positivam.”

makes reference to the *iura regni* that the king ought to observe, it is not clear whether he does so as an exhortation or as a call to an obligation.³⁵

To recap, the *De regimine* presents a broad picture of the figures and principal methods of action of the ideal prince, in which Giles's preference—despite his knowledge and recognition of other forms of government³⁶—is clearly for a hereditary monarchy in which the sovereign is not bound by the law. Even if Giles observes in passing that every king is also a bit of a tyrant, the guarantee of monarchy not degenerating into tyranny consists in the virtue of the prince himself.³⁷

Giles enjoyed considerable success with this work, as the large number of surviving manuscripts bears witness. As Charles Briggs has been able to show, *De regimine* was read not only in the circles to which it was explicitly destined but also by many who made use of it as an instrument of study, regarding it to be a compendium of Aristotle's ethico-political thought.³⁸ In this way Giles also influenced in a significant fashion the reception of Aristotle's *Politics* in the Latin West.

4 Papal Abdication

During the years 1297–98 Giles of Rome weighed in on the debate regarding the legitimacy of Pope Celestine V's abdication. As is well known, this controversy assumed a particularly dramatic character since the denial of the legitimacy of Pietro del Morrone's abdication could also be used to deny the legitimacy of the pope currently in office, Boniface VIII.³⁹ Jürgen Miethke has correctly identified in the debate on the abdication the forerunners of a much larger discussion about the nature of spiritual and temporal power that a few years hence would find expression in the literary genre of the treatises *de potestate papae*.⁴⁰ Although Giles's own treatise largely consists of point-by-point

35 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.9, 474.

36 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.2, 453–55.

37 Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 3.2.9, 480–81.

38 Charles F. Briggs, *Giles of Rome's De regimine principum: Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University c. 1275–c. 1525* (Cambridge, 1999). Concerning the numerous vulgarizations of the work, see especially, Noëlle-Laetitia Perret, *Les traductions françaises du De regimine principum de Gilles de Rome: parcours matériel, culturel et intellectuelle d'un discours sur l'éducation* (Leiden, 2011).

39 For an outline, see John R. Eastman, *Papal Abdication in Later Medieval Thought* (Lewiston, 1990).

40 Miethke, *De potestate papae*, 57–68.

refutation of the arguments advanced in the so-called manifesto of Lunghezza by the Colonna cardinals and their supporters and has a predominantly ecclesiological interest, it nonetheless manifests some significant political ideas.⁴¹ Whereas in *De regimine principum* the prevalent interest was turned toward temporal royal power (and the problems of the spiritual power remain in fact in the margins⁴²), here Giles tackles the prerogatives of the pope within the ecclesiastical power structure. The principles on which Giles bases his defense of the legitimacy of Celestine's abdication are not without ecclesiological as well as political implications: that is, that every power, including that of the pope, comes from God, but with the cooperation of humans, which in the case of the pope consists of an election by the cardinals and of the consent of the one whom they elect.⁴³ To put it more precisely, the institution of the papacy is willed directly by God, whereas the decision about which individual holds the office is dependent on human cooperation.

Having ascertained this, Giles will also be able to argue that if the individual who occupies the pontifical office should find himself in a situation of harming the common good of the Church (as in the case of being manifestly incapable), then it is necessary that he be able to resign exactly for the purpose of safeguarding that common good.⁴⁴ This affirmation shows that Giles interprets the papacy as an office that has an end that transcends it, this being the good of the institution which it represents.

This understanding nevertheless in no way threatens either the papacy's plenitude of power or its primacy, since the papacy is the office that cannot be judged by anyone, to the point that, according to Giles, the abdication of the pope depends exclusively on his own will; the consent of his electors, the

41 For the historical context, see Ovidio Capitani, "La polemica antibonifaciana," in *Iacopone da Todi. Atti del XXXVII Convegno Storico Internazionale, Todi, 8–11 ottobre 2000* (Spoleto, 2001), 127–142; now in Ovidio Capitani, *Da Dante a Bonifacio VIII* (Rome, 2007), 61–79. See also Berardo Pio, "La propaganda politica nel contenzioso tra Bonifacio VIII e i Colonna," in *La propaganda politica nel Basso Medioevo. Atti del XXXVIII Convegno storico internazionale, Todi 14–17 ottobre 2001* (Spoleto, 2002), 261–313.

42 This is not to say that Giles does not draw a portrait of a "Christian sovereign," since he does not fail to point out the supernatural character of the prince's office (see, for example, Giles of Rome, *De regimine* 1.1. prol., p. 1; but also 1.1.12, 37–39). Still it is undeniable that any connection between kingship and priesthood remains at the margins of this treatise; cf. Roberto Lambertini, "Tra etica e politica: la *prudentia* del principe nel *De regimine* di Egidio Romano," *Documenti e studi* 3 (1992), 77–144.

43 Giles of Rome, *De renuntiatione pape* 5, (ed.) John R. Eastman, (Lewiston, 1992), 168.

44 Giles of Rome, *De renuntiatione* 7, 192–93.

cardinals, however desirable, is not required.⁴⁵ Obviously, just as justly motivated abdications can take place (as is the case with Celestine V, according to Giles), so too could a pope abdicate in order to avoid his weighty responsibilities, which would be an unjust act. Nevertheless, as no human institution has the authority to pronounce on this subject, such an abdication remains valid.⁴⁶

The aim of this work leaves little room for the consideration of the relationship between the power of the pope and the temporal powers. However, in one passage Giles does note that the papacy is the highest among the powers that govern men.⁴⁷

5 The Power of the Pope

As is well known, Giles would soon after devote his attention to the relationship between papal power and temporal powers in his *De ecclesiastica potestate*, a work entirely devoted to this theme. Richard Scholz, in his critical (and still unsurpassed) edition of this text, published in 1929, noted that some parts of this work are in fact characterized by a style uncharacteristic of a “scientific” text of the period, but which rather calls to mind the style of sermons.⁴⁸ Scholz’s intuition was confirmed some twenty years ago by Concetta Luna’s discovery of a sermon—albeit one that is stylistically a bit unusual—by Giles dedicated to the topic of the *potestas papae*.⁴⁹ Having involved himself in a matter which the worsening controversy between Boniface VIII and Philip IV of France had by then made of pressing topicality, the Augustinian theologian composed this sermon (and perhaps others, though only this one has been found) and then later drew material from it in his more extensive *De ecclesiastica potestate*. This, at least, seems to be the most likely reconstruction, since significant textual coincidences demonstrate an undeniable relationship between the sermon and the treatise. And even if the chronological relationship between these two works cannot be determined with absolute certainty, Luna

45 Giles of Rome, *De renuntiatione* 6, 180.

46 Giles of Rome, *De renuntiatione* 6, 181.

47 Giles of Rome, *De renuntiatione* 5, 170.

48 Richard Scholz, “Einleitung”, in Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, (ed.) Richard Scholz (1929; repr. Aalen, 1961), xi.

49 Concetta Luna, “Un nuovo documento del conflitto tra Bonifacio VIII e Filippo il Bello: il discorso ‘De potentia domini pape’,” *Documenti e studi* 3 (1992), 167–243.

and, even more strongly, Jürgen Miethke are inclined to favor a later date for *De ecclesiastica potestate* and its use of material drawn from the earlier *sermo*.⁵⁰

If the fundamental ideas set out and maintained by Giles in *De ecclesiastica potestate* are relatively well known, less attention has been paid to its structure. Yet this latter element, though not systematic, is nonetheless important, as Elmar Krüger has recently stated.⁵¹ The work's first part is concerned with the relationship between the pope's *potestas spiritualis*, which removes him from any human judgement, and his superiority over any form of earthly power. As is well known, Giles's position on this matter pushes him to claim that both powers (to which he refers with the image of the two swords) belong to the pope, even though he only directly wields the spiritual power, and that no legitimate earthly power exists (or indeed has ever existed) that does not recognize its dependency on the spiritual power.⁵² The sole exceptions to this are those instances wherein both spiritual and temporal power have existed in the same person, as in the case, according to Giles, of Melchisedek.

But according to Augustine, in the *De civitate Dei*, kingdoms without justice are great bands of robbers. And although such men are called kings, they are not kings, but thieves and robbers. Kingship not instituted through the priesthood, therefore, either was not kingship, but robbery, or was united with the priesthood. For even before Saul was instituted and appointed as king through Samuel as through a priest of God, Melchisedek was king of Salem. But this Melchisedek, besides being a king was also a priest.⁵³

50 Luna, "Un nuovo documento," 197–99; Miethke, *De potestate*, 96; Karl Ubl, "Johannes Quidorts Weg zur Sozialphilosophie," *Francia* 30 (2003), 43–72. For further remarks of mine on this, see Roberto Lambertini, "Il sermo 'De potestate domini papae' di Egidio Romano e la difesa di Bonifacio VIII: acquisizioni e prospettive della storiografia più recente," in *Le culture di Bonifacio VIII. Atti del Convegno organizzato nell'ambito delle celebrazioni per il VII Centenario della morte, Bologna, 13–15 dicembre 2005* (Rome, 2006), 93–108.

51 Elmar Krüger, *Der Traktat "De ecclesiastica potestate" des Aegidius Romanus. Eine spätmittelalterliche Herrschaftskonzeption des päpstlichen Universalismus* (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna 2006), 35–73. I was unable to consult Robert W. Dyson, *Giles of Rome's On Ecclesiastical Power: A Medieval Theory of World Government* (New York, 2004).

52 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica* 1.8, 31.

53 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica* 1.5, 15: "Sed secundum Augustinum, de Civitate Dei, regna sine iusticia sunt magna latrocinia. Tales autem etsi vocantur reges, non sunt reges, sed fures et latrones. Regnum ergo non per sacerdotium institutum vel non fuit regnum, sed latrocinium, vel fuit sacerdotio coniunctum. Nam et antequam per Samuelem tamquam per sacerdotem Dei institueretur Saul et preficeretur in regem, fuit Mechisedech rex Salem."

The second part of *De ecclesiastica potestate* concerns the possession of temporal goods. After refuting those arguments that deny the legitimacy of the Church possessing such goods, Giles reaches a directly opposite conclusion, according to which the Church not only can, but must exercise power over all *temporalia*.⁵⁴ From this thesis derives the consequence that no legitimate title to *dominium* exists that is not subordinated to the pope.⁵⁵ Particularly significant in this regard is the following metaphor:

[T]he earthly power is indeed a certain kind of instrument and a kind of hammer of the ecclesiastical power; and, although the earthly power has a lordship over temporal affairs, it receives this from the ecclesiastical power, just as the hammer receives the capacity to strike the piece of iron from the blacksmith.⁵⁶

To support this claim, Giles returns in some later chapters of the second part to the relationship between the spiritual and temporal powers, and confirms that the lay powers are subordinate to the priestly power.⁵⁷ Although he has already taken into consideration, in the first two parts of this work, some objections to his thesis, Giles then dedicates the third and final part to a refutation of all those arguments that were often put forward to support positions hostile to his own, in order to conclude with a treatment of the concept of *plenitudo potestatis*. In such a context Giles's responses to the objections that are based on other, earlier modes of understanding the primacy of the pope over Christendom assume particular relevance. A clear instance of this is his reinterpretation of the *Donation of Constantine* in terms of a renunciation, in favor of the Church, of that *ius utile* and *potestativum* that the emperor normally possesses over certain goods, without that renunciation modifying in any way the higher-order *dominium* of the superior position that the Church

Sed huiusmodi Melchisedech cum hoc quod erat rex, erat eciam sacerdos." English translation from Giles of Rome, *On Ecclesiastical Power. The De ecclesiastica potestate of Aegidius Romanus*. Translated with an introduction and notes by R.W. Dyson (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1986), 11.

54 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica* 2.4, 48.

55 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica* 2.7, 73.

56 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica* 3.4, 163; "potestas quidem terrena est quasi quoddam organum et quidam martellus potestatis ecclesiastice, et quod potestas terrena habeat dominium super temporalia, hoc habet a potestate ecclesiastica, sicut martellus quod attingit ferrum, hoc habet a fabro." (Trans. Dyson), 159.

57 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica* 2.9, p. 85.

possesses anyway.⁵⁸ Another instance is the reinterpretation of Innocent III's statements concerning the ability of the pope to intervene in temporal matters *ratione peccati*.⁵⁹ Those positions, in fact, although traditional and authoritative, were already potentially incompatible with Giles's theories, according to which—as has been seen—the pope has both a dominion over all *temporalia* and full ability to intervene in the political sphere, which falls under his competence without any mediation. In his substantial monograph, Elmar Krüger has analyzed in a detailed fashion the strategies employed by Giles to support his position, demonstrating, for example, the not coincidental use of the opposition between ecclesiastical *potestas* and secular *potencia* in order to suggest—even at the level of linguistic choice—the deficit of legitimacy inherent in the latter term.⁶⁰

Miethke has stressed the modest manuscript diffusion of this Aegidian treatise compared to other, contemporary works devoted to the same problems.⁶¹ The immediate reception of this work, however, is important. Some time ago it was suggested that the *De ecclesiastica potestate* was used in the drafting of the bull *Unam sanctam*. A few years ago I believed I was able to recognize in a passage of John of Paris a polemical reference to Giles's work; concerning this question, however, Karl Ubl has since argued persuasively that this passage can better be explained as a polemic against the positions assumed at Paris by James of Viterbo. With the elimination of this reference point, the relative chronology of the *De ecclesiastica potestate* and the *De potestate regia et papali* might also be reversed.⁶² The recent critical edition of James of Viterbo's *De*

58 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica* 2.11, 205.

59 Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica*, 3.4, 162–63.

60 Krüger, *Der Traktat*, 137–45. In this regard, Krüger quite rightly borrows from studies on the “language of politics,” even if his use of the scholarship in this field is quite limited.

61 Miethke, *De potestate*, 104.

62 Roberto Lambertini, “Da Egidio Romano a Giovanni di Parigi, da Dante a Marsilio: fautori e oppositori della teocrazia papale agli inizi del Trecento,” in *Il pensiero politico. Idee, teorie, dottrine*, 1, *Età antica e Medioevo*, (ed.) Carlo Dolcini (Turin, 1999), 216; Karl Ubl and Lars Vinx, “Kirche, Arbeit und Eigentum bei Johannes Quidort von Paris O.P. (†1306),” in *Text-Schrift-Codex. Quellenkundliche Arbeiten aus dem Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, (eds.) Christoph Egger and Herwig Weigl (Vienna-Munich, 2000), 304–44; Karl Ubl, “Die Genese der Bulle Unam Sanctam: Anlass, Vorlagen, Intention,” in *Politische Reflexion in der Welt des späten Mittelalters. Political Thought in the Age of Scholasticism. Essays in Honour of Jürgen Miethke*, (ed.) Martin Kaufhold (Leiden, 2004), 129–49; for a dissenting view, see Hans-Georg Walther, “Aegidius Romanus und Jakob von Viterbo-oder: Was vermag Aristoteles, was Augustinus nicht kann?” in *Politische Reflexion in der Welt des späten Mittelalters. Political Thought in the Age of Scholasticism. Essays in Honour of Jürgen Miethke*, (ed.) Martin Kaufhold (Leiden, 2004) 151–69.

regimine christiano confirms instead that Giles's successor to the "Augustinian chair" at Paris knew very early on and utilized the *De ecclesiastica potestate* with the aim, probably, of reiterating unconditional support for Boniface VIII, while toning down some of the arguably extreme statements of his confrère.⁶³

6 The Origins of Power

We are indebted to Concetta Luna for the many years of research on Giles of Rome's *Commentary on the Sentences* that led to the publication in 2003 of an edition of the *Reportatio* of his *Lectura*.⁶⁴ In this context, it was possible to further clarify the relationship between the text derived from the course on the *Sentences* given at the start of the 1270s and the commentaries that made their way into early print, establishing that the commentaries on books 1 and 2 of the *Sentences* were reworkings by Giles himself, known technically as *Ordinationes*, whereas the commentary on the third book, published in Rome in 1623, is not authentic.⁶⁵ Furthermore, if the *Ordinatio* of the commentary on book 1 was redacted immediately after the course, and therefore as early as the first half of the 1270s, the *Ordinatio* of book 2 was not completed before 1309, and reflects therefore a long delay, during which it was possible to reflect and study in greater depth.

This information is important for the political thought of Giles, especially since Graham McAleer has identified precisely in *Ordinatio* II some questions pertinent to the problem of the origin of power among men.⁶⁶ In the *Reportatio* on the same book these texts do not appear. It thus follows that Giles's treatments of these subjects are typical of *Ordinatio* II and can be traced to a more advanced phase of his thought, datable between 1290 at the earliest and—as has been said—1309 at the latest. In the questions that concern the conditions, modalities, and consequences of original sin, Giles identifies the sin of the Progenitors as a desire to possess the *scientia dominandi* (as he interprets the *scientia boni et mali*) and the power necessary to assert one's knowledge. As

63 On this work of James of Viterbo, consult Miethke, *De potestate*, 102–05; for a recent critical edition, see James of Viterbo, *"De regimine Christiano": A Critical Edition and Translation*, (ed.) Robert W. Dyson (Leiden, 2009).

64 Giles of Rome, *Reportatio Lecturae super libros I–IV Sententiarum. Reportatio Monacensis. Excerpta Godefridi de Fontibus, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia* 3.2, (ed.) Concetta Luna (Florence, 2003).

65 Luna "Introduzione," in *Reportatio*, 75–139.

66 Graham McAleer, "Giles of Rome on Political Authority," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999), 21–36.

an effect of sin, those who desired to have the same power as God instead had to suffer the rebellion of what in the state of innocence had been subject to them, thus losing the *dominium* that they had over the earth, over their bodies, and over the other animals.⁶⁷ With the Fall, therefore, the relations of power underwent a profound transformation.

Giles returns to this theme in distinction 44, which already was and continues to be a prime locus for reflecting on power.⁶⁸ Asking if in the state of innocence ties of subordination would have existed among men, theologians wondered about a kind of “double-face” of power: one corresponding to the plan of God over humankind and the other functioning in a world now marked by rebellion. Taking up again the distinction between the modality of “government” within the family/household introduced by Aristotle in the first book of the *Politics*,⁶⁹ Giles maintains that even in the state of innocence the husband had power over his wife and the father ruled his children; between adult men, however—although a function of direction of the more gifted over the less gifted is also admissible in the state of innocence—there was no relationship comparable to the *regimen despoticum* which exists between the slave and master, since this type of *regimen* was limited to the relationship between human beings and beings deprived of reason. Servitude (*servitus*) thus entered the world only with the Fall. This means, according to the Giles, that before sin authority over other men had been limited to a function of guidance (*directio*); the coercive component in relationships between men is therefore a characteristic of corrupted nature, not of nature unimpaired.⁷⁰

In his contribution, McAleer insists on the significant Augustinian component in Giles’s conception, which would contradict the idea that the adoption of Aristotelian models of political thought had practically obliterated the inheritance of Augustine.⁷¹ Some of McAleer’s observations are spot

67 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.22.1.3 (Venice 1581; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1968), 2:209.

68 Gianluca Briguglia, “*Si stetissent primi parentes*. Elementi di un modello politico tra filosofia ed esegesi,” *AHDLMA* 73 (2006), 43–62; see also Roberto Lambertini, “Nature and the Origins of Power: An examination of Selected Commentaries on the *Sentences* (Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries),” in *La nature comme source de la morale au Moyen Âge*, (ed.) Maaïke van der Lugt (Florence, 2014), 95–111.

69 Nicolai Rubinstein, “The History of the Word *Politicus* in Early-Modern Europe,” in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, (ed.) Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, 1987), 41–56; James M. Blythe, “Family, Government, and the Medieval Aristotelians,” *History of Political Thought* 10 (1989), 1–16.

70 Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio* 2.44.1.3, 2:685.

71 McAleer, “Giles of Rome,” 24.

on, and besides it is well known that in many ways Giles progressively aligned himself more closely with Augustine as the years went by.⁷² It should also be recognized, however, that in this period the proximity and divergence among authors cannot be reduced to a contrast between Augustinianism and Aristotelianism, but are, rather, far more complex, while the elements of contrast can be numerous. In particular, the connection between natural superiority and the exercise of power may constitute an important element: with all the necessary qualifications, Giles is among those authors for whom even in the state of innocence there existed natural differentiations among men which would have made some individuals suited to command, even though this command was not exercised in terms of coercion.

7 The Templars and the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy

Giles composed the *Contra exemptos* in the context of the Council of Vienne and particularly in connection with the question of the Templars, to which he had already contributed in 1308,⁷³ some months after their arrest *en masse* in France, demonstrating his absolute opposition to their cause.⁷⁴ In this treatise, the Templars' deviation from orthodoxy and good customs (which Giles considers proven) is treated as one of the grave consequences that can result from the institution of exemption, which frees religious orders from episcopal control, thus making them directly subordinate to the pope alone.⁷⁵ Against this practice, Giles deploys a conception of the Church that insists upon the observance of the various levels of the hierarchical order. This, according to Giles, is the only way whereby the ecclesiastical hierarchy would be able to conform to the order of nature, which from macrocosm to microcosm is essentially hierarchical, as is, obviously, the celestial order, here conceived according

72 Giorgio Pini, "Le letture dei maestri dei frati agostiniani: Egidio Romano e Giacomo da Viterbo," in *Libri, biblioteche e letture dei frati mendicanti (secoli XIII–XIV). Atti del XXXI Convegno Internazionale. Assisi, 7–9 ottobre 2004* (Spoleto, 2005), 79–114. From a doctrinal point of view, some aspects of Giles's "Augustinian" inheritance are thoroughly discussed in Peter S. Eardley, "The Foundations of Freedom in Later Medieval Philosophy: Giles of Rome and his Contemporaries," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 44 (2006), 353–76.

73 Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati, and Concetta Luna, "Egidio Romano," in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 42 (Rome, 1993), 325–26.

74 For a detailed and reliable overview, see Malcolm Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2006).

75 Giles of Rome, *Contra Exemptos* 21–22 (Rome, 1555), 16a–17b.

to the model of the pseudo-Dionysius.⁷⁶ Attacking so radically the granting of the exemption (something which his own Order benefited from⁷⁷), Giles could not avoid raising the issue of papal power, the very authority from whom these privileges of exemption emanated. Faced with this difficulty, Giles compares these papal initiatives to divine miracles, which suspend the natural order.⁷⁸ That is, he does not deny that the pope has the ability to grant the exemption, but rather he explicitly compares the pontiff's role to that of God, who as author of nature and its laws has nonetheless the power not to obey the laws that he himself has established. In this way, Giles restates his conception of the pope as sovereign,⁷⁹ even if he does so in a work that insistently demands the drastic limitation of the exemption and that doubtless was not politically welcome to the pope at that time.⁸⁰

8 Conclusion

Giles of Rome died in 1316. Taking into consideration his considerable production in the fields of political thought and ecclesiology (which to his mind are closely related, as we have seen), it is difficult to say whether *an* Aegidian political theory exists, even though several ideas reappear in diverse works. The value of his writings, however, remains indisputable, both as testimony of the political debates of his own time and for the influence exerted by several of them, especially the *De regimine principum*.

76 Giles of Rome, *Contra Exemptos* 17–18, 12b–14b. For the debate over exemption, see also the recent study of the author of a polemic responding to Giles's treatise: William C. Jordan, *Unceasing Strife, Unending Fear, Jacques de Thérines and the Freedom of the Church in the Age of the Last Capetians* (Princeton, 2005); for the critique of Giles, see 43–51.

77 Giles tried to explain why exemption, which was so damaging to the rest of the Church, was nonetheless useful for the mendicant orders (*Contra Exemptos* 1, 1b); it should also be recalled that in the earlier clashes between the secular clergy and the mendicant orders, Giles was not always in agreement with the positions taken by other mendicant orders: see, Del Punta, Donati, and Luna, "Egidio Romano," 322.

78 Giles of Rome, *Contra Exemptos* 1, 1b.

79 On this subject, see Eckhard Homann, "Totum posse, quod est in ecclesia, reservatur in summo pontifice," *Studien zur politischen Theorie bei Aegidius Romanus* (Würzburg, 2004), 79–114, although Homann does not discuss the treatise *Contra exemptos*.

80 Cf. the interpretation of Miethke, *De potestate*, 127–30, of the success of the French monarchy's pressure to bring about the condemnation of the Templars at this same council, despite the papacy's reluctance to carry this out.

Chronology of the Works of Giles of Rome

c. 1270–75	<i>Errores philosophorum</i>
Before 1271	<i>Super librum I Sententiarum</i> (reportatio); <i>Super librum II Sententiarum</i> (reportatio); <i>Super librum III Sententiarum</i> (reportatio); <i>Super librum IV Sententiarum</i> (reportatio)
c. 1269–72/3	<i>Quaestiones metaphysicales</i> (reportatio)
c. 1271–73	<i>Super librum I Sententiarum</i> (ordinatio)
c. 1271–74	<i>Super libros Rhetoricorum</i> (probably 1272/3)
c. 1274	<i>Super De generatione et corruptione</i> ; <i>Quaestiones super librum I De generatione et corruptione</i> ; <i>Theoremata de Corpore Christi</i>
c. 1274–75	<i>Super libros Elenchorum</i> ; <i>Super Physicam</i>
1275–77	<i>De plurificatione intellectus possibilis</i>
c. 1271–78	<i>Super De bona fortuna</i> (probably not before 1275)
c. 1276	<i>Super De anima</i>
1277	<i>Apologia</i>
1270–77	<i>De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae</i> ; <i>De partibus philosophiae essentialibus</i> ; <i>Quaestio de medio demonstrationis</i> ; <i>De plurificatione intellectus possibilis</i> ; <i>Quaestiones de resurrectione mortuorum</i> ; <i>De peccato originali</i>
1277–78	<i>Contra gradus et pluralitatem formarum</i> ; <i>De gradibus formarum in ordine Christi opera</i> ; <i>De gradibus formarum accidentalium</i> . And perhaps <i>Super Cantica canticorum</i> ; <i>De intentionibus in medio</i>
c. 1280	<i>De regimine principum</i>
1281	<i>Quaestiones disputatae in capitulo generali Paduae</i>
1278–85	<i>Theoremata de esse et essentia</i>
1286	<i>Oratio in die coronationis Philippi regis</i>
c. 1286–87	<i>Quaestiones de esse et essentia</i>
c. 1286–88	<i>De materia caeli contra Averroistas</i>
c. 1287–88	<i>Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum</i>
c. 1288–89	<i>Quaestiones de mensura angelorum</i>
c. 1287–90	<i>Quaestiones de compositione angelorum</i>
1286–91	<i>Quodlibeta I–VI</i>
c. 1289–91	<i>Super De causis</i>
1288/9–1295	<i>Quaestiones de motu angelorum</i> ; <i>Super Posteriora Analytica</i> ; <i>De formatione corporis humani in utero</i> ; <i>Quaestio de subiecto theologiae</i> ; <i>Tractatus de subiecto theologiae</i>

c. 1287–90	<i>De praedestinatione et praescientia, paradiso et inferno</i>
1297 (after May–June)	<i>De renuntatione papae</i>
1297–99	<i>Contra expositionem Petri Joannis de Narbonna super Apocalypsim ex mandato Bonifacii; Isagoge, sive introductio in fidei ad regem Armenie; Capitula fidei christianae ad Tartarum maiorem</i>
1301–02	<i>Sermo de potentia domini papae; De ecclesiastica potestate</i>
Before 1303	<i>Hexaemeron</i>
1309 (or after)	<i>Super librum II Sententiarum (ordinatio)</i>
1311	<i>Contra exemptos</i>

Editions of Giles of Rome's Works

The following bibliography limits itself to those works of Giles of Rome about whose authenticity there is general scholarly consensus. Incunabula and early printed editions are cited by place and date of publication (followed by the place and date of modern reprints). Where a modern critical edition is available, this is cited first. Published modern translations are also cited; where there is more than one modern translation, only the best version is cited. In the case of *De regimine principum*, this bibliography only cites editions of the complete original Latin text.

I Philosophical Works

I.1 *Philosophical Commentaries*

Super libros Priorum analyticorum: Venice 1499; Venice 1500; Venice 1502; Venice 1504; Venice 1516, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968; Venice 1522; Venice 1598.

Super libros Posteriorum analyticorum: Padua 1478; Venice 1488; Venice 1496, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1967; Venice 1500; Venice 1513; Venice 1520; Venice 1530.

Super libros Elenchorum: Venice 1496, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1967; Venice 1499; Venice 1500; Venice 1530.

Super libros Rhetoricorum: Venice 1515, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968.

Super De anima: Pavia 1491; Venice 1496; Venice 1500 repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968.

In libros De generatione et corruptione: Naples c. 1476?; Padua 1480; Venice 1493; Venice 1500; Venice 1504; Venice 1505, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1970; Paris 1515?; Venice 1520; Venice 1567.

Super Physicam: Padua 1493; Venice 1501; Venice Sept. 1502, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968; Venice Oct. 1502.

Quaestiones metaphysicales: Venice 1499; Venice 1501, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1966; Venice 1552.

Super De bona fortuna: Venice 1496; Venice 1525; Venice 1551.

Super De causis: Venice 1550, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968.

1.2 *Philosophical Quaestiones*

Quaestiones super librum I De generatione: Venice 1504; Venice 1505, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1970; Venice 1518; Venice 1520; Venice 1567.

Quaestio quid sit medium in demonstratione: (ed.) Jan Pinborg, "Diskussionen um die Wissenschaftstheorie an der Artistenfakultät," in *Die Auseinandersetzungen an der Pariser Universität im XIII. Jahrhundert*, (ed.) A. Zimmermann (Berlin, 1976), 240–68, 254–68.

Quaestiones de esse et essentia: Venice 1493; Venice 1503, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968; Venice 1504; Venice 1507.

Quaestio de deceptione: (ed.) Gerardo Bruni, in *Analecta Augustiniana* 17 (1939/40), 229–45.

1.3 *Philosophical Treatises*

De formatione corporis humani in utero: (ed.) Romana Martorelli Vico, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia II, 13 (Florence, 2008). Paris 1515; Venice 1523; Arimini 1626.

De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae: (ed.) Gerardo Bruni, in *New Scholasticism* 6 (1932), 1–18, 5–12. Naples 1525.

Theoremata de esse et essentia: (ed.) Edgar Hocedez (Louvain, 1930). Leipzig 1493; Bologna 1522. English trans. Michael V. Murray (Milwaukee, 1952).

De materia caeli contra Averroistas: Padua 1493; Venice 1500, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968; Venice 1502.

De plurificatione intellectus possibilis: (ed.) Helda Bullotta Barracco (Rome, 1957). Padua 1493; Venice 1500, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968.

Contra gradus et pluralitatem formarum: Venice 1500, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968.

De gradibus formarum in ordine ad Christi opera: (ed.) Vincenzo Cilento, *La forma aristotelica in una "quaestio" medievale* (Naples, 1961), 105–14. Naples 1525.

De intentionibus in medio: Naples 1525.

De partibus philosophiae essentialibus: Leipzig c. 1490.

Errores philosophorum: (ed.) Josef Koch, English trans. John O. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1944). Vienna 1482; Venice 1581.

II Theological Works

II.1 *Biblical Commentaries*

Super epistolam ad Romanos: Rome 1555.

Super Cantica canticorum: Rome 1555. English trans. John E. Rotelle (Villanova, Pa., 1998).

II.2 *Sentences Commentaries*

Super librum I Sententiarum (Ordinatio): Venice 1492; Venice 1521, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968; Cordoba 1699.

Super librum II Sententiarum (Ordinatio): Venice 1482; Venice 1581, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1968; Cordoba 1706.

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